SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CHERTOFF'S VISIT TO JAPAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 001445

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY PLEASE PASS TO PAUL
FUJIMURA, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2016
TAGS: OVIP PTER PREL JA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CHERTOFF'S VISIT TO JAPAN

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Embassy Tokyo welcomes your coming visit. The
U.S.-Japan relationship is healthy and strong. Japan is
eager to expand its special relationship with the United
States. The Department of Homeland Security plays a central
role in four of the key elements of a 21st century U.S.-Japan
alliance: 1) anti-terrorism initiatives, 2) disaster
preparation and response, 3) law-enforcement cooperation and
4) public-private sector partnerships that secure and
facilitate travel and trade.


2. (C) The Japanese have embraced several DHS projects,
including the Container Security Initiative (CSI),
Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) and the Air Marshals
program. We hope your visit can build on their enthusiasm to
help expand our bilateral partnership in areas such as
information sharing, science and technology (S&T)
collaboration and secure trade. A recent legislative change
to the Immigration Law clears the way for Japan to share
information with foreign immigration officials, an
opportunity we would like to pursue. Despite high-level
visits by DHS representatives -- Commissioner Bonner and
Ambassador Arcos visited in 2004 and Assistant Secretary
Hawley was here earlier this year -- and frequent outreach by
your Embassy representatives, the broad and far-reaching
responsibilities of DHS remain puzzling to parts of the
Japanese government. Your visit will help rectify that.

Politics and Economics
--------------


3. (C) After feeling the heat early this year over a variety
of domestic scandals, the Koizumi administration is back on
track in the Diet. We expect the Diet to pass Japan's FY06
budget by the end of the month, freeing political leaders to
tackle new issues. Much attention is being paid to a package
of administrative reform bills that will revamp the
government. Of vital importance to us is a proposed revision
to the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Law. The
revision would authorize the government to collect
foreigners' biometric data, deport suspected terrorists, and
mandate airline participation in a Japanese version of the
Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS). Several groups
in Japan continue to oppose blanket fingerprinting, and we
expect heated debate on the issue during the session, which
is set to close on June 18.


4. (C) Prime Minister Koizumi's Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP),together with its coalition partner Komeito, controls
over two-thirds of the Lower House and a simple majority in
the Upper House. Despite its overwhelming numbers, the
coalition has differences on issues like education reform,
constitutional revision and defense policy, and negotiations
on these issues can be painstakingly slow. Koizumi is
expected to step down in September, and the race to succeed
him has already begun. You will be meeting with several
frontrunners, including Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe (the
leading candidate at this point),Foreign Minister Aso and
Finance Minister Tanigaki.


5. (C) As the world's second-largest economy, Japan's market
provides rich trade and investment opportunities for U.S. and
Asian firms. After a decade of economic stagnation, Japan is
now in its second year of domestic demand-led growth. Japan,
with an annualized growth rate of 5.5 percent during the
fourth quarter of 2005, posted 2.8 percent real GDP growth
for CY2005. However, Japan faces several challenges
including a fiscal deficit that is the largest of the G-8
countries and a rapidly aging population. Koizumi's reforms
are highlighted by the privatization of Japan's massive
postal system and also include cuts in government spending
and the beginnings of an overhaul of the pension and health
care systems. He is on track in his vow to double foreign
investment in five years, but lingering public distrust has
made slow going for reform of merger and acquisition laws of
interest to U.S. business.

Bilateral and Foreign Relations
--------------


6. (C) In October last year, Secretary Rumsfeld and
Secretary Rice and their Japanese counterparts signed a

SIPDIS
historic agreement on transformation of our alliance. The
agreement strengthens deterrence, enhances Japan's
contribution to regional peace and security and reduces the
burden on Japanese communities hosting U.S. bases. We are
still hammering out the details, with relocation of Marine
Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa and moving 8,000 Marines
to Guam being the major sticking points. In other areas, we
have secured, in principle, extension of the deployment of
Japan's Self Defense Force troops in Iraq, notified Japan
that a nuclear-powered carrier is scheduled to replace the
USS Kitty Hawk at Yokosuka and begun deployment of the
advanced X-Band missile defense radar in Japan. We recently
agreed that Japan would maintain its level of host-nation
support for two years.


