CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001167

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
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WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR
45TH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION, MAY 16-19


This is CWC-43-06.

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (U) The U.S. achieved its primary goal at EC-45:
discussion of the U.S. request for an extension of its 100%
destruction deadline was serious and somber. Delegations
were clearly disappointed that it did not appear likely the
U.S. would complete destruction by 2012, but there was
virtually no harsh criticism and no panicked calls for
immediate action, such as an amendment conference.


2. (U) Unfortunately, the impulse outside the Western Group
to link the U.S. extension request and national
implementation of Article VII obligations was clearly
present. And the sentiment regarding Article VII among
non-WEOG States Parties is that progress has been made due to
positive outreach, not "negative" measures. While
disappointing, this was expected. What was disappointing and
unexpected was the total lack of will among WEOG delegations
to support U.S. efforts to have more robust Article VII
language. Indeed, it frankly appears that the U.S. is
isolated on this issue. Before EC-46, it will be necessary
to rebuild cohesion among WEOG delegations and then talk with
key NAM delegations, particularly Iran and India.


3. (U) Finally, it was noteworthy that NAM delegations
attempted to negotiate as a block through Malaysia, which
currently heads the NAM. Unfortunately, this effort was
seemingly "blessed" by the Article VII facilitator and the
acting EC Chairman when they asked Malaysia to present the
NAM position. Delegation will work to counter this
development carefully, but firmly, and on this issue, the
U.S. can expect strong WEOG and some other support. On a
more general point, as Iran and India were dominating the
"NAM" decision-making process, the key challenge remains
finding a way to remove obstacles placed by these two
delegations. End Summary.

--------------
U.S. EXTENSION REQUEST
--------------


4. (U) As a procedural matter, the U.S. extension request
was, as anticipated, deferred to EC-46. What was critical
was the tone of the formal debate and off-line discussion.
While many SPs expressed serious concern, their tone was
tempered and their comments were at times directed at other
possessor states besides the U.S. One notable exception was
South Africa, which harshly criticized the U.S., commenting
inter alia on the Article 12 provisions for the Conference to
take measures in the event that activities prohibited under
the CWC may seriously damage the Convention. Iran echoed
South Africa's sentiments, but far more diplomatically
without commenting on Article 12 provisions.


5. (U) The common themes among the floor statements about
possessor states included commentary that they should be
fully transparent in their destruction activities, improve
their reporting on destruction progress, adhere to CWC
deadlines, and reinforce their efforts on destruction so as
to meet CWC deadlines. Delegations also noted that complying
with destruction deadlines was a central element of the CWC,
and failure to comply would undermine its credibility.
Several delegations acknowledged the costs and challenges of
CW destruction and appreciated the U.S. efforts to be
transparent in this matter. Some also noted that it was
premature to consider scenarios of failing to meet a
destruction deadline which was yet six years away, and that
SPs needed to find reasonable solutions.


6. (U) During the discussion, the UK tabled a proposal for
the Chairman and a few interested states to make transparency
visits to the large possessor states and report their
findings to the EC. This proposal received considerable
support from WEOG members. In side-bar discussions, and
bilateral talks reported below, the delegation was also asked

when the U.S. anticipated providing draft decision language,
indicating a clear expectation that they anticipated
receiving such language soon.

--------------
ARTICLE VII
--------------


7. (U) As a procedural matter, after informal consultations
chaired by facilitator Maartin Lak (Netherlands) failed to
reach consensus on report language, the EC noted the DG's
report on Progress Made on the Plan of Action regarding the
Implementation of Article VII Obligations. South Africa
attempted to change the word "obligation" for the phrase
"national implementation measures," but this was not
acceptable to other EC members.


8. (U) However, the run-up to that final decision was
extremely difficult and contentious and bodes ill for the
U.S. goal of more robust Article VII efforts in the coming
months. Most important, while the delegation sought to avoid
linkage between the U.S. extension request and Article VII,
non-WEOG delegations were not about to miss that opportunity.
Aside from South Africa, few delegations made an overt
linkage from the floor or in consultations. However, it was
clear in side-bar discussions. What made it difficult to
combat this non-WEOG effort was the almost complete lack of
will among WEOG delegations to put up a fight. Indeed,
during discussions on Article VII report language, there was
a race to the bottom to find the lowest common denominator
language that would include no mandatory actions by the EC
Chair, Vice-Chairs or anyone else.


