NETHERLANDS/NATO: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001958

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR NULAND FROM AMBASSADOR ARNALL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MAAR ISAF NATO NL AF
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/NATO: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR
NULAND

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROLAND ARNALL FOR REASONS 1.4(B,D).
reasons 1.4 (b,d)

Ambassador Nuland:

1, (C) My staff and I warmly welcome you to The Hague. Our
Dutch hosts, including Foreign Minister Bot, are looking
forward to consulting on a wide range of NATO-related
issues with you, and you will also have excellent
opportunities to engage with Parliamentarians and the press
during your visit. The fact that you will be coming to The
Hague directly from Afghanistan -- and Uruzgan in
particular -- makes your visit especially timely.

ELECTION POLITICS:
--------------


2. (C) This is an election year, with all that that
entails. The governing center-right coalition of Christian
Democrats (CDA) and Liberals (VVD) face tough opposition
from the center-left Labor Party (PvdA),but the results
are far from certain. At the moment, the PvdA -- led by
the charismatic Wouter Bos -- have a 5-10 point lead in the
polls over the next largest party (CDA),but a strong
economy appears to be shifting support back to Prime
Minister Balkenende and his political allies, the VVD. No
single party has enough support to win a majority, which
ensures that the next government -- like all Dutch
governments -- will be a coalition. If CDA and VVD
together win a majority, they could exclude PvdA from the
next government, even if PvdA emerges as the largest party
in Parliament. Alternatively, PvdA may seek to form a
coalition with either the CDA or VVD -- in either case,
moderating the PvdA's more Euro-centric approach to foreign
policy. There is a remote chance that left-leaning parties
-- PvdA, the Socialist Party (S/P),and GreenLeft (GL) --
could form a majority in Parliament, but long-standing
differences between the parties would make the formation of
a stable government extremely unlikely. If no natural
majority emerges from the November 22 elections a few small
parties -- such as the Protestant Christian Union (CU) --
could become kingmakers. You will have a chance to meet
representatives of all the key parties at lunch.


3. (C) The good news is that nearly every possible
government coalition will be positively inclined toward
NATO and supportive, to one degree or another, of continued
Dutch involvement in future NATO missions. This reflects
the deep transatlantic orientation pervading Dutch
political culture. Only a few weeks ago, the formerly
Maoist Socialist Party (SP) formally renounced its
decades-long opposition to Dutch NATO membership in a
blatant effort to present itself as a "credible" coalition
partner for the PvdA. The PvdA, meanwhile, has been
careful to draw a distinction between its opposition to
many U.S. policies from its long-standing support for NATO;
the PvdA, for example, opposed the deployment of 600 Dutch
Special Forces to Afghanistan under OEF, but unanimously
supported the deployment of 1,400 troops to Uruzgan as part
of the ISAF mission.

AFGHANISTAN:
--------------


4. (C) Afghanistan remains the elephant in the room in
this election. Having supported the Uruzgan mission, albeit
with reservations, the PvdA leadership has no desire to
reopen the deployment decision as a campaign issue. That
said, public support for the mission remains weak -- a
recent poll indicates that 57 percent of the population is
opposed to the mission -- and all parties remain sensitive
to the potential impact of events on the ground on the
electorate. So far, the Dutch have been lucky not to have
lost any personnel as the direct result of combat, but a
dramatic incre Dutch casualties, a scandal involving
detainees, or clear indications that "reconstruction"
projects in Uruzgan will not be possible during the Dutch
deployment could all increase public dissatisfaction with
the mission while pushing the three largest parties into
contrary positions. At the same time, smaller parties such
as the Progressive Liberals (D-66),Green Left, and the
Socialists, will continue to exploit public concerns about
the mission to steal votes from the larger parties.


5. (C) In this tense environment, even relatively minor or
technical questions -- such as the appropriate level of
support Dutch troops should provide to ISAF forces in
neighboring provinces -- will be exposed to intense media
and parliamentary scrutiny. So far, the Government has
stood firm to every challenge, but your GONL counterparts
will appreciate any reassurances to help stiffen its
resolve to stay the course.

ROAD TO RIGA:
--------------


6. (C) Regardless of the outcome of the November 22
elections, Prime Minister Balkenende will come to Riga in a
caretaker capacity -- forming a new Dutch government
generally takes between three and six months -- and with
his mind firmly focused on domestic politics. Fortunately,
the issues currently on the table for Riga are not likely
to be contentious domestically or create divisions between
us and the Dutch. In recent weeks, the Dutch have dropped
their opposition to granting Intensified Dialogue to
Georgia and signed a Letter of Intent committing 500 hours
worth of funding to the C-17 project for FY07. On other issues --
NRF, Global Partnership, NTM-I, etc. -- the Dutch generally
support our objectives and share our frustration over the
unwillingness of other partners to move forward quickly or
to deploy resources. Over the long term, the Dutch are
cautious about enlargement/expansion prospects and hope to
engage in a "comprehensive" dialogue on the NATO's identity
and future roles before extending new invitations -- a position
determined as much by domestic skepticism about the EU's
rapid expansion as by any NATO-specific concerns. No doubt
your interlocutors will look to you for clues regarding our
long-term thinking about NATO to help formulate their
positions for Riga and beyond.



ARNALL