Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06THEHAGUE612
2006-03-22 06:14:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR

Tags:  PARM PREL CWC 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0612/01 0810614
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 220614Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5155
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000612 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR
44TH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION

REF: STATE 39953

This is CWC-26-06.

--------
SUMMARY
--------

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000612

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR
44TH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION

REF: STATE 39953

This is CWC-26-06.

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (U) The 44th Executive Council session of March 14-17
resulted in modest movement on some issues of importance to
the U.S. Most critical was what did not happen: there was no
protracted discussion of the fact that the U.S. did not
provide its extension request for the 100% destruction
deadline. This was due to the expectation that the U.S. will
submit the request before April 29, 2006 as required by the
Convention. There was agreement on the Russian 45%
destruction deadline and no language linking foreign
assistance to Russian obligations. Discussions with the
Russian delegation provided useful insights into the Russian
destruction program. Text regarding biomedical sampling
capability was noted. The Iraqi Ambassador and members of
his Embassy staff attended the EC as observers. Finally,
informal discussions generated substantial support for UK
Ambassador Parker to be the head of the working group
preparing for the Second RevCon, supported by
vice-chairpersons from the other regional groups. The March
13 donors meeting, destruction informals and discussions with
the Albanians are also reported below. End Summary.

--------------
ITEM 3 - STATEMENT BY THE DG
--------------


2. (U) The Director-General spoke on the usual themes: there
are 12 CW destruction facilities in operation this
intersessional period; the Technical Secretariat confirmed
the soundness of the U.S. optimization approach; Russia will
destroy 45% of its Category 1 CW stockpiles by December 31,
2009 and it is requesting the EC decide to set this date as
the phase 3 deadline. He noted that Albania plans to start
destruction operations at the Qaf-Molla CWDF in July. The DG
also noted the initial destruction deadline set out in the
CWC is near and the international community will be expecting
possessor states to increase their destruction efforts. Any
hesitation or uncertainties could damage the credibility and
effectiveness of the CWC. The DG commented that the present
ratio of industry inspections is still too low and he hoped

States Parties will support a quantitative increase in this
type of inspection. He further noted an uncertainty in an
initial Schedule 2 inspection in the UK, and that they are
working together to resolve the issue.


3. (U) Under ICA, the DG noted TS efforts to assist national
authorities, and to implement the CWC, and cited technical
assistance visits. He remarked on support of SPs for their
Associate and Internship Support Programs, and improving
national capacity building. He particularly noted EU
political support and voluntary contributions, and the
continued offering of courses on analytical techniques. The
DG noted there are now 178 member states, however North Korea
continues to remain unengaged on the CWC and there are still
a number of Middle Eastern countries that are not yet
signatories. He mentioned that the TS will soon host the
third workshop on universality in the Mediterranean Basin,
with the date and venue announced in the near future.


4. (U) The DG noted 96% of annual contributions were paid in
2005, but were not made until the last quarter of the year,
creating a problem for the TS in planning and delivering the
approved program over the course of the year. He said the TS
is addressing procurement issues highlighted by SPs, the
Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial Matter, the
Office of Internal Oversight, and External Auditor. He also
noted the development of initiatives to improve TS management
of positions in regards to tenure. The DG expects Ralf
Trapp's study on the policy to be ready before the summer
holidays. The DG said the TS will ask for additional funds
for training and staff development in the 2007 draft budget,
noting the OPCW currently spends 0.5% of its budget on this

area, compared with the 2% the UN recommends. The DG
announced the Prime Minister of the Netherlands will attend
the first observance of the Day of Remembrance for victims of
chemical warfare on April 27, 2006. He also announced the TS
is working on plans to commemorate the 10th anniversary of
the entry into force of the Convention in April 2007.
Finally, the DG saluted Deputy DG Brian Hawtin who will be
leaving the OPCW shortly and welcomed his successor, John
Freeman.

