Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06THEHAGUE1666
2006-07-31 14:54:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Tags:  PARM PREL CWC 
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VZCZCXYZ0013
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #1666/01 2121454
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 311454Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6422
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001666 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINTSTAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: CHEMICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION (CWC): U.S. CW DESTRUCTION 100% EXTENSION REQUEST

REF: THE HAGUE 1530

This is CWC-064-06.

-------
Summary
-------

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001666

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINTSTAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: CHEMICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION (CWC): U.S. CW DESTRUCTION 100% EXTENSION REQUEST

REF: THE HAGUE 1530

This is CWC-064-06.

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (U) Reactions to the U.S. 100% extension request, and the
recently submitted draft decision, continue to be
surprisingly muted. However, comments over the past several
weeks, and during EC-46, are beginning to shape a way forward
for the U.S. strategy to gain approval for its extension
request at EC-47 and CSP-11.

--------------
U.S CW DESTRUCTION UPDATES
--------------


2. (U) In general, the latest approach to the U.S. CW
Destruction Update, delivered at the destruction informals,
was well received. (Based on feedback that details from
previous briefings in April and May were more than adequate,
and that the briefings focused too heavily on excuses and not
on a clear path forward, del and DOD worked to develop a
briefing that focused instead on a site-by-site update, to
include specific, current challenges faced at each site.)
Delegations appreciated the focused approach, and del was
told by UK del members that the consistent transparency and
approach would be instrumental in eventual approval of the
extension request. Del believes it will be effective to
maintain a factual, forward-looking focus in future
briefings.


3. (SBU) However, to ensure a thorough understanding of
site-specific challenges, and to set the stage for approval
of the U.S. extension request by CSP 11, del recommends that
to give the briefing greater political impact, Ambassador
Javits, as appropriate, take a more active role in the
briefing to emphasize the U.S. political commitment to
completion of destruction as quickly as possible.


4. (SBU) In addition, although it is readily apparent to
those involved in the program, the idea that devotion of
greater resources to the U.S. destruction program would not
significantly alter the pace of destruction is evidently
still quite difficult for some delegations to grasp. It may
be useful to provide more detail on some of the specific
challenges faced at certain sites. Del also appreciates the

opportunity it has had to provide input in the development of
recent briefings, and recommends this approach continue so
that feedback from local delegations to the OPCW can be used
to shape an effective briefing for EC-47.

--------------
NATIONAL STATEMENTS
--------------


5. (U) Of the relatively few statements during the EC-46
general debate, most references to CW destruction were
variations on a &general concern/disappointment8 theme that
major possessors were making such slow progress toward the
complete elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles.
Finland, speaking on behalf of the EU, also expressed strong
support for visits to possessor states that would enable the
EC to &assess progress8 and, more notably, to &highlight
to national decision makers in these States Party the
expectations of the international community.8 (Del comment:
The second element would seem to be formal evidence of
continued UK and German efforts to muster support for the
idea of visits to capitals, as opposed to destruction sites
alone, in order to retain the &appropriate political
element.8 End comment.)


6. (U) The Mexican statement was also sharply critical of
slow progress in possessor states, including a confusing
statement implying that requests to extend destruction
deadlines to 2012 were inconsistent with the Convention (when

presumably the real concern was the indication in the U.S.
detailed plan that destruction operations may extend beyond
2012). Mexico requested a more detailed rationale for the
extension requests that have been submitted, and noted that
detailed plans should include &actions necessary for
complete fulfillment of obligations under the Convention8
and &maintain consistency and adhere to commitments.8 (Del
comment: This seems to be a reference to the same line of
reasoning encouraged/followed by the Russian delegation,
which is to submit a plan that conforms to the Convention,
regardless of whether or not it is achievable. End comment.)
Finally, Mexico expressed support for the idea of visits to
possessor states, and recommended that these visiting
delegations be supplemented by independent experts with a
technical background.


7. (U) Interestingly, despite UK and German warnings that the
U.S. could expect the NAM and other, non-WEOG States Party to
insist upon visits (to include visits in capitals),no
reference was made to the UK proposal by either Malaysia
(speaking on behalf of the NAM and China) or Sudan (speaking
for the Africa Group). Both statements included the standard
lines expressing serious concern over the pace of CW
destruction and urging possessor states to adhere to
Convention deadlines, but made no mention of site visits.
Sudan also referred to clear indications that, even after the
5-year extension period, major possessors may be unable to
complete destruction, thus (perhaps inadvertently) publicly
placing the U.S. and Russia in the same category, a
distinction the Russians have worked assiduously to avoid.

