U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WISNER DISCUSSES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TIRANA 000408

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE (BENEDICT, SAINZ)
NSC FOR BRAUN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KS AL
SUBJECT: U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WISNER DISCUSSES
KOSOVO STATUS TALKS WITH ALBANIAN LEADERS

REF: STATE 59894

Classified By: Ambassador Marcie B. Ries for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Albanian officials expressed appreciation
for the USG role in the region and especially in Kosovo. All
accepted the role that Wisner asked Albania to play as the
Kosovo status negotiations advanced, and pledged that Albania
would do its part to reach a successful conclusion.
Ambassador Wisner told PM Berisha, President Moisiu and other
GoA officials that Albania should use its influence in
Pristina to convince Kosovar leadership to be flexible in the
negotiations on Kosovo's status. Ambassador Wisner said
three issues needed to be resolved for the negotiations to
proceed -- de-centralization, church property claims, and
protecting minority rights. Ambassador Wisner also counseled
the GoA to make extra effort to assuage the concerns of other
countries in the region that there was no intention of
re-thinking borders and creating a "Greater Albania." The
goal of all this was to pull Serbia along to a place where it
could co-exist peacefully with an independent Kosovo, and be
a participant in regional prosperity. End Summary.


2. (SBU) USG Kosovo Special Representative Ambassador Wisner
held a series of meetings with Albanian government and
opposition party officials, including President Moisiu, PM
Berisha, Deputy FM Harxhi, and NGO representatives during his
April 19-20 visit to Tirana. Ambassador attended the
meetings as well.

AMBASSADOR WISNER: NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE DIFFICULT


3. (C) Ambassador Wisner told PM Berisha that the
negotiations would be difficult, primarily because the
political class in Belgrade had not yet accepted the fact
that Kosovo would be independent. The trick was not to
impose a solution on Serbia, but to find a way to "bring them
along" so that the end result would not be a hostile Serbia
bordering a new country in desperate need of economic growth.
Serbia's own fragile stability in the wake of Kosovo's
independence constituted another factor.


4. (C) Three issues would dominate the initial stage of
negotiations: 1) de-centralization; 2) resolution of property
claims by churches; and 3) establishing the basic principles
for protecting minority rights. Ultimately, Kosovo would be
independent, but a strong international presence would be
needed for a transitional period and the EU would be expected
to bear most of the financial burden to establish basic
security services, an economic plan and budget assistance.
He discounted speculation that the USG was preparing to "wash
its hands" of the region, and said that the U.S. would remain
deeply engaged and work closely with the EU.


5. (C) To achieve the goals sought by the USG and Albania,
Ambassador Wisner said the GoA could do two things. First,
work closely with Kosovo PM Ceku to encourage him to take the
hard practical steps -- assure churches of protected lands,
return lands to returning Serb families, for example. He
also suggested that Kosovar leaders at all levels of
government take additional steps to make Serb returnees feel
welcome. Second, GoA leadership has to assuage the concerns
of other countries that Albanians harbored dreams of
re-thinking borders and creating a "Greater Albania." He
encouraged PM Berisha to emphasize the GoA's commitment to
fighting crime and corruption as part of this campaign
because much of the fear of "Greater Albania" resided in the
perception that more Albanian assertiveness and mobility
means more crime in Europe.

BERISHA: IDEA OF "GREATER SERBIA" PERSISTS


6. (C) PM Berisha thanked Ambassador Wisner for the USG role
in the Kosovo status process and stated his government's
chief priority was to fight crime and corruption. Berisha
added that Albania needed help with the fight against money

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laundering and would "pay any price" to join NATO in 2008.
On Kosovo, Berisha said that in Serbia the idea of "Greater
Serbia" still persisted and that de-militarization was
needed. Kosovo leaders Ceku and Sediju were "committed" to
doing what had to be done, but party leaders in Kosovo were
not sending a strong enough message that the interests of
ethnic Albanians were best served by reconciliation with
ethnic Serbs. Berisha said he advised Ceku to use the
position of the Serb Orthodox Church -- to keep Serbs in
Kosovo -- to his advantage. He also felt that
inter-religious dialogue would be effective, particularly if
Don Vicenzo Paglia of the San'Egido Community was involved.


7. (C) Berisha noted that Ceku was not strong within his own
party and needed visible USG support to help him weather
internal dissent. Ambassador Wisner said the USG had and
could continue to give Ceku strong support. Berisha said he
agreed with all of Ambassador Wisner's suggestions and would
encourage Ceku and other to be flexible on the initial set of
issues and that he would assure regional leaders that Albania
did not support border changes or ideas of Albanian
unification. Berisha told Wisner that he -- like other
Albanians -- had been raised to believe in "Greater Albania".
But the Kosovars' decision to pursue independence had
changed all that and Albanians accept the Kosovar decision.
Berisha added that international, and especially U.S.,
presence in an independent Kosovo was "fundamental" -- and a
proposition accepted by all Kosovar leaders.


