Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06THEHAGUE2049
2006-09-20 07:27:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:
CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): DISCUSSIONS
how-toVZCZCXYZ0015 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHTC #2049/01 2630727 ZNR UUUUU ZZH O 200727Z SEP 06 FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6865 INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS THE HAGUE 002049
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE
WINPAC FOR WALTER
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): DISCUSSIONS
WITH THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT ON SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS
DURING SCHEDULE 2 INSPECTIONS
REF: STATE 145877
This is CWC-81-06.
UNCLAS THE HAGUE 002049
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE
WINPAC FOR WALTER
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): DISCUSSIONS
WITH THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT ON SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS
DURING SCHEDULE 2 INSPECTIONS
REF: STATE 145877
This is CWC-81-06.
1. (U) Background: In December 2005, the Technical
Secretariat (TS) announced its intention to begin sampling
SIPDIS
and analysis (S&A) (on a limited basis) during subsequent
inspections of Schedule 2 facilities beginning in the third
quarter of 2006. This will be done on a trial basis for
approximately 18 months so that the Secretariat can build up
its experience with this tool and evaluate further use.
Plans currently call for S&A during 13 Schedule 2 inspections
in 13 different States Parties, one of which will be the
United States, expected sometime in 2007. The TS invited the
U.S. to see the S&A-equipment and to discuss procedural,
logistical, and technical issues associated with S&A in the
U.S.
2. (U) Subject discussions were held in accordance with
guidance (REF) with the Technical Secretariat on 11-12
September 2006, in The Hague with the goal of how to make S&A
work in the United States. U.S. objectives were to (a)
understand how the TS intends to proceed, (b) understand the
logistical requirements, (c) outline the U.S. position that
S&A should be conducted in a realistic manner including a
sound basis for using this inspection tool, (d) understand
the technical details attendant to S&A, and (e) reach a
"cooperative arrangement" with the TS on how S&A would be
conducted in the U.S.
3. (U) The U.S. team consisted of Rick D'Andrea (DOS),Beth
Scott and Hung Ly (DOC),and Larry Denyer (Del). Per Runn
headed the TS side with 12 others from the Policy Review
Branch, Industry Verification Branch, Technical Support
Branch and the Inspection Division. Following introductions
on both sides Rick D'Andrea began the discussions by
outlining the U.S. goal and objectives for these talks and
handed over an informal outline (that had served as the basis
for a prior STATE/COMMERCE planning meeting) that included
topics to be discussed and elements of the "cooperative
arrangement." He stated the U.S. position (per paragraph 5
reftel) that S&A be conducted in a realistic manner, taking
into account appropriate Convention provisions and U.S.
regulations. Next, Bill Kane (Chief of IVB) gave a
presentation on the evolution of S&A in the Secretariat (U.S.
team has hard copy). Bill stated that in 1997, when the CWC
entered into force, the TS was not ready to do S&A. In 2005
the TS announced that they were prepared to do S&A and
planned an 18 month trial during which S&A would be done at
about 13 subsequent Schedule 2 inspections in 13 different
States Parties. The balance of the presentation detailed how
the TS arrived at this decision. Mr. Sokolowski, Acting Head
of the OPCW Laboratory, next gave a presentation on "Tasks
and the Role of the Lab in Analytical Verification Activities
of the Secretariat" (U.S. team has hard copy). The U.S. team
was mainly in listening mode. Further discussion would later
occur during the visit to the laboratory (see paragraph 5).
4. (U) Details, Details, Details. What follows are a number
of details the U.S. learned during the discussions and an
outline of several unresolved issues:
A. Concerning the basis for S&A, Per Runn pointed out that
S&A provides a unique set of information that directly gets
at whether there are undeclared scheduled chemicals present.
This unique data can then be combined with the information
from previous inspection(s) at the declared facility to get a
clearer picture of inspection-relevant features of the
facility. The U.S. team reiterated its desire to have a
rationale for the sampling request as part of the written
request from the inspection team.