9. (U) All of this set the stage for a lengthy, contentious
discussion on report language on the last day of the EC.
Tensions were high during the negotiations, and as a result
of time pressure, the facilitator closed the last informal
consultation without summarizing where delegations stood,
resulting in subsequent disarray. While delegation will take
soundings once tempers have cooled, the immediate impression
was that the U.S. lost a substantial amount of goodwill by
taking what others viewed as a "hard line" on Article VII.
While there was commentary fQ some delegations that the
U.S. extension request will now face a tougher grilling, and
even from one delegation that the U.S. extension request was
"dead," it remains to be seen if that was just a high level
of frustration.


10. (U) What is clear is that the U.S. will have to do a lot
of work if it wants to push an active Article VII agenda.
The first step will be to re-build support among WEOG
delegations and gain some Allies for the U.S. around a
mutually acceptable position. Then it will be necessary to
have discussions with Iran and India, as these two
delegations continue to be the main obstacles to progress on
Article VII (if not most OPCW issues). Delegation will
provide further commentary and recommendations on Article VII
to Washington.

---
NAM
---


11. (U) In a notable and unfortunate development, the
Non-aligned Movement made its presence known, presenting
so-called "united" positions on the draft Article VII report
language. The Article VII facilitator played into the hands
of the NAM by calling on the NAM coordinator (Malaysia) and
allowing him to present NAM positions during the
negotiations. This was repeated by the acting EC Chair
(Ambassador Petri of Germany) during the afternoon session of
May 19, until del reps requested that he refrain from doing
so.


12. (U) On this issue at least, WEOG delegations were
immediately energized and supportive of the U.S. view that
this NAM effort must be neutralized. Canada in particular is
adamant that allowing blocs in the OPCW would make it
impossible to reach agreement, and that clearly seems to be

the general sentiment in the group. Switzerland as WEOG
coordinator intends to have discussions on how to respond to
the NAM effort.


13. (U) It was notable that the NAM positions put forward
were identical with those presented earlQ by Iran and
India. And there is indeed reason to question the strength
of the "NAM" position. The Colombian representative
privately informed del rep that the "NAM" had no formal
meetings and that not all NAM members agreed with the
positions put forward. And the Algerian Ambassador has also
flatly stated that he was disappointed in the Ambassador of
Sudan's handling of the Africa Group in that he virtually
delegated his authority to South African delegate Peter
Makwarela. The Algerian Ambassador also said firmly "the NAM
does not speak for Algeria." Delegation will continue to ask
various delegates whether they have signed on to letting the
NAM speak for them. And the solution to this problem may
simply be to ensure that facilitators and chairpersons note
that the NAM is not a recognized voting entity in the OPCW
and ask delegations for individual national positions.


14. (U) The following are the EC-45 agenda items as numbered
in the annotated agenda.

--------------
ITEM 3 - DG'S STATEMENT
--------------


15. (U) The Director-General's statement spent significant
time on the U.S. extension request. He expressed his regret
that the U.S. cannot make the original deadlines, but
appreciated the transparency in the information provided. He
also acknowledged the difficulties the U.S. faces in
completing its destruction program, both technical and
financial. The DG asked for continued support for the
Russian program by the donor community, noting it is the key
to ensuring success. The DG further noted that if Libya's
deadlines and extension proposals are granted, it will finish
later than envisaged, but before the final deadline in the
CWC. He also noted India's extension request, the joint
extension request from China and Japan on abandoned CW, a
State Party resuming its stockpile destruction, and the
successful consultations between the Technical Secretariat,
Albania, and the U.S. on destruction of Albanian CW.


16. (U) The DG stressed that the TS continues to conduct
training courses for National Authorities, assistance and
protection programs, and implementation support in accordance
with the Article VII action plan. He stated that 24
participants have been selected for the Associate Program in

2006. He mentioned the TS is organizing two EU-financed
courses on analytical skills. The TS has conducted a number
of activities to promote universality, bilateral assistance
visits to the Dominican Republic, Bahamas, Central African
Republic and the Congo. He noted he has personally initiated
demarches and establish contacts with States not Party in the
Middle East, including a visit to Israel. The DG announced
the third workshop on universality in the Mediterranean Basin
will be held in Rome in October.