8. (C) Berisha put on the table the possibility that some
would argue for denial of a UN seat for Kosovo as a
face-saving measure for Serbia. Ambassador Wisner replied it
was too early in the negotiation to consider such a strategy.
He also doubted at end of the day this strategy would
deliver Serb agreement. He stressed that now is the wrong
time to consider such propositions -- the Serbs have given no
such indication that there is a price short of their
preferred position (i.e. "more than autonomy, less than
independence").


9. (C) Berisha did not object to the notion of the need for
flexibility later in the day. He said he was committed to
working closely with the Kosovars to keep them together in
support of Ceku and his reconciliation program. He noted
several times though that he worried about Ceku's position.
He pledged he would play "Dutch uncle" to Kosovar political
leaders, but would also push for strong measures aimed at
reconciliation with Kosovar Serbs. Wisner underscored, and
Berisha said he understood, that Kosovar Albanians must deny
Belgrade any evidence either today or after independence that
supports the contention that the Kosovars will not treat the
Serb minority equitably.

HARXHI: WE SUPPORT AHTISAARI'S APPROACH


10. (C) In his meeting with Deputy FM Harxhi (FM Mustafaj was
unavailable due to illness),Ambassador Wisner reiterated the
need to "pull Serbia along" and urged the MFA to both use its
"special ties" with Pristina to keep them pointed in the
right direction while at the same time calm the fears of
others in the region who worry of a "Greater Albania."
Harxhi expressed support for Ahtisaari's approach in the
negotiations and said that Albania understood that playing a
moderate role benefited both Kosovo and the region. She said
the initial focus on decentralization was good. She
understood the negotiations had been "tedious" thus far, but
was under the impression that the issue of status would be
discussed on May 4. She also said she had heard rumblings of
a Tadic-Sediju meeting. Ambassador Wisner explained the
sequence of negotiations and dismissed the idea of a
Tadic-Sedjiu meeting outside of the auspices of Ahtisaari,
which he described as a "not a good idea."

MOISIU: STABILITY IN KOSOVO EQUALS STABILITY FOR EUROPE


11. (C) President Moisiu observed that resolving the Kosovo

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issue this year, meant stability not just for the region but
also for Europe. Moisiu reported that he personally has met
with Serb leaders and urged them to move beyond the past, be
realistic, and look to the future. The Kosovars are doing
just that. He identified as the most difficult issues for
the Serbs their insistence that Kosovo is the "cradle of the
Serb identity". Regarding religious monuments, he noted that
many Albanians are themselves Christian. (NOTE: President
Moisiu is Orthodox. End Note.) Turning to Albania's role in
the region, the President stated firmly that "Albania will
not ever ask for Kosovo to join Albania"; there should be no
changes in borders, and Albania fully supports the position
of the international community. Kosovo, he noted, should be
independent, but must respect minority rights. At the same
time there can be no double standards. The international
community should apply the same standards for Kosovo
independence that it applied to the other parts of the former
Yugoslavia. Moisiu said he is arranging a meeting of
regional Presidents at the end of the week to discuss
regional security issues. He agreed that Albania could do
more to advance the process by a) helping to convince
regional leaders that Albanians had no designs on creating a
"Greater Albania", and b) helping Kosovar Albanians navigate
the negotiation process by urging them to be flexible and
keep their eye on the desired result.

SP LEADERS: SERB LEADERS LACK VISION; ALBANIA CAN PLAY A
ROLE


12. (C) Former PM and MOD, and current Socialist Party SecGen
Majko told Ambassador Wisner there would continue to be
problems during the negotiation process because political
leaders in Belgrade, specifically President Kostunica and PM
Tadic, lacked the courage to lead. None was willing to
prepare the Serbian people for the inevitable outcome -- an
independent Kosovo. In contrast, he said, Kosovo politicians
have public opinion on their side, and expect the status
question to be resolved this year. An unresolved Kosovo
would create "unbalance" in the region. Belgrade was causing
problems because it wants to sell its cooperation for EU
integration and a seat at the table. Majko predicted that
Macedonia would have an excellent relationship with Kosovo,
and that the Tirana-Pristina-Skopje triangle would function
well politically and economically. Eventually, Greece would
also become part of that group. In addition, armed with
their traditions of religious tolerance, both Albania and
Kosovo could be used to foster better relations in the
Islamic world. Finally, Majko downplayed the idea of a
"Greater Albania" arguing that, "Albanians will be three
times as strong with an independent Kosovo, Albania, and the
Albanian community in Macedonia." He agreed with Ambassador
Wisner that Albania needed to convince its neighbor's that an
independent Kosovo was not a threat to the region.


Roundtable with Opinion-makers


13. (C) Ambassador Wisner met with a roundtable of leading
opinion-makers and NGOs dealing with regional issues. The
participants noted the difficulty in understanding
Ahtisaari's statement that Albania be "active, but not an
actor." Wisner offered that Albania should decide its own
role, and should be active in encouraging Kosovar leaders to
engage on the issues currently on the table. Because of its
relationship with Kosovo, Albania could play an important
role in encouraging moderation on the Kosovar side as well as
calming fears on the Serb side. The participants also
queried whether the USG approach was the same as Brussels's.
Ambassador Wisner responded it was.


14. (U) Ambassador Wisner cleared on this cable.
RIES