Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06THEHAGUE2603
2006-12-13 16:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP OF

Tags:  PARM PREL CWC 
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INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1960
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1724
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 0156
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C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002603 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR LEDDY
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP OF
U.S.-CHINA BILATERAL MEETINGS, DECEMBER 11-13, 2006

Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Javits, U.S. Permanent Representative
to the OPCW. Reasons 1.5 (B) and (D).

This is CWC-113-06.

--------
OVERVIEW
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002603

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR LEDDY
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP OF
U.S.-CHINA BILATERAL MEETINGS, DECEMBER 11-13, 2006

Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Javits, U.S. Permanent Representative
to the OPCW. Reasons 1.5 (B) and (D).

This is CWC-113-06.

--------------
OVERVIEW
--------------


1. (SBU) U.S.-China bilateral consultations on
implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),
held at Chinese initiative, were substantive and detailed.
Chinese Ambassador Xue Hanqin, who participated throughout
the two full days of discussions, said in an opening
statement that these consultations were in line with recent
U.S.-China discussions in April 2006 on cooperative
relations, including a constructive partnership,
strengthening our dialogue, and coordination efforts. The
recent APEC meeting reaffirmed U.S.-China relations, pointing
to an ever-growing relationship. She stressed that the
meetings with the U.S. were the first bilaterals that China
has had with any country on this subject. The Chinese del
included 7 experts from Beijing, in addition to members of
their OPCW del. At Chinese suggestion, discussions were
conducted almost entirely in English. The Chinese made clear
that they would like to hold further rounds of consultations
in 2007.


2. (SBU) Substantive discussions focused on CWC
implementation in industry and destruction of abandoned
Japanese chemical weapons, with both sides presenting
briefings and responding to detailed questions from the other
side. The third topic on the agreed agenda - clarification
of certain aspects of the Chinese CWC declaration - was
limited to a brief U.S. explanation of the background of the
questions; the Chinese said that, since they received the
questions only ten days earlier, they had not had sufficient
time to prepare responses. Chinese indicated, however, that
they should be able to provide written responses relatively
quickly.

--------------
INDUSTRY IMPLEMENTATION
--------------


3. (U) Mr. Sun Ruhong, Division Director, Chinese National

Authority, presented a brief overview of China's practices
and experiences on national implementation of the CWC. In
the presentation, he discussed their National Authority
structure, legislation, declarations, declarations and
inspection statistics, and challenges.


4. (U) Tracey O'Donnell and Larry Denyer of the Commerce
Department presented a detailed overview of the entire U.S.
process for CWC implementation in industry -- legislation,
regulations, declarations, inspection management, electronic
declarations, industry outreach, and import/export
reconciliations.


5. (U) Given the size of the U.S. industry, the Chinese del
inquired about how the Federal government communicates with
industry and ensure their compliance. Notably the Chinese
national authority does not have direct contacts with
companies and facilities, but communicate through provincial
(and in a few cases, local) offices. Unfortunately,
understanding of the CWC requirements is often very poor at
the plant level. Chinese experts inquired about the 7-year
gap between U.S. interim-final and final regulations and
whether there were requirements during this period. The
Chinese delegation also discussed their declaration
procedures and their plans for submitting electronic
declarations to the OPCW.


6. (U) After the U.S. presentation, the Chinese delegation
discussed their recent experience hosting a Schedule 2
inspection involving sampling and analysis. The involvement

of local authorities was important to the success of this
inspection. Of note: (1) the inspection equipment arrived at
the POE three days before the inspection team; (2) the
Technical Secretariat made the arrangements for the shipping
of the inspection equipment from the POE to the site; (3)
analyses were first made in the "blinded" mode and then the
open mode to clarify a discrepancy which the Chinese felt was
a result of contamination; (4) the inspection team had some
early problems with the analytical equipment which were
worked out over 5 or 6 hours through phone conversations with
The Hague; and (5) sampling thiodiglycol was difficult
because of viscosity caused by cold weather (-15 degrees C).
(This problem resulted from sampling from a drum rather than
the production line.)


