Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06THEHAGUE2220
2006-10-12 11:12:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR

Tags:  PARM PREL CWC 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7091
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
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RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
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UNCLAS THE HAGUE 002220 

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STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR
WEEK ENDING OCTOBER 6

This is CWC-91-06.

-----
CHINA
-----

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 002220

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR
WEEK ENDING OCTOBER 6

This is CWC-91-06.

--------------
CHINA
--------------


1. (U) PRC Amb. Xue Hanqin asked to meet with Amb. Javits on
Oct. 6, and began by raising the issue of the Taiwan Chemical
Industry Association requesting observer status at the
December Conference of States Parties. She noted that
Beijing still objects to the TCIA receiving observer status.
She asked for support from the U.S. on the PRC position and
said she would raise it with other delegations. Amb. Xue
added that she wanted to make sure there was a consensus on
how to proceed to ensure this did not become "an issue."


2. (U) In the past, it had come up just before the CSP,
which had generated a last-minute flurry of activity. The
PRC wanted to avoid that this year. She then expressed a
concern about statements that indicated a forward-leaning
approach by some delegations toward observers from chemical
industry associations over applications from NGOs. (Note:
Those sentiments had been expressed at the recent meeting of
the Second RevCon Working Group.) Amb. Javits simply noted
that there has as yet been no formal application by the TCIA,
but that we would convey PRC views to Washington.


3. (U) Amb. Xue then said she wanted to discuss industry
inspections, and had a particular concern about why the PRC
has so many declarations on file in comparison to other
member states. (Note: The PRC delegation had recently raised
this issue separately with del rep.) The Ambassador noted
that her staff had informed her this was due to the fact that
the PRC has so many small facilities, such as fertilizer
plants. However, she was wondering whether there was
something "wrong" with the methodology. The underlying
message was clearly that China is being treated unfairly.
She commented that this was not an issue of the PRC in
comparison to the West; the PRC has many more declarations
than India, which is in a similar state of development. Amb.
Xue wondered if this is due to criteria in the CWC or the
Technical Secretariat methodology. She added that China is
looking to "right-size" its chemical industry.



4. (U) Amb. Javits noted that it would be best if she asked
the TS directly, putting her questions to Bill Kane, the head
of the Industry Verification Branch. Amb. Xue said that she
would do so, commenting that this has an impact on the issue
of productive use of OPCW resources, since targeting small
fertilizer plants for inspections is a questionable use of
money and inspector time. She went on to note that it is
important that SPs not be passive about questionable
facilities. Indeed, they should look at their own chemical
industry activities.


5. (U) Amb. Javits used the opportunity of the meeting to
deliver the U.S. response to China's proposal of new dates
for consultations (State 166807),noting that the points
would also be delivered in Beijing. Amb. Xue expressed
appreciation for the response and said that she would check
with Beijing. She took the point made by Amb. Javits that it
would be good to continue to have the technical consultations
Nov. 13-15 to take advantage of the presence of U.S.
technical experts in The Hague, but declined to provide any
further comments.

--------------
IRAQ
--------------


6. (U) Del reps, with UK rep Mark Matthews, met with Ahmed
Jewad, Counselor at the Iraqi Embassy, on Oct. 6 to reiterate
proposed dates for the December follow-up to the February
2006 Amman workshop. Jewad displayed some confusion
regarding both the dates and the purpose of the workshop;
U.S. and UK reps explained the importance of a declaration
workshop and the effort that had gone into coming up with
dates that would be acceptable to the TS, U.S., UK and
Jordan. Del reps also inquired as to whether any progress

had been made toward Iraqi accession to the CWC; Jewad seemed
unsure, but also expressed a desire to see the formation of a
special council within the government that would specifically
track accession.


7. (U) Del reps assured Jewad that a December meeting would
be beneficial regardless of the eventual timing of accession,
and requested that he encourage colleagues in Baghdad to
communicate the status of the Iraqi declaration to the TS,
and to continue their own work prior to any follow-up
meeting. Delegation recommends Washington also convey
proposed dates (11-15 December 2006) to Embassy Baghdad to
facilitate GOI receipt of accurate information and provision
of feedback as to the feasibility of the dates as soon as
possible.

--------------
DIRECTOR GENERAL'S MEETING ON TENURE
--------------


8. (U) The Director General held a meeting on October 5 to
discuss the future of tenure implementation. The basis of
the discussion was the DG's proposal to be granted additional
flexibility in implementing tenure until 2012 as outlined in
EC-47/DG.2, dated August 30, 2006. The DG noted that one of
the reasons he decided to hold the meeting now was that
delegations had received adequate time to study his proposal
and refer it to capitals. The DG said his proposal was an
attempt to strike a balance between the original tenure
decision, which he wholeheartedly supports, and the
operational needs of the organization. The DG emphasized
that he supported tenure, as it had brought new blood into
the organization and increased geographical representation,
and that all he was asking for was a two year and four month
extension in his flexibility.