--------------
ITEM 4 - GENERAL DEBATE
--------------


5. (U) There were nineteen speakers during the General
Debate, most touched on the usual issues, including Article
VII, universality, and African office. The primary topic in
most statements was destruction deadlines. Nearly all
countries and regional statements addressed the issue, many
making the point that all destruction should be completed
within the April 2012 timeframe laid out in the CWC. New
Zealand and Norway noted they have made or will make,
additional contributions to Russia's destruction efforts.
The topic of OPCW site selection was a hot button for New
Zealand. Their Ambassador also noted their displeasure with
the facilitator's paper. Malaysia on behalf of NAM, Iran and
Cuba noted that political elements should not be used as an
element in the methodology. Norway, New Zealand and NAM also
noted there needs to be a more equitable geographic
distribution factor. New Zealand used solid numbers to back
up their statement, in particular noting that soon they will
be undergoing a second round of inspections on their
facilities.


6. (U) The usual delegations, including NAM, Iran and Cuba,
noted that Article XI needs to be fully implemented, in
particular, unresolved issues in subparagraphs 2 (c) and 2(e)
of the article. Others mentioned it in relation to "peaceful
uses of chemistry." Some delegations mentioned the 2008
Review Conference and the need for a good facilitator to run
the working group, further stating it must be a consensus
decision. Sudan suggested it be presided by two Ambassadors,
noting they could supply one of them. Japan commented on the
importance of timely submission of declarations. There was
reference to the subjects of assessed contributions and
regularization of payments, the OPCW's role in fighting
global terrorism, optimization of EC work, challenge
inspections, forming a host country committee, and the OPCW
MOU with the African Union. China commented that Japan is
lagging behind on abandoned CW in China and Japan replied in
its statement on the work they have done, pointing out the
difficulties involved. Cuba again mentioned the U.S.
blockade.


7. (U) Delegations welcomed the Iraqi observers, noting it
was a positive measure for their accession to the treaty.
(EC Chairman Dastis had simply raised the Iraqi request
before the EC began, and Iraqi attendance was adopted without
any discussion.) Iran first noted they were victims of
chemical weapons by the former government of Iraq, then went
on to say approval of Iraq's presence at observers at an EC
should not be seen as a precedent for other non-State
Parties, and stated any other requests to come to ECs or CSPs
as observers should be decided by the EC on a case-by-case
basis.

--------------
ITEM 5 - STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION
--------------


8. (U) Item 5.1: The EC agreed to defer until the next
session the verification plan for the CWDF in India. The
U.S. stated that it was unable to join consensus until the
draft associated facility agreement has been distributed and
reviewed. India informed the EC during the general debate
that it requested to the OPCW on March 14, 2006 an extension
to the 100 percent deadline. The U.S. del learned later that
India is requesting a date in 2009.


9. (U) Item 5.2: The EC deferred until its next session the
verification plan for the Newport Chemical Agent Disposal
Facility. The Russian delegation indicated that it was now
satisfied with a resolution on Newport, but there was
insufficient time to get approval from Moscow. Such approval
may be sufficient to ward off German objections on Newport.


10. (U) Item 5.3: The EC approved the verification plan for
the Pine Bluff Binary Destruction Facility.


11. (U) Item 5.4: The EC approved the amendments to the
verification plan for the Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal
Facility.


12. (U) Item 5.5: The EC agreed to note the Note by the TS on
corrections to the Russian Federation detailed plan for the
conversion of the sarin CWPF at Volgograd and approved the
corrections.


13. (U) Item 5.6: A State Party, the U.S. and Russia
reported orally on the progress made in meeting the revised
deadline. The U.S. referred to the detailed presentation
provided at the March 13 destruction informals and noted that
copies of the presentation were available to delegations.


14. (U) Item 5.7: The EC noted the report by the DG on the
progress that has been made in meeting the revised deadlines
for the destruction of chemical weapons.