17. (U) Referring to the budget surplus in 2004, the DG
commented that some delegations believe these excess funds
are available to the TS. He then tried to explain TS
underspending. First, he noted some of the factors,
including late and partial payment of assesQ contributions,
exchange rates, and actual vs. projected inspection
activities by the TS. The DG said the TS is working with
ABAF to improve its financial performance, and he will submit
his 2007 Draft Programme and Budget in July, asking for an
early designation of a facilitator.


18. (U) The DG was pleased that preparations for the
open-ended working group for the Second Review Conference
have begun, and pledged his full support for the working
group and its leader, UK Ambassador Lyn Parker. The DG spoke
about the open-ended working group on terrorism, and noted
SPs continue to attach great importance to fighting
terrorism. He also stated the TS operates in accordance with

its mandate as defined by the CWC, specifically, that the
OPCW is not an anti-terrorism agency. Finally, he thanked
delegations for their participation in the Remembrance Day
ceremony, and referred to the upcoming Tenth Anniversary
commemoration next year.

--------------
ITEM 4 - GENERAL DEBATE
--------------


19. (U) The overwhelming focus was on, as anticipated,
destruction deadlines. Nearly all delegations stated that
possessor states must put as many resources as necessary
toward meeting deadlines set forth in the CWC. Many
delegations referred to the success of the convention being
affected by whether or not possessor states meet the
deadlines. There was little finger pointing at the SPs that
have requested extensions. The EU noted it is willing in
principle to agree to the requested extension to April 29,
2012, but are concerned this deadline will not be met.
Mexico stated it is concerned that not meeting deadlines
would affect the credibility of not just the CWC, but all
multilateral disarmament actions. In order to facilitate the
decision process, Mexico requested a comprehensive report on
destruction status to be distributed prior to EC sessions.


20. (U) Of the possessor states, India noted their extension
request of two years, to April 2009. Russia referred to
difficulties in destruction of CW stockpiles: technical,
economic, social, financial and ecological. They noted the
assistance provided to them, and their interest in continuing
and expanding destruction assistance programs. China
addressed the jointly submitted extension request, with
Japan, for destruction of ACW in China. A State Party,
without referring to its extension request, noted that SPs
should make efforts to meet deadlines, as there could be
credibility issues if they do not.


21. (U) On Article VII, there was appreciation of efforts
toward implementation, attributed to encouragement and
assistance tactics adopted by the TS. Most statements noted
90% of SPs have designated a National Authority, but few
mentioned many SPs still have to write and implement
anti-trafficking legislation. Colombia noted that Andean
countries are making progress on legislation. On the Second
RevCon, nearly every statement endorsed the selection of UK
Ambassador Parker as Chairman, and the four regional
vice-chairs. Most statements also mentioned that full
implementation of the CWC is necessary to combat terrorism, a
few mentioned the work of the open-ended working group on
terrorism, and the hope that the work of the group will
continue.


22. (U) Malaysia for the NAM and China, Iran, Cuba, India,
Saudi Arabia and Indonesia requested consultations begin for
full implementation of Article XI. A few countries mentioned
the need for an effective method for OCPF site selection,
though not as many as usual, and there were only scattered
references to Africa Office, Article X and universality.


23. (U) Iran floated the idea of an international network to
support victims of CW attacks. They proposed bringing
governments, international organizations, NGOs, chemical and
pharmaceutical, and private industry together to discuss the
issue. They merely noted that they want to work on this idea
with the TS and SPs, but did not elaborate further. (Note:
At the Conference of States Parties, Iranian groups usually
have booths right outside the main meeting room to inform and
generate support for their chemical weapons victims. End
Note.)

--------------
ITEM 5 - STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION
--------------


24. (U) Item 5.1: The EC agreed to defer to EC-46 the
verification plan for the Indian CWDF. As during previous
sessions, the U.S. stated it was unable to join consensus
until the draft associated facility agreement has been

distributed and reviewed. (Comment: In the run-up to EC-45,
Amb. Javits and del reps met with the Indian Ambassador and
del reps to express concerns regarding continued lack of EC
oversight of destruction operations. India cited
disagreements over air monitoring standards (both the
application of new CDC standards to this facility, and TS
dissatisfaction with the air monitoring system currently in
place),and assured U.S. del they would provide periodic
updates on any progress in facility agreement negotiations.
End Comment.)


25. (U) Item 5.2: The EC approved the verification plan for
the Newport Chemical Agent Disposal Facility.


26. (U) Item 5.3: The EC approved the verification plan for
Kambarka.


