Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06THEHAGUE1893
2006-08-29 12:53:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR

Tags:  PARM PREL CWC 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHTC #1893/01 2411253
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 291253Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6659
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001893 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR
WEEK ENDING AUGUST 25


This is CWC-72-06.

--------------------------------------------
EXTENSION REQUEST -- DISCUSSIONS WITH RUSSIA
--------------------------------------------

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001893

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR
WEEK ENDING AUGUST 25


This is CWC-72-06.

--------------
EXTENSION REQUEST -- DISCUSSIONS WITH RUSSIA
--------------


1. (U) Del reps delivered on August 23 the U.S. responses to
Russian questions regarding the U.S. CW destruction program
(formally received during the 46th Executive Council
session),as well as a series of questions for Moscow related
to Russia's CW destruction program and coordination with
international donors. Reps met with Konstantin Gavrilov, the
Russian head of delegation, who reiterated many of his points
from a similar discussion earlier in the summer. He made it
quite clear that while Moscow is not opposed to the concept
of visits by an EC delegation to their destruction sites (or
to Moscow),Russia will not reference such visits in its
draft decision. Gavrilov suggested that modalities could be
worked out independently of an EC decision, and that Moscow
might accept a reference to the visits in EC-47 report
language.


2. (U) Gavrilov also believes Moscow is opposed to any
impact visits might have on the OPCW budget, and also to
establishing a set frequency for the visits (i.e. annual) and
would prefer to see visits triggered by "EC concern" or
other, as yet undefined, criteria. Del reps expressed some
concern over the potential this created for political
mischief making, and pointed out that delegations would
likely require a very clear definition of criteria. Finally,
Gavrilov reaffirmed the Russian position that an extension
request has already been granted, and that this is more a
gesture of political goodwill than a necessity, indicating
that Moscow is not overly concerned with approval of its
decision. Based on further discussion, del read is that,
despite current differences in approach, drafting a set of
parameters acceptable to both the U.S. and Russia is
certainly possible; the difficulty at EC-47 and CSP-11 will
be in reaching agreement on an acceptable way of assuring
delegations the visits will actually occur (i.e. report
language versus decision text).

--------------
EXTENSION REQUEST - DISCUSSIONS WITH UK
--------------



3. (U) Del reps also met with the UK rep Mark Matthews on
August 24 to provide a copy of U.S. questions on Russia's CW
destruction, and discuss possible strategies for reaching
consensus on extension requests in the fall. The UK del is
exhibiting more flexibility than in the run-up to, and
during, EC-46. To achieve the ultimate goal of visits to
U.S. and Russian destruction facilities, London is likely to
be flexible on parameters, and possibly decision text,
provided a satisfactory arrangement can be worked out through
the EC Chair.


4. (U) Matthews is still reluctant to support consultations
or discussions on the draft decisions, but recommends that,
if necessary, any such efforts be headed by South Africa in
its role as EC Chair. Del reps also discussed which States
Parties, in the end, might actually be willing to block the
U.S. extension request. Although Russia and Iran are both
potential candidates, discussions centered on Iran; U.S. and
UK reps agreed that the timing/nature of any IAEA actions
could impact Iran's inclination to use the political leverage
of "U.S. non-compliance" in the CWC context.

--------------
CW POSSESSORS (OTHER STATES PARTIES)
--------------


5. (U) Del rep met with the Technical Secretariat Chemical
Demilitarization Branch staff to discuss the status of CW
destruction in the other possessor states. Of note was the
fact that Maradykovsky is now operational. Although Russia
is still working to complete its main operations building,
August 17 evidently marked the movement of the first
munitions into the ad hoc processing building, where

munitions that do not require draining of agent prior to
neutralization can be processed. The TS estimates 80-90
munitions are being processed each day. The TS noted that,
given the timing of Russia's 20% intermediate deadline and
the fact that the incinerator at Maradykovsky is unlikely to
be constructed in the next several months, a discussion on
the end point of destruction is increasingly likely in the
near future. Facility documents are unlikely to be available
before October.


6. (U) The TS also stated that India has still not concluded
its Facility Agreement. (Del comment: TS reps seemed unsure
as to whether the delay was due to summer holidays, or
lingering concerns in New Delhi.) Del will follow up with
the Indian del and TS in the coming weeks. Del continues to
work with the Albanian delegation and the TS to ensure next
steps taken prior to beginning of destruction at Qaf Molla
are successful. The TS is prepared for a Final Engineering
Review in early October, and agrees with the U.S. suggestion
to compress the normal schedule, due to the relative
simplicity of the facility. Del will also work with
Washington and the Albanian delegation on submission of an
extension request for Albania's intermediate destruction
deadlines.

