AMB CRUMPTON MEETINGS WITH CRISIS MGMT CHIEF NODA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 006295

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2016
TAGS: PTER PINR PREL JA AU
SUBJECT: AMB CRUMPTON MEETINGS WITH CRISIS MGMT CHIEF NODA
AND VFM YACHI

Classified By: AMBASSADOR J. THOMAS SCHIEFFER. REASONS 1.4 (B),(D).


1. (C) Summary. Japan is making progress on the 16 items of
its 2004 Counterterrorism Action Plan, Deputy Chief Cabinet
Secretary for Crisis Management Noda told Ambassador Henry

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Crumpton and his Australian counterpart October 24. Noda
believed gaps in Japan's laws were partly a result of
tensions between the American and European elements of the
legal system. The government needs to educate the public on
the need for new provisions, such as wiretaps. He viewed
Japanese ultra-rightists and foreign groups as the greatest
potential domestic terrorist threat, while North Korea posed
a potential external threat. In a separate meeting, Vice
Foreign Minister Yachi underscored Prime Minister Abe's keen
interest in counterterrorism. Yachi also stressed said it
was too early to include India in a "quadrilateral" and
expressed concern about the vulnerability to terrorists of
Japan's transportation system. End summary.

Crisis Management Chief Noda
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2. (C) Ambassador Henry Crumpton, together with his
Australian counterpart, Ambassador Michael Smith, discussed
trilateral counterterrorism cooperation during October 24
courtesy calls on Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis
Management Takeshi Noda and Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro
Yachi. Noda affirmed the importance of coordinating closely
with the United States and Australia on counterterrorism
issues. Referring to Japan's 2004 Action Plan for Prevention
of Terrorism, Noda told Ambassador Crumpton that Japan had
already made headway on many of the 16 action items, but not
all of them. For example, the goal of fully implementing
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations would
require the passage of new legislation before it could be
achieved.


3. (C) Having served at the Japanese Embassy in Rome in the
1980s, during a period when over 200 people died in that
country from terrorism-related causes, Noda said he
recognized a certain tension between the American and
European elements of the Japanese legal system for dealing
with terrorism. In Japan's post-war legal system, the rules
governing investigations and arrests, and the differing
functions of prosecutors and investigators, make it difficult
to perform terrorism investigations. For example, in Italy,
he said, hotels provide information on all foreigners staying
overnight, but this sort of system does not exist in Japan.
The government is pushing public health authorities to
require hotels to record the passport numbers of all
foreigners based on possible health contingencies, such as
SARS.


4. (C) Japanese law does not allow for wiretaps either, Noda
observed. In part, this situation reflects a lack of
understanding by the Japanese public, he said, adding that
the government needs to do a better job of educating its
citizens if Japan is to make greater strides in
counterterrorism. He hoped MOFA's Ambassador in Charge of
Counterterrorism, Akio Suda, would travel extensively to
other countries to gain insights to share with Japan. He
noted that Japan was already working with Thailand, the
Philippines, and other ASEAN countries to help improve
passport control and security. He expressed an eagerness to
learn additional ways that Japan could contribute to
counterterrorism efforts.


5. (C) Domestically, Japan's greatest terrorist threats were
ultra-right wing nationalist groups and certain foreign
groups, Noda told Ambassador Crumpton. He thought the threat
from religious groups, such Aleph (formerly known as Aum
Shinrikyo),had diminished greatly. Internationally, Noda
worried most about the DPRK, which he described as
unpredictable. He did not consider Islamic fundamentalists a
significant threat to Japan, given the fact the Japan was not
a Christian nation, or even particularly religious, but
recognized that Japan, as an advanced industrialized Western,

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still faced an indirect threat.


6. (C) Noda briefed Ambassador Crumpton on his role as Deputy
Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management, laying out his
responsibility for dealing with incidents as diverse as
natural disasters and transportation accidents. Formerly,
the prefectures had played the lead role in crisis
management, he said, but the Hanshin earthquake and sarin gas
attacks of the mid-1990s had convinced the national
government of the need to play a more central role in
coordination. He described national crisis management
efforts in Japan as multi-agency, in principle, but admitted
that there were sometimes coordination problems. Ambassador
Crumpton highlighted the importance of integrating domestic
and external concerns, as exemplified by the multi-agency
nature of the U.S. delegation to the counterterrorism
trilateral.


7. (C) Ambassador Crumpton thanked Noda for Japan's
assistance with counterterrorism efforts in the Philippines
and elsewhere, and encouraged Japan to invest further in
external intelligence gathering. Noda agreed on the
importance of intelligence in the fight against terrorism,
and recognized the need for Japan to develop greater
capacity. Ambassador Crumpton also encouraged Japan to use
its economic power and the rule of law in other countries to
help prevent the development of safe havens for terrorists.
Once the terrorists were pushed out of those countries,
Ambassador Crumpton noted, Japan could assist with developing
the sort of infrastructure that would prevent their return.
On Afghanistan, Ambassador Crumpton noted difficulties in
Japan completing its portion of the Kandahar Ring Road, and
reminded Noda of the vital importance of that project to the
security situation in Afghanistan.


8. (C) Noda expressed his appreciation for U.S. participation
in the Immigration Advisory Program. While there had
initially been problems in establishing jurisdiction for U.S.
agents working at the airport, he thought it was very
important to have them there in an advisory role. He hoped
also that by the end of the year Japan would be able to make
it mandatory for airlines to provide passenger lists after
takeoff, a system that has been voluntary until now.

Vice Foreign Minister Yachi
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9. (C) Meeting with Ambassador Crumpton later that same day,
Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi said he had heard from
Australian Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade Michael
L'Estrange that there was interest in expanding the
counterterrorism trilateral framework to include India.
Yachi thought that might be possible in the future, but not
yet. For one thing, he noted, India's counterterrorism
concerns tended to center on Pakistan, while the current
trilateral grouping focused on Southeast Asia. Adding India
to the mix might confuse and change the nature of the
dialogue, he said.


10. (C) Yachi echoed the earlier comments of Noda regarding
the capacity of North Korea to conduct terrorist activities,
noting his particular concern over nuclear terrorism. His
other major worry was the vulnerability of Japan's
transportation system. For example, the absence of security
checks on the bullet train meant there was no visible
deterrent to potential bombers, although Japan Rail
management was confident that there were sufficient monitors
in place to prevent an attack. He ended the meeting by
noting that new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has a keen interest
in counterterrorism issues and would continue to cooperate
with the United States and Australia in providing the strong
leadership that was critical to success.


11. (U) S/CT has cleared this message.
SCHIEFFER