CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000534

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR
WEEK ENDING MARCH 10

This is CWC-23-06.

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P-5 MEETING ON UNIVERSALITY
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1. (U) Russia hosted a March 7 meeting of the P-5
ambassadors. The Director General made a presentation on
universality-related efforts of the OPCW. He noted that much
has been achieved, membership now stands at 178 states, and
the organization rapidly is being faced with approaches to
just the hard cases: Angola, North Korea, Syria, Egypt, and
Israel, whose adherence is of critical importance to achieve
the objective and purpose of the CWC. States believed close
to adherence are the Bahamas, Central African Republic,
Comorros Islands, and the Congo. Angola is particularly
difficult and is nowhere close to joining. The DG noted he
had a good meeting on January 24 with the Angolan Foreign
Minister, but results since then have been lacking.


2. (U) The DG reported that in Asia, Myanmar is showing good
signs and is actively interacting with the Technical
Secretariat. However, historically, Myanmar always appears

SIPDIS
receptive but like Prometheus' rock, it always falls back
down the hill. Iraq possibly will join soon. The TS
training for Iraq has been successful, but it needs to fully
understand CWC requirements. North Korea is the hardest case
of all: it has no interest in communications with the TS; it
has never responded to TS initiatives. The DG will continue
his efforts, focusing on his visit to the UNGA to try to meet
with the ambassador from North Korea.


3. (U) The DG noted that States Party must avoid
legitimizing the Middle East stand off. SPs must actively
engage the non-SPs, whether by demarche or other means, and
have not done enough to assist. Slow progress is being made,
via the Mediterranean workshops. The DG met with the
Egyptian Foreign Minister during his Africa trip. The
Egyptian Ambassador in The Hague requested a meeting with the
DG, where they discussed the possibility that Egypt might
send an observer to Executive Council or Conference of States
Parties meetings or OPCW workshops. Under discussion was how
Egypt might increase its presence generally. The DG reported
that he has had no recent contacts with Lebanon or Syria.
The DG noted that he had been invited as a guest speaker to
an April 3 WMD-related meeting at Hebrew University in Israel
where he will take the opportunity to press Israel regarding
its accession.


4. (U) With respect to the Mediterranean workshop schedule
for June 2006, the DG reported that he had been waiting for a
response from the Turkish ambassador regarding Ankara's
willingness to host the meeting. Unfortunately, he received
a firm no on March 6, and the TS had no alternate venues
under consideration.


5. (U) The P-5 ambassadors thanked the DG for his
presentation, and stressed the importance of adequately
preparing the Mediterranean workshop. Finding an alternate
venue with a view towards a meeting in June would not be
practical, recommending the second half of the year instead.
The DG agreed, but the schedule is very full, making that
time period impractical. The DG suggested March 2007 as an
alternative, expressing his hope that Turkey might be willing
to play host at that time. The DG further noted that the TS
would need three to four months to prepare the workshop. The
UK and Russia commented that it would be best to keep
pressure on Egypt, to keep the process moving. China also
stated that Egypt will be the key to Middle East accessions.
(After the DG departed, China remarked that the DG is overly
optimistic about Egypt's willingness to join the Convention.
The P-5 ambassadors agreed to consider meeting the Egyptian
ambassador in The Hague, to keep up the pressure.)


6. (U) China noted that it is important to continue pressing
Myanmar, regretting the recent EU/ASEAN splits in decisions
affecting Myanmar. China urged the EU to reconsider. It is
important to take a cautious approach and not give up too
soon. The UK responded that the OPCW is a small piece of the

complex issues that arise from the military government. EU
members hold strong opinions about the Myanmar government,
and change in policy is unlikely. China retorted that when
the target is the regime itself, no communication is possible
with the government. This is beyond Beijing's comprehension;
Myanmar must be part of the ASEAN summit.


7. (U) France noted the importance of regional groups such
as SADEC in any effort to pressure Angola to join the CWC.
Especially if the other African states adhere in the
near-term, Angola will feel the pressure. This also would
make the situation more uncomfortable for Egypt.


8. (U) Finally, the ambassadors briefly discussed the
upcoming March 10 consultation on rationalization of the EC,
chaired by the Russian ambassador. Russia noted it had
tried, without success, to find a facilitator, so that the
meeting would be more of a brainstorming session.
Delegations noted concerns over the South African proposals,
which may not have come up recently but could arise in the
future. Items should not be carelessly taken off the EC work
program. There is no cost to leaving items on the list. The
alternative might result in endless discussion, distracting
delegations from the real work of the EC.

