Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06THEHAGUE987
2006-05-03 13:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): SCENESETTER FOR

Tags:  PARM PREL CWC 
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VZCZCXYZ0014
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DE RUEHTC #0987/01 1231319
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031319Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5601
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000987 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): SCENESETTER FOR
45TH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION, MAY 16-19

Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Javits, Permanent Representative to t
he OPCW. Reasons: 1.4 (B, D)

This is CWC-39-06.

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000987

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): SCENESETTER FOR
45TH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION, MAY 16-19

Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Javits, Permanent Representative to t
he OPCW. Reasons: 1.4 (B, D)

This is CWC-39-06.

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (U) The focus of the May Executive Council session will
be on extension requests of destruction deadlines, and the
U.S. request clearly will get the lion's share of attention.
Now that delegations and capitals have had a chance to
analyze the U.S. presentation from April 20, there probably
will be more extensive questions about the state of the U.S.
destruction program. In general, there remains a vague
disappointment with the U.S. projection that it will not be
able to complete destruction by 2012, and that will likely
remain the mood at and immediately after the May EC. While
not an optimal atmosphere, as long as the dissatisfaction
remains amorphous, there is an opportunity for the U.S. to
work to shape the views of delegates by emphasizing full
transparency and reiterating the clear U.S. commitment to
destruction of all CW stocks.


2. (U) The extension request will make it very difficult at
EC-45 for the U.S. to make a hard sell on policy objectives
in other areas. Most notably, it will be awkward to press
for full implementation of Article VII obligations as many
delegates have made the mental link between destruction and
national implementation obligations. On Article VII, del
recommends highlighting U.S. contributions and support for EC
actions to finalize the work on establishing National
Authorities, shying away from any discussion of negative
measures. With the exception of Article VII, most of the
items on the May EC agenda are routine or administrative.
The only other issue that will likely generate extended
discussion is the chairmanship of the working group to
prepare for the second RevCon, and most of the work to try to
reach agreement on that issue will probably be done in
informal discussions. End Summary.

--------------

U.S. EXTENSION REQUEST
--------------


3. (U) Following the extensive briefing provided by Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Army Ormond on April 20, there
were only a few questions from delegations. That was to be
expected, in light of the detailed nature of the briefing.
However, there continues to be an absence of operational
questions. The expectation is (and the planning presumption
definitely should be) that with experts from capitals
arriving for the May EC, there may now be a flurry of
questions about the U.S. program.


4. (U) The lack of questions, however, may simply validate
the assumption that the concern of delegations is not about
operational details, but larger political and legal issues.
If that is indeed the case, the U.S. certainly should
anticipate that providing clear, extensive questions about
the U.S. destruction program will be necessary, but not
sufficient, in getting support from other delegations.


5. (C) Of the few questions the del has received, Washington
should be aware of, and prepared to address, two prevalent
themes. The first is that of an amendment. Although it is
undeniably premature to discuss such measures, feedback on
the ground to date has been that the U.S. answer to the
amendment question has not been well received and has been
viewed as simplistic, dismissive and seemingly evasive. Del
strongly recommends that we should henceforth avoid
categorically dismissing any option (regardless of seeming
impracticality or significant disadvantages).


6. (C) The second (and perhaps more sinister) theme is the
question of the legality of our extension request. Several
delegations (most in anticipation of the Russian line of
questioning) have raised concerns about the legality of an
E

extension request that refers to a plan going beyond 2012.
Although del has pointed out that the request itself is to
April 29, 2012, delegations have also commented on the
necessity of a plan depicting operations complete at 2012.
Again, it has been highlighted that the terms in the
Convention call for a plan "for the period of the proposed
extension," but del recommends being prepared to discuss this
in detail at the May EC, particularly with Russia and Iran.


7. (C) The difficulty in addressing the larger political
and legal issues is that they have yet to take concrete form.
There is general concern with and discussion of the problem
with having plans for facilities that go beyond 2012, but no
call for an amendment of the CWC, nor any other proposed
solution. At present, there certainly is no easy solution on
which States Parties can agree. That is an advantage for the
U.S. in the push for dialogue and transparency that will be
important, particularly at EC-45. What some in Washington
have called "use of the Socratic method" should assist
delegations in coming to the conclusion that there is no easy
solution.

--------------
OTHER EXTENSION REQUESTS
--------------


8. (U) Russia: On April 26, Russia submitted its "amended
detailed plan" to the DG and EC Chair. A copy of the
original Russian text was provided to Washington. The TS
anticipates having a translated version available for
distribution by May 5. Despite the length of the document,
del does not anticipate the provision of any (substantive)
new information. More noteworthy, however, is the hope
expressed privately by the Russian del that the U.S. would
follow suit and submit a detailed plan that conveniently
concludes by April 29, 2012.