15. (U) Item 5.8: The EC approved the Russian 45 percent
deadline extension of its Category 1 CW. The U.S., Germany,
France, UK and Austria (representing the EU) raised with
Russia the concern of the linkage in the draft decision
document between Russia's ability to meet deadlines and the
receipt of foreign assistance. The U.S. suggested that
Russia consider much simpler language concerning transparency
as was contained in the October 2003 CSP decision
(C-8/DEC.13, 24 October 2003) and to avoid any political
links to international assistance. Russia agreed to consider
those concerns. The matter was ultimately resolved with a
revision on the decision language (EC-44/DEC/CRP.8, dated 16
March 2006). The deadline extension request suffered from
some last minute intervention by Italy (legitimately during
the discussion of this agenda item) and South Africa (not so
legitimately, during the discussion of report language)
pleading for additional time to consider the revision.


16. (U) Item 5.9: A State Party request on the extension of
the 100 percent deadline for the destruction of Category 1 CW
stockpile was adopted by the EC. The State Party agreed to
report every 90 days as is required under Part IV (A),
paragraph 28 of the Verification Annex.


17. (U) Item 5.10: The EC noted the report by the DG on
progress in implementing the decision regarding the
implementation of Article VII obligations. The U.S. made an
intervention on three points as per guidance regarding the
document. The new facilitator, Ambassador Maartin Lak (the
Netherlands),introduced himself and called for SPs to work
together to resolve outstanding issues like the establishment
of national authorities and the enacting of penal
legislation. The Article VII working group met to consider
report language for the EC, which led to an acceptable
outcome, and, more importantly, provided indications that Lak
will be an active, efficient facilitator ready to cooperate
with the U.S.


18. (U) Item 5.11: The EC deferred until the next session the
facility agreement for the Newport Chemical Agent Disposal
Facility.


19. (U) Item 5.12: The EC adopted the Japanese facility
agreement for its Schedule 1 facility for protective
purposes.


20. (U) Item 5.13: The EC adopted the Pine Bluff Binary
Destruction facility agreement.


21. (U) Item 5.14 and 5.15: The EC noted the TS note on

amendments to the facility agreement regarding on-site
inspections at the Anniston Chemical Destruction Facility and
adopted the amendments to the verification plan at Anniston.


22. (U) Item 5.16: At the request of Iran, the EC deferred
until the next session the Note by the DG on the update on
progress with schedule 2 facility agreements (EC-44/DG.1,
dated 2 December 2005). Iran's intervention resulted in
report language calling for the TS to prepare further updated
reports on progress with Schedule 2 facility agreements to
consider at the next EC Session.

23. (U) Item 5.17: On the issue of the status of annual
declarations, the UK, Germany and Japan all made
interventions from the floor on the importance of submitting
declarations or "nil" declaration on past activities on a
timely basis. The EC report called for the need to continue
consultation within the corresponding cluster during the
intersessional period. (Note: it appears likely that del rep
Larry Denyer will be announced soon as the facilitator for
this issue.)

--------------
ITEM 6 - BIOMEDICAL SAMPLES
--------------


24. (U) The EC noted the discussions on biomedical sampling
of the report of the Eighth Session of the Scientific
Advisory Board (section 5 of SAB-8/1, dated 10 February 2006)
and the note by the DG on the report (para 5 of EC-44/DG.7,
dated 8 March 2006). See the discussion on Agenda Item 14
below concerning the remainder of the SAB report, which was
only received.

--------------
ITEM 7 - OPCW CENTRAL ANALYTICAL DATABASE
--------------


25. (U) The EC was asked to consider and approve three notes
on new validation data, EC-42/DG.6, dated 31 August 2005,
which was deferred from the Forty Third Session, and
EC-44/DG.3 and EC44/DG.4, both dated 13 February 2006. India
expressed concerns about potential confidential business
information considerations, and the inadequate time available
for review. At their request, and with support from a small
number of other SPs, the EC decided that all three notes
would be considered further at the next session. The EC also
requested the TS submit a note assessing the implication of
data contained in EC-42/DG.6 for the activities of the SPs.