--------------
ARTICLE VII
--------------


7. (U) Facilitator Maarten Lak (Netherlands) held an August
24 consultation on Article VII, to discuss his proposed
program of work as well as potential elements for EC-47
report language. (Note: the consultation was lightly
attended, due to the vacation schedules of a number of
delegates.) The UK -- supported by Austria, China, Croatia,
France, Germany, Iran, Japan, New Zealand, and Spain --
requested that first delegations be briefed by the TS on the
current status of implementation (Note: a status report dated
August 15, 2006 was faxed back to ISN/CB). Delegations noted
their opinions that September 7 is too early to disseminate
the progress report for the November EC: a detailed briefing
would be preferable at this juncture. After much discussion,
Lak agreed to contact Legal Advisor Onate, shortly after
Onate's return from his leave on September 1. Lak noted that
the progress report would be distributed the first week of
September, but that it would be updated regularly between
then and EC-47.


8. (U) With respect to the substance, Lak summarized his
suggestion that objective indicators be established for
legislation, e.g., when the TS receives a draft for review,
when a draft goes to Parliament, and when a draft is enacted
and published. New Zealand cautioned Lak, noting that the
Convention does not require a State Party to submit its
legislation for review, and in some instances submission is
unnecessary, citing the drafts developed by Pacific Island
Forum states in conjunction with former Secretariat lawyer
Keith Wilson.

9. (U) Lak also suggested defining three groups of states:
those that have done nothing, those that are drafting but
will not finish the process before CSP-11, and those that are
drafting but will finish after CSP-11. Japan noted that it
found this idea interesting. Japan, supported by China, also
noted its concern with the facilitator's proposal to have the
Director General and the EC Chair reach out to implementing
states, wondering how it would work and whether it would be
cost effective. South Africa noted the interrelation of
Article VII outreach activities and the budget, wondering how
outreach efforts would be funded. China emphasized that
there should be no "naming and shaming."


10. (U) Iran questioned whether the facilitator's paper
should be the basis for our discussion. If so, delegations
need another round of discussion, to ensure that all
interested delegations are able to participate. Furthermore,
Iran asked delegations to bring their views early in the
process, in order to avoid waiting until the last minute, as
has been the recent practice. Spain suggested that the
facilitator should be holding continual bilateral discussions

and only having an informal consultation to allow delegations
to bring broad views on the ongoing discussions.


11. (U) The U.S. delegation noted that it would be too early
to refer the implementation issue to the Second Review
Conference at this point; we have another year to effect
progress. All other delegations supported this view,
although China noted that perhaps it might be best to simply
refer to the fact that this may be an item for the RevCon,
adding that referring Article VII to the RevCon might imply
that there is no expectation of any further progress on this
matter.

--------------
UPCOMING BUDGET CONSULTATIONS
--------------


12. (U) Del rep meet with Rick Martin, the Head of the
Budget and Finance Branch, to discuss the upcoming budget
consultations. In response to U.S. concerns regarding the
restrictive language in the budget concerning Technical
Assistance Visits (TAVs),Martin said he believed the
Implementation Support Branch (IPB) had intentionally slipped
the language into the budget authorizing "up to 10 TAVs" in

2007. Martin said that in his view the best way to address
the problem was quietly through the budgetary process.
Martin said that he would discuss the issue with the Legal
Advisor and then would probably be inclined to issue an
information paper calling for, among other changes, replacing
the "up to 10 TAVs" language in the budget with language
allowing for more TAVs.


13. (U) Martin cautioned that it would probably be better to
have the TS propose the change than have the U.S. raise the
issue in open consultations, as this could potentially lead
to horse trading on other unrelated issues such as OCPF
inspections. Martin also strongly suggested that it would be
counterproductive to raise this issue directly with
individuals in IPB, as they had drafted the problematic
language. He promised to quietly work with del to resolve
the issue and to report back after his meeting with the Legal
Advisor.


14. (U) Martin said that program managers would have a fair
amount of discretion on how to use the funding proposed for
the two temporary P-2 positions intended to support TAVs.
The money could be used to hire two P-2s, to fund trips by
other external experts, or to hire one P-4. This essentially
would be an issue to be sorted out by the Legal Advisor's
office and IPB, and possibly the director of ICA. He said
that there was limited enthusiasm in the Legal Advisors
Office for using the external network of legal experts, as
the TS has had limited success with using the network in the
past.


15. (U) On the question of increased funding for childcare
at the OPCW, Martin said this was not a new entitlement but
simply an increase of 30,000 Euros in the existing budget to
reflect increased costs.


16. (U) Martin took the point that the language in table 9
of the budget concerning Article VII implementation should
probably read, "Active engagement during the year between the
OPCW and 100% of Member States that have yet to designate or
establish a National Authority." IPB had proposed that 75% be
used instead of 100%. Martin's view was this could probably
be best addressed in the budget consultations.


17. (U) On the 2004 cash surplus, Martin said that this
would likely be returned to SPs on or about December 10,

2006. The money would first be credited towards any
outstanding 2006 assessment payments and then could be
applied towards Article IV and V payments, and finally the
2007 assessment. This will likely mean that most of the
surplus refunded to the U.S. will go towards our outstanding
2006 assessed contribution.


18. (U) Ito sends.
BLAKEMAN