27. (U) Item 5.4: The EC deferred to EC-46 the verification
plan for the Qaf-Molla CWDF in Albania. Russia asked that
Albania's detailed plan and its corresponding FA be deferred,
citing the need for Moscow to have additional time to review
the documents.


28. (U) Items 5.5: The EC approved Russia's request for
corrections to its detailed plan for conversion of former
CWPF by adding pumps to the production line at the open Joint
Stock Company "Khimprom", Volgograd.


29. (U) Item 5.6: The EC noted the TS note on progress made
in converting former CWPFs.


30. (U) Items 5.7: The U.S. extension request was discussed
above.


31. (U) Item 5.8: The Russian extension request was also
deferred to EC-46. During discussion of this item, several
states noted that SPs must take full responsibility for
meeting destruction obligations and that there is no linkage
between the availability of assistance and meeting those
obligations.


32. (U) Item 5.10: The Indian request for an extension of the
final deadline for destruction was adopted by consensus.


33. (U) Items 5.9 and 5.11: The Libyan requests for
extension of its intermediate and final deadlines were
deferred to EC-46 by Russia, citing inadequate time for
review. Germany also recommended inclusion of additional
text in the Libyan decision (covering extension of both
intermediate and final deadlines) underscoring Libya's full
responsibility for complete elimination of its CW stockpile.
As in the discussion on the Russian extension request, the
FRG raised concern that Libya should not link its destruction
obligations to international assistance.


34. (U) Item 5.12: Article VII was discussed above.


35. (U) Item 5.13: The EC approved the facility agreement for
Newport.


36. (U) Item 5:14: The EC approved the facility agreement
for the Kambarka CWDF.


37. (U) Item 5:15: The Albania facility agreement for the
CWDF at Qaf-Molla was deferred until EC-46. Russia stated
that it needed additional time to review the document.


38. (U) Item 5.16: Germany, Iran and Italy asked that the
note by the DG updating on the progress of Schedule 2
facility agreements be deferred to EC-46.


39. (U) Item 5.17: The EC noted the DG's report on the
status of implementation of Article X. Delegation made the
points outlined in the guidance cable. The importance of
Article X and the questionnaire on National Protective
Programs was noted, along with information the number of
submitting countries is higher, but still too low. Iran
asserted attention should be paid to "operationalization" of
paragraphs 8, 9, 10 and 11 of Article X. The UK will have

new language for implementation of the database soon. The
U.S. provided alternative report language, which was adopted
with a minor edit.


40. (U) Item 5.18: The EC noted the DG's report on the
status of implementation of Article XI. A number of
delegations (India, Iran, and a number of NAM states) called
for early resumption of an informal consultation on the full
implementation of Article XI. However, no delegate as yet
has offered to serve as facilitator.

--------------
ITEM 6 - LIST OF NEW VALIDATED DATA
--------------


41. (U) The annotated agenda for EC-45 showed two lists of
validated data (one list of data for scheduled chemicals, and
another of data for three analytical derivatives of scheduled
chemicals) deferred from EC-44. After initial opposition
from Iran and India to the adoption of the analytical
derivative data, the Council adopted both lists
(EC-44/DEC/CRP.3 and /CRP.4).


42. (U) EC-44 in fact decided to also consider at this
Session one further list of validated data, relating to riot
control agents (RCAs) (EC-42/DEC/CRP.5),and requested the TS
to "submit a Note assessing the implications of the data
contained in the lists set out in EC-42/DEC/CRP.5 for the
activities of Member States." Since the Note had not been
prepared, the Secretary of the Policy-Making Organs elected
to simply omit this document from the annotated agenda. Del
will monitor to ensure that the TS in fact produces the
requisite paper and the decision document is considered by
the EC, rather than quietly disappearing.

--------------
ITEM 7 - AFRICA OFFICE
--------------


43. (U) Sudan, on behalf of the Africa Group, and South
Africa again dumped this in lap of the TS and new facilitator
Andres Jose Rugeles Pineda (Colombia),without providing the
information the TS needs to begin the reports on financial
and administrative implications of an office in Africa. The
DG noted TS willingness to work on this issue, but noted they
need more details from the sponsoring SPs before they can
proceed. South Africa requested the TS identify a P-5
position to do these reports, and then see if more funding is
needed. There was no discussion of this proposal. Rugeles
Pineda stated that he will work to achieve consensus.