--------------
ITEM 8 - AFRICA OFFICE
--------------


26. (U) The facilitator of the consultations on the
establishment of an OPCW Office in Africa, Malik Azhar Ellahi
of Pakistan, reported on the results of the consultations.
He also had submitted to the EC prior to March 1, 2006 a
non-paper on the results of the consultations, which
recommended a broader review of the situation before
decision. The South African delegation declared that a
temporary office in Africa would not be a satisfactory
solution, but this was not supported by other delegations.

--------------
ITEM 9 - WORKING GROUP TO PREPARE
FOR SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE
--------------

27 (U) EC Chairman Dastis opened discussion on the
establishment of an open-ended working group for preparations
for the Second RevCon and announced that he has conducted
consultations with regional groups. However, he has not been
able to reach a consensus on a nominee for the facilitator of
the group, and plans to continue consultations. Delegations
were of the opinion that this is a very important issue, and
thus the choice of a facilitator should not be rushed.


28. (U) This was a major topic of side-bar discussions. The
resulting straw polls show significant support for UK

Ambassador Parker to chair the group, and complete acceptance
that the Iranian Ambassador, who had announced last year that
he wanted the post, could not get it. However, the Iranian
Ambassador is not yet ready to join consensus, and reaching
an agreement was especially difficult as he was in Tehran for
consultations the entire week of the EC. There were a number
of attempts to try to find a formulation that might address
his concerns. One bizarre suggestion that came from South
Africa was a co-chairmanship (presumably a UK-Iranian
pairing) that was put forth publicly by Sudan. That has now
died a well-deserved death. There is now general consensus
on an approach mirroring the EC with a chairman supported by
vice-chairs from the other regional groups. Dastis has
indicated that he will meet with the Iranian Ambassador on
his return to outline the sentiment of delegations.

--------------
ITEM 10 - EC RATIONALIZATION
--------------


29. (U) The Russian facilitator of discussions on the EC
rationalization, Victor Smirnovskiy, reported on March 10
consultations. He noted the proposal to pass consideration
of the matter to the working group for the Second RevCon.
However, South Africa went directly to the TS to insert
language (without the knowledge of the Russian Vice-Chair)
asking that a TS paper on the status of outstanding items on
the EC agenda be submitted to EC-46. All delegations
objected to that proposal. After much debate, the EC
requested that the TS paper, together with the original South
African paper on the CW cluster, be submitted to the working
group.

--------------
ITEM 11 - OIO AND EXTERNAL AUDITOR
IMPLEMENTATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS
--------------


30. (U) Item 11.1: The EC noted the Report on the
Implementation in 2005 of the recommendations contained in
the 2004 annual report of the Office of Internal Oversight.
The facilitator, Chiho Komuro (Japan),also provided a brief
oral report on the consultation held on the report.


31. (U) Item 11.2: The EC noted the Note by the TS on the
status of implementation of the recommendations of the
External Auditor. Komuro announced that she would hold
consultations on the note during the intersessional period.
--------------
ITEM 12 - PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
--------------


32. (U) Privileges and immunities agreements with Colombia
and Madagascar were concluded. Del rep made the usual
statement from the floor per reftel instructions.

--------------
ITEM 13 - ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ISSUES
--------------


33. (U) Item 13.1: The EC deferred action on the
consideration of a mechanism for SPs to regularize the
payment of their dues to the OPCW. Jae-woong Lee (ROK) and
Florian Antohi (Romania) were announced as co-facilitators on
the issue and will be convening consultations in the
near-future.


34. (U) Item 13.2: The EC approved the classification of two
posts (EC-43/DG.7/Add.2, dated February 23, 2006) that had
not been approved at EC-43, as the position descriptions had
not yet been completed.


35. (U) Item 13.3: The EC noted the report by the DG on OPCW
income and expenditure for the financial year to December 31,

2005.


