Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TOKYO2398
2006-05-01 09:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

15TH JAPAN-EU SUMMIT: FOCUS ON POLITICAL AND

Tags:  PREL ETRD ECON MEPP EUN KNUC UNSC BO UP RS 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 002398 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2026
TAGS: PREL ETRD ECON MEPP EUN KNUC UNSC BO UP RS
CH, JA
SUBJECT: 15TH JAPAN-EU SUMMIT: FOCUS ON POLITICAL AND
SECURITY ISSUES


Classified By: Political Minister Counselor W. Michael Meserve. Reason
: 1.4 (b)(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 002398

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2026
TAGS: PREL ETRD ECON MEPP EUN KNUC UNSC BO UP RS
CH, JA
SUBJECT: 15TH JAPAN-EU SUMMIT: FOCUS ON POLITICAL AND
SECURITY ISSUES


Classified By: Political Minister Counselor W. Michael Meserve. Reason
: 1.4 (b)(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. The 15th Japan-EU Summit on April 24 in
Tokyo highlighted the maturing Japan-EU partnership. During
the Summit:

-- PM Koizumi stressed three points: his concern about low
public awareness of the Japan-EU relationship, his desire to
enhance the strategic dialogue on East Asia's security
environment and his plans to enhance people-to-people
exchanges;

-- Over EU objections, Japan unilaterally reaffirmed Japan's
strong opposition to the EU lifting its arms embargo on China
in the joint statement;

-- The Summit leaders jointly expressed their deep concern
over Iran's uranium enrichment activities while reaffirming
their support for a peaceful and diplomatic solution;

-- The Summit leaders urged Russia to play a responsible role
in global energy security, and that they hoped to strengthen
their partnership with Russia based around the shared values;
and

-- The Summit leaders also addressed tax treaties, aviation
agreements, UN reform and the Japan-EURATOM Agreement, which
was signed this past February after ten years of
negotiations. End Summary.


2. (C) Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schussel, in his capacity
as President of the European Council, High Representative
Javier Solana and European Commission President Jose Manuel
Barroso's visit to Japan on April 24 for the 15th Japan-EU
Summit further developed the "maturing" Japan-EU relationship
and highlighted the EU's growing trend of looking outward,
MOFA European Policy Division Director Norio Maruyama told
Embassy Tokyo Political Officers on April 26. The planned
one-hour discussion and one hour working lunch was extended
to over five hours, addressing all the objectives within the
Action Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation adopted in 2001. A sign

of the evolving relationship, Maruyama noted that the first
summit held in 1991 was 90% focused on economic issues, in
contrast to this year's summit, which was 70% political in
nature.

PM Koizumi's Three Key Points
--------------


3. (C) Going into the Summit, Prime Minister Koizumi had

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three specific points he wished to stress, Maruyama
explained.

-- Prime Minister Koizumi raised his concern that the many
avenues of Japan-EU cooperation did not receive enough public
visibility.

-- Koizumi explored ways to enhance the strategic dialogue on
East Asia's security environment with a view to establishing
a Strategic Partnership. Maruyama spoke positively about the
strategic dialogue that was launched last year with Director
General-level talks in September and expert-level discussions
in early December that also included defense ministry
representatives. Both sides agreed to continue and further
develop this dialogue and to add a similar dialogue focused
on Central Asia.

-- Koizumi focused on enhancing the people-to-people
exchanges between Japan and EU member countries. Maruyama
proudly noted that exchanges under the Framework Initiative
for Exchange Networks and Dialogues (FRIEND) numbered 1,900
in 2005, and that Koizumi is now pushing for a target of
bringing 4,000 Europeans to Japan each year. This target
number would incorporate all public and private sector
exchanges. The Japan Foundation has been asked to join the
program with the aim of targeting businessmen, intellectuals,
tourists, young people and experts. The EU side welcomed all
three of Koizumi's points, Maruyama stated.

Joint Statements on the Middle East
--------------


4. (C) PM Koizumi sought a strong on Iran in the joint
statement, Maruyama emphasized. Koizumi expressed his
appreciation for European efforts to find a peaceful and
diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue through
negotiation, and the Summit leaders jointly expressed their
concern over the recent uranium enrichment activities by the
Iranian government, Maruyama said. Additionally, since the
news of the formation of the new Iraqi government broke on
April 23, a day before the Summit, the Summit leaders took
this opportunity to jointly welcome the election of the
speaker of the National Assembly and the re-election of the
President as well as the appointment of the new Prime
Minister. There was minimal discussion on Iraq, Maruyama
noted, since it was "not an easy topic for the EU to agree
on." As for the Middle East Peace Process, Maruyama
highlighted the leaders' focus on addressing the basic human
needs of the Palestinian population. They kept pressure on
Hamas by reiterating support for settlement of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict "based on existing agreements."