--------------
ITEM 8 - BIOMEDICAL SAMPLES
--------------


44. (U) EC-44 report language provided the necessary top
cover for the TS to develop a proposal for future EC
consideration on the establishment of an OPCW capability to
analyze biomedical samples. This work is ongoing, including
the development of related funding proposals for inclusion in
the 2007 Draft OPCW program of work and budget. As a result,
the discussion under this item dealt not with biomedical
sampling, but with wording to conclude EC consideration of
the DG's Note on the Seventh Meeting of the Scientific
Advisory Board. In a separate conversation, Finnish experts
from VERIFIN expressed interest in working with U.S. and
other experts to develop technical proposals, procedures,
etc. related to biomedical sampling, noting that the true
expertise in this area lay in a small number of member
states, and not in the TS. Del agreed to pass this proposal
on to Washington for consideration.


45. (U) This agenda item was one of several in which a
procedural wrangle over the use and meaning of the verbs "to
receive" and "to note" played out. While at first glance a
trivial discussion, it soon became clear that this debate was
underpinned by a potentially serious issue of governance and
procedure. Specifically, Iran (with off-and-on support from
India and South Africa) considers the act of "noting" a

document to imply agreement with the content -- and,
conversely, considers that "receiving" a document is a coded
message that the EC, or some EC members, have substantive
concerns with the content. The corollary is that Iran
considers actions taken by the DG or the TS pursuant to a
document that the EC has declined to note are unsanctioned,
unauthorized, and presumably should not be undertaken.


46. (U) The DG expressed his concern that such a procedure
would give him no guidance on whether his actions were or
were not acceptable to the EC, nor on what specific elements
of a document raised concerns. The U.S. delegation intervened
to refer back to the previous decisions. By the end of the
EC, numerous delegations had expressed disagreement with the
Iranian interpretation and objections to its continued use.
The protracted debate was useful, since Iran explicitly
stated that in its view "received" was not a neutral term but
had a "special meaning," and numerous delegations,
particularly within WEOG, were sensitized to the risk of this
wording being used as a means of effectively consigning a
document to oblivion without any discussion of the substance.


47. (U) Another result of this debate was constructive
discussion within WEOG on the need improve the handling of
SAB reports and recommendations. Iran referred several times
to concerns or objections to elements of the SAB's reports or
the DG's notes to the EC on those reports, but repeatedly
declined to discuss specifics (hence the difficulty with
"noting" any of these documents). There was broad sentiment
within WEOG that a better mechanism needed to be found for
assessing which SAB recommendations required a policy
response from the OPCW governing bodies; framing appropriate
requests for EC action on individual recommendations; and
informing the EC of SAB work that did not require such
action.


48. (U) Practice to date has often left SAB recommendations
simply hanging -- neither accepted nor specifically rejected
-- and created considerable uncertainty as to their status.
The net effect has been to undermine the utility and
relevance of the SAB. U.S. and UK dels persuaded the WEOG
that the initial, instinctive response -- that a problem,
once identified, calls for EC report language and a
"facilitation" -- might not be constructive, and that further
discussion among WEOG dels to develop practical proposals
would be preferable.

--------------
ITEM 9 - WORKING GROUP FOR SECOND REVCON
--------------


49. (U) The Council anointed UK Ambassador Parker as Chairman
of the working group, supported by four vice-chairs (Sudan,
Mexico, Russia, and Iran). This deal required recording in
the report a set of "understandings" about the conduct of the
Working Group and the role of the Chairman and Vice-Chairs as
a "bureau."


50. (U) Comment: Parker is likely to be an effective Chair.
However, the creation of a "management team" for the working
group including Russia, Iran, Sudan and Mexico may not auger
for a smooth process. In particular, the constructive
arrangement the U.S. enjoyed with the Chair of the Working
Group for the First Review Conference, which allowed us to
heavily shape draft report language from the outset, will
likely be substantially hampered. An additional complication
is that the UK del was clearly reluctant to do anything that
would antagonize non-aligned delegations until agreement was
reached on Parker's chairmanship of the working group.
Delegation will watch to see if there is any continuing UK
reluctance to engage and, if so, will raise this matter with
the UK.

--------------
ITEM 10 -- OIO REPORT
--------------


51. (U) The Council noted the annual report of the Office of
Internal Oversight for 2005 and the accompanying note by the

DG. Facilitator Chiho Komuro (Japan) gave a brief oral
report on the consultations held on the report. Per
Washington guidance, Del rep thanked the DG for his efforts
to ensure full implementation of OIO recommendations.