36. (U) Item 13.4: The EC deferred action on the Draft
Financial Rules of the OPCW. Facilitator Rick Snelsire
(U.S.),noted that much progress had been made in recent

consultations and that he hoped that the Financial Rules
could be approved in the near future.

--------------
ITEM 14 - SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD
--------------


37. (U) The SAB chair and the head of the SAB working group
on biomedical sampling made themselves available to address
questions from the EC on their respective reports. In the
end, the EC received the report of the Eighth Session of the
SAB, while noting the relevant discussions on biomedical
sampling within these documents (section 5 and para 5,
respectively). The reason for this awkward decision was
because some delegations felt they needed more time for their
capitals to review the remaining details of the report and
DG's note.

--------------
ITEM 15 - ANTI-TERRORISM
--------------


38. (U) The EC was asked to note the DG's note on the OPCW's
contribution to global anti-terrorist efforts. Facilitator
Sophie Moal-Makame (France) briefed the EC, with emphasis on
the recent useful interaction with the African Centre for
Study and Research on Terrorism. Several SPs spoke in support
of the report and the ongoing effort by the open-ended
working group, with "WMD" mitigation concepts mentioned by
several SPs. Comment was also made that anti-terrorism should
be included within the scope of RevCon preparation. South
Africa, supported by India, noted the need for more time to
review the note in context of the working group's mandate.
Thus, the note was acknowledged as having been received and
will be considered further at the next EC.

-------------- -
ITEM 16 - ELECTION OF EC CHAIR AND VICE-CHAIRS
-------------- -


39. (U) The EC elected Ambassador Hlengiwe Buhle Mkihze of
South Africa as the new Chairperson, and the permanent
representatives of Colombia, Germany, Iran, and Russian
Federation as its new Vice-Chairpersons. (Note: There are
repeated references in the preceding paragraphs to
difficulties raised by the South African delegate.
Unfortunately, his behavior at this EC was the rule, not the
exception, and it has generated concern among delegations
about whether the South African chairperson will have the
kind of support needed to be effective. Amb. Javits has
emphasized to his South African counterpart that he wants her
to have a successful tenure in the chair, and that it is
important that she have a skillful and respected officer to
help her achieve that goal.)

--------------
ITEM 17 - ANY OTHER BUSINESS
--------------


40. (U) A number of delegations raised concerns about the
OPCW Memorandum of Understanding with the African Union and
other similar agreements. The DG expressed his intent to
report to EC-45 on the issue generally, the MOU with the
African Union and other regional organizations specifically,
as well as similar documents.

--------------
RUSSIA BILATERAL
--------------


41. (U) U.S. delegation met with the Russian delegation on
the margins of EC-44. Russian participants included Elena
Rodyushkina, Anna Lukashina, Leonid Liangasov, Viktor
Smirnovsky, and Petr Svirin. U.S. provided the Russians with
a non-paper drawn from EC-44 guidance prior to consultations.
The primary purpose of the meeting was to request detailed
information on the status of documentation at Russia's two
newest destruction facilities, specific technologies employed
at these sites, and future plans for destruction. U.S. also

provided a draft revision of language for the Newport
Facility Agreement and Verification Plan for Moscow's review.
The Russian delegation was significantly more responsive
than in previous sessions, and provided a surprising amount
of detail that in all cases closely matched what TS staff had
explained.


42. (U) The U.S. inquired as to possible reasons for the
delay in distribution of documents for the Kambarka facility,
and stressed its belief that timely provision of
documentation is essential in ensuring transparency. The
Russians assured the U.S. of its intention to provide
documents in time for EC-45 consideration. Rodyushkina then
explained that four major issues remain. First, Russia has
some concerns about TS insistence that all equipment items
from the approved list be brought on site, primarily for
reasons having to do with transportation costs. Russia also
has concerns with the use of NDE equipment on agent storage
tanks. Russia has requested that a full equipment list be
included in the FA, with corresponding restrictions on its
use.


