BERISHA VS. SOLLAKU: ONE ROUND IN A BROADER BATTLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L TIRANA 000740

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE (MBENEDICT)
NSC FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PHUM AL
SUBJECT: BERISHA VS. SOLLAKU: ONE ROUND IN A BROADER BATTLE

REF: TIRANA 436

Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARCIE RIES. REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. A Parliamentary investigative committee
looking into allegations of incompetence and misconduct
against Prosecutor General (PG) Sollaku has issued a report
claiming evidence of serious misconduct and recommending not
only that President Moisiu dismiss the PG, but that criminal
proceedings be brought against him as well. Minority members
of the committee attacked the constitutionality of the
commission itself and other procedural matters, but did not
address the specific findings of the majority regarding
Sollaku's culpability. Under the rules of Parliament, any
measure sanctioning an individual must be voted on by secret
ballot; simple adoption of a report, however, can be done by
open vote. The opposition has insisted on a secret ballot,
and this issue must be resolved before the final vote takes
place on July 24. The report must be approved by the full
Parliament before being sent to the President, but given the
Government's strong Parliamentary majority, the outcome is in
little doubt. What is uncertain is President Moisiu's
action; most are betting that he will not dismiss Sollaku, in
part due to concern over PM Berisha's efforts to consolidate
executive power at the expense of Albania's
constitutionally-mandated independent institutions, and in
this case of his own prerogative over appointment of the PG.
The opposition is using this imbroglio as part of a campaign
to show that Berisha has not changed and is engaging in a
campaign to take control of Albania's independent
institutions. Berisha certainly gives them plenty of grist
for their mill. We expect the political temperature here to
remain pretty high until the situation is resolved. END
SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) On May 2, Parliament approved the formation of a
committee to investigate alleged violations of the law on the
part of Sollaku in the execution of his duty as the PG (see
reftel). The commission was presented with 83 specific cases
to investigate and was given two months to complete its work.
It was composed of 13 members, seven from the ruling
coalition and six from the opposition. Opposition members
tried to block the formation and the work of the committee,
charging that its formation was unconstitutional. The
Constitutional Court ruled that the opposition members who
brought the suit had no standing in the case.


3. (SBU) Despite a boycott of the commission's work by
opposition members in the final days, on July 4 it released
its final report, which included the expected recommendation
that the PG be removed from office. The report also called
for prosecution of Sollaku for violations of the law and
misconduct. It was read before Parliament on July 11 and
must now be voted by the full Parliament (50% plus 1 vote, or
82 members) before being sent to the President who, under the
Constitution, has the final say. (As noted reftel, the
President may discharge the PG, on the recommendation of
Parliament, for violations of the Constitution, for serious
violations of the law during the exercise of his duties, for
mental or physical incapacity, or for acts and behavior that
seriously discredit prosecutorial integrity and reputation.)


4. (SBU) Parliamentary rules require that the report be
voted by Parliament within 20 days of its presentation, and
the final vote was scheduled for July 24. Under the rules of
Parliament, however, votes pertaining to individuals must be
conducted by secret vote. Based on this, the opposition has
demanded that the acceptance vote for the Sollaku report be
conducted by secret ballot. The majority has countered
saying that this is a procedural matter involving simply the
acceptance of a committee report (thus no secret vote) since
the President has the final say on whether the PG stays or
leaves. The last dispute over secret voting brought
Parliament to a standstill. It is likely the opposition has
a similar plan in mind in this instance. There are rumors
that the opposition is trying to convince some MPs of the
majority to vote against the report to embarrass the
Government. The opposition is also reportedly seeking to
deny a quorum to vote on the report by convincing members in
the governing coalition not to come to the floor. Both
tactics are unlikely to work.


5. (SBU) Charges brought by the governing coalition majority
in the commission's report fall into four broad categories:

-- Failure to pursue serious criminal cases, or improper
suspension of such cases.

-- Improper appointment of prosecutors.

-- Failure to pursue cases brought by the State Audit
Office, members of Parliament, or other sources, including on
public tenders (non-criminal cases).

-- Failure to disclose wealth/property.