B. Inspection team size will be five inspectors vice the
three inspectors normally used for subsequent Schedule 2
inspections, and the notification period will be five days
vice two.
C. Concerning the increased time required for the Technical
Equipment Inspection (TEI) of the S&A equipment and the
impact that will have on meeting the CWC requirement to get
the inspection team to the inspection site within 12 hours of
arrival, it was agreed that (a) the TEI would start as soon
as the inspection mandate was handed over, (b) the words
"inspection team" mean all of the inspectors and not their
equipment, and (c) if the inspected state party made every
reasonable effort to get the "inspection team" to the site
and it took longer than 12 hours, that fact would be
documented in the inspection report and have no practical
consequence. Unresolved was whether the pre-inspection
briefing and beginning the period of inspection could occur
prior to arrival of the S&A equipment. The TS strongly
prefers that these events wait until after equipment arrival.
D. S&A will be included in the inspection mandate as a work
instruction.
E. If the inspection team is unable to do S&A because of
equipment malfunction, they will not/not seek alternative S&A
methods (e.g., use of the site's analytical equipment) during
the trial period.
F. Concerning support the inspection team will need from the
U.S., the TS referred to Note S/548/2006 dated 10 February
2006 and explained that the space they needed for the S&A
equipment was about five meters of counter space and room for
a fume hood. Mr. D'Andrea asked whether the inspection team
could set up on a loading dock or in a truck? The response
was yes, provided temperature, humidity, electrical power,
water, etc., were conducive to S&A operations. Ideally, what
is needed is access to lab bench space with a fume hood.
G. The Fume Hood. The TS is working toward getting a fume
hood that meets U.S. technical and safety specifications
prior to S&A in the U.S. Should they fail to do so, the U.S.
would have to be willing to provide a fume hood in order for
S&A to occur. Strong preferences were expressed on both
sides that the fume hood issue be resolved before S&A takes
place in the U.S.
H. Securing the S&A equipment: In the event that a separate
lockable room is not available at the site, the sides
discussed several possible methods of securing the S&A
equipment and did not reach a useful conclusion. The TS
agreed to work on this issue further with the aim of having a
workable method prior to S&A in the U.S.
I. The TS estimates that it will take them two to four hours
to set up the S&A equipment and another four to six hours to
have it operational.
J. Get it in writing. The U.S. team pointed out that 22 CFR
Part 103 sets a number of conditions that must be met for S&A
to occur, and that requests for the taking of samples must be
in writing. The team handed over a copy of this regulation.
K. Costs: The TS estimates that doing S&A will add roughly
$15K to the cost of a Schedule 2 inspection. The TS agreed
to reimburse the U.S. for "billable" expenses. Privately,
Commerce team members expressed concerns that their office
would expend funds for shipping, truck rental, etc., and
would not be reimbursed because the TS money would go to the
U.S. general fund. (This reimbursement mechanism is the same
as at present, but the costs would be significantly higher.)
Consequently, Commerce may be unable to afford more than one
S&A inspection in 2007.
5. (U) Analysis Mode: The U.S. team visited the OPCW
Laboratory and was shown sample analyses by two gas
chromatograph/mass spectrophotometer (GC/MS) instruments, one
operating in OPEN mode and one operating in BLINDED mode.
The controlling software in both cases is AMDIS (Automated
Mass Spectra Deconvolution Identification System). Both
modes display the same analytical result, however, in OPEN
mode the analyst has a number of additional data access
options available upon request. Use of one or more of these
options would be needed to resolve an ambiguous analysis. If
AMDIS BLINDED mode is selected the GC/MS wipes the OPEN mode
additional analytical options off the hard drive. Resolution
of ambiguous analysis results would then require installation
of a replacement hard drive containing the other software
configuration, a procedure that takes at least two hours.
The TS strongly favors operating in OPEN mode. This issue
remains unresolved.
