JAPAN TO SUPPORT SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN UNDER

S E C R E T TOKYO 003518

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP KNUC IAEA JA IR
SUBJECT: JAPAN TO SUPPORT SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN UNDER
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION

REF: A. TOKYO 3201

B. TOKYO 1884

C. TOKYO 2473

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4(b),(c) a
nd (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso during a
June 22 interview with Reuters stated that Japan would take
part if the international community imposed sanctions on Iran
over its nuclear program. The report also noted that Aso had
urged his Iranian counterpart to seriously consider the
current package of incentives offered by the EU-3, Russia,
China and the U.S. In follow up discussions with ESToff,
MOFA desk officers confirmed the accuracy of the report and
emphasized Japan's preference for Chapter VII sanctions based
on a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution.
Aso's comments also track with comments made in early May by
Deputy Foreign Minister Nishida to DCM and in early April by
MOFA Arms Control, Science and Non-Proliferation Bureau desk
officers. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) ESToff contacted MOFA Second Middle East Affairs
Division desk officer Kamada on June 23 to discuss comments
concerning Iran by Foreign Minister Aso in a June 22
interview with Reuters. Kamada confirmed reports that Japan
would support Chapter VII sanctions against Iran as long as
the sanctions are based on a UNSC resolution. Japan has not
yet decided whether it would support sanctions imposed by
"like-minded countries" in the absence of UNSC action,
according to Kamada. MOFA Deputy Director for
Non-Proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Kenji Enoshita
also confirmed the reporting, but told ESToff that, to the
best of his knowledge, no formal decision had been made about
possible sanctions menus.


3. (C) In an April 6 meeting, MOFA Non-Proliferation,
Science and Nuclear Energy Division Officer Teppei Kanda told
ESToff that Tokyo was preparing for the possibility of some
sort of sanctions being applied to Iran in the event it
failed to comply with a UNSC Presidential Statement (reftel
B). Pressed further on the types of sanctions the Japan
envisioned in that event, Kanda said that internal Japanese
discussions had yet to identify a concrete sanctions menu.
At the time, Kanda acknowledged that sanctions targeting
Iran's financial and petroleum sectors would have the most
impact; he also pointed out that they would cause the most
economic pain to Japan.


4. (C) On May 8, DCM urged Deputy Foreign Minister Nishida
to support Chapter VII sanctions against Iran as a potential
next step in resolving the impasse (reftel C). Nishida
agreed that Japan should use its bilateral relationship with
Iran to urge compliance but also pointed out that the
international community must make a collective effort to find
a resolution. A UNSC resolution that does not have the
backing of Russia or China could encourage Iran to increase
its rhetoric and its efforts to further split the
international community's resolve. Nishida told DCM that
Japan was conducting intergovernmental discussions on
sanctions options and that the GOJ was ready to consult with
the U.S. on possible next steps. Japan is not against
economic sanctions, but any sanctions must be carefully
articulated with regards to targets and participants in order
for them to be truly effective.


5. (S) During early June meetings on Iran with Departments
of State and Treasury officials, Japanese officials outlined
the legal and economic hurdles Japan must clear in order to
implement sanctions.


6. (S) COMMENT. Aso's comments are the first public
statement by a senior Japanese official in favor of sanctions
against Iran but substantively track with what our
interlocutors have been saying since April: Japan will
support sanctions under a UNSC resolution. Aso's public
comments suggest Japan is prepared to begin discussions on
possible sanctions menus with the United States and other
UNSC partners. Although MOFA officials argue they are
reluctant to support "like-minded" sanctions, a G-7
consensus on sanctions would allow Japan to implement
sanctions. We assess that Japan could be persuaded that EU3
and U.S. support for sanctions would provide enough political
cover for Japan to move ahead. END COMMENT.
SCHIEFFER