Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06THEHAGUE1209
2006-05-30 14:19:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 26

Tags:  PARM PREL CWC 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #1209/01 1501419
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 301419Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5849
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001209 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 26
MAY 2006


Classified By: Elizabeth Sanders,Alternate Permanent Representative for
reasons 1.4 (B, D).

This is CWC-44-06.

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 001209

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 26
MAY 2006


Classified By: Elizabeth Sanders,Alternate Permanent Representative for
reasons 1.4 (B, D).

This is CWC-44-06.


1. (U) The week ending 26 May 2006 was relatively slow, so
this week the wrap-up will bring together a few subjects that
have yet to be reported to Washington: Japan views on CW
destruction in China, anti-terrorism, and Article X.

--------------
Japan/China O/A CW Destruction
--------------


2. (S//NF) During a 15 March 2006 lunch on the margins of the
EC, delrep met with the head of the OPCW Inspectorate (who
also is a senior Japanese military officer) to discuss
Japan's plans for destroying the CW munitions it abandoned in
China between after the end of its World War II occupation.
The CW destruction effort will be centered in Harbaling,
Manchuria, where some 300,000 abandoned CW (ACW) munitions
have been found. There are some 15 other sites around China
and Manchuria that also have small amounts of ACW as well.


3. (S//NF) Japan has proposed what it considers to be a
cost-efficient destruction effort that would allow Japan to
maintain control while preventing the Chinese from acquiring
restricted destruction technology and an open-ended source of
funding for the PLA. A joint Japan-China Committee at the
Deputy Foreign Minister level would establish destruction
program parameters and oversee the destruction effort.


4. (S//NF) Japan and China have yet to agree on their
appropriate functions during the CW destruction effort.
China wants a Japanese head to underscore Japan's financial
and moral responsibility, but China also wants Japanese
funding and technology to go to the PLA to carry out the
destruction. Generally, the Japanese MFA has supported a
larger Chinese role. The Japanese Defense Agency largely
supports the heavier Japanese role. The issue has been
briefed at the cabinet level but remains unresolved.

--------------
Anti-Terrorism
--------------



5. (U) A meeting of the Open Ended Working Group on Terrorism
was held on May 11, 2006. The meeting focused on reviewing
the Note by the Director General on the OPCW,s Contribution
to Global Anti-Terrorism Efforts (EC-44DG.8). The OPCW,s
new Director of the Office of Special Projects (OSP) Krysztof
Paturej began the meeting by describing DG,s note as a
simple historical review of the TS, anti-terrorism efforts.
He noted that full implementation of the CWC and achieving
universality were the two most important contributions that
the TS could make in the war on terrorism. Paturej went to
great lengths to downplay the number of contacts that the
OPCW has had with other international organizations,
apparently in order to allay the Iran,s concerns. Pasturej
stated that the TS does talk with other organizations that
contact the TS to discuss possible synergies in the
anti-terrorism field. He characterized most of the contacts
as information sharing and not operational in nature.


6. (U) India said that it believed that the OPCW was best
suited to discuss anti-terrorism at a policy level as opposed
to working on counterterrorism at an operational level.
India then suggested that increased efforts within the sphere
of Article X assistance also would make a positive
contribution to anti-terrorism. Norway countered that it
supported the TS exploring &operational8 ways that the TS
could play a greater role in anti-terrorism efforts. The
Netherlands cautioned that delegations should be cautious
about how they use the term &operational,8 making it clear,
for example, that &operational8 would not include
intelligence sharing. The facilitator, Moal-Makame (France),
suggested that the term &practical efforts8 would be better
than the term &operational8. Spain strongly supported TS

anti-terrorism efforts and urged delegations to give the TS
the latitude it needs to determine with which and what types
of contacts would be best for the organization.


7. (U) Iran said there was a great need to review the TS,
efforts in anti-terrorism. Iran questioned the utility of
the contacts the TS has had with other international and
regional organizations to date and observed that some of the
organizations with which the TS has had contacts (read NATO)
are involved in intelligence gathering and sharing. Italy
suggested that a greater emphasis should be put on
universality. The Italian delegate muddied the waters a bit
by suggesting that greater efforts should be made to
operationalise the TS, anti-terrorism efforts. China said
it was broadly supportive of the TS' anti-terrorism efforts
provided it would not require additional financial resources
from the budget. China also suggested that the
organization,s anti-terrorism efforts and the direction it
should take would be a good topic for discussion at the
second Review Conference. The facilitator noted that she was
not sure this would be an appropriate topic.


8. (U) Iran requested that the Office of Special Projects
provide delegates with a plan of work for the next six months
so that delegations can judge the necessity of contacts with
outside organizations. Paturej responded that he was acutely
aware of his mandate and would not exceed it. He said he was
not aggressively seeking large numbers of contacts with
outside organizations but at the same time, if an
international or regional organization contacted him to
discuss anti-terrorism efforts, he would not refuse to
discuss the issue or possible areas for cooperation. Iran
then asked that Paturej at least inform delegations which
organizations contact him. Norway supported TS contacts with
outside organizations. Germany strongly supported Paturej's
contacts with outside organizations and said it did not
believe that the TS had at any point transgressed its mandate
in talking with other organizations about anti-terrorism
efforts. Germany said that whether or not States Parties
like NATO should not be the issue. What is more important
was the relevance of the organization to the global
anti-terrorism efforts. Germany and Austria also supported
an increased linkage between Article X assistance and
protection efforts with anti-terrorism efforts.