9. (U) The DG noted that when the original decision on
tenure implementation had been made it had not been foreseen
that the level of destruction activity would be at its peak
between 2009 and 2012. He also asserted that the original
decision to give him flexibility had been made in 1999, and
the 2009 date had been arbitrary and only based on the fact
that it was ten years after the decision was made. The
decision was not made based on operational considerations.


10. (U) The DG said he did not want to open a debate on
tenure itself and that if delegates could not easily agree on
his proposal he would withdraw it and continue to implement
the 1999 decision, though he asserted that this could be
catastrophic for TS operations. He added that he hoped to
see a decision on his proposal by the next EC, as many of the
personnel decisions he would have to make in the near-future
would be impacted by the proposal on tenure.


11. (U) Del rep raised the points sent by Washington with
the DG's chief of cabinet, Rafael Grossi, privately the day
before the consultation. Grossi said the DG continues to
strongly support the tenure policy, and was only seeking a
short extension in the period of time he was granted
flexibility in administering tenure in order to more
effectively manage the organization and ensure operational
effectiveness. Grossi pushed back on our suggestion that the
DG retain some percentage targets in his proposal saying that
adhering to percentage targets could be problematic if, for
example, a larger than expected number of individuals in a
certain division left because of natural attrition before
they faced tenure. This could require the DG to retain a
greater number of people who should have left because of
tenure and make adhering to a specific percentage target
problematic.


12. (U) Grossi took the U.S. point that the extended
flexibility for the DG on tenure would be particularly
important in the Inspectorate and Verification, but he said
that the lawyers in the TS had cautioned that stating this
explicitly in the decision text could be problematic as it
could result in litigation by employees who are separated
from other divisions. Grossi was willing to assure us that
the DG would be focusing his use of tenure extensions in the

Inspectorate and Verification and would also very strongly
consider including the laboratory. Grossi said that the DG
would continue to report to the EC on at least an annual
basis on the implementation of tenure and would include
language to that effect in the draft decision text to be
prepared.


13. (U) In the consultation itself, Colombia, Austria, Peru,
Kenya, Canada, Belgium, Pakistan, South Korea, Argentina, The
Netherlands, Sudan, Malaysia, and Vietnam all strongly
supported the DG's initiative. Mexico strongly supported the
proposal, but noted they had initially considered asking the
DG to retain percentage targets as had existed in the
original proposal from 1999. In the end though, Mexico had
decided it would be better to keep the decision as simple as
possible. Japan, China, the UK, Australia, and Germany said
they were waiting for guidance from their capitals, but would
recommend that their capitals support the proposal. Russia
and India said they were still awaiting guidance but spoke in
a generally positive way about the initiative.


14. (U) Only Iran said that they had problems with the DG's
proposal. Iran said that the issue was a complex one and
implied that many consultations would be needed before
consensus could be reached thereby making resolution of the
issue before EC-47 problematic. Iran also challenged the
reference to the OPCW being a "watchdog" in paragraph 54 of
the DG's proposal. The DG responded strongly that if the
issue was going to be problematic and consensus could not
easily be found, he would withdraw his proposal. He agreed to
have at least one more consultation on the matter, but not an
extended series of consultations.


15. (U) Kenya cautioned that delegations should not seek to
micromanage the TS. Iran again said they would need more
consultations before being able to join consensus.


16. (U) The DG agreed at the end of the session to work on
creating a draft decision text for delegates to examine at
the next consultation. Iran, clearly isolated, reiterated
that this was a political issue that would bear further
examination. Grossi told del rep privately at the end of the
consultation that he believed Iran would yield on this issue
once the Iranians realized that all seven of their nationals
who work at the TS are facing tenure in the next year or two
and would have a lesser chance of being extended if the DG's
proposal were blocked.

--------------
BUDGET CONSULTATIONS
--------------


17. (U) Budget consultations were held on October 6.
Co-facilitator Walter Lion (Belgium) said that the main point
of the meeting was to help him compile a list of problem
areas so that he could prepare a roadmap for future
consultations. He suggested proceeding through each budget
program so that delegations could indicate if there were
problem areas that would require additional attention. He
began with the Inspectorate and Verification.


18. (U) South Africa said they would like additional
information on the 5,000 inspector days allotted for
preparing for challenge inspections. India said they were
opposed to the reduction in Schedule 1 and 2 inspections and
asserted, once again, that the budget forum was not the
appropriate forum to discuss the change in the allocation of
Article VI inspections. Iran asked what the status was of
the numerous changes in the text that they had requested.
Pakistan said that the OCPF site selection methodology would
have to be resolved before they could support an increase in
OCPF inspections. China suggested that it was up to the TS
to propose a compromise on Article VI inspections that would
be acceptable to all delegations.