-------------- -
ITEM 11 -- FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES
-------------- -


52. (U) Item 11.1: Regularizing Payments to OPCW. Action on
this item was deferred, as consultations are ongoing.
Co-facilitator Jay Lee (South Korea) briefed the EC on
progress in consultations during the intersessional period.


53. (U) Item 11.2: The EC noted the report by the DG on OPCW
income and expenditures for the financial year to March 31,

2006.


54. (U) Item 11.3: The Council considered the audited
financial statements of the OPCW for 2005, and the report of
the External Auditor. Because the External Auditor's report
was recently released and no consultations have been held on
the report, Switzerland and others requested that
consideration of this item be deferred to EC-46.


55. (U) Item 11.4: The Council noted the Note by the DG on
transfers of funds in 2005.


56. (U) Item 11.5: Financial Rules. The EC deferred
consideration of the item to EC-46, as consultations are
ongoing.


57. (U) Item 11.6: Transfer Agreement Between Provident Fund
and UN Joint Staff Pension Fund. The Council deferred
consideration of the item after the TS reported that ABAF had
raised several questions regarding the agreement that the TS
would like to further examine.


58. (U) Item 11.7: The EC considered the report by the DG on
the implementation of the regime governing the handling of
confidential material by the TS. The facilitator Betsy

SIPDIS
Sanders (U.S.) led delegations to a consensus on report
language, asking the TS to send to National Authorities an
annex to the Declarations Handbook on Confidentiality.


59. (U) Item 11.8: The Council noted the Note by the DG on
the report of Security Audit team IV.

--------------
ITEM 12 - ANTI-TERRORISM
--------------


60. (U) After a lengthy and sometimes acrimonious debate over
this item and the report language on it, the EC agreed to
receive and consider the Note by the DG on the OPCW's
contribution to global anti-terrorism efforts. Early in the
debate, South Africa attacked the DG's note and the work of
the TS in the anti-terrorism field. Algeria, Switzerland,
Belgium, Spain, the U.S., Italy, India, China, Germany,
Australia and even the DG responded to an isolated South
Africa's attack by supporting an anti-terrorism role for the
OPCW and by supporting facilitator Sophie Moal-Makame's
(France) efforts in the Open Ended Working Group on
Terrorism. Even EC Chair Mkhize (South Africa) appeared to
be surprised and taken aback by her delegation's attack on
the DG's note and the work of the Working Group.


61. (U) During the debate over the report language concerning
this item, Iran pushed to have the report "received" as
opposed to "considered" (despite the fact that the document
had already been received, at EC-44) noting during one of its
interventions that "received" had a different meaning for the
Iranian delegation and was therefore essential in the report
language. Iran's position seemed to be that by only
receiving the report the DG would have a diminished, if any,
mandate to work on anti-terrorism issues. Iran appeared to
be reluctant to directly attack the DG's note (not surprising
considering the drubbing that South Africa endured for
attacking the note) and instead opted to attempt to weaken

the report through the creative use of report language. A
number of delegations pushed back forcefully on this effort,
although ultimately delegations finessed the issue with
language which included both verbs.

--------------
ITEM 13 - TS INSTRUMENTS
--------------


62. (U) The EC received the Note by the DG on instruments
signed by the TS with the governments of SPs and with organs
of equivalent function within other international
organizations and decided to consider it further at its next
regular session. India and Iran had asked that the item be
deferred for consideration at the next EC, although the
Iranian delegation concluded its request with "preliminary
remarks" that amounted to a broadside against current
practice and a call for development of detailed "parameters"
limiting the DG's authority to sign such agreements. South
Africa accused the DG of signing agreements with SPs and
other organizations in contravention of the CWC, citing as an
example the EU assistance agreement with the TS.

--------------
ITEM 14 - ANY OTHER BUSINESS
--------------


63. (U) There was no discussion under this topic.

--------------
DESTRUCTION INFORMALS
--------------


64. (U) At the May 15 destruction informals, the TS provided
three overview presentations updating attending delegations
on the status of verification activities, CW destruction
efforts, and CW production facilities conversion. All
possessor States, except Albania, provided an update (either
as a presentation or national statement) on their destruction
progress.