9. (U) India: The content of the extension request is
consistent with discussions held with the TS. India has
noted the difficulty of destroying older, polymerized agent,
and munitions (versus bulk agent). The request cites the
long-standing air monitoring issue as one of the reasons for
delay, inferring (unintentionally or not) that the TS is
somehow partly responsible. Del has not received any
feedback from other SPs, but will inform Washington of any
discussions on the subject prior to the EC, and does not
anticipate any real objections to the request.


10. (C) Republic of Korea: The Korean extension request was
recommended for approval by EC-44. Del does not anticipate
any further discussion on this issue.


11. (U) Japan/China: While Japan/China have submitted an
extension request regarding abandoned CW in China, the issue
will not be on the EC-45 agenda. The two delegations
anticipate that the document will be circulated in time for
the May 15 destruction informals, and will assist in
discussions at that meeting, although it is unclear at this
time whether they intend to make formal presentations. The
document is, not surprisingly, light on detail, and del
anticipates possible revisions prior to official
distribution.


12. (U) Libya: At this point, the Libyan extension requests
have not generated substantial discussion, beyond general
puzzlement about why destruction cannot be completed before

2010. However, to preempt questions from becoming
objections, del recommends that Washington encourage the
Libyans to provide a clear statement at the May 15
destruction informals, and to request the presence of experts
from Tripoli to answer any questions that may arise. Del
will keep Washington informed of the discussion.

--------------
ARTICLE VII
--------------


13. (U) While delegations have still not come to any
immediate conclusions about the U.S. extension request, they

wasted no time in making the immediate linkage to national
implementation. Certainly at this EC, del strongly
recommends that the U.S. should emphasize what it has done to
support Article VII efforts (e.g., numbers of technical
assistance visits) and what measures the EC will take before
EC-46 to assist the small handful of SPs that still have not
established a National Authority, rather than engage in any
discussion that may even hint at remedial or other measures.
The U.S. does not need at this juncture to be seen prodding
other SPs.


14. (U) This period of enforced silence should abate over
time. And it should not be fatal to U.S. goals on Article
VII. Maarten Lak (Netherlands) has proven to be an energetic
facilitator and should continue to press the TS and laggard
States Parties in directions fully in sync with U.S. goals.
And DG Pfirter has told Amb. Javits that more money will be
allocated for TAVs by the TS.

--------------
AGENDA ITEMS
--------------


15. (U) The following items are listed using the internal
numbering system in the annotated provisional agenda.

(U) Item 3 - DG's opening statement: Del will provide a copy
as soon as it becomes available.

(U) Item 4 - General Debate: Del has E-mailed a draft
statement by Ambassador Javits to Washington.

(U) Item 5 - Implementation of the Convention.

(U) 5.1 - Verification plan for Borkhedi. India has yet to
distribute the accompanying facility agreement for Borkhedi;
del is working with the TS and India to seek clarification,
and to encourage greater transparency.

(U) 5.2 - Verification plan for Newport. The Russian
delegation has indicated that it is now satisfied with the
Newport documents. Unless objections are raised by a
previously silent delegation, the prospects of adoption by
this EC look good.

(U) 5.3 - Verification plan for Kambarka. The plan has been
distributed; del is awaiting specific feedback following
Washington's review.

(U) 5.4 - Verification plan for Qaf-Molla in Albania. Del is
aware of no objections or questions that have been raised
regarding this document.

(U) 5.5 - TS note on corrections to the conversion plan for
the Open Joint Stock Company "Khimprom" in Volgograd. The EC
is asked to note the document (EC-45/S/1, dated 24 April
2006).

(U) 5.6 - TS Note on progress in converting former CW
production facilities. The EC is asked to note the document
(EC-45/R/S/1, dated 21 April 2006).

(U) 5.7 - U.S. extension request. Discussed above.

(U) 5.8 - Libyan 100% extension request. Discussed above.

(U) 5.9 - Indian 100% extension request. Discussed above.

(U) 5.10 - Libyan request for extension of intermediate
deadlines. Discussed above.

(U) 5.11 - Article VII progress report. Discussed above.

(U) 5.12 - Facility Agreement for Newport. Discussed above.

(U) 5.13 - Facility Agreement for Kambarka. Although the
verification plan has been distributed, the facility
agreement has not. As both documents went to PMO at the same
time, this seems to be an administrative delay, rather than
E

an indication of continuing unresolved issues on the
document.

(U) 5.14: Facility agreement at Qaf-Molla in Albania.
Discussed above.

(U) 5.15 - DG's note on progress on Schedule 2 facility
agreements. The EC is asked to note the document
(EC-45/DG.5, dated 25 April 2006). Italy has raised this
issue in the WEOG expressing various vague concerns, but
generally seeking to have the TS push on completion of these
facility agreements. Germany replied that it did not see the
value of pushing ahead on this matter.

(U) 5.16 - DG's report on the status of implementation of
Article X. The document has not yet been released.

(U) 5.17 - DG's report on the status of implementation of
Article XI. The document has not yet been released.