--------------
INDUSTRY CONSULTATIONS - GENERAL DISCUSSION
--------------


9. (U) The vice-chair for the industry cluster, Ambassador
Guillermo Fernandez de Soto (Colombia) chaired this session,
with Bill Kane, head of the Industry Verification Branch,
directing the TS input. In his opening remarks, de Soto
stated that the purpose of this meeting was "to give new
impetus to this cluster." Mohamed Daoudi (IVB) made a
presentation on past achievements of the industry cluster
since EIF, for historic perspective. The three current
facilitators - Steve Wade (2A/2A*),Arya Sandeep (Schedule 3
transfers),and Luis Garcia (OCPF site selection) - presented
the status of their facilitations. Ken Penman (Declarations
Branch) made a brief presentation summarizing three TS
recommendations for potential future industry cluster topics:
late submission of declarations, improvement in the
submission and handling of industry declarations, and
transfer discrepancies. Daoudi made a brief summary
presentation on 12 other outstanding industry issues.


10. (U) Del rep deployed the talking points received as
guidance: there is U.S. interest in the topic of late
declarations and willingness to consider facilitating such
discussions. There is also interest in seeing the TS report
its ongoing efforts to clarify declarations that are
incomplete or internally inconsistent. De Soto was
supportive of U.S. facilitation on late declarations and
stated he would bring this to the Bureau; other SPs were also
supportive of moving forward (e.g., France, Germany, Japan,
Australia, Netherlands). In addition to the topics the TS
raised, the Netherlands suggested that TS efforts in the area
of sampling and analysis may raise other topics for the
cluster. Iran stated that they felt the DG's paper on
facility agreements was not very promising and reminded the
group that SPs cannot decide whether facility agreements are
needed.

-------------- --------------
INDUSTRY CONSULTATIONS - 2A/2A* LOW CONCENTRATION LIMITS
-------------- --------------


11. (U) Steve Wade (UK) led a facilitation on the topic of
low concentration limits for declarations of Schedule 2A/2A*
chemicals. He provided an updated draft (dated March 2006)
of his paper during the consultation, which included the
following changes to OP 13 (all in brackets): (1)
specification of the concentration at "30" percent; (2)
specification of the quantity threshold at the "verification"
threshold; and (3) clarification that this quantity is the
"annual" amount produced, processed or consumed. Wade stated
that he had had a discussion with the TS Legal Advisor
regarding the provisions of this proposal, and that he felt


the provisions were legally viable. France asked that the
Legal Advisor prepare something in writing to this end, which
Wade committed to request.


12. (U) Wade also gave several statistics about the
fluoropolymers industry (which generates PFIB as an unwanted
byproduct). He stated that between 2004 and 2009: (1) growth
of the PTFE industry was estimated at about 6 percent
annually; and (2) growth of the other fluoropolymer
industries was estimated at about 5.3 percent annually. He
also stated that the range of capacities of PTFE facilities
was 1,500 to 16,000 tons per year, which meant that
facilities would have to drop production below 200 tons per
year in order to avoid declaration under this proposal.


13. (U) The discussion centered on OP 13 and PFIB. India
still favors 1 percent without a quantity threshold and
requested more clarification on this proposal. Switzerland,
the UK, and Norway all favor a low concentration but would
support this proposal. France still seems very confused on
what OP 13 accomplishes and requested clarification. Germany
requested that we return to discussion on Option C from the
October 2005 facilitator's paper, at which point Italy left
the meeting. Germany also referred to its paper on BZ and
asked that the rationale for a low concentration level for BZ
be discussed. Japan supported Germany's proposal to return
to the October 2005 paper.


14. (U) Ken Penman (Industry Information Evaluation) stated
that, currently, six SPs declare 12 PFIB plants under
Schedule 2. From open source information, the TS estimates
that this proposal would bring in about 12 new plants for
declaration, some of which would be in the U.S. Later,
Penman provided del rep a copy of an October 2005 report
compiled by CEH Marketing Research Reports on the
fluoropolymer industry. He also recommended the discussion
on this topic in the Report of the Fourth Session of the
Science Advisory Board (SAB-IV/1, dated 6 February 2001).
With these documents and current SP declarations, we should
be able to get a better feel of the actual impact of this
proposal.


15. (U) Wade promised to provide the additional legal and
clarification information requested. He also committed to
providing a new draft of his paper in the near future.

--------------
INDUSTRY CONSULTATIONS - SCHEDULE 3 TRANSFERS
--------------


16. (U) Arya Sandeep (India) led a facilitation on the topic
of transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals. The basis of this
discussion was the existing facilitator's paper from January
19, 2006. However, at the meeting, Iran dropped a paper of
proposed amendments to the facilitator's paper. The
facilitator opened discussion on Iran's proposed amendments,
but there was no expectation of any acceptance of these
proposals until delegations have received reactions from
capitals.


