CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 002299

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR
WEEK ENDING OCTOBER 20

This is CWC-97-06.

--------------
ARTICLE VII
--------------


1. (U) Facilitator Marten Lak (Netherlands) held two
consultations on his draft EC-47 report language. The first
session on October 5 introduced the draft and invited general
comments. Other than Sudan, all delegations that spoke
supported the basic thrust of the draft. Sudan asked that
the facilitator gut the language in paragraph 4, the meat of
the document, but other attendees requested that the draft
remain as presented for now. Japan requested that language
be inserted that referred to the UN Security Council or the
1540 Committee. The UK noted that several elements needed to
be strengthened. Neither India nor Iran presented informal
views on the document, saying that as it had only been
received that morning, they had not had time to review it.


2. (U) After Onate presented the final version of the
Article VII Progress Report on October 19, facilitator Lak
opened the floor for a paragraph by paragraph review of the
draft decision language. Delegations began with the first
three paragraphs, with Germany commenting that the phrase
"all States parties concerned had now provided information on
the steps they are taking, on the difficulties they are
encountering, and on any assistance they might need" was
misleading and the word "and" should be changed to "and/or."


3. (U) With respect to paragraph 4, several delegations noted
that elements of paragraph 2 were duplicated in 4a and
advised the facilitator that the intent was fine, but the
draft should not repeat elements. Mexico noted that it would
be difficult for the Executive Branch to influence the work
processes of the Legislative Branch, so that the phrase "to
seek to expedite" was not acceptable. Several delegations
suggested alternative language -- Turkey: "to seek to explore
legislative measures to assist implementation of the
Convention," and the UK: "to seek to expedite, in accordance
with its constitutional processes,..."


4. (U) Iran noted that the centerpiece of the draft was the
extension of the follow-on plan for another year. Although
without instructions, Shahrokh Shakerian, supported by India
and South Africa, noted that his personal view was the plan
should not/not be extended. If it were to be renewed, the
proposed recommendations for CSP-11 could not include any new
elements (such as the new reporting designations for the
status of legislation: draft, in Parliament, enacted).
Shakerian also noted indirectly that the Japanese request for
a reference to 1540 was not successful last year and would
not make the cut again this year. Finally paragraph 4 goes
beyond the follow-on plan elements and is unacceptable as it
stands. South Africa added that if the plan is to be
extended, the decision should consist of one simple paragraph
stating that it is to be extended. Nothing more.


5. (U) Finally, delegations commented briefly on paragraphs 5
to 8, with Legal Advisor Onate noting that it would be too
difficult for the Technical Secretariat to prepare progress
reports for every EC session. Status changes slowly, so the
reports would not change substantially. Japan noted that it
would welcome more frequent reports, but that if it were too
difficult for the TS, Japan could accept reports in June and
in October. The facilitator noted that he would make a few
changes to his draft that would next be considered on
November 2.

--------------
BUDGET
--------------


6. (U) Budget consultations were held on October 17 to
discuss the core objectives of the proposed 2007 budget and
the Medium-Term Plan (MTP),EC-46/S/4 dated 3 July 2006. The
first intervention was made by Iran, who stated that their
position on the core objectives has already been addressed in
prior consultations. With regard to the MTP, Iran asked that

references to international organizations, such as the UN, be
omitted from the text, arguing that the OPCW does not define
its role as a result of UN policies. Iran said that they had
little information on the 2005 assistance and protection
exercise organized by NATO in Ukraine, therefore text
referring to the exercise should be deleted. Curiously Iran
also asked that the reference to compliance with CW
destruction deadlines being a topic for discussion at the
Second Review Conference be omitted because the destruction
deadline is too far away. India supported all of Iran's
proposed changes to the text.


7. (U) With regard to OCPF inspections, India stated that
the issue is still being discussed, and asked the TS delete
all text in the MTP referring to an increase in OCPF
inspections. Iran asked that the MTP focus on risk
assessment regarding inspectable Schedule 3 and OCPF sites.
India commented that the MTP includes many conclusions made
by the TS that have not yet been decided among SPs.


8. (U) Co-facilitator, Walter Leon (Belgium),noted that the
MTP is a background paper prepared by the TS and used to
develop the budget. The UK commented that the text of the MTP
document has not been negotiated in previous years, as it is
not intended to represent the view of SPs. Italy and Japan
supported the UK's statement, drawing attention to the first
paragraph of the MTP, which clearly states the purpose and
limitations of the document as it relates to the budget. The
TS explained that during the EC, States Parties are asked to

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either "receive" or "note" the document.


