CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR

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TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR
WEEK ENDING NOVEMBER 3

This is CWC-102-06.

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EXTENSION REQUEST INFORMATIONAL MEETING
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1. (U) On October 31, EC Vice Chair Alexander Petri (Germany)
chaired a discussion of requests for extension of the
deadline for completion of destruction of 100% of Category 1
CW. The meeting was very widely attended across all regional
groups, and had to be moved to the much larger Ieper Room as
the attendees exceeded the capacity in the Ooms Room.
Discussions were collegial and went along expected lines.


2. (U) Russia was clear in their initial statement and during
later discussions they did not want to put any reference to
visits into their decision language. They stated they were
willing to consider visits, under certain conditions: the
visits need a uniform criteria, they should be on a
case-by-case basis, there should be sufficient grounds, there
should be no automatic annual visits, the visits should not
be funded from the OPCW budget, and they should not be a
burden on the possessor states.


3. (U) The UK made clear several times that references to
visits should be in the approval of the extension requests,
while leaving the EC Chair to work out the specifics later.
They also want the EC and CSP to reaffirm to possessor states
the need to finish all destruction by April 29, 2012,
indicating that if they do not, it could mean there is a
problem with the Chemical Weapons Convention. They further
noted that approval of the decisions would be the best way to
formally enforce these deadlines.


4. (U) There were several expressions of concern regarding
references to the U.S. national paper in the U.S. draft
decision language preambular paragraphs 6-8, that destruction
could go beyond 2012, and into 2017. Iran noted that this
calls into question the legality of the extension request,
and further noted its concern that the U.S. had been
premature in its transparency. Amb. Javits informed
delegations that under U.S. law, the Secretary of Defense
must inform Congress of both the possibility of missing the
Convention deadline and, through the budget process, the
implications for out-year expenditures, all of which are
available in the public domain. He reminded delegations that
there is no reference beyond 2012 in the actual draft
decision language, and that the U.S. had in fact included
preambular and operative language indicating this decision in
no way relieved it of its obligations to complete destruction
by 2012.


5. (U) Austria questioned whether it might be helpful to
remove references to the extension request from the draft
decision. Amb. Javits said the U.S. request incorporated
language analogous to the extension requests of the other
major possessors, and was concerned that removal of these
references might imply the U.S. is amending its national
paper. However, he would inform Washington of the views of
the Austrian delegation.


6. (U) Germany questioned Russia's draft decision text on the
reference to the need for international donations for their
destruction program. Germany noted that language acceptable
to all delegations had been agreed for the 45% extension
request, and Russia should use this as a model for references
to international assistance in this draft decision. After
conferring, the Russian delegation indicated it could
consider incorporating similar language. The Netherlands
requested information from the Russians on when they
anticipate reaching specific deadlines. The Russians
responded to these questions by referring delegations to
their upcoming presentation at the November 6 destruction
informals.


7. (U) Discussion then focused on the visits aspect of the
extension requests. The Netherlands began by pointing out
that neither the U.S. nor Russian draft decisions put all the
points from the UK non paper into their language, and asked

how we would address these discrepancies. The UK outlined
their view that visits should be in the context of the
verification annex (pushing back on Russia's implication that
the UK was asking for "additional verification"),while
allowing the EC Chair to decide the details. They stated
visits would reinforce the need for the U.S. and Russia to
redouble their efforts on destruction. The UK welcomed the
U.S. proposal to conduct annual visits, and indicated they
want similar language in the Russian decision. South Africa
indicated their view that visits do not add anything to the
process, saying that if the TS is doing their job well we
should trust them and should not need to do visits of our
own. Amb. Javits then invited delegations to share their
views on what benefits they might expect from a visit. The
Russians agreed with the U.S., saying they were open to
visits but did not want a "pig in a poke." They want
specifics.


8. (U) Canada, Iran, France, Germany, Switzerland, Kenya,
India, Australia, Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, Ireland and China
all intervened to express support for the concept of visits.
Most delegations indicated visits should only pertain to the
major possessors, the U.S. and Russia. They all noted the
need to continue to look at the modalities of visits. They
also said reference to visits should be in each of the
decision documents. India reiterated that visits should only
apply to the major possessors and not themselves. Mexico
also suggested inviting independent experts along on the
visits so someone who understand the issues at destruction
sites would be there.


9. (U) Russia expressed their view that they would not put
language regarding visits into their decision document, but
noted their willingness to work on some other arrangement.
They further noted that if delegations wanted more
transparency, it must mean they do not trust their fellow
member states, or that the CWC is not working (in particular,
the verification regime). They felt that visits to just the
U.S. and Russia was discrimination, and that this requirement
should fall to all states requesting extensions.