6. (U) Overall, the discussions were cordial and highly
productive in terms of understanding operational details.
Issues remain, but they should be resolved as both sides gain
experience in S&A at Schedule 2 inspections during the trial
period.
7. (U) Javits sends.
ARNALL
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE
WINPAC FOR WALTER
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): DISCUSSIONS
WITH THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT ON SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS
DURING SCHEDULE 2 INSPECTIONS
REF: STATE 145877
This is CWC-81-06.
1. (U) Background: In December 2005, the Technical
Secretariat (TS) announced its intention to begin sampling
SIPDIS
and analysis (S&A) (on a limited basis) during subsequent
inspections of Schedule 2 facilities beginning in the third
quarter of 2006. This will be done on a trial basis for
approximately 18 months so that the Secretariat can build up
its experience with this tool and evaluate further use.
Plans currently call for S&A during 13 Schedule 2 inspections
in 13 different States Parties, one of which will be the
United States, expected sometime in 2007. The TS invited the
U.S. to see the S&A-equipment and to discuss procedural,
logistical, and technical issues associated with S&A in the
U.S.
2. (U) Subject discussions were held in accordance with
guidance (REF) with the Technical Secretariat on 11-12
September 2006, in The Hague with the goal of how to make S&A
work in the United States. U.S. objectives were to (a)
understand how the TS intends to proceed, (b) understand the
logistical requirements, (c) outline the U.S. position that
S&A should be conducted in a realistic manner including a
sound basis for using this inspection tool, (d) understand
the technical details attendant to S&A, and (e) reach a
"cooperative arrangement" with the TS on how S&A would be
conducted in the U.S.
3. (U) The U.S. team consisted of Rick D'Andrea (DOS),Beth
Scott and Hung Ly (DOC),and Larry Denyer (Del). Per Runn
headed the TS side with 12 others from the Policy Review
Branch, Industry Verification Branch, Technical Support
Branch and the Inspection Division. Following introductions
on both sides Rick D'Andrea began the discussions by
outlining the U.S. goal and objectives for these talks and
handed over an informal outline (that had served as the basis
for a prior STATE/COMMERCE planning meeting) that included
topics to be discussed and elements of the "cooperative
arrangement." He stated the U.S. position (per paragraph 5
reftel) that S&A be conducted in a realistic manner, taking
into account appropriate Convention provisions and U.S.
regulations. Next, Bill Kane (Chief of IVB) gave a
presentation on the evolution of S&A in the Secretariat (U.S.
team has hard copy). Bill stated that in 1997, when the CWC
entered into force, the TS was not ready to do S&A. In 2005
the TS announced that they were prepared to do S&A and
planned an 18 month trial during which S&A would be done at
about 13 subsequent Schedule 2 inspections in 13 different
States Parties. The balance of the presentation detailed how
the TS arrived at this decision. Mr. Sokolowski, Acting Head
of the OPCW Laboratory, next gave a presentation on "Tasks
and the Role of the Lab in Analytical Verification Activities
of the Secretariat" (U.S. team has hard copy). The U.S. team
was mainly in listening mode. Further discussion would later
occur during the visit to the laboratory (see paragraph 5).
4. (U) Details, Details, Details. What follows are a number
of details the U.S. learned during the discussions and an
outline of several unresolved issues:
A. Concerning the basis for S&A, Per Runn pointed out that
S&A provides a unique set of information that directly gets
at whether there are undeclared scheduled chemicals present.
This unique data can then be combined with the information
from previous inspection(s) at the declared facility to get a
clearer picture of inspection-relevant features of the
facility. The U.S. team reiterated its desire to have a
rationale for the sampling request as part of the written
request from the inspection team.
B. Inspection team size will be five inspectors vice the
three inspectors normally used for subsequent Schedule 2
inspections, and the notification period will be five days
vice two.
