S/P DIRECTOR KRASNER'S MAY 11 MEETING WITH MOFA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 002650

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2026
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IAEA IR IS IN JA
SUBJECT: S/P DIRECTOR KRASNER'S MAY 11 MEETING WITH MOFA
DISARMAMENT DG NAKANE

REF: A. TOKYO 2609

B. TOKYO 2610

C. TOKYO 2613

D. TOKYO 2637

E. TOKYO 2638

F. TOKYO 2639

G. TOKYO 2640

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Joe Donovan. Reason: 1.4 (d) (
d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. During a May 11 meeting, MOFA Disarmament
DG Takeshi Nakane told visiting S/P Director Dr. Stephen D.
Krasner that although Japan has not yet fixed its position,
it remains concerned about the possible effect the U.S.-India
nuclear agreement may have on the NPT regime, remains
unconvinced that India can be trusted to live up to its
obligations, and is dissatisfied that the agreement does not
bind India to any new disarmament commitments. Krasner
explained that the agreement is the best solution available
to a long-standing problem and emphasized that having 80
percent of India's civilian nuclear infrastructure under
safeguards is better than nothing. Nakane told Krasner that
Japan is deeply troubled by Iran's provocative attitude and
activities. Nakane does not see any real chance for a
meaningful UNSC resolution so long as Russia and China oppose
such a move. Although the diplomatic road will be
challenging and time consuming, it is the one the
international community must take, he said. Krasner agreed
and assured Nakane that the U.S. is firmly committed to
pursuing diplomatic options. END SUMMARY.

Japan Wary of India Nuclear Agreement
--------------


2. (C) MOFA Director General for Disarmament, Science and
Non-proliferation Ambassador Takeshi Nakane briefed Policy
Planning Director Dr. Stephen D. Krasner on his May 1
discussion on disarmament and non-proliferation with Indian
Ministry of External Affairs Joint Secretary for Disarmament
and International Security Hamid Ali Rao. Nakane explained
that Japan and India initially had been discussing
disarmament and non-proliferation on the sidelines of a
broader bilateral security dialogue, but a January 2006 joint
statement by Japan FM Aso and the Indian Minister for
External Affairs calls on Japan and India to hold annual
discussions on these issues. India traditionally has been
reluctant to hold such discussions with Japan because of
Japan's penchant for calling on India to join the NPT as a
non-nuclear weapons state. The U.S.-India Civil Nuclear
Cooperation Agreement was the main topic of discussion during
the May 1 talks, according to Nakane.


3. (C) Stressing that Japan had not yet fixed its position
on the U.S. India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, Nakane
added that Japan understands well the growing strategic
importance of India and appreciates its need for greater
energy resources. However, Japan cannot overlook the
potential that the agreement may have a negative impact on
the credibility of the NPT regime, he stated. During the May
1 meeting, Nakane pressed Rao for details on the type and
scope of India's safeguards agreement with the IAEA; it is
his understanding that other Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
partners are focusing on this as well. Rao implied that it
would not be appropriate for India to be subject to
comprehensive safeguards similar to those of NPT non-nuclear
weapons states, according to Nakane.


4. (C) Nakane indicated he was disappointed with India's
insistence that because the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear
Cooperation Agreement is civilian in nature, it is not an
appropriate vehicle for discussions about disarmament. It is
Japan's understanding that disarmament is a component of the
agreement-by calling for a fissile material cut-off treaty,
for example.


5. (C) During the May 1 discussions, Japan formally urged
India to become formal active participant in PSI, Nakane
said. India told Japan that it supports the PSI in
principle, but cannot justify becoming a participant unless
it is allowed to join as a core group member. Nakane told
Krasner that it is statements such as these that raise
questions about India's commitment to actually live up its
non-proliferation obligations and become an active partner in
global non-proliferation activities. Nonetheless, Japan and
India were able to find common ground regarding the BWC and
combating small arms proliferation.


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6. (C) Krasner responded that the civil nuclear agreement
with India is an essential component to a broader strategic
realignment in our relations with India. Improving our
relationships with multiethnic democracies like India is
crucial to dealing with repressive regions and failed states
in the Third World. Krasner argued that developing coherent
regional coordination in Central and South Asia could provide
stability in a fragmented region.