10. (U) The U.S. noted that visits could be useful as less
than a handful of people on the EC have ever gone to a
destruction facility. They could show the EC the enormity of
the task ahead, give them the ability to assess what can be
done and provide a better understanding of timeframes. Amb.
Javits also noted that we have to be careful of details and
have a measured process in place. Several delegations, most
notably Iran, began discussing the need for further detailed
discussion of site visits, and the fact that this is not a
decision that should be taken in haste. Iran's implication
was that the extension requests should not be considered
until there is approval by all delegations of site visit
parameters. Amb. Javits noted the focus should be on agreeing
on the decisions themselves, and emphasized this should be
achieved without becoming bogged down in the details of the
visits. Russia expressed full support of that position. The
UK reiterated that decision language does not have to cover
all details regarding visits. A mention of the acceptance of
the idea was sufficient. They also stressed that the primary
concern should be agreeing on the two decisions, and that the
details of site visits can be worked later.


11. (U) Amb. Petri suggested delegations ponder the points
made in this meeting and reconvene later to further discuss
the issue.

--------------
ARTICLE VII
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12. (U) Facilitator Maarten Lak (Netherlands) held a November
2 consultation on his proposed EC-47 report language, noting
that only five states have yet to update their status with
the Technical Secretariat (EIF 1997: Niger, Paraguay and
Swaziland. EIF 2000: Eritrea. EIF 2003: Timor Leste). Iran,
India, and South Africa noted that if the Follow On Plan was
to be extended for another year, there was no need for
additional elements such as tasking the Executive Council to

consult with implementing states. It would be better to task
the Director General to consult with them. Delegations asked
for consolidation and reorganization of the text, to better
distinguish between EC report language and recommendations
from the EC to the Conference.

--------------
INDUSTRY CLUSTER: SCHEDULE 3 TRANSFERS
--------------


13. (U) The consultation on the transfer of Schedule 3
chemicals successfully ended in a decision and recommendation
to refer this issue to EC-47. Del rep deployed guidance,
specifying that the facilitator's editorial changes to the
U.S. proposal were acceptable. The UK, Iran, and Germany all
joined in stating their acceptance of the language and desire
to refer it to the EC. A couple of misspellings were
corrected in the text, as well. The facilitator will now
transfer a clean version of the decision to the TS for
preparation for EC-47. The group also expressed their thanks
to the facilitator (Arya Sandeep of India) for his two years
of effort on this issue. He will be leaving The Hague at the
end of November.

--------------
INDUSTRY CLUSTER: TRANSFER DISCREPANCIES
--------------


14. (U) The facilitator began by confirming the progress from
the previous meeting - that the group would like the
facilitators to prepare a draft decision document that would
formalize the use of an absolute threshold (the declaration
threshold from the Convention) as the trigger for transfer
discrepancies that require followed-up. All agreed.
However, Germany made a very confusing intervention, asking
that the decision include both an absolute and a relative
threshold. The facilitators and TS agreed to meet with the
Germans bilaterally to sort through the details of their
request.


15. (U) The facilitators introduced a non-paper entitled:
"Understanding on import and export data for (th)e AND
declaration for Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals." This will be
discussed in detail in a later meeting, but does include the
definitions of import and export from the legislation of 63
States Parties, derived mostly from Trade questionnaire
responses. The TS also made a presentation on a number of
scenarios that result in transfer discrepancies. This
resulted in a very complicated discussion about scenarios,
how they were arrived at, recommendations for other
scenarios, free trade zones, free ports, bonded warehouses,
etc. For the next meeting, the facilitators agreed to accept
new scenarios from SPs and incorporate them into a more
focused presentation on the two options laid out in the
non-paper.

-------------- --------------
INDUSTRY CLUSTER: LOW CONCENTRATIONS FOR 2A/2A* CHEMICALS
-------------- --------------


16. (U) The facilitator (Steve Wade, UK) made his last
attempt to drive through his proposal on this issue. Germany
made it clear that they are still not happy with the current
proposal, and asked that, if any drafts were to be referred
back to the EC with the facilitator's report, that they
include all options the Legal Advisor has cleared -- the
current facilitator's draft and the October 2005 draft. Del
rep deployed guidance and supported sending this back to the
EC. Canada, the UK, and Switzerland all expressed
discouragement at this failure, stating their concern that
there will be "quantities of PFIB much above the verification
threshold that are not being verified", a point del rep still
fails to understand, as the same happens under Schedules 2B
and 3. (Del rep questioned the Canadian delegate about this
afterward, and he did not have a response.) Switzerland said
their impression from industry is that they desire that a
concentration be set, whatever it might be, to level the
playing field, and the UK pointed out that CEFIC (the
European chemical association) made just this point during

the universality conference in Rome. China does not have
final guidance yet, but they expect to be able to support the
current proposal. India continues to desire a flat
one-percent level for all three chemicals.


17. (U) Based on the outcome of the meeting, the facilitator
will prepare a report for EC-47. With Wade taking a position
within the TS very soon, the loss of a facilitator is likely
to leave this issue fallow for some time.