9. (U) Germany asked the TS to define the parameters of
"voluntary contributions," which is repeated several times in
the text.


10. (U) No further comments were made on the core objectives
of the proposed 2007 budget. The next consultation will be
held on October 20 and will focus on ICA funding levels. As
a result of significant pushing from the del, the
co-facilitator circulated at the end of the meeting draft
decision text (e-mailed to ISN/CB on 10/19/06) on the budget.
Del believes that all of Washington's objectives are met in
the draft decision text, but that Iran and India will seek
significant changes to the decision.


11. (U) Budget consultations were held on 20 October to
discuss concerns about the level of funding for the
International Cooperation and Assistance (ICA) Program in the
2007 proposed budget. John Makhubalo, Director of ICA, was
present answer questions regarding the ICA division.
Makhubalo began by outlining the function of the ICA
division, which offers support to SPs in implementing Article
VII obligations, supports measures to improve assistance and
protection against chemical weapons, and promotes programs
related to the peaceful use of chemistry. Co-facilitator,
Hela Lahmar (Tunisia) noted that in prior consultations, some
delegations expressed concern with the low level of ICA
funding, and asked that those delegations with concerns
provide tangible proposals for the TS to consider.


12. (U) India was the first delegation to intervene noting a
major reduction in support for capacity building since 2005,
and asked the TS to return funding levels to that of the 2005
budget. Budget chief Rick Martin pointed out that the
significant increase in the capacity building budget in 2005
was not budgeted but rather the result of transferring money
from other parts of the ICA budget to capacity building.
The TS also noted that the proposed budget for capacity
building is a 4.8% increase from 2006. India said that they
still would like to see an increase of 70,000 euros in the
capacity building budget.


13. South Africa stated that they were also in favor of
increasing funding for ICA, noting that the overall current
OPCW budget was lower than that of 2006. South Africa asked
the TS how many requests were made for assistance compared to
how many were actually accommodated. Iran supported the
Indian and South African comments, and declared that the TS
should be responsible for proposing an alternative budget,

taking into consideration the NAM position.


14. (U) The UK asked delegations to keep perspective on the
zero nominal growth budget, commenting that funding levels
should not be dramatically increased in any division. The UK
stated that ICA funding levels had, in fact, increased for

2007. Canada further noted that prior to 2005, the funding
level for ICA was always around 5% of the total budget, and
for 2007, the proposed ICA funding level is 7%, showing a
moderate increase. Canada also stated that the focus of ICA
should be on the quality of programs, not on the quantity,
and expressed full support for the proposed budget.


15. (U) Germany, China, and Switzerland agreed that the
focus should be on the quality of ICA programs, not on the
quantity. China asked the TS to produce a document assessing
the quality of ICA programs. Iran pushed back stating that
quality and quantity are not contradictory, and increasing
the quality of programs can be achieved through increasing
the quantity. India supported the Iranian comment.


16. (U) Australia stated that their delegation fully
accepted the ICA budget. Australia said that they would
consider alternative proposals, provided they are presented
in the near term, noting that EC-47 is quickly approaching.
Australia also argued that it would not be appropriate for
the TS to prepare another proposal because support for the
current budget was clearly divided. South Africa countered
Australia's comment noting that SPs did not propose the
current budget, therefore, they should not prepare an
alternative, and the TS should be responsible. Germany, in
a heated intervention, stated that the TS must have some
indication from those SPs concerned on what to change in
order to prepare a counter-proposal.


17. (U) South Africa responded by requesting that funding
levels for several ICA programs be increased: the Equipment
Exchange Program, the Associate Program, the Laboratory
Assistance Program, and the Program for Support of Research
Projects. The South African delegate suggested that the
budget surplus be used to fund these programs. Iran stated
that the TS has given some indication that manpower in the
ICA division is a problem and suggested that manpower be
increased, which would theoretically increase the number of
programs that ICA would be able support.


18. (U) The TS responded to the South African proposals by
explaining that the Equipment Exchange Program is primarily
funded by the EU. With regard to the Associate Program, the
TS stated that it is not an issue of manpower as facilities

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are unable to accommodate more than twelve people. The TS
noted that the ICA division has yet to reject assistance to
any laboratory request under the Laboratory Assistance
Program, and if applications increase funding could be an
issue. However, to date the program was funded
appropriately. In addressing the Internship Support Program,
the TS responded that some laboratories have an intense
workload and can just not accommodate interns. The TS also
noted interns must find accommodations on their own, which is
difficult, and often reduces a potential intern's interest in
the program.