C. Concerning the increased time required for the Technical
Equipment Inspection (TEI) of the S&A equipment and the
impact that will have on meeting the CWC requirement to get
the inspection team to the inspection site within 12 hours of
arrival, it was agreed that (a) the TEI would start as soon
as the inspection mandate was handed over, (b) the words
"inspection team" mean all of the inspectors and not their
equipment, and (c) if the inspected state party made every
reasonable effort to get the "inspection team" to the site
and it took longer than 12 hours, that fact would be
documented in the inspection report and have no practical
consequence. Unresolved was whether the pre-inspection
briefing and beginning the period of inspection could occur
prior to arrival of the S&A equipment. The TS strongly
prefers that these events wait until after equipment arrival.
D. S&A will be included in the inspection mandate as a work
instruction.
E. If the inspection team is unable to do S&A because of
equipment malfunction, they will not/not seek alternative S&A
methods (e.g., use of the site's analytical equipment) during
the trial period.
F. Concerning support the inspection team will need from the
U.S., the TS referred to Note S/548/2006 dated 10 February
2006 and explained that the space they needed for the S&A
equipment was about five meters of counter space and room for
a fume hood. Mr. D'Andrea asked whether the inspection team
could set up on a loading dock or in a truck? The response
was yes, provided temperature, humidity, electrical power,
water, etc., were conducive to S&A operations. Ideally, what
is needed is access to lab bench space with a fume hood.
G. The Fume Hood. The TS is working toward getting a fume
hood that meets U.S. technical and safety specifications
prior to S&A in the U.S. Should they fail to do so, the U.S.
would have to be willing to provide a fume hood in order for
S&A to occur. Strong preferences were expressed on both
sides that the fume hood issue be resolved before S&A takes
place in the U.S.
H. Securing the S&A equipment: In the event that a separate
lockable room is not available at the site, the sides
discussed several possible methods of securing the S&A
equipment and did not reach a useful conclusion. The TS
agreed to work on this issue further with the aim of having a
workable method prior to S&A in the U.S.
I. The TS estimates that it will take them two to four hours
to set up the S&A equipment and another four to six hours to
have it operational.
J. Get it in writing. The U.S. team pointed out that 22 CFR
Part 103 sets a number of conditions that must be met for S&A
to occur, and that requests for the taking of samples must be
in writing. The team handed over a copy of this regulation.
K. Costs: The TS estimates that doing S&A will add roughly
$15K to the cost of a Schedule 2 inspection. The TS agreed
to reimburse the U.S. for "billable" expenses. Privately,
Commerce team members expressed concerns that their office
would expend funds for shipping, truck rental, etc., and
would not be reimbursed because the TS money would go to the
U.S. general fund. (This reimbursement mechanism is the same
as at present, but the costs would be significantly higher.)
Consequently, Commerce may be unable to afford more than one
S&A inspection in 2007.
5. (U) Analysis Mode: The U.S. team visited the OPCW
Laboratory and was shown sample analyses by two gas
chromatograph/mass spectrophotometer (GC/MS) instruments, one
operating in OPEN mode and one operating in BLINDED mode.
The controlling software in both cases is AMDIS (Automated
Mass Spectra Deconvolution Identification System). Both
modes display the same analytical result, however, in OPEN
mode the analyst has a number of additional data access
options available upon request. Use of one or more of these
options would be needed to resolve an ambiguous analysis. If
AMDIS BLINDED mode is selected the GC/MS wipes the OPEN mode
additional analytical options off the hard drive. Resolution
of ambiguous analysis results would then require installation
of a replacement hard drive containing the other software
configuration, a procedure that takes at least two hours.
The TS strongly favors operating in OPEN mode. This issue
remains unresolved.
6. (U) Overall, the discussions were cordial and highly
productive in terms of understanding operational details.
Issues remain, but they should be resolved as both sides gain
experience in S&A at Schedule 2 inspections during the trial
period.
7. (U) Javits sends.
ARNALL