-------------- --------------
INDUSTRY CLUSTER: OCPF SITE SELECTION METHODOLOGY
-------------- --------------


18. (U) Facilitator Luis Garcia (Spain) held two
consultations (30 October and 2 November) on his proposed
methodology. The first focused on unresolved issues,
fine-tuning the presentation. Delegations agreed that the
proposal should not specifically mention the A14 methodology
for the TS component, preferring generic language instead.
This would allow the TS to change its algorithm without first
seeking EC or CSP approval. The discussion got off topic,
debating on whether the EC ever formally approved the use of
the A14 algorithm (no) and/or whether it should be formally
approved (Iran: yes, others disagreed).


19. (U) The discussion then moved to whether the facility's
A14 value should be included on the anonymous list as one of
the descriptive elements. The Netherlands, Germany, France,
Italy, Japan and India all said no. Switzerland, Canada,
Australia, the UK and the U.S. indicated flexibility, and
supported including it as a indicative piece of information
regarding the facility's relevance to the CWC.


20. (U) Garcia then asked whether it should be compulsory for
all SPs to make selections, and if not, what should be the
minimum participation necessary to include the SP component
in the selection methodology. Japan noted that one way
forward would be to distribute the points of a SP that
chooses not to make selections equally over all OCPFs. This
proposal was supported by India and Iran. Iran worried that
not all regional groups might be represented in such a small
number of selections. The UK, supported by Germany, raised
concerns that if enough states did not make selections, that
the SP component would never be included. Perhaps set the
minimum level of participation at 40 states, and if that was
not reached, distribute the "missing" points equally across
all OCPFs.


21. (U) The U.S. noted that there needed to be a balance:
states with small National Authorities might need to be
reassured that they would not need to make annual selections,
that their selections would remain in force until revised.
If so, more states might be willing to make selections.
Canada, supported by Italy, made a strong statement, noting
that every state is equally entitled to make (or not make)
selections; no state should have its points distributed on
its behalf. Canada also noted that it would be unprecedented
and unacceptable to impose regional group restrictions; all
member states are alike. Australia noted that the minimum
participation should be low, say 25 states. Finally China
noted that the easier the methodology is to understand, the
more states will participate.


22. (U) On November 2, the facilitator presented a draft
decision with the proposed methodology included as an annex.
India noted that elements of the decision, in particular the
dates of implementation, were impractical and should be
removed. India, supported by Germany, noted its preference
for a three vice four-year trial period.


23. (U) New Zealand, supported by Australia, the UK, Canada,
China, Switzerland, and the U.S., noted its preference for a
simple prose-based decision, one that would preclude the need
for the over four page long annex with mathematical symbols.
New Zealand noted that bureaucrats and diplomats find
equations difficult to comprehend and will make reaching
consensus quickly difficult. It would be far preferable to
use prose to explain the methodology. The facilitator

disagreed, noting that the math is easily accessible to
everyone and is needed to ensure the methodology is
implemented accurately.

-------------- --------------
INDUSTRY CLUSTER: LATE SUBMISSION OF DECLARATIONS
-------------- --------------


24. (U) The facilitator (Denyer, U.S.) received a formal
legal opinion from the TS Legal Advisor on the concept of
"nil declarations" on November 1. This document, together
with a facilitator's draft decision to implement "nil
declarations" was the basis for the November 3 consultation.


25. (U) It should be noted that Canada, along with several
other delegations, originally asked for the decision to
include a provision whereby previous Schedule 3 declarations
would be treated similarly to OCPF declarations -- that is,
the TS would assume that previously declarations would
continue valid until such time that a new declaration were
received. This would have given the TS some data for
verification planning purposes. However, the LAO informed
the facilitator that para 3 of Part IX of the Verification
Annex allowed the TS to implement this practice for OCPF
declarations, whereas no such language exists for Schedule 3.
It was their opinion that, to do something like this for
Schedule 3, an amendment to the CWC would be needed. As
such, that language was removed from the draft decision
before the November 3 consultation. If further investigation
lends an appropriate way forward on this, it could be
reinserted later.


26. (U) The November 3 afternoon consultation was lightly
attended, presumably because of the scattered scheduling of
industry cluster meetings throughout the week. Delegations
were generally supportive of the "nil declarations" decision
but needed more time to get formal responses from capital.
New Zealand and others expressed concern that this be
implemented in a way to place the least burden possible on
small NAs. Switzerland and others reaffirmed that the burden
on NAs is in the gathering of data to determine whether
declarable activities exist, not in the preparation of the
declaration. France suggested that no new form was needed to
implement "nils", but this rather could be done through a
simple cover letter from the NA. Australia suggested that
the TS reminders to NAs could provide simple details on
submitting a "nil declaration."


27. (U) Javits sends.
ARNALL