19. (U) As major contributors to the OPCW budget, the UK,
Japan and Germany stated that they were in favor of retaining
a zero nominal growth budget. Germany stated that because
the budget is zero nominal growth, in order to increase
funding in the ICA division, a decrease must occur within
another division. Germany suggested that all SPs return to
the priorities of the Convention, CW destruction and
non-proliferation.


20. (U) The co-facilitators stated that they would prepare a
draft decision on the 2007 Program and Budget, which has
since been placed on the external server. The next
consultation will be held on October 26 to review the draft
decision. At that consultation, the NAM will likely continue
to push for increased ICA funding and a reduction in OCPF
inspections. WEOG is likely to remain united in opposing any
increase in ICA, at least until it becomes clear that that

there will be no reduction in OCPF inspections.

--------------
OPCW OFFICE IN AFRICA
--------------


21. (U) The Open Ended Working Group on establishing an OPCW
Office in Africa met on October 17. It was a widely attended
meeting, however only four or five countries from Africa
attended (most notably, Algeria, South Africa, Cameroon,
Sudan),which was unusual in that this consultation usually
generates a large number of African delegations.


22. (U) The Director General opened the meeting by
reaffirming his commitment to toward a thorough consideration
of an OPCW Office in Africa. He asked delegations to bear in
mind the financial commitment in their deliberations on the
subject. The facilitator, Andres Rugeles (Colombia),
reviewed his statement at EC-46 and noted the meetings he had
held since then, with the UN, the Africa Group Ambassadors
and their alternates. He presented his paper, which proposes
setting up an office within the UN Regional Center for Peace
and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC),which is based in Lome.
He noted there is a political benefit to the OPCW of such an
arrangement, through the use of UNREC's network of contacts.
Legally, all OPCW mission personnel would be covered under
previously established UN privileges and immunities.


23. (U) Financially, beyond actual costs (gas, phones, etc.
there would be no additional costs. The TS personnel
involved would be already hired staff taking on this new
responsibility. There would be no/no new TS positions for
this specific task. He also noted that UNREC would benefit
by gaining a higher profile with OPCW activities. Further,
his paper indicates an office in Africa would not be a
permanent office, but would be staffed for short term visits
by a "Rolling Liaison Office."


24. (U) The facilitator went over his paper, which had three
key proposals. First, there would be within the TS a
representative for Africa who would coordinate OPCW
activities in Africa. Second, there would be an OPCW African
Task Force (again, drawn from existing staff) to further
enhance OPCW activities in Africa. Finally, there would be a
TS "Rolling Liaison Office" which would be activated for

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fixed periods of time to implement the programs of the Task
Force and TS, work with the AU and/or UN and promote
cooperation and joint activities.


25. (U) The U.S. requested further information on the UNREC
office, logistical information related to current staffing,
size of office, and location. The facilitator said he would
find that information. The U.S. also asked to see UNREC's
calendar of events for the past two years in order to
ascertain the current profile of the UNREC. Delegations were
generally supportive of the facilitator's idea. However Iran
did not agree and initially was especially concerned about
the Africa office effort becoming involved with the UN.
(Note: They struck the same chord during discussions of NATO
involvement in the Joint Assistance Exercise 2005 in Kiev
last year and recently during discussions of report language
which noted NATO's involvement in JAE 2005.)


26. (U) Sudan, on behalf of the Africa Group, noted their
dissatisfaction with the facilitator's idea. They were
concerned that Lome was too remote, and requested that the
facilitator explore Addis Ababa in the same manner as he did
Lome. They further suggested if Addis would not work to look
at other countries in the region. They were not supportive
of the facilitator's proposal of a "rolling liaison office"
which would not have a permanent location. They were clear
in their determination to have a permanent office in Africa.
South Africa echoed these sentiments, further noting that
some basic issues need to be decided before going into the
weeds on the details. Constantly looking at various
alternatives and then generating numbers would lead to an
endless process of churning with no progress.


27. (U) Iran then proposed that the facilitator return to

the one concrete proposal on the table: the African Group's
request for a permanent office in Addis. The facilitator
replied that he had put forth his proposal for how to
proceed. Avoiding a direct conflict with the African
delegations, he did say that he would continue to explore the
Addis option as well as other options. However, he added, it
would be with little support from the African Union, which
gave lip service to offering assistance, but could give no
substantive help.


28. (U) All delegations noted the need for more time for
capitals to review the facilitator's proposal. It was clear
to delegations that the facilitator plans to use the basic
framework of his proposal as the basis for further work. The
facilitator said he will look at Addis, get more
clarification for his current proposal and will obtain the
information requested by the U.S. on the UNREC office in
Lome. All documents referenced above were faxed to ISN-CB on
October 18.