7. (U) On the topic of export controls, the Chinese
delegation said that their provisions were put into place via
Executive Order, regulations, etc. They further indicated
that they maintain a control list of chemicals and unilateral
chemical equipment and technology controls, which they feel
to be consistent with the Australia Group. The Chinese have
also adopted an important "catch all" provision. They also
require end-use certificates for all exports of listed
chemicals. The Chinese briefly described their export
license process, which consists of an inter-ministry group,
including Commerce, Foreign Affairs, National Reform
Development Commission, and Customs. Sensitive exports are
escalated to the State Council for approval. (The Chinese
del said it would provide a copy of the text in Chinese.)


8. (U) The Chinese del mentioned that all exports of
Scheduled chemicals must be done by only two "designated"
companies, with quarterly reporting. Each export requires a
license. In response to a U.S. question, the Chinese
delegation said they do not carry out pre-license checks or
post-shipment verification. However, they require certain
language to be included in contracts which states that they
have the right to verify the end-user or end-use, although
this is not general practice. In response to the U.S.
presentation on transfer discrepancies, the Chinese
delegation expressed similar problems and concerns.


9. (U) ISN/CB office director Robert Mikulak outlined the
background and issues regarding the ongoing consultations on
OCPF site selection for inspection. The Chinese del said
they still believe inspections should focus on Scheduled
chemicals, while acknowledging the need for OCPF inspection
to gain confidence and to serve as a deterrent. They said
that the three factors outlined in the treaty should be given
equal weight in defining the selection methodology. Chen
Kai, division director in the Department of Arms Control at
the MFA, stated that in early discussions on beginning OCPF
inspections, there was an understanding that OCPF inspections
would be focused on States Parties that do not declare
Scheduled chemicals. They feel that risk needs to be
assessed in determining which sites to inspect. They also
said that the facilitator's proposal for a new site selection
methodology has its own merit because it takes into account
recommendations from States Parties. However, the current
methodology adequately addresses equitable geographic
distribution.

--------------
JAPANESE ABANDONED CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN CHINA
--------------


10. (U) The second day of bilateral discussions focused on
the destruction of old and abandoned chemical weapons.
Department of Defense experts, led by Dale Ormond (Deputy
Assistant to the Secretary of the Army for Elimination of
Chemical Weapons),participated. The Chinese opened with a
detailed presentation by Mr. Bai Xiaobo of the Chinese
Ministry of Defense, who outlined current plans for the
recovery and disposal of abandoned chemical weapons at more
than ninety sites in China. Copies of the slides (Chinese)
and speaker notes (English) will be forwarded separately.

Mr. Ormond then presented an overview of the U.S. chemical
demilitarization program, focused on recovery and destruction
of "non-stockpile" items as the subject of primary interest
to the Chinese. China also provided a written list of
questions (provided SEPTEL for formal response),focused on
four general topics: hazard assessment and evaluation,
personnel safety, medical support, and U.S. experience in
recovery (ground and water) of munitions.


11. (U) The Chinese presentation was consistent with details
the Japanese have provided during previous sessions of the
Executive Council. Construction of a fixed destruction
facility is planned for the Harbaling site, where several
hundred thousand items remain to be destroyed. Munitions are
categorized as "red" (agents DA and DC, phosgene) or
"yellow," (mustard, lewisite) distinguishing between
shells/projectiles, and fused munitions, the latter of the
two clearly being considerably more dangerous to recover and
destroy. Yellow munitions will undergo thermal detonation;
the agent will be destroyed in the primary combustion chamber
and the shell fragments treated in a metal parts furnace.
Red munitions will be separated from their explosive
components; the shells will then be processed identically to
the yellow munitions while the explosive charges will undergo
treatment in a rotary kiln. Construction will require 2.5
years with an additional 2.5 years to complete the
destruction at this site.


12. (U) At the remaining sites, the Chinese and Japanese
intend to employ a mobile (perhaps more accurately described
as transportable) system, which will evidently require
considerably more infrastructure, either locally or as part
of the deployable system, than the U.S. mobile systems. Two
systems are under consideration, one employing controlled
explosion (rapidly moveable, for small quantities) and one
heat detonation (considerably more complex, for larger
quantities),both of which would have to be redesigned by the
manufacturer to reduce weight to make them transportable.
The Chinese noted they have recommended purchasing one of
each system to explore which might be more effective, but
that the Japanese have resisted due to what they consider to
be excessive cost. The two sides are also discussing a
"consolidation plan," likely centered on the eighteen
temporary storage sites currently in use, as it is clearly
unrealistic to send one or two transportable systems to all
excavation sites.


