Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TOKYO1685
2006-03-30 07:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

JAPAN MULLING IRAQ FORCE ADJUSTMENT ISSUES

Tags:  PREL PGOV MOPS IZ UK AS JA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6593
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHKO #1685/01 0890712
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 300712Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0331
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0098
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 1592
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1446
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001685 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS IZ UK AS JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN MULLING IRAQ FORCE ADJUSTMENT ISSUES

REF: A. STATE 46975


B. TOKYO 1627

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joe Donovan. Reason: 1.4 (b)(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001685

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS IZ UK AS JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN MULLING IRAQ FORCE ADJUSTMENT ISSUES

REF: A. STATE 46975


B. TOKYO 1627

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joe Donovan. Reason: 1.4 (b)(d)


1. (C) Summary: MOFA National Security Policy Division
Director Shimmi indicated to Poloffs March 28 that he was
personally optimistic about extending Air Self Defense Force
C-130 flights at least to Baghdad Airport once assessment of
the nine "candidate" airfields is complete. Shimmi was less
optimistic that Japan would send a PRT to Basrah, where, as a
member of the recent assessment team, he had found the
security situation worse than he had expected. Japan hopes
to decide certain troop-adjustment issues before the
scheduled rotation out of its troops in late April, Shimmi
stated. Consequently, the next month of coordination would
be crucial in achieving an outcome that benefits all parties.
At the same time, he acknowledged that the Prime Minister's
office has made clear that the Self-Defense Forces
humanitarian mission must withdraw from Samawah. In a
separate meeting at the Prime Minister's Office, Assistant
Cabinet Secretary Ando's Executive Assistant told Poloffs he
would relay Ref A points to Ando. End Summary.


2. (C) Following presentation of the information contained
Ref A regarding U.S. priorities for Japan in Iraq after its
troop adjustment, MOFA National Security Policy Division
Director Jun Shimmi on March 28 explained to Poloffs that he
had just returned from Iraq. He had visited Basrah on March
25 as part of a six-person assessment team sent to evaluate
its suitability as a possible Japanese Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) site. Describing his initial
impression of Basrah as "much worse than I had thought,"
Shimmi told Poloff that while his government would make the
final decision after an internal review, he was not
optimistic that Basrah would be selected as a PRT site.
Asked whether Japan would consider places other than Basrah,
Shimmi said Japan was not "stuck" on any one place. Basrah,
nonetheless, was attractive because it was in the same region

as Samawah, the location of current Japan Self-Defense Force
operations, and is a major port city. Following a brief
discussion of PRTs in general, Shimmi indicated that Japan
would still appreciate more specific concrete suggestions on
possible PRT roles for Japan.


3. (C) Turning to possible expansion of Air Self Defense
Forces (ASDF) airlift destinations, Shimmi explained that an
ASDF assessment team was currently evaluating the security
situation at Baghdad, Balad and seven additional airfields.
The process would take more time to complete, he remarked,
because U.S. forces, who are taking the assessment team to
the various sites, have been pulled away by sudden
operational requirements. Nonetheless, Shimmi said he was
cautiously optimistic that once the process is complete,
C-130 flights would be extended to Baghdad Airport, at a
minimum. To date, ASDF had been reluctant to consider new
operations, citing security concerns. Shimmi believed that
the ASDF would see that the security concerns at Baghdad
Airport were not as grave as they had imagined, noting that
many commercial aircraft are now flying into that airport.
Separately, Shimmi noted that Japan was announcing that same
day, March 28, that it would resume yen loans for Iraqi
reconstruction (Ref B),a matter handled by a separate MOFA
division.

Japan's Decision Timeline
--------------


4. (C) Commenting on the Australian government's offer to
keep forces in Samawah as long as necessary, Shimmi observed
that the job of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) there is
done. The Japanese government will announce plans for next
steps at "the end of April," when the current ninth
contingent of GSDF troops is scheduled to rotate out of
Samawah. Shimmi outlined Japan's general timeline with
regard to the GSDF:

-- March 28: "Mini-Quad" in London

-- April 4-9: Shimmi travels to London and then Washington
to discuss "parameters" of Japanese participation post-troop
adjustment

-- April 10: Director General-level Full Quad in London

-- mid-April: Japan's decision on next steps for GSDF

-- April 10-23: Consult domestically and with coalition
partners


TOKYO 00001685 002 OF 002


-- April 24 (week of): Announce next steps

These dates are tentative, Shimmi explained, with all
presuming that the March 28 "mini-Quad" meeting results in an
April 10 Full Quad meeting.


5. (C) Whatever the outcome, Shimmi concluded, "everyone
must be winners." At the same time, he acknowledged that the
Prime Minister's Office has made clear that the SDF must
withdraw from Samawah. Consequently, the next month of
coordination would be crucial in achieving an outcome that
benefits all parties. Shimmi underscored that his government
is considering all three priorities suggested by the United
States -- airlift expansion, reconstruction aid and PRT
participation -- but was quick to add that Japan "politically
could not manage all three at once."


6. (C) In a separate March 27 meeting, Poloffs conveyed Ref A
points to Hideki Adachi, Executive Assistant to Assistant
Cabinet Secretary Hiroyasu Ando. Adachi told Poloffs that he
would relay the information on U.S. Government priorities for
Japanese support of Iraq to the appropriate persons,
including Assistant Cabinet Secretary Ando. When offered
further detailed information on Provincial Reconstruction
Teams, Adachi responded that people other than himself would
be more appropriate interlocutors and promised to contact
Poloff if those parties wished further information.
DONOVAN