--------------
UNIVERSALITY
--------------


29. (U) Consultations were held on universality on October

19. The consultation was almost as interesting for what was
not mentioned as what was discussed. Facilitator Said Moussi
(Algeria) did not ask the TS to provide delegates a rundown
of recent universality-related activities, as is usually
done, before beginning a discussion of draft decision
language on universality for CSP-11. This may have been
because Algeria had asked the TS just a day earlier to cancel
the universality workshop scheduled to take place in Algiers
on November 13-14. Apparently Algeria asked to cancel the
workshop after the TS refused to fund large numbers of
African delegates to attend the workshop. Many within the TS
told del rep privately that they were frustrated with
Algeria's decision, especially after Algeria had aggressively
pushed the TS to hold the workshop in the first place.


30. (U) The discussion of the draft universality began with
Iran questioning if there was a need for CSP decision
language and any reference to the action plan given that the
action plan approved at the CSP-10 runs until CSP-12. The UK
and Japan said that they still favored language that made a
specific reference the universality action plan. Mexico and
Colombia called for dramatically shortening the text. Del
rep said that we could consider shortening the text, but
would need to ensure that the text retained its balance,
especially as last years text was carefully negotiated.
Italy supported the U.S. The Netherlands said that since the
number of SPs was now at 180, the goal should be increased.
The TS suggested that 184 would be a more realistic target.


31. (U) France, Germany, Russia, and Iran said that they
would be satisfied with report language and did not see a
compelling need for decision text, as report language would
suffice. Only Iran seemed to have a strong view on the

matter. The U.S., Mexico and Italy asked if simply drafting
report language would demonstrate the same commitment to
universality as decision text.


32. (U) In the end, all delegations indicated that they
could go along with decision language and Malik Ellahi,
Government Relations and Political Affairs Branch chief, was
tasked with redrafting a more concise draft that would
include all of the key elements present in the current draft.
The facilitator said that he would hold another consultation
on the matter after the EC, noting that delegations still had
a fair amount of time before the CSP.

--------------
REPAYMENT PLANS
--------------


33. (U) Consultations were held on October 18 to review the
revised draft decision document (dated 9 October 2006) on
creating a repayment mechanism for those SPs in arrears.
Approximately, 10 delegations were present for the

consultation. The UK was the first to intervene noting that
the draft decision still links voting rights to the payment
plan. The UK stated that they would prefer no reference at
all to voting rights in the document, but if others insisted
on retaining OP 6 (c),the reverse must also be noted - that
those SP who default in the repayment plan should have their
voting rights suspended. Germany and Japan supported the UK
comment, noting that a link between voting rights and the
payment plan should not exist. The facilitator proposed
doing a paragraph-by-paragraph review, beginning with the
pre-ambular text, in order to address all concerns in a
structured approach.


34. (U) Iran stated that "Article VIII, paragraph 8" is
mentioned twice in the pre-ambular text (PP2 and PP6),making
it very repetitive, and requested one of the references be
deleted.


35. (U) The UK asked the TS to clarify OP 2 so that it reads
"all SPs", not just those in arrears as of CSP-11. The UK
stated that OP4 essentially repeats OP2 and suggested
combining the two. Iran said that OP2 needs some
"streamlining" to retain the element of encouragement, but
they consider it to be an introduction for OP4 and see no
benefit in combining the two. The UK asked that OP 4(a)
read, "submit a request that includes an explanation of the
reasons for the arrears and the reasons for a multi-year
payment plan." Iran commented that a SP should not need to
give an outline or explanation. The UK stated that this was
a red-line for them because they must know why a SP fell into
arrears in order to justify to their capital that repayment
plans and the eventual return of voting rights be approved.
The U.S., Japan, France and Turkey supported the UK's
proposed changes and rationale. Iran stated that they would
prefer to delete OP 4(A),but because this text is a red-line
for others, they would report back to capital for
consideration of this issue in future consultations.


36. (U) Iran requested that OP9 be deleted, commenting that
such administrative details should be worked out between the
OPCW and the SP in arrears. No delegations offered support
for this proposal.


37. (U) In working with the current text regarding voting
rights and the payment plan, Germany proposed inserting
language into OP 11, which would read, "If a State Party does
not meet the terms of the agreed multiyear-repayment plan,
this plan will cease to apply with immediate effect, and if
applicable, the restoration of voting rights will cease to
apply with immediate effect in accordance with Article VIII,
Para 8." Most delegations generally supported the German
proposal.