9. (U) Moal-Makame suggested that delegations examine the UN
SYG note on anti-terrorism efforts (A-60-825) and note the
SYG,s references to possible terrorist chemical attacks and
the OPCW. She highlighted the fact that paragraph 89 of the
note urges increased security for industrial chemical
facilities to protect them from terrorist attack.


10. (U) At the end of the meeting Paturej informed
delegations that he had recently had a positive meeting with
the EU Anti-Terrorism Coordinator Mr. DeVries. Paturej said
they discussed both EU and OPCW anti-terrorism efforts.
DeVries said he would be willing to attend the next OEWG
meeting and discuss the EU,s efforts in this area.


11. (U) In the end little came out of the meeting. Iran and
India made it clear that they were concerned about TS work in
this field, in particular its cooperation with NATO. Most
other delegations were supportive of the TS continuing to
play the ill-defined role that it plays in anti-terrorism.
It is clear that there is political support for the TS to
play some kind of role in anti-terrorism but at the same time
there is nothing approaching consensus on what exactly that
role should be.

--------------
Article X
--------------


12. (U) Consultations on Article X were held on May 12, 2006.
The focus of the consultation was the Joint Assistance II
exercise held in the Ukraine from October 9 - 13, 2005. Only
about 12 delegations, primarily from NATO countries, attended
the meeting (due to a last minute NAM meeting scheduled at

the same time). In addition to the facilitator, Hans Schramml
(Austria),TS officials Faiza Patel-King (VER/PRB) and Renato
Carvalho (INS/IMB) attended. Captain Francois from the
French Army also took part, giving the perspective of a
participating SP.


13. (U) Patel-King, who drafted the TS report on the
exercise, began the meeting by noting the importance of the
exercise for the OPCW. She said it was the largest exercise
in which the OPCW had participated as well as the first that
included consequence management. There were seven States
Parties that took part, approximately 170 personnel from
those seven countries. The TS deployed 29 inspectors, 25 of
who focused on Investigations of Alleged Use (IAU),and four
who worked on assistance. In addition, there were two US and
two UK evaluators. On the whole the OPCW was able to carry
out the task assigned to it, though Patel-King conceded that
this was largely due to the fact that the OPCW team had
received specialized training in advance of the exercise.
Targeted training played a key role.


14. (U) In evaluating the exercise afterwards, the TS
concluded that in the future it would be critical to develop
a &core team8 to coordinate the activities of the TS in any
IAU or challenge inspection (CI). The TS should also
consider increasing the number of individuals focusing on
assistance even if only to gather information in case
assistance is later requested. Long range planning that
addresses potential IAUs and CIs needs to be incorporated
into the TS training program. The database of experts
available for assistance needs to be significantly improved
and updated. Radio equipment adequate for longer ranges that
works around the world should be purchased. Reconnaissance
equipment also needs to be upgraded. A capacity for
biomedical sampling needs to be developed. Information
sharing within the TS and externally with other actors needs
to be improved. The OPCW,s media outreach plans need to be
reviewed and improved. Simply saying &no comment8 will not
work in the real world. Formal reporting back to HQ needs to
be improved and more work needs to be done in developing
possible future for scenarios for exercises and real world
contingencies.


15. (U) Carvalho told delegations that after the TS completed
its evaluation, the DG asked that a working group be formed
and a follow up plan be developed to address the issues
raised in the evaluation report. The working group developed
the plan and then is to make sure the plan,s 50
recommendations were implemented. Almost all of the
recommendations have been implemented but there are still a
few problems to be addressed. They include revising all of
the SOP,s related to IAUs and CIs (60% completed to date),
increased funding for training needed, and addressing the
shortage of Inspectorate personnel in place to do inspections
and at the same time receive training, continued work on
scenario development.


16. (U) Captain Francois from the French Army then gave his
presentation on Joint Assistance II. The French had a
37-person reconnaissance module take part in the exercise.
He noted several areas for improvement in future exercises or
real world operations of this type. They included the need
to standardize procedures whenever possible, the need to work
in a common language or at the very least have participants
bring interpreters if a common language is not possible, the
need to identify and involve local officials who have
decision-making authority, and the need to have available and
respected safety guidance whenever possible. Despite the
identification of all these areas for improvement, Captain
Francois said he still found the exercise beneficial. In
closing Francois said that there are two difficult questions
that delegates should think about: Is the OPCW ready to
assume a coordinating role for such a situation (exercise or
not)? If an SP has difficulty in managing a &situation8 on
their territory, which actor will take charge?


17. (U) The Italian delegation asked if the OPCW was capable
of leading the coordination of such a large-scale exercise or

situation. Would the TS have to work with a larger regional
or international organization? Patel-King responded that
Joint Assistance constituted a large commitment of resources
and personnel for the TS but was beneficial to the
organization. She said that the scale of future exercises or
incidents as well as the scenario would determine the ability
of the TS to play a leading role, noting for example that the
TS only has 1000 protective suits in its inventory and hopes

SIPDIS
to increase that to 2000 in the near future. She also said
it was clear that the TS had much work to do in the area of
assistance. Patel-King also announced that there would be a
final follow up meeting in Kiev from October 16-20 to
evaluate the exercise.


18. (U) The UK supported the idea of improving the assistance
database and urged the TS to continue to conduct small-scale
exercises including tabletop exercises. In cases of IAU, the
UK supported the French suggestion of having specialized
interpreters available. The UK supported continued work in
biomedical testing. Patel-King replied that the biomedical
issue was before the policy making organs now and that the TS
was working on developing some smaller scale exercises in the
future.


19. (U) SANDERS SENDS.
ARNALL