Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TIRANA559
2006-05-26 13:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tirana
Cable title:  

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AFFIRMS JUDICIAL Q@%Q@AQQN(U) Under the Albanian

Tags:  PREL PGOV KJUS AL 
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R 261353Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY TIRANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4340
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
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RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
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RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
RHDLCNE/COMUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUFNPKB/COMUSNAVEUR POLAD NAPLES IT
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3265
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2148
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA 3408
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TIRANA 000559

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE (MBENEDICT)
NSC FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KJUS AL
SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AFFIRMS JUDICIAL Q@%Q@AQQN(U) Under the Albanian
Constitution, the High Council of
Justice (HCJ) is the governing body of the judiciary, with
responsibility for its organization and functioning. The
primary purpose of the HCJ is to propose judges for

appointment, discipline judges, and transfer judges from one
court to another. The HCJ also has the authority to appoint
one of the seven members of the Central Election Commission
(CEC). The HCJ consists of fifteen members, including nine
proposed by the National Judiciary Conference (NJC) and three
by the Parliament. The final three members are the President
of the Republic, who serves as the Chairman of the HCJ, the
President of the Constitutional Court, and the Minister of
Justice.

MOST AMENDMENTS REJECTED...
--------------


3. (SBU) In a 5-4 decision the Constitutional Court
overturned key provisions of a controversial set of
amendments aimed at reforming the HCJ. Referred to as the
"Law Regarding Conflict of Interest in the HCJ", the
amendments were approved by Parliament late last year and
came into force in January. The amendments automatically took
effect without the signature of President Moisiu, since he
declined to take action within 20 days (thereby signaling
disapproval without exercise of a veto),as specified by the
Constitution. The legislation ostensibly sought to reduce
possible conflicts of interest by forcing HCJ members to
either resign from the HCJ or to retire active judgeships and
cease all outside activities (except teaching) in order to
serve full time on the High Council.


4. (SBU) As originally written, the 2001 HCJ law declared
membership on the High Council as incompatible with
employment as a prosecutor, an executive in a political
party, or a lawyer accredited to trial courts or courts of
appeal. As amended, teaching would have been the only
permitted outside activity for members of the HCJ and all
other positions, including that of judge, would have to be
relinquished.


5. (SBU) The Constitutional Court wrote that forcing HCJ
members to choose between continued membership or an active
judgeship is unconstitutional. The term of office for
membership in the HCJ is 5 years and that of a judge is life.
Forcing HCJ members to choose between these offices
infringes on the independence of the judicial branch by the
legislative branch. It was argued that the terms of these
offices are set in the Constitution, and the legislature
cannot change that by act of law.


6. (U) In further explanation, the Court noted that
membership on the HCJ is not only inherently part-time, but
must allow for members of that body to have other functions,

TIRANA 00000559 002 OF 002


including that of an active judge. Why? Because the head of
the Supreme Court, as a constitutionally-mandated member of
the HCJ, must necessarily remain an active judge, something
the new law would have disallowed.


7. (SBU) The proposed law also granted members of the HCJ
immunity from prosecution, under the reasoning that if they
were no longer sitting judges they would no longer enjoy
immunity derived from that office. But this measure would
also have extended immunity even to the non-judicial members.
Such immunity is not provided by the Constitution and,
according to the decision of the Constitutional Court, cannot
be granted by an act of law.

...EXCEPT ONE
--------------

Qe|Qu*embers elected by the National Judiciary Conference must be
judges with a minimum of 10 years experience and that the
three members chosen by the Parliament must be lawyers, not
judges, with a minimum of 15 years experience. As originally
written, all elected members of the HCJ could be judges.


9. (C) COMMENT: A common criticism of the Berisha government
is that, though well intended, it has sometimes behaved
heavy-handedly in its efforts to combat organized crime and
corruption. By issuing this ruling the Court has fulfilled
its "checks and balances" role. It also reaffirms that
respect for the rule of law begins with respect for the
Constitution. This law would have also infringed on the
ability of the judiciary to control and regulate itself, an
essential element of the division of power.


10. (C) COMMENT CONT: As is often the case there may be an
underlying political motive. Some believe that these
amendments were pushed through by the DP-led Parliament in
part as a way to force out a number of the members of the HCJ
before the expiration of their mandates. The underlying
issue here is not merely control over the HCJ itself, but
over the critically important role of the HCJ to select the
supposed "impartial" deciding member of the Central Election
Commission (CEC). By changing the make up of the HCJ, the
governing party would have strengthened its ability to
control the CEC. END COMMENT
RIES