19. (U) Switzerland was very supportive of the budget
proposal and was especially pleased with the increase in OCPF
inspections. Del rep asserted that the budget consultation
was the appropriate forum to discuss the levels of Article VI

inspections, as it was required in the CWC. Del rep also
said that the U.S. was very supportive of the inspections
levels proposed by the TS in the budget and in fact would
have liked to have seen the OCPF numbers even higher. Del
rep countered the Chinese suggestion that the TS should
propose a compromise solution as it was up to delegates to
engage in a thorough discussion of the issue and arrive at
consensus. Australia supported the U.S. and suggested that
the Verification division provide another presentation to
address the concerns of those opposed to the increase in OCPF
inspections.


20. (U) Ian Mundell (Canada) said that this was the eighth
budget that he had negotiated and the level of and allocation
on industry inspections had always been discussed and agreed
upon in the budget consultations, so Canada saw no reason to
do things differently this year. Canada also rejected the
assertion by some delegations in previous consultations that
the schedule of chemicals constituted a hierarchy of risk.
France supported the increase in OCPF inspections.


21. (U) Iran opposed the increase in OCPF inspections and
added that they did not feel it would be useful for another
factual presentation from the TS on the issue as the decision
to be made was essentially a political decision. South
Africa, on the other hand, said they would like more
information in order to make am informed decision on the
issue. Pakistan said that they were not opposed in principle
to increasing the number of OCPF inspections but they were
concerned about the size of the increase. China in a more
assertive intervention said that the TS had put forward the
increased number of OCPF inspections without consulting SPs
like China who were most affected, so it made sense to them
that the TS propose a solution.


22. (U) On the Office of Special Projects (OSP),South
Africa asked if any progress had been made on the "office in
Africa" issue. France said they supported the work of the
OSP and would again seek to lead the discussions in the
Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism. The Head of the OSP
told delegates that he was waiting for consultations on the
"office in Africa" to move forward before taking any actions
on the issue. Iran said they would like a reference to the
EC included in paragraph 4.63 of the budget and the reference
to non-proliferation removed from paragraph 4.64. Germany
opposed the removal of the reference to non-proliferation as
suggested by Iran.


23. (U) Co-facilitator Hela Lahmar (Tunisia) said the
facilitators would continue to seek the views of delegations
on problem areas in the budget at the next consultation
scheduled for October 10.

--------------
SEQUENTIAL INSPECTION
--------------


24. (U) At the September 5 WEOG meeting, Australia had
raised some concerns expressed by their NA regarding
sequential industry inspections. In the same meeting, New
Zealand also had expressed some concerns, stated that they
had four sequential inspections to date, and stated that they
were considering withdrawing their consent to these types of
inspections.


25. (U) Del Rep met with Sonya Koppe (Australia) to get more
details. She said that the concerns coming from her NA had
to do with how notifications were done for sequential
inspections and whether this gave additional preparation time
for the second facility, particularly for potential sites in
countries of concern. They have since met with Horst Reeps,
Director of Verification, and been able to resolve most of
their concerns. She also explained that New Zealand's
concern centers around sequential inspections that start in
Australia and end in New Zealand. They think that being
next-door to a country with a bigger industry is resulting in
more inspections in New Zealand, to which they take
exception. (This has since been verified with the New
Zealand delegation.)



26. (U) By way of background, the U.S. consented to
sequential inspections early on. However, during the TS's
first attempt to do this in the U.S. (during two initial
Schedule 1 inspections),the TS made some mistakes that
brought into question their ability to adequately protect
confidential business information. Recently, the TS has been

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in consultations with the U.S. delegation to demonstrate that
they have resolved the earlier problems, asking the U.S. to
reconsider a consent to sequential inspections. Delegation
understands Washington is considering this request and
whether earlier concerns have been adequately addressed.

--------------
TS MEETING ON PREPAREDNESS TO CONDUCT

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AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED USE
--------------


27. (U) The Joint Assistance 2005 exercise in the Ukraine in
October 2005 revealed that the TS needed more work to be
prepared to receive a request for an investigation of alleged
use (IAU). This was of concern as IAUs, along with challenge
inspections, are important tools to provide data upon which
States Parties can base compliance judgments. Consultations
with the TS during the week of September 25 showed a
much-improved TS posture in relation to IAU since 2005. The
TS, having prepared encompassing SOPs and work instructions,

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and having launched a continuing training program, sees
itself as ready to receive a real request for IAU with the
caveat that an IAU done under Article X, in which the
investigation is requested by a State Party on its territory,
will likely have less political issues that one conducted
under Article IX on the territory of one State Party at the
request of another.


28. (U) Javits sends.
ARNALL