6. (SBU) The views of the opposition were not included in
the final report and were released separately to the public
on July 10. The opposition attacked the constitutionality
and functioning of the commission itself, but did not address
any of the specific findings of wrong-doing on the a part of
Sollaku. The opposition report called on the President to
reject the report of the majority on the grounds that the
commission did not complete the work it set out to do (not
all of the 83 cases brought before the commission were
investigated) and failed to complete its work in the allotted
time (the final report was released two days after the
deadline). The minority also complained that the functioning
of the commission did not conform with either Albanian law or
internationally-accepted norms.

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COMMENT
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8. (C) IS SOLLAKU GUILTY? It is hard for us to evaluate
fully the findings in the commission's report. While many of
the charges are grave, serious observers agree that the
Government only came close to making a convincing case on two
minor charges -- failure to declare properly ownership of an
apartment and failure to vigorously pursue a well-known case.
Sollaku, in the testimony before the commission, denied all
allegations of wrong-doing. In testimony, an open letter to
Parliament, and a 50-page document sent to MPs and the
President, Sollaku systematically refuted all charges on
legal and factual grounds. (It is worth nothing that some of
the charges included in the final report were added during
the course of the commission's work, including after the PG
testified.) In our view, even if Sollaku committed the
errors noted above, these do not meet the rigorous standards
spelled out in the Constitution for dismissal.


9. (C) WHAT IS BEHIND THE MOVE AGAINST SOLLAKU? The
opposition has charged that the move to remove Sollaku is an
attempt by the DP to bring one of Albania's
constitutionally-created independent institutions under the
purview of the Prime Minister, and that it is part of a

larger pattern. In fact, shortly after assuming office,
Berisha attempted to put his own person at the head of SHISH
(Albanian Intelligence),another appointment controlled by
the President. The ruling DP is engaged in efforts to
replace two members of the High Council of Justice, which
will fill one of the vacancies on the Central Electoral
Commission (CEC). With arguably three of the four current
members of the CEC already in its pocket, the DP could
reverse the SP majority on the CEC created while the
Socialists were in office.


10. (C) Perhaps the PM is not orchestrating a consistent
campaign to undermine independent institutions, but he has
handed the opposition a ready-made public relations issue on
a silver platter. Berisha and Parliamentary President
Topalli say they have told the Socialists that they could
name Sollaku's replacement, that the DP has no candidate in
waiting. Obviously, the opposition neglects this point in
its propaganda. But even if the offer has been made, it is
also not surprising if the opposition views it with some
skepticism.


11. (C) There are two potential ways to interpret the
Berisha Government's actions, which skirt the edges of
democratic process: The opposition interpretation that his
instincts are authoritarian and his chief objective is
winning the local elections. Or, the DP version that he is
driven to govern Albania effectively, sincerely desires to
rid the country of organized crime and corruption, and chafes
when bureaucratic hurdles or less-than-efficient prosecutors
general impede his progress. Given the win-lose,
hard-scrabble Albanian political environment which shaped
him, as well as his controlling, even micro-managing
personality, it is not surprising the PM is making various
efforts to assert his control over different government
entities, replacing Socialists with his supporters. Indeed,
the SP in its day also liberally exploited the patronage at
hand. The Constitutional Court and the President, two
institutions provided by the Constitution to balance the
power of the Government, have blocked the Government in
several instances and appear about to do so in the case of
the PG.


12. (C) WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD? It is almost certain
that Parliament will pass the full report on July 24, sending
the recommendation that Sollaku be dismissed and investigated
for criminal conduct to President Moisiu. Most, including
we, are betting the President will not dismiss Sollaku,
either because the charges have not been proven, or because
he is concerned with Berisha's intentions, or both. If this
happens, the Prosecutor General could continue with his work
(with the same non-communication between his office and the
PM's as now) and the situation could bump along. The
(recently united) opposition has scheduled the first of what
may be a series of street protests for July 12 in Tirana's
Skenderbeg Square, aimed at highlighting the "undemocratic
and heavy-handed tactics" of the ruling party. Even if the
demonstration is not exceptionally large, it will certainly
raise the political temperature.


13. (C) Both we and the EU have told both sides that their
approach to politics as a zero-sum game is damaging to their
country and its future prospects. We will be watching the
situation very carefully over the coming days to determine
whether more vigorous international diplomatic intervention
is needed.
RIES