BEILIN PONDERS PA REFERENDUM ON A GOI-ABBAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000899

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREF KWBG KPAL IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GOI INTERNAL
SUBJECT: BEILIN PONDERS PA REFERENDUM ON A GOI-ABBAS
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT


Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: Meretz Chairman Yossi Beilin repeatedly
expressed incredulity to the Ambassador during their February
28 meeting that FM Tzipi Livni publicly referred to
Palestinian Authority (PA) President Abbas as "irrelevant."
Beilin said that former PA negotiator Saeb Erekat recently
proposed to him that the GOI negotiate on final status issues
with a PA team headed by Abbas and that the PA then hold a
referendum on the results. Beilin advised that the
international community not expect Hamas to change its
position overnight and advocated using a third party to talk
to Hamas about its positions. Beilin said his party is
interested in joining a Kadima coalition, but noted the
Meretz condition that Kadima open negotiations with the PA.
The Ambassador made clear the USG's opposition to
negotiations with Hamas unless it accepted the Quartet's
conditions. He offered his observations about Livni's press
statement, noting that she and the GOI are worried that
contacts with Abbas may eventually serve to legitimize a
Hamas government. The Ambassador noted that the Quartet
conditions relate to the PA, not to Hamas per se, and cited
the USG interest that Hamas form a straight Hamas government
so that full governing responsibility is placed on it and
there is no confusion between it and the PA. End summary.

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Tzipi's Faux Pas
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2. (C) Beilin began the Ambassador's February 28 courtesy
visit by inquiring about what he termed the "unusual tension"
between the USG and the GOI over how to deal with PA
President Abbas after the Hamas elections victory. The
Ambassador made it clear that no tensions exist, and that the
relationship is strong, but acknowledged that some
disagreement exists on this issue. Beilin then expressed
strong incredulity -- which he repeated throughout the
meeting -- that FM Livni referred to Abbas as "irrelevant" in
press interviews on February 26. "I can't understand the
logic (of Livni saying this)," Beilin exclaimed, adding "and
we are to be in the same coalition?" He commented that it is
"tricky" in the elections run-up to know what are real GOI
policy statements and what are political statements.


3. (C) The Ambassador offered that Livni is concerned that
the GOI will be pressured to negotiate with Abbas, whom she
fears does not have the power to deliver. He said that Abbas
may not be relevant, in the eyes of a GOI unwilling to deal
with him, but Abbas is certainly relevant to the
international community, especially if he is saying the right
things about violence, Israel's right to exist and the need
to honor existing agreements. The Ambassador also observed
that the GOI is worried that international unity on the
Quartet conditions is wobbly. He added that the GOI worries
that funding to the PA now channeled through Abbas in the
future might lighten the financial burden on the Hamas-led
PA. He noted that the U.S. prefers a straight Hamas
government that bears full responsibility before the people
for its actions. Beilin responded that he believes Hamas
will not be any worse at governing than Fatah -- and that it
may be better.

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Don't Discount Fatah
--------------


4. (C) Beilin said he is still trying to understand the
ramifications of the Hamas win, which he described as "a sad
development," and to determine how to proceed. He said he
has been meeting with "old partners," including Saeb Erekat,
whom he met on February 24, and former PA minister Yasser
Abed Rabbo, his partner on the Geneva Initiative. He said
that many of his Fatah contacts "have almost given up."
Beilin stressed that these old Fatah veterans should not be
dismissed since Hamas won the elections with only 44 percent
of the vote. He added that their world is collapsing.
"Their worst nightmare was a Hamas takeover," including the
institution of Islamic law, Beilin said. He noted that the
wives of these Fatah contacts are strong women used to their
freedom. He also commented that the international community
should understand that not all "Hamasniks" (Hamas members),
are hard-core "Hamasniks."


5. (C) Beilin said that during their February 24 meeting,
Erekat discussed a proposal by which Abbas could use his
constitutional powers as head of the PLO to reconstitute a
negotiating team -- which would include Erekat -- and then
engage in negotiations with Israel during a six-month period.
Beilin noted that Erekat proposes to negotiate on final
status issues. "They believe they can solve the problems
(during this time frame)...and achieve (President) Bush's
vision," Beilin said. There would then be a referendum of
the Palestinian people on any agreement reached, Beilin said.
According to Beilin, Abbas as head of the PA, can call a
referendum on his own. "He doesn't need the (Palestinian
Legislative Council,)" Beilin added, and "Hamas will have to
abide by the results or give up power." Beilin mused that
perhaps Hamas would accept this scenario, since they may
realize that "their old slogans can't prevail" and they need
a "buffer." Beilin noted that Abbas's deputy chief of staff,
Ghaith al Omari, who, Beilin said, is being paid by the Adam
Smith Institute, is also involved in elaborating this
proposal.


