Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TOKYO1989
2006-04-13 00:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

VCI SENIOR ADVISOR HEINTZELMAN AND ISN/RA SENIOR

Tags:  PREL PARM KNNP JA KS KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #1989/01 1030020
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 130020Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0882
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1707
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0967
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 7874
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0358
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 001989 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP JA KS KN
SUBJECT: VCI SENIOR ADVISOR HEINTZELMAN AND ISN/RA SENIOR
ADVISOR KANG DISCUSS NORTH KOREA WITH MOFA
NON-PROLIFERATION DIRECTOR SUZUKI


Classified By: VCI Senior Advisor for Noncompliance Harry Heintzelman;
reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 001989

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP JA KS KN
SUBJECT: VCI SENIOR ADVISOR HEINTZELMAN AND ISN/RA SENIOR
ADVISOR KANG DISCUSS NORTH KOREA WITH MOFA
NON-PROLIFERATION DIRECTOR SUZUKI


Classified By: VCI Senior Advisor for Noncompliance Harry Heintzelman;
reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Bureau of Verification, Compliance and
Inspection Senior Advisor for Harry Heintzelman, IV, and ISN
Regional Affairs Senior Advisor Eliot Kang met with MOFA
non-proliferation officials on April 7 to discuss potential
areas of cooperation in dismantling North Korean nuclear
facilities. Heintzelman briefed MOFA Director for
Non-proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Satoshi Suzuki
on his experience with dismantling Libyan nuclear facilities
and removing sensitive documents and materials from that
country. Heintzelman suggested that Japan may have valuable
experience with dismantling graphite-moderated reactors that
could facilitate operations in North Korea should the
opportunity arise. Suzuki agreed that Japan could add real
value to operations in North Korea, but cautioned that Tokyo
was not yet in a position to determine to what extent Japan
would be involved or the nature of its involvement.
Heintzelman also briefed Suzuki on USG efforts to determine
the best site for a base of operations for coordinating
activities in North Korea and suggested the USG would likely
want to use Yokota Air Base as a gateway for US teams. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) On April 7, VCI's Senior Advisor for Noncompliance
Harry Heintzelman and ISN's Office of Regional Affairs Senior
Advisor Eliot Kang met with MOFA Non-proliferation, Science
and Nuclear Energy Division Director Satoshi Suzuki to
discuss potential areas of cooperation in dismantling North
Korean nuclear facilities. Heintzelman told Suzuki that a
working group was established in the U.S. last fall but its
work has been slowed somewhat by other proliferation
challenges. Nevertheless technical experts have been working
on the challenges presented by the denuclearization and
verification of the DPRK nuclear and nuclear weapons program.
For example, finding a single governing protocol for health
and safety guidelines for nuclear facility inspectors

operating in North Korea is a prime example of the type of
challenges facing USG Departments and Agencies that will have
to be resolved before plans can move ahead. There also are
various domestic laws and acts that affect the activities
which could arise during this effort. Heintzelman said, as
the working group is moving ahead in planning, it would be
useful to learn the other Parties views and of their
experience in nuclear-related dismantlement efforts.


3. (C) From the US's experience in Libya, Heintzelman argued
that we must look at each facility individually to determine
the best course of action for decommissioning and/or
dismantling. The USG already is conducting such studies on
known facilities and is consulting with its partners on how
to implement plans. Heintzelman told Suzuki that Japan's
experience dismantling a small graphite-moderated reactor at
Tokai makes it uniquely qualified to provide information and
ideas for planning how to dismantle the Yongbyon reactor in
North Korea. Suzuki added that aside from the Tokai reactor,
Japan also previously had decommissioned a light water
reactor and a small pilot-scale enrichment facility. Suzuki
said he supports holding technical talks in June to continue
discussions along these lines.


