JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER VISITS KAZAKHSTAN AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 005028

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2016
TAGS: ECON ENRG PARM PHUM PREL ZK KZ UZ JA
SUBJECT: JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER VISITS KAZAKHSTAN AND
UZBEKISTAN, PROMOTES ENERGY COOPERATION

REF: TOKYO 4661

Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor Carol Reynolds for r
easons 1.4(b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: During an August 28-29 visit to Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan, Prime Minister Koizumi focused primarily on
promoting cooperation in developing energy resources,
particularly uranium, according to MOFA Central Asia and
Caucasus Division Deputy Director Uyama. Koizumi urged
Uzbekistan President Karimov to step up efforts to promote
democratization, protect human rights and achieve a
market-based economy. He also announced that Japan will
provide $2.8 million in education grants to permit 2,000
students from the Central Asian states to study in Japan.
Both Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev and Uzbekistan's Karimov
reaffirmed their support for Japan's effort to obtain a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Despite press
speculation that one purpose of the visit was to compete for
influence with Russia and China, one informed local observer
believes Central Asia remains a relatively low priority for
Japan, and that Tokyo has no intention of outwardly competing
with either Russia or China. END SUMMARY.

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URANIUM DEAL, GOOD RELATIONS WITH KAZAKHSTAN
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2. (C) Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's August 28 visit
to Kazakhstan and August 29 stop in Uzbekistan comprised the
first visit ever by a Japanese Prime Minister to Central
Asia, MOFA Central Asia and Caucasus Division Deputy Director
Hideki Uyama told Embassy Tokyo Political Officer on
September 1 .Koizumi's delegation consisted of approximately
70 officials and 40-50 members of the press. During a August
28 meeting at the Presidential Palace in Astana, Kazakh
President Nazarbayev hailed the visit as "historic," and
Koizumi said it signified Japan's desire to actively develop
ties to Central Asia, and to Kazakhstan in particular. He
praised Kazakhstan's economic development and confirmed that
Japan would continue to assist with its democratization and
its development of a market economy.


3. (C) Both leaders emphasized their desire to enhance the
level of strategic cooperation in the field of energy
resources, particularly uranium mines, Uyama reported. (NOTE:
Kazakhstan is said to be the world's third leading producer
of uranium. Japanese firms Sumitomo Corp. and Kansai
Electric Power Company have previously announced they would
jointly develop a uranium mine with Kazakhstan's state-owned
mining company to assure supplies for Japan's nuclear power
plants, estimated to require approximately 8,000 tons a
year.) During the visit, the Japanese Ambassador and the
Kazakh Minister of Energy Resources signed a memorandum for
coordination in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear power.
Under the agreement, Kazakhstan officials and Japanese
private sector representatives will "promote dialogue"
regarding the joint development of uranium mines and uranium
processing. The Japanese will, in turn, provide assistance
to improve Kazakhstan's capabilities in the fields of nuclear
nonproliferation, nuclear materials safeguards, and the
protection and control of nuclear materials. As Kazakh
capabilities in these fields improve to meet Japanese
expectations, the two countries will then begin to negotiate
a bilateral agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
which will allow Japanese firms to participate in the
development of nuclear energy in Kazakhstan.


4. (C) The development of other energy resources, such as
oil and natural gas, was discussed only in general terms,
Uyama reported. Nazarbayev expressed an interest in
increased Japanese investments in sectors other than energy,
including chemical manufacturing, metal processing, and
electronics. Responding in part to Nazarbayev's desire to
increase the number of Kazakh students studying in Japan,
Koizumi announced that over the next three years Japan will

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provide $2.8 million in education grants to permit 2,000
students from Central Asian states to study in Japan. He
also pledged that Japan try to make it easier for more Kazakh
students to study in Japan on an individual basis.


5. (C) With regard to the DPRK, Uyama said that Nazarbayev
shared Koizumi's concerns about missile launches, nuclear
weapons development, and "humanitarian issues," i.e.,
abductions, and agreed to establish a framework for
MOFA-level consultations on the situation in Asia, including
the DPRK. Finally, Nazarbayev reaffirmed Kazakhstan's
support of Japan's quest to gain a permanent seat on the UN
Security Council.

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VISIT TO TASHKENT A BIT BUMPIER
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6. (C) According to Uyama, Koizumi's visit to Tashkent was
more contentious then his stop in Astana He was received by
President Karimov on August 29, meeting privately with
Karimov before joining a larger meeting with other delegation
members. Karimov (like Nazarbayev) initially hailed
Koizumi's visit as an historic moment in Uzbek-Japanese
relations and thanked him for Japan's generous ODA. He said
he hoped for increased levels of Japanese investment in his
country. Koizumi congratulated Karimov on the occasion of
Uzbekistan's 15th anniversary of independence and underlined
Japan's continued commitment to developing relations with the
Central Asia states.