6. (C) "Is this a scenario or just wishful thinking," Beilin
asked out loud, adding that he does not want to fool himself.
"I know (Fatah) is not in power, (but) should we use this
opportunity?" Beilin added that if such a scenario does not
happen, "Abbas may resign -- he doesn't want to be Hamas's
fig leaf." Abbas, Beilin joked, seems to always be on the
verge of resigning, and, Beilin added, Abbas could
financially afford to do so. Digressing, Beilin recounted a
meeting he had with then-retired-PM Abbas in Amman in June
2004, when Abbas asserted that only he could deal with Hamas.
Beilin added, "(Abbas's) belief in 'one weapon' is real --
he believes he can negotiate this."

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Hamas Can't Change Overnight
--------------


7. (C) Beilin said that it is unrealistic for the
international community to expect that Hamas will change its
positions overnight. In response to the Ambassador's comment
that Hamas may not want to change, Beilin acknowledged that
he has had no contact with Hamas. He speculated, however,
that Hamas is not prepared for the power they have won and
that the international community may be able to influence
them. Beilin underlined that while he will "stick to his
guns" on the three Quartet conditions, he does not want to
dismiss "talking" to Hamas. "They are naive," Beilin said,
"and don't know about Israeli society."


8. (C) The Ambassador noted that the Quartet placed its
conditions on the PA -- not on Hamas -- whereas the GOI
placed the conditions on Hamas. If the PA contains only
Hamas representatives, this does not present a contradiction,
the Ambassador said. However, if Hamas took non-Hamas
officials into its government and this mixed PA then accepted
the Quartet conditions, it would potentially complicate the
issue. He noted that Ha;aretz journalist Aluf Ben had pointed
this out in a recent conversation, asking if the distinction
was intentional. Beilin acknowledged that he had not been
aware of this distinction and said it could be a very
important point. He said that he believes some kind of
"third party" is needed to talk to Hamas to see what they are
ready to do. "We can't set up impossible conditions," Beilin
said, adding that "my electorate is to my left. It's stupid
to say we can't negotiate with someone who doesn't recognize
me. The very willingness to negotiate is a form of
recognition."


9. (C) Beilin noted that his party will not agree to enter a
coalition with Kadima unless Kadima agrees to pursue
negotiations for at least a six-month period. Beilin
remarked, "Why shouldn't we try it? If they want to, why
not?" The Ambassador commented that Beilin should be careful
to distinguish between negotiating with Abbas and negotiating
with Hamas. The Ambassador noted USG opposition to
negotiating with a U.S.-designated terrorist organization
such as Hamas. Beilin commented that he has "debates with my
own people about (this issue)," adding that he has no
"temptation" to negotiate with Hamas. "What's most important
to (Meretz)," Beilin underlined, "is to divide the land
before we become a minority in our own land." In response to
the Ambassador's query about right-wing Yisrael Beiteinu
party leader Avigdor Lieberman's "land swap" plan, wherein
some Israeli-Arab population centers would be placed within
the Palestinian territories and major Jewish settlements
around Jerusalem would be placed within Israel, Beilin said
that "this will never, never fly -- I hope." Beilin also
expressed his opposition to any further unilateral moves.

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Kadima will Win
--------------


10. (C) On the upcoming elections, Beilin asserted that,
"Kadima won the elections already." The question, he said,
is with which parties Kadima will form a coalition. He
expressed amazement about the people on Kadima's list, joking
that the Kadima leaders do not even know many of the people
on their list. Beilin claimed that number 16 or 17 on
Kadima's list is a Russian immigrant who lives in a
settlement and who opposed disengagement. "He got a call
from Olmert one day out of the blue," Beilin said, because
Kadima needed a Russian on the list. Beilin speculated that
because of the way it put its list together Kadima may one
day have its own "rebels" like Prime Minister Sharon had
faced when he was head of Likud. "What's the glue (of
Kadima)?" Beilin asked, and answered, "He's in Hadassah
(Hospital). Olmert isn't (the glue.)" Beilin said in
confidence that Senior PM Advisor Dov Weissglas acknowledged
to him that Kadima is a one-term party, but, Beilin added,
Weissglas said that this is irrelevant since within four
years they could change the world. Beilin asserted that
Kadima will first seek out the smaller parties, like Meretz,
Shas, and United Torah Judaism, to invite into a coalition
since smaller parties will not be able to credibly demand
important ministerial portfolios. If Kadima succeeds in
reaching a majority this way then it can approach a chastened
Labor party from a position of strength without having to
concede key portfolios. Beilin claimed that Kadima leaders
have told him that this is their plan. Beilin said he
prefers to join with Kadima than to try to form a left-wing
bloc against Kadima.

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JONES