43. (U) Second, the TS has requested Russia change some of
the camera positions from their current configuration in the
storage buildings. Russia is reluctant to reposition cameras
in the first storage building, as agent is already being
destroyed from this building, which presents safety concerns
in modifying equipment. Del rep inquired as to whether
Russia would then at least consider changes to the four
remaining buildings; Rodyushkina replied that cost will also
be a factor. Third, the TS and Russia seem to disagree on
whether agent volume or mass should be recorded in tracking
quantity destroyed. One possible solution would be the
introduction of further calculations using density as flow
meter readings are obtained. Finally, the TS had requested
that Russia declare the storage buildings as temporary
storage areas, while Russia would prefer to declare the tanks
as an integral part of the destruction process. It seems,
however, that in this case Russia is willing to accept the TS
proposal.


44. (U) The U.S. also requested information on the status of
the FA and VP for Maradykovsky. Russia stated that the TS
has scheduled its Final Engineering Review in May, at which
point additional changes to monitoring equipment may be made
before documents are finalized. The U.S. then asked how
Russia intended to conduct destruction operations for its
second train (smaller munitions). Rodyushkina replied that a
more traditional approach will be applied, in which agent is
drained from munitions into a neutralization reactor. There
are a limited number of munitions with a mustard/lewisite
mixture, for which Russia plans to construct a separate
destruction unit for neutralization with monoethanol. The
reaction mass will be disposed of in a thermal treatment unit
(Del comment: this term seems to be used interchangeably
with incinerator) in Building 101, adjacent to the main
technical building, Building 1047. Construction has
evidently begun on the incinerator foundation. Reaction mass
from both trains will be fed to accumulation vessels, and
then into the incinerator. A metal parts furnace with an
afterburner is also being constructed.


45. (U) The U.S. inquired as to whether similar processes
would be used at Leonidovka and Pochep, given the
similarities between stockpiles. Russia stated that a
similar neutralization technology will be used at Leonidovka,
but that a more traditional approach will probably be used at
Pochep, given the distance between the storage and
destruction facilities at this site. The U.S. also asked
whether Russia intended to dispose of all reaction masses
through on-site incineration. Russia replied that
hydrolysate disposal was dependent on several factors, to
include new environmental regulations, cost, and
practicability. Rodyushkina confirmed that Russia does
intend to construct an on-site incinerator at Leonidovka, but
that reaction mass from Pochep may need to be transported
elsewhere.


46. (U) The U.S. distributed proposed changes to the Newport

documents (based on consultations with Germany),and asked
whether Russia was prepared to approve the documents even
without these changes. The Russians requested more time to
consider the changes in the context of the full document, but
asked whether the hydrolysate was being stored at the
facility, and how agent quantity destroyed was being tracked.
The U.S. explained the current on-site storage arrangement,
and the fact that no destruction credit will be taken until
the hydrolysate undergoes secondary treatment. The U.S.
highlighted the fact that the new language proposed now
explicitly states the requirement for EC approval of changes
involving the TSDF.


47. (U) Finally, the U.S. asked whether Russia intended to
circulate a new draft of its 45% extension request, based on
concerns numerous delegations had expressed about language
clearly linking Russia's ability to meet CW destruction
deadlines with provision of international assistance. The
U.S. again expressed its concern over this language, and
offered several possible alternatives. Lukashina explained
that, realistically, Russia did require international
assistance for progress with CW destruction, and was merely
attempting to highlight this fact. Lukashina also noted that
the language was preambular, not operative, and did not
therefore imply an obligation for donor states. The U.S.
pointed out that the language, simply by virtue of its
presence in a decision document, implied a political linkage.