7. (C) Uyama said that Koizumi "carefully" raised the
subject of human rights, telling Karimov that improvements in
Uzbekistan's record vis-a-vis human rights, democratization,
and market economy development would bring increased
stability, and that Japan was ready to support Uzbekistan's
efforts in these fields. Using an argument that Japan also
uses with Iranians, Koizumi said that the Uzbeks should learn
from Japan's history of what can happen to a country that
isolates itself from the international community. In the
1930's, Japan ignored international concerns, confronted the
United States, and suffered a terrible defeat in war. Since
the war, Japan has emphasized close cooperation and
friendship with the United States, and this remains the basis
of Japan's prosperity today. Karimov agreed that this was an
important lesson and that Uzbekistan would continue its
efforts to improve in these fields.


8. (C) In a later conversation over dinner, heard by only a
very few people, Karimov told Koizumi that he suspected the
United States was "involved" in the Andijan incident, Uyama
confided. Koizumi stressed to Karimov that good relations
with the United States were in Uzbekistan's strong national
interest. Karimov replied that he believes U.S.-Uzbek
relations will eventually improve. (NOTE: Uyama requested
this exchange be strictly protected.)


9. (C) Both leaders expressed a readiness for closer
cooperation in the energy field, particularly with regard to
uranium, Uyama said. A number of Japanese companies are
potentially interested in exploring possibilities in this
field, he explained, but the Uzbeks have generally been
unresponsive to their inquiries. During this visit, however,
it was the Uzbeks who expressed strong interest in developing
joint ventures, and the two sides agreed to begin information
exchanges between the Uzbek government and Japanese
companies. The next step will be for the Japanese Natural
Resources Agency to contact its Uzbek counterpart. Uyama
said that Uzbekistan, which holds the world's tenth largest
uranium reserves, is well behind Kazakhstan in developing
this resource and wants to become more competitive. Koizumi
repeated the announcement he made in Kazakhstan regarding
educational grants to Central Asian students.


10. (C) Concerning the DPRK, Karimov was silent and did not
respond when Koizumi explained to him Japan's concerns about

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that country's development of missile and nuclear weapons
technology, as well as Japan's "humanitarian concerns."
Karimov did, however, reaffirm Uzbekistan's commitment to
support Japan's efforts to obtain a permanent seat on the
Security Council.


11. (C) Uyama said that Japan deliberately resisted issuing
any type of signed documents during the Uzbekistan visit (as
it had in Kazakhstan),a move that did not please the Uzbeks.
The Uzbeks then insisted upon a joint press statement, but
refused to include language important to the Japanese
concerning human rights, democratization, and the DPRK. The
Japanese refused to issue a joint press statement if it did
not contain reference to these subjects and the Uzbeks only
agreed to include the topics at the last minute, just hours
before Koizumi's arrival. As it was, the references to human
rights and democratization were watered down, referring to
these concepts in general terms, rather than
Uzbekistan-specific. On the subject of the DPRK, the Uzbeks
initially refused to include it, using the excuse that there
are over 200,000 "Koreans" in Uzbekistan and that the DPRK
maintains an embassy in Tashkent. The Japanese held firm for
mention of the DPRK in any joint press statement, but
eventually agreed to accept "humanitarian concerns" in place
of their preferred word "abductions." Uyama said the
negotiations were very tough.

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AN OBSERVER COMMENTS
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12. (C) In a separate September 1 discussion, Takeshi Yuasa,
a Senior Research Fellow at the National Institute for
Defense Studies who specializes in Central Asia, told us the
overall significance of Koizumi's trip is likely to be
minimal. He believes that despite recent attempts to enhance
relations, Central Asia remains a relatively low diplomatic
priority for Tokyo. Notably, Koizumi's trip focused purely
on bilateral relations and was not intended to directly
advance the "Central Asia plus Japan" initiative, Yuasa
claimed, despite statements to the contrary. Nor, advised
Yuasa, was it intended to provoke or compete with Russia or
China, as was speculated by some Japanese media outlets. He
pointed out that there is no way Japan can realistically hope
to compete in Central Asia with Russia, still a formidable
power which until recently exercised sovereignty over the
area, or China, a superpower to the east. In fact, Tokyo
should be flattered if these countries consider Japan a
threat to their interests in the region, he opined. Yuasa
added that Japan realizes that if it is to successfully
exploit the resources of Central Asia, it would behoove it to
maintain good relations with both China and Russia. He
labeled Japanese hopes to develop a southern resource
transportation route through Afghanistan and Pakistan as
premature, particularly as he is unaware of any Japanese
efforts to coordinate such plans with U.S. policies and
priorities in those countries.


13. (C) With regard to the advancement of human rights and
democracy in Uzbekistan, Yuasa was also skeptical. He opined
that Karimov would have expected Koizumi to raise human
rights and that Koizumi would have done so in a pro forma
manner. He believes that Japan is concerned above all else
with maintaining stability in the region, and fears that if
Karimov's government was to be precipitously forced from
office, instability could spread beyond Uzbekistan's borders.

DONOVAN