Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TOKYO1479
2006-03-22 06:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

DEFENSE MINISTER NUKAGA MEETS AMBASSADOR ON

Tags:  MARR MCAP PREL PGOV JA 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001479 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2016
TAGS: MARR MCAP PREL PGOV JA
SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER NUKAGA MEETS AMBASSADOR ON
REALIGNMENT


Classified By: AMB J. THOMAS SCHIEFFER for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001479

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2016
TAGS: MARR MCAP PREL PGOV JA
SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER NUKAGA MEETS AMBASSADOR ON
REALIGNMENT


Classified By: AMB J. THOMAS SCHIEFFER for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C ) Summary: Defense Minister Nukaga on the evening of
March 17 made a pitch for a "two plus two" ministerial
meeting after the base realignment initiatives are finalized,
stressing that a "political statement" is necessary to gain
public understanding of the realignment initiatives,
particularly with respect to Japanese financing for the
relocation of Marines to Guam. The Ambassador noted our
reluctance to hold a 2 plus 2 unless the realignment package
has been resolved. Nukaga also said he has been listening to
local news on the Futenma Replacement Facility, (FRF) and
hopes to find a solution soon. He stopped short of saying
the Japanese government will agree to adjusting the current
plan to meet local government concerns. End Summary.


2. (C) Ambassador Schieffer met with Defense Minister Nukaga
the evening of March 17 at Nukaga's request. Nukaga began by
saying he asked for the meeting to discuss the upcoming March
23-24 realignment talks, and noted that with respect to the
Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) the Japanese government is
making utmost efforts to get local understanding. He said he
has met informally with the Okinawa Governor and Nago Mayor
and other local officials several times, and thinks we are
now coming to a time to get a final solution to the issue.
Nukaga said he, the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister Aso, and
Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe share the same view on this, and
he would like to persuade the Okinawa leaders based on this
understanding.


3. (C) He then said that what he wants to ask is that we make
utmost efforts to finalize the realignment initiatives, and
that then, even if the time has to slip, we have a 2 plus 2
meeting, because it is necessary to issue a political
statement to accompany the realignment initiatives. He cited
the following rationale:

-- First, relative to the general public, it is useful to
issue a political message for public understanding of the

direction of the U.S.-Japan alliance in conjunction with our
realignment initiatives.

-- Second, with respect to the realignment initiative to
relocate Marines from Okinawa to Guam, Japanese financial
support is dependent on public understanding (as taxpayers).
A political message is indispensable to get the understanding
of the public.

-- Third is the relationship to the U.S.-Japan Summit
meeting. Nukaga noted he had heard during his January trip
to Washington that a Summit would be held in June or July. A
political message at a 2 plus 2 would be quite useful leading
to a Summit level meeting on the future of the U.S.-Japan
alliance.


4. (C) Nukaga said this is his view as well as that of
Foreign Minister Aso, so he would appreciate this message
being conveyed to both the Department of Defense and the
Department of State. Nukaga then emphasized that he is
aiming for a political message AFTER finalizing of the
realignment initiatives.


5. (C) Ambassador Schieffer responded that he would convey
this to Washington. He explained to Nukaga that the
reluctance Nukaga has heard comes from our feeling that we do
not want to be portrayed as the villain to Okinawa. The
relationship has matured to the point that the old message "
the U.S. made us do it" doesn't work any more. The only way
the relationship will work in the future is if both sides
take ownership, and both sides say this is what we have
agreed to do.


6. (C) The Ambassador continued that with respect to FRF,
while we have shown flexibility, our position has been
portrayed to Okinawa as if it is the U.S. that is unwilling
to show flexibility, and that's not right. If there is a
possibility Okinawa could be won over by a small alteration

TOKYO 00001479 002 OF 002


to the plan, of only 200 or more yards or so, we don't see
why that's a bad thing to do. In the end, we understand that
the Japanese government must make the decision. But if the
Japanese government makes the decision that there will be no
change, then the Japanese government must take responsibility
for that.


7. (C) Nukaga responded that the GOJ and he himself will take
responsibility for resolving the issue. The FRF is not a
bilateral issue, but a domestic one, he said. Of course
realignment is a bilateral matter, but FRF to Camp Schwab
must be resolved domestically. That's why the Japanese
government and he himself will resolve it. Nukaga added that
there is no intent to make the U.S. the villain to Okinawa.
He asked the Ambassador to please let Washington know this
message, to make the schedule after finalization of the
realignment initiatives go as smoothly as possible.


8. (C) Nukaga then said JDA Administrative Vice Minister
Moriya also is willing to visit Washington in the near
future. It would be difficult this month, but after
finalizing the realignment initiatives, or perhaps when
finalizing the political statement to be issued, Moriya could
travel to Washington. Nukaga said it is difficult to travel
himself because the Diet is in session, but he could get Diet
authorization to travel to Washington soon after the
realignment initiatives are finalized. What is necessary, he
said, is that after the initiatives are finalized, special
legislative authority by the Diet will be needed to get
financial support for the relocation of Marines to Guam, so
the understanding of the general public, the taxpayers, is
required.


9. (C) The Ambassador then asked Nukaga -- noting he was not
negotiating but only asking for his own understanding -- why
JDA would not want to move the FRF runway 200 or so yards
down the peninsula if this would satisfy the Mayor and the
Governor. Why is it so important not to move the planned
runway? Nukaga responded that if the runway is moved 200 to
300 meters, then the facility will be mostly in the ocean.
The former SACO plan was entirely in the ocean. There were
many protesters who obstructed construction, and this is one
reason the former plan could not proceed. So, he said, it is
important to start construction from the land.


10. (C) At the Ambassador's request, Pol-Mil Director then
explained that even with a move of 200-300 meters towards the
ocean, the construction still could begin from land. He also
pointed out that even with the current plan, much of the FRF
will be landfill in the ocean, so the difference in the
amount of landfill between the current and a revised plan is
not significant.


11. (C) Nukaga again emphasized that he will take
responsibility to resolve the issue. Please watch what
happens, he said. I have been meeting with the local
politicians many times, listening to their views and
explaining Japanese government views, so I hope to find a
solution. The Ambassador asked Nukaga if he is telling us
this means there might be an opportunity for a small change
to the plan. Nukaga responded by saying there were some
false reports in the Japanese press today, such as the Sankei
Shimbun article, which complicate negotiations with the local
communities. I'm following the characteristic Japanese way
of negotiating, he said, so I would like to explain after we
are successful.


12. (C) The Ambassador ended by stating he has some
negotiating experience himself, and is well aware there can
only be one negotiator, and one needs to have faith in that
negotiator. "So I have great faith that you can resolve this
issue", he told Nukaga.
SCHIEFFER