13. (U) During the question and answer session, Mr. Ormond
provided general answers to many of the questions, avoiding
several specific facility design and specification questions.
Additional questions also focused on worker safety, risk
assessment, and standards employed by the U.S. in operation
of its own facilities. Ormond discussed safety at length,
but did not elaborate on U.S.-specific standards, and noted
that safety standards had to be developed with the particular
site and operations in mind, and should protect the workers,
community and environment without being unnecessarily costly
in terms of productivity or facility design. Notably, the
Chinese inquired what legislation exists in the U.S.
regarding transportation of chemical weapons.


14. (U) Mr. Bai also provided a brief overview of work the
Abandoned Chemical Weapons Office, a departmental level
bureau of the MFA, has carried out so far. The office has
overseen the recovery of ACW in more than sixty locations in
fourteen provinces, although roughly thirty additional sites
still require initial Japanese evaluation. Recovered rounds
are stored in seven "trust" warehouses, and eleven
additional, temporary storage facilities. Bai confirmed that
the Chinese have assigned local security to these sites. At
Harbaling the basic design of the excavation and recovery
facilities has been completed, as well as a feasibility
study. The destruction facility is nearing completion of the
design phase. Bilateral expert groups meet monthly to
discuss destruction technology, and less frequently to
discuss excavation and recovery, environmental protection,

and emergency response.


15. (U) At the close of the ACW session, Chinese
representatives noted that China and Japan lack the mature
chemical demilitarization technology the U.S. possesses, and
that China is "willing to enhance" discussions with the U.S.
to draw upon this experience. Mr. Ormond inquired as to
whether China envisioned any specific U.S. involvement in the
recovery and destruction of Japanese ACW. In response,
Chinese Ambassador Hanqin asked whether the U.S. would be
prepared to help, and how. Ormond replied that while the
U.S. does have valuable expertise in the safe destruction of
recovered CW, this is ultimately a bilateral process between
China and Japan.


16. (U) Comment: DOD experts later evaluated Chinese
estimation of excavation and destruction throughput was
completely unrealistic, especially given the state of
deterioration of many of the recovered munitions. In
assessing the overall tone and specificity of the Chinese
questions, DOD representatives were struck by the number of
detailed questions concerning safety standards and risk
assessment, and believe the intent of such questions may be
to establish an unreasonable/impractical set of standards to
which they will force the Japanese to adhere during facility
design and operation. Ormond's office has received mixed
signals from the Japanese MFA and other Japanese officials as
to whether or not the Government of Japan is interested in
U.S. participation in or assistance with ACW recovery and
destruction. Having a clear message from Japan would be of
particular importance to the U.S. in light of discussions
with China.

--------------
CLARIFICATION OF THE CHINESE CWC DECLARATION
--------------


17. (C) The Chinese informed the U.S. del toward the end of
the demil discussions that they did not have responses ready
to the U.S. questions provided to them on December 1. They
added that when the U.S. questions were delivered their
experts were already leaving for the annual meeting of CWC
member states that began on December 5. As a result,
discussion of this agenda item was considerably briefer than
expected.


18. (C) U.S. del stressed the importance of resolving the
questions and explained the background of each section to
ensure that the Chinese had no uncertainty about the specific
information that the U.S. is seeking. The Chinese confirmed
that the questions were clear and undertook to provide
written answers as soon as possible. They noted that in many
cases the questions followed up on responses provided to
earlier U.S. questions.


19. (C) In response to a U.S. question about declaration of
chemical agent to Albania, the Chinese confirmed that the
information is contained in their declaration to the OPCW and
expressed puzzlement at the U.S. request that they authorize
the OPCW Technical Secretariat to release the relevant page
to the U.S. The Chinese agreed that the U.S. should
certainly receive the page in question, but noted that the TS
had released the other pages to the U.S. and had no authority
to withhold the one remaining page. (U.S. del will ask the
TS to provide the page in question.)

