Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TOKYO1959
2006-04-11 23:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

WHA A/S SHANNON'S APRIL 10 CONSULTATIONS WITH MOFA

Tags:  PREL ETRD ECON XR CH LA XK JA 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 001959 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS USTR FOR BEEMAN, CUTLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2026
TAGS: PREL ETRD ECON XR CH LA XK JA
SUBJECT: WHA A/S SHANNON'S APRIL 10 CONSULTATIONS WITH MOFA
LATIN AFFAIRS DG SAKABA: MORNING SESSION

REF: A. DEPT PLEASE PASS USTR FOR BEEMAN


B. CUTLER

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joe Donovan. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d
).

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 001959

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS USTR FOR BEEMAN, CUTLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2026
TAGS: PREL ETRD ECON XR CH LA XK JA
SUBJECT: WHA A/S SHANNON'S APRIL 10 CONSULTATIONS WITH MOFA
LATIN AFFAIRS DG SAKABA: MORNING SESSION

REF: A. DEPT PLEASE PASS USTR FOR BEEMAN


B. CUTLER

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joe Donovan. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d
).


1. (C) SUMMARY. Japan's top priority in Latin America is to
revitalize its economic relationship, MOFA Latin American
Affairs DG Sakaba told WHA A/S Shannon April 10. Sakaba said
policy mistakes by Latin American governments over the past
10-15 years have lead to widening income gaps, a broad
disappointment with democracy and the left's resurgence.
Japan now recognizes that its programs must reach out to the
people, not just governments. A/S Shannon described U.S.
efforts to overcome a perception of U.S. disengagement in the
region despite greater attention and doubled ODA. A/S
Shannon separately reviewed the U.S.-Venezuela relationship
and concerns about the role of Chavez in the region. Sakaba
underscored the role of the international community in
ensuring a fair election. End summary.


2. (SBU) MOFA Lain American and Caribbean Affairs Director
General Mitsuo Sakaba welcomed Assistant Secretary Thomas A.
Shannon and Executive Assistant John Creamer to Tokyo, noting
that although this was the 25th round of U.S.-Japan
consultations on Latin America, it was his first as MOFA's
Latin America DG. A/S Shannon responded that at a time when
Latin America was undergoing dramatic change, the U.S.
believes it is important to consult with partners in Asia and
Europe, to enable them to work together to ensure that change
in the region contributes to stability. While acknowledging
that Japan attaches lower priority to Latin America than does
the U.S., Sakaba stressed that Japanese foreign policy does
not neglect the region. Prime Minister Koizumi had visited
the region in 2004, and eight Latin American presidents had
visited Japan in 2005. Furthermore, Japanese ODA and
investment in the region gives it some leverage. Sakaba
noted that he had proposed this round of consultations to

gain a better under
standing of U.S. policies and perspectives on the region.


3. (SBU) Sakaba briefly reviewed Japan's historical
engagement with Latin America, citing Japanese emigration to
Latin America from the late 19th century and the expansion of
economic ties in the 1950s and '60s, when it was easier for
Japanese firms to do business in Latin America than in
neighboring Asian countries as a result of "issues" left over
from WWII. Trade and investment flows dropped off sharply
following Latin America's debt crisis in the 1980s and
Japan's economic slowdown in the 1990s.


4. (SBU) Japan's top priority with Latin America is to
revitalize the economic relationship, Sakaba continued. This
had been the focus of PM Koizumi's visits to Mexico, Chile
and Brazil, and it motivated Japan's conclusion of an

"economic partnership agreement" (EPA) with Mexico, which
entered into force in April 2005. It is also behind the EPA
it is negotiating with Chile, which Sakaba said he expects
will be concluded by the end of 2006. Japan also holds
general consultations with Mercosur on business climate
topics, most recently during the early April visit to
Argentina of MOFA Deputy Minister Yabunaka.


5. (C) Describing Latin America as a major source of energy
resources and an export market for Japan, Sakaba admitted to
a sense of economic rivalry with China for access to the
region's energy resources. He expressed frustration with
Japanese business's "excessive caution," which he
characterized as left over from the region's debt crisis.
China's trade with the region overtook Japan's in 2003.