7. (C) There is little likelihood that India will give up
its nuclear weapons and, without the deal, India would
continue to exist outside the non-proliferation regime,
Krasner explained. Under the agreement, approximately 80
percent of India's civil nuclear facilities will come under
IAEA safeguards. Nakane responded that Japan has
long-standing policies on disarmament and non-proliferation
that enjoy popular support. Japan attaches great importance
to the NPT regime, and major media outlets and Diet
politicians have been critical of the agreement since its
announcement. Japan's disarmament and non-proliferation
policies are a matter of principle that the government cannot
easily abandon, according to Nakane. From Japan's
perspective, the deal is inadequate since it does not require
India to commit itself to any disarmament obligations that go
beyond those already in place. It is crucial that
requirements for India to pursue a comprehensive test ban
treaty and fissile material cut off treaty remain in
the agreement.


8. (C) While recognizing that India does not have a record
of horizontal proliferation, Nakane noted that nuclear
material imported from Canada in the 1970s did wind up in
India's nuclear weapons program. He also noted that the
Indian PM has repeatedly argued before the Indian Parliament
that the agreement will in no way infringe upon India's
nuclear weapons infrastructure.


9. (C) Krasner assured Nakane that the U.S. appreciates
Japan's position but argued that the issue at hand is how to
best make the world a safer and more stable place. Krasner
noted that Israel's neighbors do not complain loudly about
Israel's nuclear weapons because these weapons, in
themselves, are not seen as a regional threat, whereas
regimes like North Korea and Iran are seen as threats.
Non-proliferation policy must be flexible enough to be able
to distinguish between the nature of regimes and nuclear
programs instead of clinging dogmatically to the NPT.


10. (C) Japan does not officially oppose the agreement and
is currently trying to balance U.S.-Japan relations,
Japan-India relations, and its own domestic non-proliferation
policies, Nakane observed. Regarding Israel, Nakane argued
that in Japan's experience, most Middle East countries in
fact are deeply concerned about Israel's nuclear weapons.
Disagreement about the status of Israel was a major reason
the 2005 NPT RevCon was unable to reach a substantive
agreement or concluding document, he said. Nakane added that
while the actual military utility of nuclear weapons is
debatable, the threat they pose is unmistakable. For that
reason, the U.S. must be prepared to clearly articulate why
India gets the deal and Pakistan does not. According to
Nakane, the Pakistani ambassador already has told him that
Pakistan will follow suit if India is permitted to produce
weapons grade fissile material.

Diplomacy Only Option on Iran
--------------


11. (C) Nakane told Krasner that Japan is deeply troubled by
Iran's attitude and activities. Japan has been very
proactive trying to find a diplomatic solution and has had
frequent senior-level contact urging Iran to comply with its
IAEA and UN obligations. Iran's actions have only escalated
tensions. Nakane argued that the international community
must send a strong unified message to Iran in the form of a
Chapter VII resolution, but is concerned that Russian and
Chinese opposition will delay a meaningful resolution.
Nonetheless, the international community must remain
committed to finding a diplomatic solution, he insisted.


12. (C) Nakane reiterated Japan's desire to be more closely
involved in the multilateral discussions on Iran. Nakane
told Krasner that being seen to be on the inside of the
international decision-making process is crucially important
for Japan. Being perceived domestically as outside the
decision-making process could make it hard for Japan to take
difficult steps when the time comes, according to Nakane.


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Participants
--------------


13. (U) Participants in the meeting included:

United States
--------------

Stephen D. Krasner, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Joe Donovan, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy Tokyo
Evan Feigenbaum, S/P Member
David Wolff, Political Officer, Embassy Tokyo
Matthew Wallace, EST Officer, Embassy Tokyo (notetaker)

Japan
--------------

Ambassador Takeshi Nakane, Director General for
Disarmament, Science and Non-proliferation Bureau
Shou Ohno, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Division
Kaoru Magosaki, Principal Deputy Director, Non-
proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Division
Satoshi Kikuchi, Desk Officer, Non-proliferation, Science
and Nuclear Energy Division


14. (U) S/P Director Krasner cleared this message.
DONOVAN