4. (C) Suzuki continued that in order to determine the best
course of action, all groups involved must consider how to
handle North Korean hardware (facilities and material),
software (documentation and personnel),as well as
cooperation among the parties. North Korean issues are
highly charged in Japan, but it is essential to have a firm
timeline that realistically reflects the political and
technical obstacles dismantlement operations would face in
North Korea, according to Suzuki. Heintzelman emphasized the
need to quickly identify and remove critical items from North
Korea facilities; dismantling or removing any weapons would
be the top priority. However, the pace of this effort would
be dictated by DPRK's strategic decision to verifiably
dismantle its programs and the cooperation the DPRK extended
to the dismantlement and verification effort. Suzuki assured
Heintzelman that Japan is not interested in being involved in


any weapons-related activities or in having access to
sensitive weapons-related information.


5. (C) Suzuki noted that the GOJ assesses that the term
"point of no return" potentially could offer North Korea an
opportunity to stall on implementing its obligations and that
Japan prefers instead the USG-favored "substantial
degradation." Heintzelman told Suzuki that the issue of when
there had been a substantial degradation of North Korea's
nuclear weapons and nuclear program was not time driven but
dependant upon North Korean cooperation and progress on
dismantlement, elimination and verification. Suzuki noted
that there would be political pressure for an expeditious
implementation process and for substantial progress to be
made at the one-year point; momentum that would be vital to
keeping North Korea on track. Heintzelman agreed that an
expedited process is preferable but it would depend on the
North's behavior and the progress made on the ground.


6. (C) Suzuki asked whether the USG intended to enlist the
help of other nuclear weapons states, particularly France and
the UK, in CVID. Heintzelman responded that outside
participation was an important factor to consider as plans
move forward and that those states had unique expertise that
could facilitate dismantlement and verification operations in
North Korea. This was an issue that should be discussed
further and broached with the other Parties. Responding to
Heintzelman's question on where a multilateral entity to
provide technical support to teams in North Korea should be
sited, Suzuki noted that both China and South Korea would
likely prefer to host such an entity. Although more
discussion is needed, Suzuki suggested that Japanese
politicians might wish Japan to play such a role. Suzuki
also asked whether the USG intended to use U.S. bases in
Japan as staging or storage areas for operations in Japan.
Heintzelman replied that this issue was still under study but
use of Yokota could be an attractive option. Suzuki said
Japan generally was supportive of such use but would need to
know the details and also would have to coordinate such use
with other parts of the government.


7. (C) During a follow-on lunch, Suzuki mentioned that Iran
and India currently are high priority issues for his office.
Referring to the India civil nuclear agreement as "the India
problem," Suzuki restated Japan's concerns that the agreement
could set a double standard and potentially undermine the
credibility of the NPT regime. (BIOGRAPHIC NOTE: Suzuki is
very well spoken in English and very knowledgeable about
international non-proliferation issues. Like most MOFA
officials in the Disarmament, Science and Non-proliferation
Department, Suzuki takes an almost puritanically legalistic
approach to most non-proliferation issues, particularly with
regards to the NPT. Suzuki tends to wait till the end of
meetings to bring up more provocative issues, such as
criticism of US policy or new GOJ positions. END NOTE.)


8. (U) Deputy Director for Non-proliferation, Science and
Nuclear Energy Kenji Enoshita proposed meeting again with
Heintzelman at a later date to discuss North Korean issues in
more detail.

Participant List:

Japan:

Satoshi SUZUKI, Director, Non-proliferation, Science and
Nuclear Energy Division
Kenji ENOSHITA, Deputy Director, Non-proliferation, Science
and Nuclear Energy Division
Kaoru MAGOSAKI, Principal Deputy Director, Non-proliferation,
Science and Nuclear Energy Division
Takuya IWAMOTO, Special Assistant for North Korean Issues,
Non-proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Division
Hiroyuki SHIMIZU, Reprocessing Specialist, Japan Atomic
Energy Agency, seconded to Non-proliferation, Science and
Nuclear Energy Division

U.S.:



Henry Heintzelman, IV, Senior Advisor, VCI
Eliot Kang, Senior Advisor, Regional Affairs, ISN
Joyce Rabens, Minister-Counselor for Environment, Science and
Technology, US Embassy Tokyo
Matthew Wallace, Second Secretary, Environment, Science and
Technology Affairs, US Embassy Tokyo



SCHIEFFER