6. (C) Turning to negative issues on Japan's agenda with
Latin America, Sakaba first cited former Peruvian President
Fujimori, whose decision to stay in Japan had complicated
Japan's dialogue with Peru. Second, he cited the rising
numbers of "Nikkei" - descendent of Japanese emigrants -
entering Japan since the GOJ eased visa regulations to make
it easier for them to remain in Japan. Not only were the
numbers large - around 300,000 in the case of Brazil - they
also tended to concentrate in a few large cities, compounding
pressures on those communities. Sakaba identified this as an
issue in Japan's dialogues with Brazil and Peru. Third,
Sakaba cited remaining public and private debt owed to Japan
by Argentina and Cuba.


7. (SBU) A/S Shannon provided an overview of U.S. relations
with the region, describing efforts to overcome the
perception of U.S. disengagement from the region following
the September 11 terrorist attacks and U.S. military
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. He noted this perception
had arisen even as the Bush Administration had doubled ODA to
the region. The President had also participated in the
Summit of the Americas process, traveled to the region, and
received numerous Latin American heads of state. Shannon
identified a main policy challenge as the need to help
governments in the region build the capacity to address the
popular expectations created by Latin America's democratic
revolution. Shannon looked forward to identifying ways in
which the U.S. and Japan could coordinate and cooperate.


8. (C) Turning to the political landscape in Latin America,
Sakaba said there are many analyses of why the political left
is resurgent. He found the most compelling in a recent UNDP
report on democracy in the Peru, which attributed rising
dissatisfaction with democratic governance to governments'
failure to meet people's expectations that democracy would
bring concrete benefits to their lives. The general public
in Latin America seems to evaluate democracy not for its
merits as a political philosophy but on its ability to
deliver, Sakaba commented. They are ready to accept

authoritarian governments that deliver what democratic
governance has not. This is a dangerous trend, he added, and
underscores the need for Japan to reach out not only to Latin
American governments but also directly to Latin American
peoples, for example through Japanese ODA projects.


9. (C) Citing the widening gap between rich and poor in Latin
America, Sakaba described this as the result of policy
mistakes committed over the last 10 to 15 years, which also
contributed to the sense of disappointment with democracy.
This helped to explain how Peruvian presidential candidate
Humala could do so well in his campaign despite having no
political background and no policy agenda. Sakaba separately
flagged Japan's interest in deepening political engagement
with Haiti, Colombia, and Guatemala, which he described as
focused on peace building.


10. (C) A/S Shannon agreed with Sakaba's analysis. Latin
American publics understand democracy first in terms of
individual freedoms, second in terms of living standards, and
not at all as a political philosophy. The challenge is to
build capacity not only at the state level but also at the
individual level. The clear implication for ODA strategy,
Shannon continued, is to try to connect directly with people,
an approach the U.S. is adopting after years of trying to
work through Latin American governments.


11. (C) Asked for his analysis of the apparent contradiction
between the size of the U.S.-Venezuela economic relationship
and the anti-U.S. thrust of Chavez' rhetoric, A/S Shannon
described in detail how Chavez had undermined
government-to-government relations, to the point that the
historically close relationship had broken down in all but
the economic sphere. The energy relationship persists
because it is private on the U.S. side and Venezuela has its
own refining and distribution capacity in the U.S. The USG
would like to rebuild bilateral relations, but Chavez needs
the U.S. as an enemy. While trying not to let itself be
provoked, the USG has real concerns with what Chavez is
trying to do in the region. Sakaba agreed that other leaders
are increasingly fed up with Chavez' anti-U.S. rhetoric but
he noted that some Latin electorates still applaud it. He
voiced concern over Venezuelan economic controls, tax policy,
and moves to increase government shares in joint ventures.


13. (C) At Sakaba's request, A/S Shannon offered his
assessment of Venezuelan opposition parties and expectations
for the election in December. The old political parties had
lost credibility and collapsed when Chavez first came to
power, while the emerging opposition groups lack experience
and organizational ability. Shannon voiced concern that
voting rates have fallen because people don't think their
votes matter. They are unlikely to return to the political
process until an effective opposition leader emerges. Sakaba
responded that the role for the international community is to

demonstrate its interest and ensure that votes are counted.
Japan has supported and contributed to OAS election
monitoring efforts and is in talks to continue doing so.


14. (U) A/S Shannon cleared this message.
SCHIEFFER