Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TOKYO1492
2006-03-22 08:43:00
SECRET
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:
IRAQ: GOJ REQUESTS SECURITY ASSESSMENT; U.S.
how-toVZCZCXRO7596 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS DE RUEHKO #1492 0810843 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 220843Z MAR 06 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0014 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T TOKYO 001492
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS IZ UK JA
SUBJECT: IRAQ: GOJ REQUESTS SECURITY ASSESSMENT; U.S.
RESPONSE IF U.K. WITHDRAWS IN MAY
REF: TOKYO 0757
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4 (b/d).
S E C R E T TOKYO 001492
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS IZ UK JA
SUBJECT: IRAQ: GOJ REQUESTS SECURITY ASSESSMENT; U.S.
RESPONSE IF U.K. WITHDRAWS IN MAY
REF: TOKYO 0757
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (U) This is an urgent action request. Please see last
paragraph.
2. (S) Summary: As input to GOJ decision on when to withdraw
SDF from Iraq, Assistant Cabinet Secretary Ando asked DCM
March 22 for an updated security assessment of the situation
in Iraq and for an explanation of what the U.S. response
would be should the UK withdraw as announced by the end of
May. DCM undertook to provide responses by Friday, March 24
Tokyo time, and urged that Japan keep SDF in Iraq for as long
as possible. End Summary.
3. (S) At lunch on March 22 with DCM Donovan, Assistant
Cabinet Secretary Ando noted that Japan had said it would
decide how long to keep the SDF in Iraq based on three
considerations: political, including the founding of a new
government; the security situation and the degree of transfer
of responsibility to Iraqis; and, the decisions on continued
participation by the multilateral force, in particular, the
U.S., UK and Australia. Ando noted that the UK had not yet
changed its decision to withdraw by the end of May, but that
the U.S. had urged a cautious approach of not having
predetermined withdrawal dates. With the three GOJ criteria
in mind, in order to help the GOJ decide about the date of
SDF withdrawal, Ando asked for an update on U.S. views of the
security situation in Iraq and how the U.S. would respond if
the UK did withdraw by the end of May.
4. (S) In response, DCM noted that the U.S. wanted the GOJ to
stay as long as possible and that Australia's decision to
extend their deployment was positive for the security
situation. DCM said that he would convey Ando's questions to
Washington and request a more detailed response by March 23.
5. (S) Action Requested: Please provide by Friday, March 23,
Tokyo time, our latest assessment of the security situation
in Iraq and our planned response should UK withdraw by the
end of May.
SCHIEFFER
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS IZ UK JA
SUBJECT: IRAQ: GOJ REQUESTS SECURITY ASSESSMENT; U.S.
RESPONSE IF U.K. WITHDRAWS IN MAY
REF: TOKYO 0757
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4 (b/d).
1. (U) This is an urgent action request. Please see last
paragraph.
2. (S) Summary: As input to GOJ decision on when to withdraw
SDF from Iraq, Assistant Cabinet Secretary Ando asked DCM
March 22 for an updated security assessment of the situation
in Iraq and for an explanation of what the U.S. response
would be should the UK withdraw as announced by the end of
May. DCM undertook to provide responses by Friday, March 24
Tokyo time, and urged that Japan keep SDF in Iraq for as long
as possible. End Summary.
3. (S) At lunch on March 22 with DCM Donovan, Assistant
Cabinet Secretary Ando noted that Japan had said it would
decide how long to keep the SDF in Iraq based on three
considerations: political, including the founding of a new
government; the security situation and the degree of transfer
of responsibility to Iraqis; and, the decisions on continued
participation by the multilateral force, in particular, the
U.S., UK and Australia. Ando noted that the UK had not yet
changed its decision to withdraw by the end of May, but that
the U.S. had urged a cautious approach of not having
predetermined withdrawal dates. With the three GOJ criteria
in mind, in order to help the GOJ decide about the date of
SDF withdrawal, Ando asked for an update on U.S. views of the
security situation in Iraq and how the U.S. would respond if
the UK did withdraw by the end of May.
4. (S) In response, DCM noted that the U.S. wanted the GOJ to
stay as long as possible and that Australia's decision to
extend their deployment was positive for the security
situation. DCM said that he would convey Ando's questions to
Washington and request a more detailed response by March 23.
5. (S) Action Requested: Please provide by Friday, March 23,
Tokyo time, our latest assessment of the security situation
in Iraq and our planned response should UK withdraw by the
end of May.
SCHIEFFER