7. (C) In contrast to our healthy bilateral partnership,
Japan's relations with its neighbors are riddled with
territorial and historical problems. Anger over the North
Korea abductee issue is palpable, and Japan continues to take
a hard line, in cooperation with us, in the Six-Party Talks.
Koizumi's annual visits to Yasukuni Shrine make international
headlines. The Shrine houses convicted class-A war criminals
and China and South Korea oppose these visits because they
claim it glorifies Japan's wartime aggression. In addition,
unresolved disputes over energy rights in the East China Sea
and an ongoing freeze in high-level discussions with China
and South Korea have led even Foreign Minister Aso to say
that there is "nothing he can do" to improve relations.
Despite its diplomatic troubles, Japan continues to pursue
good economic relations with China and other neighbors.
China replaced the United States as Japan's largest trading
partner in 2004, and bilateral trade with Russia continues to
grow even though the two countries remain deadlocked over
"Northern Territories Problem" (both countries lay claim to
four islands off Hokkaido's coast).

Homeland Security in Japan -- Praise and Prod
--------------


8. (C) DHS does not have a direct counterpart in Tokyo, and
many homeland security responsibilities are dispersed among
various ministries and agencies. There appears to be genuine
admiration within the Government of Japan (GOJ) for the
massive government reorganization that created DHS. The GOJ
has been receptive to our ideas, but bureaucratic stovepiping
impedes the sharing of information among ministries. In
addition, a complacent attitude about threats directed
against domestic targets means that many Japanese do not
share the same urgency in developing and implementing
domestic anti-terrorist measures as we do in the United
States.


9. (C) Your visit presents an opportunity to blend praise
for cooperation already extended with encouragement for
further progress. In your meetings, we hope you can express
appreciation for Japan's support on CSI, IAP, the Air
Marshals program and the International Port Security Program
(IPSP). Japan's commitment to CSI served as a catalyst for
participation by other Asian countries; four CSI teams are
currently operating in Japan in the ports of Tokyo, Nagoya,
Kobe and Yokohama. In 2005, an exchange of diplomatic notes
for the Air Marshals program formalized U.S. operations to
Japan and Japanese operations to the United States. By the
time of your visit we expect to have completed an exchange of
diplomatic notes with the Foreign Ministry authorizing IAP
and setting the stage for signature of three Memoranda of
Operation. Nevertheless, there is room for further
cooperation. We hope that you will educate your
interlocutors about the roles and responsibilities of DHS and
push for greater information sharing, law enforcement and
anti-terrorism cooperation, and S&T collaboration.


10. (C) The President has stated that S&T, an area where we
have a key advantage over the terrorists, is one of our most
important tools in the fight against terrorism. One
long-standing goal is to enhance collaboration with Japan on
S&T, specifically in the areas of biodefense and infectious
diseases, food safety, border controls, and
critical-infrastructure protection and cybersecurity. Our
aim is to leverage Japan's S&T capabilities and seek greater
Japanese contribution to our common defense against terrorism
through the U.S.-Japan Workshop for a Secure and Safe
Society, which we established in February 2004. While
progress has been slow and matching priorities remain a
serious challenge under the Workshop, we are still eager to
advance the counterterrorism and homeland security S&T agenda
with Japan, albeit under a less ambitious program. Your
visit should be an opportunity to prod the Japanese into
gearing up their S&T program to focus on more practical
results for end-users.


11. (SBU) U.S. and Japanese businesses are interested in
working with both governments to enhance security even as we
reduce transaction costs involved in trade. Japan, as a key
ally in the war on terror, our largest overseas trading
partner, and a source of leading-edge technology, would make
an ideal candidate for a pilot "secure trade" program that
could use new technologies such as radio frequency ID (RFID)
programs to track shipping containers. This would help
legitimate businesses and U.S. and Japanese law enforcement
officials. When you meet with American and Japanese
business, they might raise this concept with you. We
recommend working with Japan on such a program that, if
successful, could become a model for other key trading
partners.

High-Level Meetings
--------------


12. (C) In order to cover the spectrum of DHS issues, we are
requesting meetings with Prime Minister Koizumi, Chief
Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe and five other Cabinet
ministers. All are elected politicians; the Diet chooses the
Prime Minister, who then appoints his Cabinet. To aid you in
tailoring your comments to different meetings, here is a list
of the ministers you will be meeting and their DHS-related
responsibilities.


13. (C) Foreign Minister Taro ASO: The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MOFA) is the gatekeeper of many issues, particularly
those that require multiple ministry participation. MOFA
granted diplomatic status for CSI personnel in 2005, assisted
in the exchange of notes for the Air Marshals program and is
helping to initiate a pilot IAP for Narita Airport. MOFA is
also marshaling Japanese government support for Megaports.
We require future MOFA cooperation on the U.S.-VISIT
initiative, biometric passports, 10-finger biometric
identification, exchanging biometric data on terrorists, and
the registered traveler program. MOFA will likely want
assurances about its visa-waiver status. Japan's new
biometric passports meet international standards and should
ensure its continued participation in our visa-waiver
program. Minister Aso might also ask whether we will
continue to require a visa for non-Japanese passengers
transiting the United States. In the past, MOFA has also
asked us to consider revalidating visas for Japanese
entrepreneurs in the United States.


