CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): TAIWAN AND CHINA

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000982

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, EAP/CM, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): TAIWAN AND CHINA


Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Javits, Permanent Representative to t
he OPCW, Reasons: 1.4 (B, D)

This is CWC-38-06.

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Summary
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1. (C) On the margins of Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Executive Council meeting in
mid-March, Washington-based delegation officers discussed the
question of Taiwan's relationship to the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) separately with representatives of the local
Taiwan representation and the Chinese delegation. Both
expressed flexibility on modalities for making an arrangement
on the issue, but indicated no particular drive emanating
from their capitals for doing so. Discussions with the two
sides and delegation research indicate that there are
formulas by which both Taiwan and China in the recent past
have joined or cohabited international organizations.
Discussion with a key aide to OPCW Director General Rogelio
Pfirter, indicates that he may be willing to suggest a way
forward with Beijing in a trip later in the year.


2. (C) Del believes that it is desirable that a formula be
found that brings Taiwan into the global chemical
non-proliferation regime sooner rather than later. As things
stand now, Taiwan--which reportedly has the world's 14th
largest chemical industry--is a potential proliferation risk.
If Pfirter is willing to help the process, that would offer
the potential for a constructive way forward.

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Meeting with Taiwan Reps
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3. (C) Robert Mikulak, ISN/CB Director, and
Washington-based deloff Robert Blum, met Taipei
Representative Office Director of Economic Division Mark K.

N. Tseng and Commercial Attache Jennifer P.C. Hsieh at lunch
in The Hague on 14 March. The meeting was part of the
ongoing U.S. outreach to Taiwan's representation in The Hague
and in Washington on CWC matters. In the course of the
discussion, Hsieh said that she had worked in Taipei on
Taiwan's joint accession with China to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in 2001. (Note: China joined the WTO
December 11, 2001, and Taiwan joined January 1, 2002. End
Note.) Taiwan came in as the "Separate Customs Territory of
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu." Hsieh said that the deal
for Taiwan's entry into the WTO resulted from a combination
of U.S. and EU pressure and work of the WTO Secretariat.


4. (C) Tseng said that there had been recent contact
between the OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS) and Taiwan
figures. I Yuan, a Chinese Institute of International
Relations figure active on behalf of Taiwan's government, had
met informally with a TS public affairs officer in recent
months. The TS Director of Administration, Ron Nelson, had
also sponsored a lunch with Director General Pfirter's chief
of cabinet, Rafael Grossi, and the then-head of the Taipei
Representative Office, Katherine Hsiao-yueh Chang. Chang,
according to Tseng, has returned to Taipei to be a Vice
Minister who, in her capacity of overseeing European issues,
would be in charge of issues associated with OPCW. Tseng
said that if there were to be forward movement on Taiwan
entering OPCW, Chang would be in a position within the
government to help.


5. (C) (Note: Del hosted a lunch between Grossi and Taipei
representatives in 2003. At that time, Grossi said the DG
and the TS could play a middle man role in brokering a deal
between the two parties, but could not, in the first
instance, take actions that would be deemed offensive in
Beijing.)

6. (C) Tseng thought that Taiwan might be flexible on
modalities of implementation of the CWC under a China
umbrella, but he offered no specifics. He said that IAEA
safeguard arrangements for Taiwan offered a potential model.
Deloffs observed that technical aspects of the IAEA model
made it difficult to use for the CWC, but to the extent that
it demonstrated flexibility on both sides, the model might be
useful.


7. (C) Meanwhile, Tseng said, Taiwan remains concerned by
being outside OPCW, in large part because States Parties are
not permitted to sell Schedule 2 chemicals to non-member
states. An even greater worry is that the OPCW would
eventually ban the sale of Schedule 3 chemicals to
non-members and if Israel were to join the Convention, the
impetus for a Schedule 3 ban would increase.

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Meeting with Chinese Representative
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8. (C) Deloff used the occasion of a dinner on 14 March
with Kang Yong, China's Deputy Permanent Representative to
OPCW, to get China's perspective on de facto Taiwan accession
to the CWC. Kang noted that the two sides had in the late
1990s discussed the issue, but to no avail. Taiwan's current
leadership has a two China policy, which is unacceptable,
said Kang. Much of the conversation that followed dwelt on
the close relationship China had with Taiwan commercially.
China in fact wished the Taiwanese chemical industry well,
said Kang. China was open to a variety of formulas that
might allow its participation in the Convention as long as it
did not offend China's position on sovereignty. Taiwan had
to operate under the Chinese umbrella. A formula in which
Taiwan was identified as "China Taipei" would potentially
work. Kang (please protect) said that if the U.S. wished to
pursue the subject, it might do so informally on the margins
of bilateral talks on implementation of the convention. He
did not wish that it be known, however, that the suggestion
came from him.

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Meeting with OPCW Director General Special Assistant Grossi
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9. (C) Deloff paid a courtesy call on Rafael Grossi on 15
March where the focus of discussion was CWC universality
issues, including Taiwan. Grossi noted that Director General
Pfirter was contemplating a trip to China later in the year.
After discussing the conversations Deloff had with the Taiwan
representatives and China's Kang, Grossi volunteered that it
might be desirable for the Director General to provide China
with a notional detailed program of how Taiwan could engage
the CWC and under what rubric this could be accomplished.