(U) Item 6/6.1 - Lists of new validated data. There is no
indication that Iran and India are yet ready to lift their
objections regarding what should be a straightforward
exercise. The past requests for deferral were based on the
need for capitals to have more time to examine the lists.
Del will continue to press both delegations to lift their
vetoes, and will also call on the TS to do the same.

(U) Item 7/7.1 - OPCW office in Africa. There is good reason
for optimism that this issue will now die a silent,
well-deserved death. Facilitator Malik Azhar Ellahi
(Pakistan) has been selected to fill a position in the
External Relations Division of the TS before the May EC.
There is currently no indication of anyone willing to take
over the facilitation. Peter Makwarela (South Africa) who
was the driving force behind this exercise will be departing
in June.

(U) Item 8/8.1 - Biomedical sampling capability. While del
will check with the TS to get further details, it appears
this particular item is more procedure than substance. At
EC-44, agreement was reached on the sections of the SAB
report dealing with this issue. The remainder of the report
was held up by India and Iran. The item for the May EC is a
request for the Council to note the DG's note regarding the
SAB report. The TS has emphasized previously that practical
work on this issue has been continuing even without EC
blessing of the SAB language or the DG's note.

(SBU) Item 9/9.1/9.2 - Working Group for preparations for
second RevCon. This is an issue which will certainly drive a
lot of side-bar discussions. There remains substantial
support for UK Ambassador Parker to chair the working group.
And there is virtual unanimity on the structure of the group:
a chairman with vice-chairs (or friends of the chair) drawn
from every other regional group. However, while the Iranian
delegation has given ground on this issue, they have yet to
capitulate. Amb. Javits has played an active part in seeking
to bring the Iranians around, and EC Chairman Dastis has also
joined this effort.

(U) Item 10 - Report of the Office of Internal Oversight for

2005. Only one item concerning the U.S. has arisen in
discussions. Some delegations have noted the OIO criticism
of the handling of the VIS project, and have asked whether
the TS was able to get back the funds which had been given to
the U.S. contractor.

(U) Item 11: Administrative and financial matters.

(U) 11.1 - Consideration of a mechanism to regularize payment
of dues. The co-facilitators can report substantial progress
on this issue, and they appear to have a decent shot at
achieving agreement by the July EC.

(U) 11.2 - Income and expenditure report. The EC is asked to
note the DG's report covering the financial year ending March
31, 2006 (EC-45/DG.7, dated 25 April 2006).

(U) 11.3 - Audited financial statements. The EC is asked to
note the statements and report of the External Auditor
(EC-45/DG.7, dated 25 April 2006).

(U) 11.4 - Transfer of funds during 2005. The EC is asked to
note the DG's note on transfers (EC-45/DG.2 C-11, DG.1, dated
11 April 2006).

(U) 11.5 - Financial rules. More progress was made in the
financial rules consultations in the run up to EC-45 and the
only significant unresolved issue is the proposed procurement
language being pushed by Iran and India. The facilitator
(Snelsire) will outline the progress made to date, but
approval of the rules will not happen until EC-46 at the
earliest.

(U) 11.6 - Transfer agreement between the OPCW Provident Fund
and the UN Joint Staff Pension Fund. The EC is asked to
consider the draft agreement on the transfer of the pension
rights of participants in the UN Joint Staff Pension Fund and
participants in the OPCW Provident Fund, contained in the
DG's note on this agreement (EC-45/DG.6, dated 25 April
2006). There has been no discussion of this issue among
delegations. However, del has not heard of any opposition to
the agreement, so its approval is likely.

(U) 11.7 - Confidentiality. The EC is asked to consider the
DG's report on handling of confidential implementation in
2005 (EC-45/DG.1 C-11, DG.2, dated 10 April 2006).

(U) 11.8 - Security Audit Team IV. The EC is requested to
note the DG's note on the report of SAT IV (EC-45/DG.4, dated
25 April 2006).

(U) Item 12 - Anti-terorism efforts. The outcome at EC-44
was further consideration of the DG's note on the OPCW's
contribution in this area. A consultation is set for May 11,
but since the March EC, there has been little activity in
this area. There is still no indication of a facilitator to
succeed Sophie Moal-Makame (France) who is departing this
summer. Krzysztof Paturej, head of the Office of Special
Projects, has been given the TS lead on this issue, but has
yet to fully engage on this matter. However, none of this
will prevent another spirited discussion on this issue.

(U) Item 13 - DG's note on instruments signed by the TS.
This is an issue that has generated substantial discussion
among certain key delegations. The Chinese Ambassador has
certainly made clear to Amb. Javits that she expects the DG
to provide extensive information on what "agreements" the TS
has signed with other international bodies. Moreover, she is
concerned that the precedent not be set which would allow the
TS to usurp the treaty-making authority of the EC to conclude

SIPDIS
such "agreements." The DG is fully aware of the concerns of
various delegations, and del anticipates that he will be as
forthcoming and reassuring as possible in his presentation.

(U) Item 14 - Any other business. Del currently knows of no
issues that will be raised under this item.


16. (U) Javits sends.
ARNALL