Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TELAVIV877
2006-03-02 09:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

ABBAS AND HAMAS: LEFT-OF-CENTER ISRAELI LEADERS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 000877 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KWBG KPAL IR IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: ABBAS AND HAMAS: LEFT-OF-CENTER ISRAELI LEADERS
DISCUSS ISRAEL-PA PROSPECTS

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 000877

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KWBG KPAL IR IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: ABBAS AND HAMAS: LEFT-OF-CENTER ISRAELI LEADERS
DISCUSS ISRAEL-PA PROSPECTS

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary and Comment: In a February 28 discussion
hosted by the Ambassador, left-of-center Israeli politicians
and advisers advocated support for Palestinian President
Mahmud Abbas and criticized the GOI's refusal to deal with
him. The group generally agreed that the GOI should take a
"wait and see" approach to a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority
(PA),although some of the Israelis said that the GOI should
deal with Hamas -- under certain circumstances -- on
practical issues. The Israelis all expressed concern about
the impact of the Hamas victory on regional stability, with
several calling for increased pressure by the USG on Syria.
The discussion demonstrated that many left-of-center Israelis
disagree with FM Tzipi Livni's "Abbas is irrelevant"
statement and that some are even prepared to deal with Hamas
on practical issues. Yahad-Meretz Chairman Yossi Beilin,
Labor MK Ephraim Sneh, Meretz MK Avshalom Vilan, former
Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy, Council on Peace and Security
President MG (ret.) Danny Rothschild, former Mossad officer
and Barak adviser Pini Meidan, businessman Nimrod Novik,
PolCouns, EconCouns, DATT, and poloffs participated in the
discussion. Two Likud and Kadima guests invited to the lunch
canceled at the last minute for different reasons. End
Summary and Comment.

-------------- --------------
Left-of-center politicians favor strengthening Abbas
-------------- --------------


2. (C) The Ambassador reviewed NEA A/S Welch's visit to the
region on February 24-27 and explained the Quartet's three
conditions as well as its views on maintaining humanitarian
assistance and support for Abbas. Beilin agreed with the
importance of maintaining contact with Abbas as an
alternative to extremists. Sneh added that Israel should
work with any ally it can find in its war against Islamic
fundamentalism. Rothschild, a former Civil Administration
Chief for the Occupied Territories, urged the GOI to

differentiate between Hamas and the Palestinian people, and
between Hamas and Abbas, when making decisions on assistance.
He noted that the international community already has
experience assisting the Palestinian people through NGOs
(vice the PA).


3. (C) Sneh complained that the GOI "still sees Abbas as an
enemy, not as a strategic partner," adding that "we have two
choices, Hamas or Abbas." Together with Vilan, Sneh
advocated international support for -- and GOI talks with --
Abbas. Sneh urged the international community to encourage
Abbas to use the "tools of the presidency" to conduct
diplomatic negotiations and to control significant portions
of the PA budget. Halevy added that "Abbas will not confront
extremists," but can play a useful role moderating Hamas,
provided he is supported in "his own way." Novik claimed
that the lack of Israeli support for Abbas prior to the PLC
elections had "castrated" the PA president. The Ambassador
mentioned that the international community believes that
Abbas is both relevant and a helpful voice for moderation.
Meidan took a dissenting view, claiming that Abbas is
ineffective and that Israel has no real influence on domestic
Palestinian politics.

--------------
Uncertainty on how to deal with Hamas
--------------


4. (C) Beilin said that no one -- not the GOI, USG, Fatah, or
Hamas -- knows how to deal with the outcome of the PLC
election. He urged a "wait and see" approach. Halevy
agreed, saying that the GOI does not have sufficient
information to predict how Hamas will act. As proof, he
claimed that the entire Israeli intelligence community had
"got it wrong" when predicting the outcome of the PLC
election.


5. (C) Beilin said he does not believe that Hamas will accept
the international community's three conditions; Israel should
instead focus on practical deliverables and establish clear
benchmarks for Hamas. Novik agreed, suggesting three
conditions: "unqualified tranquility" (i.e., an end to terror
attacks); full transparency on "every penny" of assistance
money; and agreement "not to violate existing agreements."


6. (C) Halevy insisted that "Hamas must be part of the
solution," predicting that younger, western-educated Hamas
leaders will eventually gain more power. He called for
interim arrangements on borders and a prolonged armistice
instead of negotiations on final status. In his opinion, the
GOI should remain on the sidelines and allow Abbas to work
with Hamas. Novik said that he believes more moderate parts
of Hamas within the West Bank and Gaza will gain influence at
the expense of the radical leadership abroad. Rothschild
disagreed, cautioning that Iran's influence should not be
underestimated.

7. (C) Meidan was alone in calling for an immediate
confrontation with Hamas, advocating a set of preconditions
to "make Hamas become Shas," i.e., to moderate its religious
extremism and to acknowledge the rules of the democratic
process. He cautioned against using "western" logic to
understand extremists and expressed doubt that Abbas or Fatah
will be a viable alternative for the Palestinians in the near
future. If Hamas refuses to change, he said, they will face
a "war" from Israel. Vilan and several others rejected this
scenario, saying it would lead to decades of conflict.


8. (C) Halevy said the goal should be to "corner" Hamas
within the next year, something he believes is possible if
the Quartet, Israel, Egypt and Jordan remain united. Sneh
stressed the importance of maintaining unity among the
international community, the GOI, and Abbas, but predicted
that a united front will last no more than six months.


9. (C) Beilin predicted additional unilateral Israeli
withdrawals following the March 28 Knesset election. He said
the Israeli left would prefer that the GOI coordinate such
action with the PA, but is "not against" unilateral moves.
Meidan suggested that unilateral steps would be better than a
freeze in the peace process. Sneh commented that it is
unrealistic for Israel to expect any Palestinian or
international recognition of unilateral attempts to set
borders in the West Bank.

-------------- --
Implications of the Hamas victory in the region
-------------- --


10. (C) Noting that Hamas is the first offshoot of the Moslem
Brotherhood to obtain political power, Halevy and Rothschild
expressed concern about the impact of a Hamas-led PA on
Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. The Ambassador asked how
problematic influences from regional actors such as Iran
could be contained. Halevy replied that the USG and GOI
should look for areas where Iran is vulnerable and should
push for change in Syria -- a proposal backed by Rothschild.
Sneh and Novik questioned whether a new Syrian government
would be an improvement, with Meidan suggesting it would be
better to change Syrian policy than risk a Syrian regime
controlled by Islamic extremists. Sneh offered the view that
"regime change in Iran is the key for (resolving) most of the
problems in the region," including the struggle against
Islamic fundamentalism and unrest in Iraq. Novik added that
the problems in the region -- disarming Hizballah, containing
Iran, taming Hamas, stabilizing Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
and Egypt -- all require leadership by the United States.

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