LDP'S NAKAGAWA AND KYUMA ON DPRI, CHINA, IRAN AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001655

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PASS USDA FOR U/S PENN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2010
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD MARR CH JA
SUBJECT: LDP'S NAKAGAWA AND KYUMA ON DPRI, CHINA, IRAN AND
BEEF


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joseph R. Donovan, reasons 1.5 (
b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a wide-ranging discussion with the DCM
March 29, ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) heavyweights
Hidenao Nakagawa and Fumio Kyuma shared their views on
alliance realignment negotiations, Sino-Japanese relations,
Iran and beef. Policy Affairs Research Council Chairman
Nakagawa, fresh from a trip to China, said Beijing had begun
to moderate its criticism of Japan over wartime history, but
cautioned against any effort to mediate the Yasukuni dispute.
General Affairs Council Chairman Kyuma, former head of the
Japan Defense Agency, focused on alliance realignment
discussions, asserting that a Futenma replacement facility
had to be located as close to shore as possible, or
environmental protestors could blockade construction. On
funding the Marines move to Guam, Kyuma emphasized that while
Japan could probably fund housing, combined use structures,
runways and harbors, paying for core operational facilities
would be "very difficult." END SUMMARY.

DPRI
--------------


2. (C) During a March 29 luncheon meeting with the DCM, LDP
General Affairs Council Chairman Kyuma argued the case for a
Futenma replacement facility located as close to shore as
possible. The biggest obstacle to a resolution, he said, was
not local politicians, but environmental protestors. The
further offshore the new facility was located, he said, the
easier it would be for protestors to block construction.
Opposition to the new base would be a magnet for
environmental activists from outside Okinawa, including
overseas, he said. The Prime Minister had made clear, and
Defense Minister Nukaga agreed, that the facility would have
to be on the shoreline, or "it couldn't be done," Kyuma said.
To defuse environmentalists' opposition, he said he had
advised JDA to construct the landfill for the new base using
aluminum piping to ensure sufficient sunlight for the sea
grass that protesters claim would be killed off by the
project.


3. (C) On moving Marines to Guam, Kyuma expected Japan would
be able to fund (or at least finance) new housing on the
island, as well as facilities for combined use with the
Self-Defense Forces, and harbors and runways. It would be
"very difficult," however, to win public understanding to
fund core operational facilities for the Marines on Guam.
The U.S. should focus on cutting the cost of those
facilities, he suggested, perhaps by importing cheap labor
from Indonesia or the Philippines. The DCM replied that
without Japanese funding for operational facilities the
Marines would not be able to leave Okinawa.


4. (C) Costs for the Guam move could be offset in part by
cuts in Host Nation Support (HNS) as the Marines leave
Okinawa, Kyuma said. The U.S. should insist to the
Okinawans, he advised, that until Futenma replacement was
resolved, there would be no move of Marines off the island.
The Okinawans are masters of "getting but not giving," he
grumbled. The DCM noted there should be no reduction in HNS
until the Marines actually leave Japan and the funds are no
longer needed.


5. (C) On Japan's overall defense budget, Kyuma said the only
realistic way to get around the one percent of GDP spending
cap would be to fund high price tag items, such as
realignments on Okinawa, through separate, supplemental
budgets.

China
--------------


6. (C) Beijing seemed to be moderating its criticism of
Japan, said Nakagawa, referring to his February 19-23 visit
to China. Government-controlled Chinese media were now
sending the message that relations with Tokyo could not be
based solely on recent wartime history. This was a welcome
change, he said. The Sino-Japanese relationship had over two
thousand years of history; one brief period should not be
looked at in isolation. Vietnam was a good model, suggested

TOKYO 00001655 002 OF 002


Kyuma, in the way it had restored good relations with
Washington and Japan as well, despite painful memories from
the Vietnam War and World War II.


7. (C) Nakagawa voiced concern that PRC President Hu Jintao
might raise the Yasukuni issue when he visits Washington in
April. For Japan, this was a domestic issue, he said, and it
would be unhelpful if the U.S. sought to mediate. The more
China pounded on the Yasukuni issue, the more Japanese public
opinion was souring against China. Some of those upset at
Chinese criticism were also anti-American. It would be in
U.S. and Japanese interests to keep "ultra-nationalists"
under control. The Japanese media had falsely reported that
President Bush had asked Prime Minister Koizumi not to visit
Yasukuni Shrine, he said, urging that nothing be done to fuel
this wrong impression.


8. (C) Nakagawa said he had been surprised by the candor of
some of his Chinese interlocutors on the subject of
democracy. At a think-tank in Beijing, researchers had
talked openly about the need for democratization rising as
the country's economy developed. Turning to Taiwan, he noted
some concern that the opposition Kuomintang was "leaning a
bit far towards the mainland."


9. (C) Kyuma said he had a keen interest in changes in the
Chinese military, particularly in the demographics of their
senior commanders and enlisted men. PLA officers and
soldiers seemed to come mainly from the rural hinterland, he
noted. Kyuma speculated that PRC soldiers may resent the
income disparity they witness between coastal and rural
provinces. Like Japan in the 1930s, this might one day
become a source of political unrest within the military, he
observed.

Iran
--------------


10. (C) On Iran, Nakagawa said he was worried Japanese public
opinion would not agree to the government's support of a
tougher stance against Iran along with the U.S. On Iraq,
Koizumi had been able to take a firm stance, despite stiff
domestic criticism. If Iran were perceived as the "next" on
the list, it would put the government in a difficult
position. Countries dependent on Iranian oil, such as the
Europeans, might have to endure "a couple of cold winters,"
he feared. The DCM emphasized that Iran's pursuit of nuclear
weapons was unacceptable, and the U.S. believed it was time
to move this issue to the UN Security Council.

Beef Imports Ban
--------------


11. (C) The participation of Japanese experts in stateside
inspections of U.S. beef bound for Japan was the only
solution to the current impasse, said Nakagawa. He had
stressed that within the LDP and the Diet, he said, and would
continue to do so. Ministry of Agriculture experts were
worried about "being held responsible" for problems in the
U.S. inspection system, he said. The incident that had
caused a reimposition of the ban on imports had been unique,
agreed Nakagawa. When Japan had first exported beef to U.S.
markets, American experts had inspected Japanese plants.
Japanese experts should now do the same, he said. The DCM
stressed that U.S. beef is safe and that we need to come to
closure on resuming imports, and quickly.
SCHIEFFER