SIPDIS


20. (C) With regard to a U.S. question concerning apparently
undeclared production of a nitrogen mustard chemical as an
intermediate in pharmaceutical production, the Chinese
initially expressed doubt about the accuracy of the Chinese
journal article cited by the U.S. They asserted that
production of such chemicals is very strictly controlled and
could not take place without permission. After some
discussion, however, they said that they would investigate
and provide a response to the U.S. question. (Chinese MFA
official Chen Kai, who led the Chinese expert team, noted

privately that this question might be the most time-consuming
since it would involve identifying the facility involved and
establishing contact with it through the provincial national
authority.)


21. (C) Based on previous statements from the Chinese
regarding interactions among Central and Provincial
governments and specific facilities, several other questions
were asked.

Q: (Regarding the city/facility mentioned in a journal
article provided by the U.S.) Within what province the
facility was located?
A: Jiangsu Province, near Shanghai

Q: How will China contact the company - Central or
Provincial government?
A: Internal coordination will be required. Possibly will
send a team of experts from the Central government to work
with the Provincial government, or the local government may
make contact alone.

Q: If the report is determined to be true, how would China
identify other such plants in China?
A: Based on the recent decision by the OPCW on captive use
of Schedule 1 chemicals, the plants will be declared. (Note:
There was no other elaboration on this point as to how
exactly China would determine what other facilities have
processes involving captive-use of Schedule-1 chemicals)


22. (SBU) U.S. experts raised an additional question on past
destruction of abandoned chemical weapons in China, based on
a working paper presented at the Conference on Disarmament on
18 February 1992. The Chinese paper was titled "Some
Information on Discovered Chemical Weapons Abandoned in China
by a Foreign State" (CD/1127, Working paper by the Chinese
Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament which is
available in open-source at
http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/cd0292.ht m.) In this
paper, China stated that more than 20 tons of ACW had been
destroyed in China. U.S. experts asked questions regarding
when and where this work was performed, what process was
used, how many people and what organizations were involved,
and how and where the demilitarized agents and munitions were
disposed of.


23. (C) Mr. Yu Zhiyong of the MFA Office for the Disposal of
Japanese ACWs in China, who is also a former OPCW inspector,
was able to provide some information, but was unable to
provide complete answers. He said that further information
would be provided in writing.


24. (C) Yu stated that there were many locations and sites
where the decontamination was performed, and he cannot name
all the locations, but at least one was at Harbaling where
the Japanese ACW destruction site is currently being
constructed. Yu said that after World War II, there were
frequent injuries from ACW, especially in Northeastern China.
The local government at the time, The NorthEast Peoples
Government, was very concerned with the matter. The
time-frame was 1951 to 1953. The NE Peoples Government formed
the Dunhua County Toxic Shells Committee, and this committee
selected a site for burial of the ACW. The first location
was the location of the current Pit #1 at the ACW destruction
site in China. The pit was 25 meters long, 12.5 meters wide,
and 10 meters deep. The pit was filled with ACW. From 1955
to 1958, another pit was dug - currently Pit #2 at the ACW
destruction site in China - that was 20 meters long, 10
meters wide and 8 meters deep. This pit was also filled with
ACW.


25. (C) Based on this history, China was asked if, when the
paper stated that more than 20 tons had been destroyed, did
China mean was that more than 20 tons had been buried.
Alternatively, was the burial of ACW separate from stated
destruction? Yu was not able to answer the question, but

said he would follow-up.


26. (C) The Chinese were asked if any of the ACWs that had
been recovered thus far were not of Japanese origin (e.g.,
have they found any shells that originated from other
countries). Lu stated that he knew of no ACW of non-Japanese
origin, but conventional rounds of US and Russian origin had
been discovered. These conventional rounds are sent to local
security for destruction.


27. (C) Comment: Del will make clear to the Chinese OPCW reps
the U.S. unhappiness at the lack of advance warning that
China would not be ready to provide responses to the U.S.
questions. Knowing that a few days earlier would have
allowed the U.S. to avoid the unnecessary expense and trouble
of bringing experts to the Netherlands for a discussion for
which China was not ready and that therefore did not take
place. Del will also stress again the importance of
receiving prompt Chinese responses.


28. (U) Javits sends.
ARNALL