TOKYO 00002398 003 OF 005



East Asian Security
--------------


5. (C) Maruyama was emphatic that Japan remains strongly
opposed to the lifting of the EU arms embargo on China,
calling it "very worrisome" and a "serious concern." He
confided that the EU wanted to strike any reference to the
issue from the joint statement since "it is not a primary
issue for EU states." However, Japan insisted on including
language -- even though it was "unilateral" language so as to
avoid any appearance that they were softening. In the end,
the EU agreed to include the same language from the previous
year's statement (i.e., "Japan reiterated its opposition to
the lifting of the EU's arms embargo on China."). Maruyama
believes the EU's hesitance to discuss this issue highlights
Europe's lack of understanding of the security situation in
Asia, which he feels stems in part from the geographic
distance between the regions. While the Summit leaders did
not touch upon the actual arms embargo issue, he continued,
they did discuss the security environment in East Asia.
Maruyama reported that Koizumi hoped that underscoring the
military environment in East Asia would foster a greater
understanding by the EU of Japan's position. PM Koizumi also
requested the EU's support on the DPRK abduction issue. The
EU responded with a strong statement of continued support for
all efforts intended to lead to a settlement.

Praise for Ukraine, Concerns on Russia and Belarus
-------------- --------------


7. (C) PM Koizumi raised his concerns about recent troubling
Russian actions, such as cutting off gas to the Ukraine,
adding the Prime Minister felt this was particularly
problematic as Russia will host the G-8 Summit this year,
Maruyama confided. The EU leaders and Japan were reportedly
in agreement that Russia needs to play a responsible role in
global energy security, and that they hoped to strengthen
their partnership with Russia by stressing shared values.
The Summit leaders also agreed on to continue to encourage
democracy in Ukraine as well as to state their opposition to
the forceful detention of peaceful demonstrators by the
Belarusian authorities, Maruyama said. The Western Balkans
demonstrates successful cooperation between Japan and the EU,
Maruyama observed. Koizumi underscored Japan's commitment to
peacebuilding through technical assistance and ODA in the
region, and its intention to continue working with the EU to
further enhance stability, democracy and sustainable
development there.

Renegotiating Outdated Bilateral Tax Treaties

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--------------


8. (C) Japan is concerned about the inability to establish a
comprehensive bilateral tax treaty with the EU due to the
EU's lack of legal authority to negotiate such matters on
behalf of member states, Maruyama explained. Consequently,
Japan must negotiate separate bilateral tax treaties with
each member state in order to modernize outdated bilateral
tax treaties provisions. Maruyama cited tax withholdings on
royalty payments as one problem area. Japan currently has 17
bilateral tax treaties with various EU member states inked in
the 1960s and 1970s, Maruyama explained, and hoped to
accelerate the process of updating them based on the
U.S.-Japan Tax treaty model.

UN Reform Language Debated
--------------


9. (C) Because of differences within the EU on UN reform, an
particularly on UNSC reform, both sides had to make
concessions in formulating joint statement language on the
issue, Maruyama said. The final text stated that the "Summit
leaders underlined the importance of implementing the
on-going reform process adopted at the UN Summit, notably the
reform of main UN bodies." Japan succeeded on inserting
"notably" instead of the EU's preferred formulation of
"including," Maruyama explained. Japan allowed the reference
of "all UN bodies" to remain vague.

Japan-EURATOM Agreement
--------------


10. (C) Maruyama pointed to signing of the Japan-EURATOM
Agreement in February 2006 as a major achievement following
ten years of negotiation. The agreement has made it easier
for Japan to export nuclear materials to EU member states,
Maruyama explained. The Summit leaders welcomed this major
step forward in EU-Japan cooperation. Prior to this
agreement, Japan only had bilateral treaties with France and
the United Kingdom, and an agreement with Belgium, Maruyama
noted. The new comprehensive agreement covers exports to all
25-member states, as well as any components exported out of
the EU to a third party.

Aviation Issues, Bilateral is Bilateral
--------------


11. (C) In response to the Political Officers' inquiry if
there had been any contentious Summit-related "issues,"
Maruyama remarked that division of competence between the EU
and its member countries on aviation matters was affecting

TOKYO 00002398 005 OF 005


Japan. Japan currently has bilateral aviation treaties with
individual member states; however, the EU has expressed its
desire to allow bilaterally agreed upon aviation routes to be
utilized by other member states, explained Maruyama. (He
used the hypothetical example of a Luxembourg carrier with a
route between Luxembourg and Frankfurt then using the route
between Frankfurt and Tokyo, despite the fact that Japan and
Luxembourg do not have a bilateral aviation agreement).
Japan's position is that these treaties are to remain solely
between Japan and the individual member states; any change in
allowed routes must be a result of negotiations between Japan
and the individual member state, Maruyama stressed.
DONOVAN