--------------
DONORS MEETING
--------------


48. (U) U.S. del reps attended the March 13 informal
consultations on international assistance for Russia's CW
destruction program. The meeting was chaired by Frank van
Beuningen of the Dutch MFA, who facilitated a tour-de-table
during which donor states gave an update on their financial
commitments, and progress on construction at the various
sites. Russia also made a statement, thanking all donor
states at the beginning, but following with a status update
from which U.S. efforts at Schuch'ye were notably absent.
U.S. del highlighted its overall monetary contributions so
far, and current problems settling on a suitable contractor
for Building 101. Overall, recent developments included
conclusion of a bilateral agreement between France and
Russia, beginning of destruction operations at Kambarka, and
plans for a joint UK/Canada visit to Khizner in the near
future.


49. (U) Germany made a more detailed statement explaining
the background, as well as the current status, of its
assistance efforts. Del later learned that this was at the
request of van Beuningen, who is searching for ways to
re-energize the donors meeting. He asked whether the U.S.
would be willing to consider giving a similar presentation
during the next meeting July 4, 2006. Finally, the Russian
delegation called upon donor states to respond to Russia's
EC-42 proposal for additional projects that could benefit
from international assistance.

--------------
DISCUSSIONS WITH ALBANIA
--------------


50. (U) Members of the U.S. delegation and the program
manager and deputy for the CTR/DTRA Albania CW-stockpile
destruction project met with the Albanian delegation and TS
representatives on the margins of the EC to review the draft
facility agreement and draft verification plan for the
Qaf-Molla CWDF. Final agreement was reached on the Facility
Agreement and Verification Plan, as well as on the draft
decision. Final concurrence with the agreed Facility
Agreement is required from Tirana, with official submission
to the TS expected by April 3, 2006, in time for distribution
and consideration for approval during EC-45.

--------------
DESTRUCTION INFORMALS
--------------



51. (U) The TS as usual provided updates on the status of
verification activities, chemical demilitarization and a
review of progress on the destruction of CW and on the
destruction or conversion of CWPFs for the period 02 December
2005 to 10 March 2006. Handouts were provided addressing the
above.


52. (U) The U.S. made its presentation on the status of its
destruction program, and received no questions from
attendees. Russia gave a PowerPoint presentation on its CW
destruction program with lots of pictures and colored charts,
but provided nothing new. Shchuch'ye is still listed as
beginning operations in 2008. The CWDF at Kambarka began
operations on December 20 that were referred to as trial
tests, and reported its draft verification plan and facility
agreement (FA) as still with the TS. The U.S. learned that
there are several outstanding issues relating to the FA. The
TS conducted its initial visit in September 2005 to the

SIPDIS
Maradykovsky CWDF and Russia reported its plans to begin
operations by second half of 2006. The verification plan for
destruction and FA are also in the works. The CWDFs at
Leonidovka and Pochep are supposed to become operational in
2008 with Kizner starting in 2009. The Gorny CWDF completed
destruction operations. So far, Russia has been credited with
destroying approximately 3% of its Category 1 CW. Germany
provided an electronic presentation with lots of pictures and
self-proclamation for German equipment and expertise in
assisting Russia with the destruction of its CW stockpile.


53. (U) The Indian delegation provided an oral presentation
on its CW destruction operations. The CWPF at Borkhedi began
operating in mid January and is expected to end its campaign
in mid March. Its FA is still being worked with the TS. The
next campaign is expected to start in July 2006. India has
destroyed 53% of its Category 1 CW. India made no reference
during the informals that it will be seeking an extension to
the 100 percent deadline.


54. (U) A State Party gave an electronic presentation with no
handouts. It explained its rationale behind its decision to
seek an extension to the 100% deadline. The State Party
began a new campaign on March 13; so far it has destroyed 67%
of its Category 1 CW.


55. (U) Libya and Albania provided their pre-arranged
briefing as coordinated by the U.S. There were no questions
from SPs. China and Japan as usual gave the latest ACW
updates. Both China and Japan stated that Japan would be
seeking a deadline extension from the OPCW.


56. (U) Javits sends.
ARNALL