--------------
RECENT REACTIONS TO U.S. DRAFT DECISION
--------------


8. (U) Although the U.S. decision was deferred to the next EC
session without discussion, there were two notable
exceptions. South African Ambassador Mkhize, in her role as
EC Chair, met with Ambassador Javits and del reps to express
the &general concern8 of the Council regarding U.S. CW
destruction, which she later defined as a disbelief that a
country as wealthy and powerful as the U.S. could not somehow
exercise the political will to meet the April 29, 2012
deadline set by the Convention. When del reps noted a lack
of concern, or even questions, at almost any level (capitals,
Ambassadorial, or working level),Mkhize explained that, at
least locally, perhaps delegations were reluctant to approach
a highly respected figure like Ambassador Javits with
difficult political questions. Del reps were unable to
elicit specific concerns from Mkhize, who admitted it was
difficult to address undefined issues, and promised she would
herself consider ways to elicit more specific feedback.


9. (U) Also of note was the last-minute Iranian (successful)
attempt to draw public attention to the &differences8
between the U.S. and Russian draft decisions. As reported in
REFTEL, Iran refused to approve report language on the two
draft decisions, initially citing references to previous
Conference decisions as problematic, but quickly moving on to
highlight the U.S. potential inability to meet 2012, and the
fact that Russia has made no such statements. Iran used
later sidebar discussions to press U.S. reps on their
anticipated reaction if consensus was not reached on their
draft decision.


10. (U) Ambassador Javits explained that, in the absence of a
CSP decision, the issue would be &in limbo,8 with the U.S.
proceeding under its &in principle8 extension from the 2003
CSP decision and that the obligation to destroy all CW stocks
by April 29, 2012 would remain in effect. Javits further
offered that the U.S. would be &in the hands of the member
states,8 and would continue to do everything in its power to
destroy its CW stocks as quickly as possible. Despite
murmurings of dissatisfaction with the U.S. extension
request, it is unlikely that most delegations would actually
block a draft decision. Iran, however, is showing an early,
but expected, inclination to use &potential U.S.
non-compliance8 to its political advantage.


--------------
WAY AHEAD
--------------


11. (SBU) As the UK,s proposal for &terms of reference8
for visits to U.S. and Russian CW destruction sites have now
been in circulation for several weeks, del recommends
distributing U.S. proposed site visit parameters in the
several weeks following EC-46. Distribution now, as opposed
to closer to EC-47, would have the advantage of making the
U.S. bottom line clearly known early in the process. It has
also been obvious since April that delegations are unlikely
to provide feedback in the absence of documents that can be
used as a basis for discussion. Despite the danger that
early presentation of text lends itself to protracted
negotiations, public availability of the informal proposal
along with the draft decision text could be instrumental in
eliciting constructive feedback in the run-up to EC-47.


12. (SBU) Delegation has been informed by German Ambassador
to the OPCW Alexander Petri (also the EC Vice Chair for the
CW Cluster) that he is under considerable pressure to hold
some sort of discussion/consultations on &CW Destruction.8
When pressed, Petri has provided little information on the
source of these requests, and it is not unlikely that he is
creating some of this &pressure8 himself, given the strong
views he has already expressed on the U.S. extension request.
However, it has become increasingly obvious that the purpose
of convening such a group would actually be to talk about the
U.S. and Russian draft decisions. While del has pointed out
to Petri that its decision language is already fairly
accommodating in several areas, and that the general concern
is pressuring the Russians to improve their text, an informal
session of this nature could (if carefully managed) serve the
purpose of drawing out delegations, positions on the
decisions, something sometimes more difficult to accomplish
in bilateral discussions.


13. (SBU) In the run-up to EC-47, it will be critical to
ascertain where States Party stand on the U.S. extension
request, and to determine which SPs specifically are inclined
to actually block the draft decision. Del will use the next
several months to approach all member states of the Executive
Council, preferably one-on-one, to seek opinions, provide
clarification, and foster an atmosphere of cooperation,
understanding and responsiveness to political and technical
concerns. Del will continue to push back on attempts to
formally define site visit parameters, and remind WEOG
colleagues that a common goal of increased transparency in
the U.S. and Russia is best achieved by focusing on principle
as opposed to details. Del will also work quietly with the
Russian del to encourage acceptance of site visits, if only
as a political gesture, and to consider supporting the U.S.
proposal for specific parameters.

SANDERS SENDS.
BLAKEMAN