17. (U) Del rep deployed guidance as received. The proposed
change to OP1 was supported by Germany, Sweden, Russia (who
proposed the language changes),and Iran (who proposed more
positive language than the Russians).


18. (U) France, UK, Switzerland, and the Netherlands were
concerned with the phrase "show restraint" in Iran's proposal
as addressing transfers that could be for prohibited
purposes, language Iran insists is similar to that of the
facilitator's earlier (October 6) paper.


19. (U) It is important to note that, despite its compromise
proposal, Iran still prefers a total ban on transfers to
non-SPs. They see the five year period discussed in para 27
of VA Part VIII to be in line with the three year delay in
implementation of the Schedule 2 ban discussed in para 31 of
VA Part VII. However, a version of Iran's proposed changes
may be the facilitator's best chance of success for a
decision.


--------------
OCPF SITE SELECTION METHODOLOGY
--------------


20. (U) Luis Garcia (Spain) led a facilitation on the topic
of how the TS should select Other Chemical Production
Facilities (OCPFs) for industry inspections. First, the TS
presented its latest round of modeling (the Highly Protected
documents were made available the day before the
consultation),showing what would happen in all 73 cases if
20 countries colluded by putting the maximum number of points
on one country and the remainder of their points on the PSF
facilities in the regional group of the country being
targeted. In general, this changed the expected number of
inspections by only one or two per year. Italy opened
discussion by pleading for simplicity, noting that it was
difficult to explain to his capital, and he had given up (a
number of delegates nodded in agreement). Italy begged the
facilitator to make the concepts more comprehensible and move
towards simplifying the proposals.


21. (U) The facilitator then introduced a draft decision.
Several delegations (UK, Iran, India) noted that this
introduction was premature because delegations are nowhere
near consensus on a methodology. The facilitator needs to
focus on the methodology, not draft decisions. Iran
supported by Brazil stated that the facilitator's proposed
methodology is unacceptable because it allows states to
nominate other states; it is unacceptable to bring political
elements into the process. New Zealand and Norway noted that
the current methodology is unacceptable, and that change is
needed now. Even with political elements, and collusion by
half the nominating states, the expected number of
inspections increases only by one or two per year, a minimal
impact.


22. (U) Delegations raised concerns regarding operational
paragraphs (OP) 4-6. OP4 recommends that the TS provide all
states upon request the nominations made by each state.
Switzerland, supported by Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the UK,
recommended that if nomination information is provided to
requesting states, it should be done in the following year so
that states cannot predict where the inspections might be
carried out. Sweden wondered how a state that feared it had
been a victim of collusion would know and what information
would be available to distinguish between collusion and
multiple nominations made without collusion. France, noting
that nominations will be incomprehensible anyway, supported
the facilitator's approach. The facilitator closed this
discussion by telling delegations that the TS should not hide
any information from anyone.


23. (U) In addition, delegations were concerned about the
90-day lag for submitting annual declarations (OP3). France,
supported by Italy, noted that this would be the same time
period states would have to prepare ADPA declarations, and
many would be unable to do both by the end of the 90 day
period. With respect to OP5, delegations wondered why the
facilitator proposed to review the methodology after four
years rather than three or five years. The TS responded that
if a four-year time period was chosen, three inspection
cycles would have been completed, allowing for a more fulsome
debate on its experience.

24. (U) Delegations worried about immortalizing the A14
methodology as currently described in OP6. New Zealand noted
that a number of delegations believe that A14 is not the
best, and that in a separate consultation delegations should
consider what technical characteristics might better describe
the work at OCPF sites worldwide. The key issue for the
selection methodology is that it increases the probability
that facilities relevant to the CWC are selected for
inspection.


25. (U) The U.S., supported by a number of delegations,
pressed the TS to provide a listing of the inspectable OCPF
sites with the relevant A14-related information. The TS
requested that interested delegates meet with Per Runn to
determine how best to move this request forward.



26. (U) Finally, delegations debated how best to proceed.
Colombia, as Vice Chair for the cluster, noted that
delegations needed to move faster. Only three consultations
remain before CSP-11, and if a method is to be finalized
prior to the CSP, more meetings are necessary. Several
delegations supported holding consultations outside the
industry intersessionals. Iran said that it favored holding
two or three OCPF meetings during the industry weeks so that
experts from Tehran could attend.

