IRAN: INITIAL JAPAN REACTION TO USG THINKING

S E C R E T TOKYO 001884

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KNNP IR XE JA
SUBJECT: IRAN: INITIAL JAPAN REACTION TO USG THINKING

REF: STATE 54012

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joe Donovan. Reasons 1.4 b/d


1. (C) On April 6, Post conveyed reftel points regarding the
status of USG thinking on Iran to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA) Non-proliferation and Second Middle East
divisions, as well as the Ministry of Economics, Trade and
Industry (METI). MOFA also shared the information with its
Policy Coordination Division.


2. (S) Initial reactions from our interlocutors generally
underscored that Japan continues to place priority on the
nuclear/non-proliferation issue. MOFA Non-Proliferation,
Science and Nuclear Energy Division Officer Teppei Kanda said
the Japanese government considers Azadegan and the Iranian
nuclear problem to be separate but related issues. That
said, Japan will never allow its stake in the Azadegan
oilfield to influence its firm opposition to Iran's
development of advanced nuclear fuel cycle technologies,
including uranium conversion, or nuclear weapons, according
to Kanda. Kanda cited the potential of the Iranian nuclear
issue to undermine the credibility of the NPT regime and its
potential influence on the North Korean nuclear weapons issue
as prime reasons behind Japan's position.


3. (C) Kanda told ESToff that Tokyo currently is preparing
for the possibility of some sort of sanctions being applied
to Iran in the event it fails to comply with the UNSC
Presidential Statement in the allotted timeframe. Pressed
further on the types of sanctions Japan envisions in that
event, Kanda said that internal Japanese discussions had yet
to identify a concrete sanctions menu. However, Kanda
acknowledged that sanctions targeting Iran's financial and
petroleum sectors would have the most impact; he also pointed
out that they would cause the most economic pain to Japan.


4. (C) Second Middle East Division's Koichi Nakao started by
pointing out that Prime Minister Koizumi's office had just
released its joint statement of the visit of Saudi Crown
Prince Abdullah, which called for the Middle East to be free
of weapons of mass destruction and reiterated the importance
of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue diplomatically. He
also stressed the importance of UNSC unity in dealing with
Iran's nuclear issue, and said he would be interested to know
what the U.S. envisions as next steps should Iran not respond
to the IAEA Board's February 4 resolution. He said MOFA is
very interested in hearing more details as to what kind of
bilateral energy dialogue we were proposing, noting that
attempts at a bilateral energy security dialogue in 2003-2004
quickly fizzled.


5. (C) METI/Agency for Natural Resources and Energy's Kenji
Goto, Director of the International Affairs Division, and
Hirofumi Katase, Director of the Petroleum and Natural Gas
Division, both expressed appreciation for the information but
did not have any immediate comments. They acknowledged
having followed the press articles alleging that U.S.
officials had made comments about Azadegan but had also seen
comments made by Press Secretary McClellan two weeks earlier
denying them. Katase, like Nakao, asked pointedly if the U.S.
was maintaining its pressure on Japan to pull out of
Azadegan. Both were told that the U.S. is neither formally
nor informally requesting that Japan cancel the Azadegan
project at this time.
SCHIEFFER