U.S.-JAPAN-ROK POLICY PLANNING TRILATERAL TALKS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 002666

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2026
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IAEA KS RS IN JA
SUBJECT: U.S.-JAPAN-ROK POLICY PLANNING TRILATERAL TALKS,
SESSION 5: NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT

REF: A. TOKYO 2654

B. TOKYO 2663

C. TOKYO 2664

D. TOKYO 2665 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Joe Donovan. Reason: 1.4 (b)(d
).


1. (C) Summary. During Session 5 of the U.S.-Japan-ROK
trilateral policy planning talks on May 12, ROK Deputy
Minister for Policy Planning Park In-kook characterized the
NPT regime as under siege and that its "fatal loophole"
allows parties to reach the brink of developing nuclear
weapons under the guise of permitted civilian nuclear
activities. Park proposed measures to restore the regime's
effectiveness. Japan's DDG for Foreign Policy Endo urged
further ratification of START II and negotiation of START
III, as well as universalization of the Additional Protocols.
S/P Director Stephen D. Krasner argued that nonproliferation
regimes require effective verification mechanisms to be
successful, noting that the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
(FMCT) now lacks credible verification. Park said South
Korea recognizes the positive aspects of the U.S.-India
nuclear cooperation agreement. Endo remarked that Japan does
not oppose the agreement, but worries that it may negatively
affect the global nonproliferation regime. End summary.


2. (C) During the May 12 session of the U.S.-Japan-ROK
trilateral policy planning talks on nonproliferation issues,
Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Deputy Minister for Policy Planning and International
Organizations Park In-kook described the NPT regime as being
under siege and argued that the AQ Khan network exposed the
potential for fissile materials to fall into the wrong hands.
Despite being the cornerstone of international
non-proliferation efforts for the past 35 years, Park said
that the greatest danger facing the regime today is the
"fatal loophole" that allows Parties to reach the brink of
developing nuclear weapons under the guise of permitted civil
nuclear activities. He cited the failure of the 2005 NPT
Review Conference to reach a substantive conclusion and
setbacks in negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) and Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) as evidence
of a global non-proliferation regime in disarray.


3. (C) Park suggested proposals that would go a long way
towards restoring the credibility and effectiveness of the
regime:

- The U.S. and Russia meeting the 2012 target date for
voluntary reductions under the Moscow Treaty could increase
momentum for revitalizing the NPT;
- Develop a proper safety net to catch would-be proliferators
and to protect legitimate civil nuclear programs and
introducing hurdles for Parties trying to withdraw from the
NPT;
- Develop a secure global nuclear fuel supply in order to
restrict the spread of enrichment and reprocessing
technology. Park noted that South Korea appreciates and
supports GNEP;
- Promote the universalization of Additional Protocols; and
- Enhance the security of nuclear materials through such
mechanisms as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Park added that active
Chinese participation in these efforts is crucial.


4. (C) Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy Director
General for Foreign Policy Yoshihisa Endo said that Japan
shares South Korea's concerns about the lack of a concluding
document at the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Japan encourages
the NPT nuclear weapons states to further promote disarmament
by ratifying early START II and by beginning negotiations on
START III as well as by entering into good faith negotiations
on a CTBT and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Endo
added that PSI, UNSCR 1540, and the G8 Global Partnership all
are effective tools for countering proliferation, but more
needs to be done to encourage the universalization of
Additional Protocols. Endo agreed with Park that GNEP is a
positive step forward that Japan fully supports.


5. (C) S/P Director Dr. Stephen D. Krasner argued that
non-proliferation regimes require effective verification
mechanisms to be successful. Non-proliferation regimes cannot
be solely about values or principles, but must be
functionally effective. Krasner said that the FMCT now lacks

credible verification measures. Krasner argued that pressure
to adhere to the NPT is not the sole reason more states have
not sought nuclear weapons over the past 30 years. Instead,
states make the decision to seek nuclear weapons based on
their own calculations of perceived strategic necessity and
value of nuclear weapons to their national interest. The
loophole alluded to by Park is an inherent flaw in the NPT,
he said.


6. (C) Reiterating the U.S. case for its nuclear deal with
India, Krasner pointed out that India is not a signatory of
the NPT and has not violated any obligations, unlike North
Korea and Iran. India is an emerging regional and global
power that faces rising energy demand. India hopes to meet
some of that demand with nuclear power, and having 80 percent
of India's civil nuclear infrastructure under IAEA safeguards
is a win for global non-proliferation efforts.


7. (C) Park told Krasner that South Korea recognizes the
positive aspects of the U.S.-India agreement and welcomes
India to be a responsible member of the international
community. He agreed that fully engaging India on
non-proliferation matters is good for international
stability. Endo added that while Japan does not oppose the
agreement and fully recognizes India's strategic importance,
Japan worries that the agreement may negatively affect the
global non-proliferation regime. Endo noticed during the
2005 NPT Review Conference a certain level of fatigue many
Parties had about living up to their obligations and worried
that were India to receive nuclear materials and technology
outside the NPT structure, those Parties could be encouraged
to leave the NPT in search of their own bilateral agreements.
Park followed up by arguing that we should be careful to
avoid giving any excuse to Iran to legitimize withdrawing
from the NPT.


8. (U) Participants in the meeting included:

United States
--------------

Stephen D. Krasner, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Evan Feigenbaum, S/P Member
Joyce Rabens, EST Minister Counselor
Matthew Wallace, EST Officer, Embassy Tokyo (notetaker)
David Wolff, Political Officer, Embassy Tokyo (control
officer)

Japan
--------------

Masaharu Kohno, MOFA Vice-Minister for Foreign Policy
Yoshihisa Endo, Deputy Director General, Foreign Policy Bureau
Nobukatsu Kanehara, Minister, Embassy of Japan (Washington)
Koji Tomita, Minister, Embassy of Japan (Korea)
Hiroshi Kawamura, MOFA Director, Policy Planning Division
Shinobu Yamaguchi, MOFA Policy Planning Division

ROK
---

In-Kook Park, Deputy Minister for Policy Planning and
International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MOFAT)
Sang-Mo Yeon, Minister Counselor, ROK Embassy (Tokyo)
Choong-Hee Hahn, Director, North America Division I, MOFAT
Song OH, Director, Policy Planning and Coordination Division,
MOFAT
Ki-Woong Kim, Director, Inter-Korean Policy Division
Ki-Jun Park, Deputy Director for North-East Asia Division II,
MOFAT
Young-Kyu Park, Deputy Director for Policy Planning and
Coordination Division, MOFAT


9. (U) S/P Director Krasner cleared this message.
DONOVAN