65. (U) Russia led the session with an update on its
destruction efforts, drawing on its recently submitted
"amended plan for destruction" and other previously provided
material, and highlighting that it plans to destroy 20
percent of its stockpile by April 29, 2007. Russia also
stated that construction had started on other destruction
facilities at Kambarka, Maradykovsky, and Shchuchye. Russia
expects to begin destruction operations (hydrolysis of CW
agent in aerial bombs) at Maradykovsky by July 2006.


66. (U) Dale Ormond, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Elimination of Chemical Weapons (DASA ECW),provided the
U.S. detailed presentation on its CW destruction efforts and
recently submitted extension request, emphasizing a possible
delay in completion of destruction beyond the deadline
requested (April 29, 2012). As after the April 20
presentation, delegations were remarkably silent. (Comment:
Informal feedback indicates many capitals are still reviewing
the significant amount of detailed information provided in
April, which may explain the lack of detailed
program/technical questions. End comment.)


67. (U) China provided a lengthy presentation on the
recovery, storage and destruction of Japanese Abandon
Chemical Weapons. (Comment: Presentation veered away from
the purely technical, and toward the politically charged,
with overt references to "heinous Japanese crimes." End
comment.) China reported that to date, some 58 sites have
been discovered, with the largest number located in Harbling,
Dunhau city, Jilin Province. The PRC presentation showed
plans for site selection and eventual construction of a
destruction facility. Japan responded with a brief statement
from the floor.


68. (U) A State Party provided a brief national statement
on it destruction efforts. Since the last EC meeting in
March 2006, a State Party reported that it destroyed 54 MT of
Diflour (DF) and 45 MT of OPA. As of April 2006, a State

Party had destroyed 70 percent of its CW stockpile. A State
Party extension request for 100 percent destruction was
approved in EC-44 through December 2008.


69. (U) Libya provided a national statement on its CW
destruction efforts by noting its recent submission of
requests for deadline extensions for Phases 1, 2, and 3
intermediate, and Phase 4, the 100 percent deadline. Libya
has requested deadlines be set for destruction of Category 1
CW by December 2010 and Category 2 CW by December 2011.
Drawing on talking points provided by the U.S., Libya noted
that this timeline takes into account the potential delays
inherent in negotiation of an assistance implementing
agreement with the U.S. Libya also provided general
information on its plans for destruction, and progress on
conversion of its former CW Production Facility at Rabta.


70. (U) India made a brief national statement updating
interested delegations on its CW destruction progress. India
reported that its second CWDF begin operation in January 2006
and completed a campaign in March 2006, having destroyed 100
MT of Category 1 CW. India also has submitted an extension
request for 100 percent destruction by December 2009. (Note:
Following mention of continuing TS/India facility agreement
negotiations by Director of Verification Horst Reeps, U.S.
rep took the floor to note the importance of facility
documents as a critical means of allowing EC oversight of
destruction operations. U.S. rep encouraged the TS and India
to reach agreement on the facility agreement, and submit it
as soon as possible for EC consideration.)

-------------- --------------
DASD (NCB) DR. HOPKINS MEETING WITH DIRECTOR GENERAL
-------------- --------------


71. (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (DASD (NCB)) Dr. Tom
Hopkins met with DG Pfirter in his role as acting ASD (NCB).
The DG expressed appreciation for Hopkins' presence as a sign
of U.S. commitment to the CWC, and expressed his opinion that
no one could question the U.S. efforts or transparency, while
acknowledging that the real concern for most interested
delegations was the progress of Russian CW destruction. As
in previous meetings, the DG stressed the importance of a
U.S. public commitment to meeting the 2012 deadline if at all
possible, without which it would be difficult for him to
speak in support of U.S. efforts.


72. (U) The DG also noted his desire that member states move
from the initial "phase" (one of confusion and unease) into
the next phase, one of acceptance and a willingness to
address the issue in detail at a more appropriate time (i.e.
closer to the deadline). He expressed a hope that the matter
would be settled, at least in the short term, by a decision
prior to CSP-11, in order to avoid the issue of CW
destruction becoming all-consuming during preparations for
the Second Revcon. Pfirter encouraged the U.S. to continue
its detailed, transparent reporting to the EC.

--------------
BILATERAL WITH RUSSIA
--------------


73. (U) Del reps met with representatives from the Russian
delegation to answer Russian questions on the U.S. extension
request. Russian del inquired as to whether the U.S.
intended to submit a new detailed plan (i.e. one allowing the
U.S. to meet the final deadline of April 29, 2012). U.S. rep
explained that Washington views the current extension
request, and supporting documentation, as legal, as the
request clearly meets the requirements set out in the
Convention. Russian del also asked whether the U.S. plans to
submit a draft decision for its extension request. U.S. rep
replied that text is being drafted, and prior to submission
(likely prior to EC-46),the U.S. will share proposed text
with key delegations.