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COMMERCIAL SCHEDULE 1 FACILITY AGREEMENT
--------------


27. (U) Del rep recently proposed to the TS that we return to
discussions on the draft facility agreement language for the
one U.S. commercial Schedule 1 facility that is declared. In
the past, discussions had stalled because of significant
differences on the Schedule 2 boilerplate language. Now that
those differences have been narrowed to just one topic
(sampling and analysis),it seems appropriate to return to
the Schedule 1 effort. The TS agreed with this proposal and
anticipates preparing a draft summarizing the current state
of discussions shortly after the meetings of the EC.

--------------
FINANCIAL RULES
--------------


28. (U) Consultations on the Financial Rules were held on
March 7, and were sparsely attended. Overall it was a
productive meeting, with only two financial rules and one
amendment remaining pending. There will be no decision ready
for the upcoming EC, however delegations foresee a decision
at the May EC, assuming capitals are on board with decisions
made at this and preceding consultations. The facilitator
(Snelsire, U.S.) opened by asking if delegations had further
comments on the amendments.


29. (U) Rule 9.3.01 (b) Germany suggested adding that
investment losses should be reported to the DG, as well as
the Principal Financial Officer and that the DG will prepare
the report. This was supported by delegations.


30. (U) The facilitator noted that the amendments to
financial rules 10.6.04(d),10.6.05(c) and 10.6.06 (all
relating to procurement) are still being considered in
capital. Discussion then began on the overall financial
rules, article by article.


31. (U) Article 1 - Rule 1.1.01 - Iran suggested replacing
the word "issued" with "prepared" to more accurately reflect
reality (1st sentence). They further suggested adding that
after DG "and approved by the Executive Council" to that
sentence; and to end the final sentence with "and Executive
Council." They linked this suggestion with rule 16.2.
Germany disagreed with adding the EC to this paragraph,
arguing that it is not needed. Japan requested deferring
this item. Germany agreed and noted that this would add an
unnecessary redundancy to the financial rules.


32. (U) Article 2 - Rule 2.2.01 - Iran noted that the same
body who approves the financial rules should interpret the
rules, therefore the DG should not make that interpretation;
instead the EC should. Thus Iran wants to change DG to EC in
both places. The TS noted that in general that is true, but
during deliberations and debate of the draft financial rules
in 1998, the EC delegated it to the DG. Other delegations
felt that to change this to reflect Iran's concerns could
lead to micromanagement by the EC and be more trouble than it
is worth.


33. (U) Japan suggested adding "shall bring the case to the
attention of the EC for its consideration" after ...the DG
shall.... Italy suggested keeping Japan's suggestion and
adding as a first sentence, "Daily interpretation of the
financial rules are by the DG." then the rest of the
paragraph. Germany preferred the original wording, noting

that the EC can change any interpretation whenever it
decides. The UK supported Germany and noted that these rules
have been discussed and agreed upon since 1998 and asked
whether there was a value into going back through the rules
so minutely. The facilitator suggested keeping the paragraph
as-is except for changing "and" to "but." Iran reiterated
that it wanted to keep its suggestion as is and suggested
deferring the question to later.


34. (U) Article 3 - Rule 3.2.01 - Italy noted the second
sentence is a redundancy and that it should be deleted. This
was agreed and the article passed without further comment.


35. (U) Article 4 - Rule 4.12.01 - Germany suggested adding
"generally" before 60 days, for flexibility in case of a
vendor having trouble getting their invoices out in this time
frame. Delegations agreed and the article passed.


36. (U) Articles 5 through 16 garnered little substantive
comment and were passed.


37. (U) The facilitator will incorporate all the changes into
a new version of the document for delegations to send to
capitals. The next meeting will be held after the March EC
with a hope to completely approving the Financial Rules at
that time.

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HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT
--------------


38. (U) EC Chairman Dastis arranged a March 3 meeting of the
OPCW working group on the HQ Agreement and MFA Protocol chief
Peter Lohman. Lohman outlined changes at Schiphol to address
the concerns raised by Ambassadors, but conceded that there
are problems ensuring that all airport staff are aware of the
procedures. He asserted that the MFA would continue making
the point to airport supervisors. On difficulties
delegations have had with police, Lohman said that the MFA
will meet with some 50 senior officers in the near term. He
added that the mayor of The Hague had expressed publicly his
general concern about how the police are dealing with the
public.


39. (U) On financial matters, Lohman noted the large policy
paper that had been prepared by the MFA. He also noted that
a steering group would be set up which would deal with
assistance to diplomats, schools and health care. The group
would also address tax issues. Finally, Lohman said that the
MFA desk handling international organizations will be
expanded to handle these issues.


40. (U) Javits sends.
ARNALL