14. (C) Justice Minister Seiken SUGIURA: The Ministry of
Justice (MOJ) is responsible for implementing many of the
projects negotiated by MOFA. The Japan Immigration Bureau
(JIB) is part of the MOJ and has proved to be a great partner
on alien smuggling, IAP and APIS. MOJ/JIB will play a
critical role in Japan's version of the US-VISIT initiative,
as well. We are engaged in ongoing discussions to advance
our information sharing processes, from exchanging data on
individuals to entire databases. The GOJ is evaluating our
proposal to share terrorist lookout information under
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6.


15. (C) Public Safety Commission Chair and State Minister
for Disaster Management Tetsuo KUTSUKAKE: Minister Kutsukake
wears two hats. As Chair of the Public Safety Commission he
oversees the work of the National Police Agency (NPA),
Japan's national law-enforcement body. The NPA is a central
police organization that controls and supervises prefectural
police organizations on matters of national concern. The
prefectural organizations have the authority to carry out
police duties. The NPA has a database of 80,000 organized
criminals but so far has refused to exchange the database.
We suggest you emphasize the broad law-enforcement mission of
DHS and underscore the importance of information sharing. It
will be important to persuade Minister Kutsukake to take a
personal stake in overcoming NPA intransigence. He is also
the State Minister for Disaster Management, Japan's version
of FEMA, and will likely be interested in our response to
Hurricane Katrina. Japanese officials participated in last
year's TOPOFF exercise, and a delegation recently visited
Baton Rouge for FEMA briefings on the response to Katrina.
NPA Commissioner-General Iwao URUMA will attend this meeting.


16. (C) Finance Minister Sadakazu TANIGAKI: The Ministry of
Finance's (MOF) Customs and Tariff Bureau (CTB) has been a
critical asset to establishing CSI in Japan. We are nearing
a milestone with almost 900,000 shipments from Japan to the
United States without incident. MOF and MOFA work closely
with us to stem the flow of terrorist finance. Cooperation
against illicit finance was a central topic of the annual
U.S.-Japan (Treasury-MOF led) financial services talks held
March 8 in Washington, DC. It would be appropriate to thank
Tanigaki for his Ministry's close collaboration. Per your
recent telephone conversation with Secretary Bodman, please
underline the importance the United States attaches to a
partnership with Japan on the Megaports Initiative.
Megaports complements the CSI program and our law-enforcement
and anti-terrorism agendas. Embassy representatives from DOE
and DHS have had productive interagency meetings with the
Japanese in October 2005 and March 2006. MOFA chaired the
meetings, and is a strong supporter of Megaports. MOF, to
date, has been non-committal on Megaports, and CTB has
resisted efforts to be made the lead Japanese agency, but
there are signs that the resistance is fading. We believe
that raising the issue with Tanigaki will help move Megaports
forward.


17. (C) Land, Infrastructure and Transportation Minister
Kazuo KITAGAWA: Minister Kitagawa is a senior member of the
LDP's coalition partner Komeito. The Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure and Transportation (MLIT) oversees the Japan
Coast Guard, a key player in the International Port Security
Program. After successfully hosting a ministerial conference
on Transportation Security in January 2006, MLIT appears
ready to play a bigger role in transportation security. The
No Fly List, passenger and baggage screening, and airport and
maritime port security are part of MLIT's portfolio. MLIT is
also a key DHS partner on S&T initiatives such as Marine
Asset Tag Tracking System (MATTS).

Press and Public Affairs
--------------


18. (C) You will be meeting with high-level U.S. business
executives from the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan
(ACCJ) representing the airline and transportation
industries. They will brief you on the current state of
relations between U.S. industry and the GOJ. You will also
be meeting with the Security and Safety Commission, a
distinguished advisory group of former business executives
and government officials, including former Japanese
Ambassador to the United States Shunji YANAI. The Security
and Safety Commission advises the GOJ on
critical-infrastructure protection, physical safety and cyber
safety. We have also arranged a roundtable for you with key
Japanese print media.


19. (U) We at Embassy Tokyo look forward to briefing you
further on your arrival and stand ready to do all we can to
make your trip productive. You are visiting Japan at a time
when our relationship is as good or better than it has ever
been. We are confident your visit will be successful and
will contribute to the continued deepening of our ties.
SCHIEFFER