74. (U) Reps from Moscow then asked a number of technical
questions, focused on destruction capacity and program

challenges, all of which were answered by program expert Mr.
Dale Ormond (Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Elimination of Chemical Weapons). Certain questions seemed
to indicate Russia believes the U.S. plans to accelerate its
program through major facility modifications; U.S. del
explained that any improvement in the pace of destruction was
currently envisioned through improvement in operational
efficiencies. Russian del also implied the U.S. detailed
plan was inadequate (through indirect comparison with their
own),a fact that U.S. reps refuted, noting that the level of
detail provided was consistent with other requests, and
augmented by the information available to the Council in U.S.
Annual Plans for Destruction.


75. (U) In a follow-up meeting later in the session, U.S. and
UK reps asked experts from Moscow a series of detailed
questions, focused primarily on the Kambarka and Maradykovsky
destruction facilities, and on international assistance for
the facilities under design and/or construction (details to
be reported SEPTEL). The meeting concluded with a
U.S./Russia bilat, during which the concept of site visits
for the "possessors requesting extensions to 2012" was
discussed. Russian del stated it would pass the proposal to
Moscow for review, but did not see any clear benefit in such
visits, especially when considering the
monitoring/verification already achieved through continual
presence of the TS Inspectorate.


76. (U) U.S. del agreed that Washington would have to
thoroughly weigh the benefits of such visits against their
operational impact, but also encouraged Russia to think of
the visits not in terms of "additional verification," but in
terms of a political gesture of increased transparency. U.S.
reps spoke to the possible impact such visits could have,
especially on SPs not familiar with the destruction process,
and the possibility of increasing member states' appreciation
for the scope of (and challenges associated with) such
operations. Russian del also expressed a desire to have
provisions such as these applied to any possessor state
extending beyond April 29, 2007, and not only to the U.S. and
Russia.

--------------
BILATERAL WITH THE UK
--------------


77. (U) U.S. reps met with the UK delegation to discuss the
U.S. extension request. UK was primarily interested in
exploring the possibility of site visits to Russian and U.S.
CW destruction facilities, and provided a non-paper that laid
out general terms of reference for such visits. U.S. reps
agreed that, as discussed earlier in WEOG, site visits could
certainly provide valuable insight into the scale and
complexity of destruction operations. However, the matter
would have to be thoroughly assessed in Washington - not only
for political benefit, but also for operational impact and
security and safety concerns. Both delegations agreed that
the terms of such visits would have to be clearly defined,
and reasonable expectations established (i.e. political
understanding/support versus a technical assessment of
progress).


78. (U) UK reps also raised the subject of the legality of
the U.S. request, and agreed the U.S. could anticipate some
difficulty with delegations holding the belief that the
detailed plan/projections presented in the extension request
must be reconciled with the specific deadline requested.
U.S. rep made the point that while Washington was clear in
its view that the extension request fulfills the requirement
set out in the CWC, UK insight into how to manage this
perception (that the plan and request are somehow
inconsistent, and that the extension request cannot therefore
be approved) would be valuable. Finally, the UK delegation
inquired as to U.S. plans for a draft decision, and expressed
an interest in seeing draft text during EC-45. U.S. reps
replied that the matter was still under review in Washington,
but that before a text was distributed to the EC (likely
prior to EC-46),the UK and other key delegations would be
consulted.


--------------
SOLOMON ISLANDS
--------------


79. (U) U.S. reps met with Jeff Osborne, Chemical
Demilitarization Branch ACW/OCW expert, to discuss the
upcoming destruction mission in the Solomon Islands. U.S.
reps answered many of Osborne's technical and logistical
questions, and reminded him that the mission date provided
previously was still subject to change. Osborne provided
several additional questions, to be relayed to PACOM
destruction team members by Joint Staff rep. Osborne also
re-iterated to the U.S. del his primary goal was to provide
assurance to member states that destruction was carried out
in accordance with the CWC; bearing this in mind, it would be
important for him to have adequate access to all phases of
the recovery and destruction processes. Finally, in response
to a U.S. inquiry, he noted a detailed plan for destruction
would still need to be submitted.


80. (U) Javits sends.
ARNALL