Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TOKYO2939
2006-05-26 10:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

AMBASSASOR YAMAMOTO PREVIEWS CT TRILATERAL PLANS

Tags:  PTER PGOV AS JA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0021
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #2939/01 1461024
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261024Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2586
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1652
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY 4117
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 0705
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 002939 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV AS JA
SUBJECT: AMBASSASOR YAMAMOTO PREVIEWS CT TRILATERAL PLANS

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joe Donovan. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 002939

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/26/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV AS JA
SUBJECT: AMBASSASOR YAMAMOTO PREVIEWS CT TRILATERAL PLANS

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joe Donovan. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary. Ambassador for Counterterrorism Tadamichi
Yamamoto reviewed Japan's strategy for the upcoming
U.S.-Japan-Australia Counterterrorism Trilateral with the
Deputy Chief of Mission on May 25, 2006. Yamamoto hoped for
a short plenary session that would include a threat
assessment and presentations on the Manila experts meeting
and on our regional counterterrorism strategies. He also
wanted to discuss pressuring the UN to be more operational in
its counterterrorism efforts. Five breakout sessions were
under consideration: law enforcement, maritime security,
intelligence, border/transport and financial issues. During
the breakout sessions, Yamamoto recommended that the three
ambassadors pay courtesy calls on counterterrorism-related
ministries and agencies. In a pull aside after the meeting,
the DCM expressed U.S. frustration with Japan's lack of
concrete progress in counterterrorism programs. Yamamoto
said he "understood completely" and shared the frustration.
Japan's domestic ministries and agencies suffer from a lack
of urgency when it comes to counterterrorism and he urged the
ambassadors to make the same points during the upcoming
meetings in Tokyo. End Summary.


2. (SBU) In a meeting with Deputy Chief of Mission Donovan
on May 25, 2006, Ambassador for Counterterrorism Tadamichi
Yamamoto explained Japan's strategy for the upcoming
U.S.-Japan-Australia Counterterrorism Trilateral on June 8-9.
Japan plans to invite the delegation heads and key
representatives of the breakout sessions to a working dinner
on June 8. Japan will set up separate tables for each
breakout session and for the delegation heads to facilitate
discussion about plans for the next day.

Plenary Session
--------------


3. (SBU) Yamamoto hoped for a short plenary session in order
to focus on concrete projects. A threat assessment had been
done at the Trilateral in Washington, DC, and he thought we
could dispose of the assessment in a few minutes since not
much had changed. Donovan suggested removing the assessment
from the plenary agenda and asking the delegations to discuss

it over dinner the night before. Yamamoto agreed that was a
possibility, but reiterated that, unless new information has
surfaced, an assessment during the plenary would take very
little time. A fuller discussion is necessary on the experts
meeting held in Manila in February, Yamamoto said. He also
suggested sharing our respective counterterrorism strategies
for the region during the plenary session.


4. (C) Japan would also like to follow up on the Roma-Lyon
meeting agreement to apply greater pressure on the UN. We
need to urge the UN to be more operational in its
counterterrorism efforts. Yamamoto suggested that the
ambassadors use the working dinner to develop an approach.
If an agreement can be reached, he hoped to formalize it
during the plenary.


5. (C) When asked if we could include countering extremist
ideologies during the plenary, Yamamoto responded that the
discussion in DC was very systematic but academic. If
concrete ideas have emerged then the plenary might be an
appropriate place to discuss it. Yamamoto worried that,
because it is a sensitive subject, discussion might run too
long to include in the plenary. He suggested we consider
dealing with it in a breakout session and then have a special
Trilateral-wide session on it after we hear the breakout
session reports.

Breakout Sessions
--------------


6. (C) Japan suggested three breakout sessions: law
enforcement (U.S. lead),maritime security (Australia lead)
and intelligence (Japan lead). Yamamoto noted that Australia
would like to add two more: border/transport and financial
issues. Japan's financial experts did not have enough
substance to share so MOFA had left financial issues off the
agenda. MOFA is willing to include it, but the United States
or Australia would have to chair the session, Yamamoto
explained. The DCM reported that we, too, would like to have
a financial breakout session on cash couriers, and promised
to get back to Yamamoto about possibly chairing it.


7. (C) Since time is limited, MOFA will encourage the
breakout session representatives to discuss their issues over
dinner on June 8 and come up with a plan on how to structure
their respective sessions on June 9. Yamamoto urged us to
divvy up the chairmanships of the breakout sessions soon and
start working on concrete proposals. He requested that we
share our proposals with him as soon as possible. He had
already spoken with Australia and Yamamoto summarized the
ideas heard so far.

Law enforcement - community policing, technical assistance,
capabilities assessments.
Maritime security - interdiction.
Border/transport - focus on Manila and DC meetings, port
security.
Financing - cash couriers.
Intelligence - more of a freewheeling discussion about what
each country is doing, compare plans for future cooperation.

Courtesy Calls
--------------


8. (C) During the breakout sessions, Yamamoto recommended
that the three ambassadors pay courtesy calls on
counterterrorism-related ministries and agencies. In rank
order, he suggested MOFA, the National Policy Agency, the
Cabinet's Crisis Management Office, the Coast Guard and the
Transportation Ministry. Donovan noted that there were eight
ministries and agencies working on counterterrorism (the
other three being the Cabinet Intelligence Research Office,
Public Security Investigation Agency and the Finance
Ministry) and wondered if it would be awkward to visit only
some of them. Yamamoto said his suggestions represented the
ministries with operational responsibilities. A group
meeting or lunch may be possible, but would affect the level
of participants. He predicted that officials at the Deputy
Director General level would attend a group meeting, and said
he hoped for higher-level interaction.

Conclusion and Future Work
--------------


9. (C) Yamamoto suggested having these high-level meetings
once a year, and working-level meetings twice a year. The
working-level meetings should be very concrete, like the one
held in Manila in February, and Yamamoto suggested we
consider focusing on Indonesia next. Despite Australian
interest in Bangladesh or other South Asian countries,
Yamamoto argued that we should deal first with Southeast
Asia. This is another issue to discuss during dinner and,
hopefully, announce on June 9.


10. (C) Yamamoto asked if Ambassador Crumpton hoped to use
this as a "political instrument" and if he planned to make a
public announcement. Unless the United States or Australia
has strong feelings, Japan would maintain the low-profile
approach.

Frustration with Japan's Progress
--------------


11. (C) The DCM noted that the bilateral working group had
not met in a long time and asked if we could jumpstart the
project. Yamamoto expressed enthusiasm but commented that it
would have to be revisited after the Trilateral. In a pull
aside after the meeting, the DCM expressed U.S. frustration
with Japan's lack of concrete progress in counterterrorism
programs. The Trilateral is an excellent opportunity for
Japan to layout a concrete agenda, he urged. Yamamoto said
he "understood completely" and shared the frustration.
Japan's domestic ministries and agencies suffer from a lack
of urgency when it comes to counterterrorism and he urged the
ambassadors to make the same points during the upcoming
meetings in Tokyo.


12. (C) MOFA Counterterrorism Cooperation Division Director
Rokuichiro Michii separately shared that it would be better
for either the United States or Australia to raise Indonesia
as a possible focus for the next working-level meeting. If
raised by MOFA, MOFA would come under heavy criticism by the
other Japanese ministries and agencies. These other
organizations view themselves as solely focused on domestic
issues and do not want to expand their responsibilities
beyond Japan's borders, Michii said.
SCHIEFFER