Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06THEHAGUE895
2006-04-21 16:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

NETHERLANDS/KOSOVO: RESPONSE TO U.S. KOSOVO POLICY

Tags:  PREL PGOV YI EU NL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0006
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0895/01 1111602
ZNY CCCAA ZZH
O 211602Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5500
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0614
RUEHSQ/AMEMBASSY SKOPJE PRIORITY 0434
RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 0422
RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 0489
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0640
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 1849
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0563
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2110
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5501
C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000895 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV YI EU NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/KOSOVO: RESPONSE TO U.S. KOSOVO POLICY
DEMARCHE

REF: STATE 59894

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Schofer, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000895

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV YI EU NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/KOSOVO: RESPONSE TO U.S. KOSOVO POLICY
DEMARCHE

REF: STATE 59894

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Schofer, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: The GONL greatly appreciated the oral brief
on U.S. Kosovo policy, but is concerned that the USG might be
"tipping its hand" by trying to influence the status process
in favor of Kosovar independence. MFA Senior Policy Advisor
for Kosovo Sebastiaan Messerschmidt said that the Dutch
remain strongly in favor of a negotiated settlement, and
questioned whether the USG intended for Belgrade and Pristina
to learn of its views by going to all EU capitals on the
matter. He also noted Dutch plans to travel to the region in
early May, and offered to deliver any messages back-channel,
should Washington find it helpful. Polmiloff discussed
reftel points with Messerschmidt on April 21. End summary.


2. (C) Messerschmidt said he appreciated the brief, and
reaffirmed strong Dutch support for ICTY conditionality and
the arrest of Mladic. But he focused mainly on the point
referring to the USG's "private view" that Kosovar
independence is the only realistic option, and worried about
the political message of talking to all EU capitals on the
issue. He reiterated that the Dutch continue to support a
negotiated settlement, and said that while the Dutch
appreciate continued U.S. support for the status process,
they would not be surprised to learn that the U.S. intended
to push for independence.


3. (C) While the oral brief diluted the formality somewhat,
Messerschmidt said the message was clear that by talking to
all EU capitals the USG was trying to influence the status
process. He questioned if the USG intended for Serbia and
Kosovo to learn of these points -- by talking to all EU
capitals, Belgrade and Pristina will likely hear about the
USG's private views. Polmiloff asked for clarification;
Messerschmidt assured him that the Dutch will handle the
information discretely, but that the EU is a "sieve,"
something the USG knows all too well -- perhaps that was the
USG's intent, Messerschmidt cynically queried.


4. (C) Messerschmidt said the Dutch understand the
significance attached to reaching a settlement by the end of
this year, and remain entirely supportive of a negotiated
settlement. However, the economy is doing poorly,
Messerschmidt argued, and the government is still in the
formative stages. Successful completion of some confidence
building measures would also be helpful, he added. Plus,
some road-blocks such as Mitrovica may require more time to
resolve -- if a settlement were to be reached by the end of
this year, then perhaps it might be best to leave the
question of Mitrovica open, Messerschmidt said.


5. (C) On Serbia's EU prospects, he noted that EU enlargement
questions and criteria have changed following the "big bang"
of 10 new members. He stressed that there is both a
political and technical process for EU enlargement. This is
not to suggest that the Dutch advocate backing away from
promises made at Thessaloniki in 2003, he said. However,
there is greater scrutiny within the EU on criteria for
enlargement. Messerschmidt said that from this perspective,
FM Bot is very reluctant to engage on the possibility of
newly independent states in the Western Balkans with
membership aspirations.


6. (C) On the other hand, Messerschmidt acknowledged the need
for greater regional security in the region -- that cannot be
ignored. He added that points made on assisting both Serbia
and Kosovo resonate with the Dutch, especially those
regarding respect for human rights. The Dutch will continue
to try and find niche areas in which their relatively modest
financial assistance can be maximized for the best results.
He also questioned U.S. plans for "reconsolidating" KFOR, and
under what capacity would the U.S. be involved in a civilian
presence. He said it would be good to know what Washington
had in mind regarding the disbursement of resources during
post-settlement implementation to ensure cohesion and
effectiveness.



7. (C) Messerschmidt emphasized that he greatly appreciated
the brief; "it's always good to know where the USG is
heading." The Dutch are planning a trip to the region in
early May, he said, but want to see what progress is achieved
at the May 4 status meeting. He added that although the
Dutch are not on the UN Security Council or the Contact
Group, they still maintain a good network of contacts in the
Balkans and would be happy to bring a message to Belgrade or
Pristina through back-channels, if Washington thought that
would be helpful.
ARNALL