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Comment
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10. (C) Del notes that Taiwan's chemical industry is
reputedly the fourteenth largest in the world and heavily
dependent on exports. With the CWC now at 178 member states,
the absence of the Taiwan chemical industry from the global
chemical nonproliferation regime is increasingly anomalous
and a significant potential source of chemicals for chemical
weapons programs in other countries.


11. (C) If Taiwan's chemical industry is somehow to come
under the global chemical weapons nonproliferation regime,
clearer thinking is needed, particularly in both Taipei and
Beijing, on how this might be arranged. With respect to the
CWC, the primary goal for Taiwan now appears to be an ability
to trade in Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals on the same terms as
if it were a CWC member state. Taiwan officials seem to have
accepted the fact that Taiwan cannot join the CWC and have
informally suggested that an inspection regime for Taiwan's
chemical industry could provide reassurance to the
international community. This greater confidence would then
somehow translate into lifting the trade restrictions to
which Taiwan, as a non-member state, is now subject. The
"IAEA model" for inspection, which has been raised by
Taiwan's experts informally over the last couple years, will
not work for the much different situation of the chemical
industry. The IAEA, in effect, subcontracts safeguards
inspections to the U.S., which has a supplier relationship to
Taiwan. In the case of the chemical industry, however, the
basic issue is Taiwan's own production, rather than the use
of imported materials. Furthermore, neither China, nor other
CWC States Parties, are likely to accept such an arrangement
for inspection of Taiwan's chemical industry.


12. (C) One approach would to bring Taiwan under the global
chemical non-proliferation regime would be for Taiwan, as a
"province" of China, to have a quasi-independent status under
the CWC, but under a Chinese umbrella. Taiwan would make
declarations and accept inspections and would be treated the
same as a State Party with respect to chemical trade. The
provisions of the CWC would be reflected in domestic
implementing legislation. Drawing on other international
arrangements in which Taiwan participates, Taiwan might be
called "Chinese Taipei" or something similar and deal
directly with the OPCW Technical Secretariat on such issues
as declarations and inspections. More problematic would be
the legal and political status of Taiwan under such
arrangements. What would be Taiwan's legal obligations and
political role under a Chinese umbrella? Would Taiwan be able
to send a representative to OPCW meetings? What role would
such a representative be allowed?


13. (C) Given the possibility that Taiwan, for political
reasons, might reject coming in "under a Chinese umbrella, an
alternative approach would be for Taiwan to enter into a
"relationship agreement" (i.e., short of being a full State
Party) with the OPCW, either directly with the Taiwan
government, or, if this is unacceptable to China, with a
non-governmental entity on Taiwan, such as the Taiwan
Chemical Industry Association (TCIA). Under such an
agreement, which would need to be approved by the OPCW
Conference of the States Parties, the Taiwan government or
TCIA might commit to measures that mirror those in the
treaty, such as "information reports" (declarations) and
"technical audits" (inspections). Taiwan's renunciation of
chemical weapons would be established either directly, or by
TCIA forwarding "for information" official acts of Taiwan's
governing authorities, including special implementing
legislation. (Comment: We will also likely have to consider
how to address questions about possible past CW-related
activities.) Representatives would be allowed to attend OPCW
meetings as observers, but would have no role in decision
making. Under this approach, the trade privileges would
require a technical change in the Verification Annex to
remove trade restrictions on entities that accept monitoring
measures equivalent to those in the CWC.


14. (C) Del defers to Washington on whether and how it wants
to try to bring Taiwan under the global chemical
non-proliferation regime reflected in the CWC. But our sense
is that there is a deal potentially awaiting. But all of
this would require, in the first instance, political will on
the part of Taipei and Beijing, and we detect little of that
so far in The Hague.


15. (C) If there is to be a deal--and if political will is
to be generated in either Taipei or Beijing--clearer thinking
than we have seen so far is needed for both sides. Taiwan's
political, as well as industry authorities, need to have a
full understanding of key CWC requirements. They need to
know what their responsibilities would be, what their
opportunities would be, and whether their concerns are valid
or imagined. China, too, needs to think, beyond professions
of flexibility, to the precise terms of how an arrangement
might work.


16. (C) Key to a deal would be third party help. Shopping
ideas to both sides on terms for implementation that did not
cross either side's political red lines is probably critical
to the process. If there is to be a middleman, OPCW Director
General Pfirter, with the resources of the Technical
Secretariat (as well as U.S. ideas and support) behind him,

SIPDIS
might show some promise, though the Chinese del should be
consulted on this in advance. Whoever makes the effort,
discussion of an arrangement with either side should
emphasize that the international community--for compelling
nonproliferation reasons--needs to bring the Taiwan chemical
industry into a relationship with the CWC. Taiwan's industry
outside the CWC constitutes a significant loophole in the
global chemical weapons and precursor control regime and thus
a proliferation threat. This needs to be fixed.


17. (U) Javits sends.
ARNALL