38. (U) The facilitator stated that he would continue with
bilateral consultations before revising another draft
decision, and as soon as the new document is drafted, it will
be placed on the external server. On October 20, the new
draft was put on the external server and FAXed to ISN/CB.
Del would appreciate further guidance in advance of the next
and final consultation scheduled for October 26.

--------------
CONFIDENTIALITY

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--------------


39. (U) Consultations were held on October 18 on establishing
Guidelines for long-term handling of confidential
information. This was a lightly attended meeting and only
three delegations took the floor to speak (Switzerland,
France and Iran). Isaac Minta from the Legal Affairs Office
(LAO) of the TS presented a paper denoting the findings of
his office on the issue of ownership of information (this
paper has been FAXed to ISN-CB). The LAO findings say that,

1) the legal status of confidential information is the same
for any medium;
2) ownership of said information is in two parts --
information produced by the OPCW is owned by the OPCW, and
information produced by States Parties is owned by the states

and subject to their domestic laws; and
3) compared with other international organizations -- the
question of ownership do not feature prominently, if at all,
in any of the information received from the UN, IAEA, World
Bank, NATO or the OECD. There was no discussion of this
document.


40. (U) Facilitator Betsy Sanders (U.S.),suggested the TS
prepare draft destruction regulations, which would provide
structure to the future debate, followed by a draft decision.
The facilitator asked delegates for their thoughts and for
ideas on the way forward. Switzerland supported her
proposal; he requested that the wording be simple and to the
point. He noted in Switzerland most information is kept 10
years, though more important documents are kept longer. The
French also supported the facilitator's proposal, but asked
that "classified" be changed to "protected" where it shows up.


41. (U) Iran chose to be obstructionist at every turn, noting
it was too soon to begin debate on any TS draft regulation,
emphasizing many open questions remained and delegations
needed to continue open debates on these issues. Iran further
stated there is no rush; delegations need not continue the
debate until after the CSP. Iran also publicly disagreed
with Minta's assertion that the OPCW Policy on
Confidentiality gave the DG authority to draft regulations,

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but that the DG welcomed State Party input on issues such as
length of retention. The facilitator agreed no further
meetings would be held until after the CSP when she hoped to
discuss a TS draft with proposed destruction regulations.
This was supported by Switzerland, France, and the TS.


42. (U) The Netherlands dropped a non-paper with facts about
how they handle confidential information. There was no
discussion of this document (has been FAXed to ISN-CB).

--------------
NIL DECLARATIONS
--------------


43. (U) During the last consultation on late declarations,
there was strong support for development of a draft decision
to implement "nil declarations". Facilitator Larry Denyer
(U.S.) has prepared draft decision text and forwarded it to
the TS for distribution to delegations. (Sent back on
October 20.) This will be the focus of the next consultation
on November 3.

--------------
SECURITY AUDIT TEAM
--------------


44. (U) SAT IV agreed to recommend provisional authority to
load electronic declaration data onto the Verification
Information System (VIS)-Industry once finally placed into
production. They currently are in the process of migrating
Schedule 1 data to the new database, and should be able to
announce to the EC that the VIS-Industry is open for
in-processing of electronic files.


45. (U) The team indicated to the DG that because they were
not able to evaluate the redaction and exportation
methodologies to be used by the VIS-Industry, they were not
comfortable in granting permission for the OPCW to export
electronic data to be exchanged with State Parties. They
were however told that they could continue to export data
from their Secure Critical Network to the inspector's laptops
as they have in the past in order to continue to perform
inspections. The team also had the opportunity to meet with
the Deputy DG and out-briefed him in the DG's absence.


46. (U) The OPCW and SAT have tentatively scheduled the
comprehensive and final system-wide audit of the SCN for
March 2007, at which time the audit scope will include an
evaluation of the overall health of the SCN environment -
including import/export of declarations, declaration
processing, document tracking system with full integration
with their Electronic Document Management System, Site
selection module, and, if ready, the Mission Planning module

(still under development). As a final note, the team will
evaluate the status on the ISO/IEC 17799 (now 27000) adoption
and implementation of the (Security Framework).


47. (U) The team anticipates that the March 2007 audit will
conclude the program of work for SAT IV and a new audit team
will be constituted - hopefully to include additional
members. The SAT has heard that Pakistan had an expert
interested in joining the team. The SAT will also select a
new chairman, and Mr. Harada has indicated that he would like
to be released from the coordinator's charges. Finally, the
SAT indicated that one of the members would be made available
to answer questions from the EC regarding the audit process,
should the DG wish.


48. (U) Ito sends.
SCHOFER