Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TOKYO1151
2006-03-03 08:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

SENIOR LDP PARTY OFFICIAL PESSIMISTIC OVER

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON ETRD CH JA 
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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9342
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0934
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7129
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RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001151 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2031
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD CH JA
SUBJECT: SENIOR LDP PARTY OFFICIAL PESSIMISTIC OVER
JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS AFTER BEIJING VISIT

REF: TOKYO 01010

TOKYO 00001151 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons:1.4(b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001151

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2031
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD CH JA
SUBJECT: SENIOR LDP PARTY OFFICIAL PESSIMISTIC OVER
JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS AFTER BEIJING VISIT

REF: TOKYO 01010

TOKYO 00001151 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons:1.4(b/d).


1. (C) Summary: Senior LDP Party official Hidenao Nakagawa
said he remained pessimistic over Japan-China relations
despite press reporting there had been a positive atmosphere
surrounding his recent visit to Beijing. Although the
Chinese received him warmly and appeared willing to deal
constructively with other bilateral issues, the Prime
Minister's visits to Yasukuni Shrine are still an
inordinately important issue to the PRC, he lamented.
Nakagawa's call on PRC Foreign Minister Li was cancelled,
presumably to signal China's continued dissatisfaction over
Yasukuni. Nakagawa urged the Chinese to adopt a more
forward-looking policy toward Japan, recognizing Japanese
efforts to promote peace and prosperity during the past 60
years. In a separate meeting, LDP Diet Member Ito, who
accompanied Nakagawa, expressed similar views, noting that
China's emphasis on Yasukuni had encouraged the growth of
Japanese nationalism. Like many in Japan, these two LDP
stalwarts believe China should put the Yasukuni issue aside
and work on improving relations with Japan. End Summary.


Ruling Coalition Delegation Visit
--------------


2. (C) In discussing his February 19-23 China visit
accompanied by six LDP and Komeito Diet Members, LDP Policy
Research Council Chairman Hidenao Nakagawa told the Political
Minister Counselor on February 27 that he remained fairly
pessimistic over a near-term breakthrough in Japan-China
relations. Nakagawa, otherwise in a good mood, seemed rather
glum and resigned when discussing his Beijing trip. Although
his delegation was warmly received in Beijing by State
Councilor Tang Jiaxuan, and CCPCC International Liaison
Division Director Wang Jiarui, among others, Nakagawa thought
the growing anti-China sentiment in Japan and the recent lack
of high-level meetings between the two countries made it

difficult to put relations between the two competing Asian
powers back on track. China pointedly cancelled a Nakagawa
delegation meeting with the PRC Foreign Minister. Proud of
having taken the political risk of visiting China at such a
difficult juncture, Nakagawa cited the importance of
exchanges between Japanese and Chinese political leaders.
Despite his lack of optimism, Nakagawa felt that both
countries recognized the need for Japan-China cooperation,
not only for peace and stability in the region, but for the
entire international community.


3. (C) Noting that his meetings in Beijing coincided with a
China visit by METI Minister Nikai (reftel),Nakagawa said
that Japan's approach to the relationship was to put aside
the history issue, while dealing constructively with such
substantive bilateral issues as joint development of
hydrocarbon resources in the East China Sea. China seemed
receptive to that approach, recognizing that China stood to
gain from improving the bilateral relationship.

No PRC Flexibility on Yasukuni Shrine
--------------


4. (C) There was no flexibility in China's stance opposing
the Prime Minister's visits to Yasukuni Shrine, an issue that
remained foremost in the minds of his interlocutors, Nakagawa
observed. Many of those he met with claimed that Japan would
be isolated internationally unless the issue was resolved.
Nakagawa rejected that argument, saying it seemed to be more
wishful thinking on China's part than reality. The Yasukuni
problem has become a highly emotional issue for the Japanese
people, he observed. The more insistent China becomes, the
greater the negative Japanese response. Citing a recent
poll, Nakagawa noted that anti-China feeling in Japan had
risen to 80 percent in the past year. Although he strongly
disagrees with the shrine's history museum's (Yushukan)
portrayal of Japan as a victim of the war, Nakagawa stressed
that Yasukuni and its museum were not under the government's
control. He thought it would take a considerable time before
the issue of prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni is
resolved.

TOKYO 00001151 002.2 OF 002



Academic Review of Japan-China History
--------------


5. (C) Nakagawa was pessimistic about the possibility of
conducting a review of the history of Japan-China relations
by academic experts. He thought it would be difficult to
find appropriate scholars willing to engage in the study and
questioned whether China would make available the relevant
documents under its control or that key documents in Taiwan
from the KMT era in China could be accessed. Nonetheless,
Nakagawa believes that the endeavor is worthwhile, and that
it deserves the full cooperation of both governments,
provided the study is conducted in a "non-political" manner.
Asked about the possibility of third-country involvement,
Nakagawa opined that it would be preferable to handle the
matter bilaterally.

Urging China to Reform its Japan Policy
--------------


6. (C) Nakagawa urged China to move beyond the history
issue and adopt a more forward-looking policy toward Japan
that recognized Tokyo's post-war efforts to promote peace and
prosperity. In frank exchanges with his interlocutors, he
stressed that China could learn much from Japan's devotion to
the principles of peace and democracy over the past 60 years.
He related a question posed to him at a think tank
concerning whether Japan was colluding with the United States
to contain China. Nakagawa countered that by opposing
Japan's efforts to obtain a seat in the UN Security Council,
China was forcing Japan to move even closer to the United
States. Unless Japan was allowed to play an independent role
in the international community, it would have no choice but
to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance to ensure its
protection, he argued. Nakagawa underscored his view that
China's attitude toward Japan would significantly affect the
chances for improving Japan-China relations under PM
Koizumi's successor.


7. (C) In a separate meeting, fifth-term LDP Diet Member
Tatsuya Ito, who accompanied Nakagawa to China, told Embassy
Tokyo political officer that the Chinese Communist Party
officials with whom they met seemed to want to establish a
channel of communication with PM Koizumi and the LDP through
Nakagawa. Ito, who has visited Beijing many times, said it
was his strong impression that the Chinese would gauge the
Japanese public reaction to the positive atmosphere of the
talks with METI Minister Nikai and Nakagawa before deciding
on next steps.


8. (C) The Japanese delegation stressed the need for China
to re-think its policy toward Japan, Ito said. He related
that Nakagawa emphasized that during the past 60 years Japan
had done much to promote Asia's peace and prosperity.
Moreover, by continuing to focus on the Prime Minister's
visits to Yasukuni, China would not improve bilateral
relations, but would contribute to the growth in Japanese
nationalism. Although concerned that Yasukuni remained such
an important issue for the PRC, Ito saw some glimmer of hope
in China's newfound willingness to take up non-political
issues -- as expressed to both Nakagawa and Minister Nikai.
However, like Nakagawa, Ito thought it would take some time
before the PRC would significantly change its Japan-relations
policy.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Like many in Japan, Nakagawa and Ito assign much of
the fault for the recent downturn in bilateral relations to
China's manipulation of the history issue. They agree with
PM Koizumi that Yasukuni is but one issue in a complex
relationship and that it should not be allowed to stymie
progress on more substantive bilateral matters.
SCHIEFFER