MOD ADVISOR ON HAMAS, ABBAS, NEIGHBORS, IRAN AND

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000858

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER ECON PINR KWBG KPAL IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS COUNTERTERRORISM GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: MOD ADVISOR ON HAMAS, ABBAS, NEIGHBORS, IRAN AND
AL QAEDA

REF: TEL AVIV 0840

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene A. Cretz, reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).


1. (S) Summary: Ministry of Defense Political Advisor Amos
Gilad told NEA DAS Dibble that Israel was on a collision
course with a new "Hamastan." He said the Hamas leadership
was very clever and would seek international acceptance while
retaining the intent to annihilate Israel. He agreed that
Israel and the international community should support Mahmud
Abbas (Abu Mazen) at present, while doubting the strength of
the Palestinian Authority President's messages to Hamas.
Gilad highlighted the importance to Israel of stability in
Jordan and Egypt, and commented on those countries' reactions
to the recent Hamas election victory. While Gilad said that
Iran would continue to support terror activities and
infrastructure, he said he did not believe Iran would
underwrite the PA budget. He mentioned an Egyptian report of
a possible arrest of an Al Qaeda member in Gaza. End
summary.

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ISRAEL AND HAMAS ON COLLISION COURSE
--------------


2. (C) In a meeting with NEA DAS Dibble and the DCM at MOD
February 23, MOD POLAD Amos Gilad said he saw Israel on a
collision course with a "new Hamastan." The fact that Hamas
did not have the support of a majority of those who voted
would "only be a comfort to historians." Gilad said Hamas
was being very clever in its efforts to form a coalition
government. Ismail Haniyeh wanted to be both prime minister
and head of security, Gilad said. He was not surprised at
the political sophistication of the Hamas leadership. Hamas
was seeking international recognition, the support of the
Arab world, economic assistance, and to be seen as a movement
and not just as being "at war with the world like Bin Laden."
Gilad and DAS Dibble agreed that Hamas was looking to create
flexibility for itself by hiding behind Fatah, technocrats,
or independents who might be willing to join a coalition
government. Gilad thought that Fatah would resist joining a
Hamas-led coalition, but there might be exceptions, including
some independents. He saw Azzam Ahmed as a potential member
of a national unity government. He characterized Ahmed as a
personal friend of Saddam Hussein, a supporter of suicide
bombers, and a symbol of the deep cooperation between Saddam
Hussein and Yasser Arafat. Dibble stated that "technocrat
hood ornaments" would complicate the situation.


3. (C) Gilad said he realized that treating Erez and Karni as
international crossings would cause suffering for
Palestinians. He called the Rafah crossing "nice looking,"
but ineffective against terror. Gilad expected that security
arrangements within a Hamas-led PA would be complex. Hamas
would seek to remove nonworking Fatah members from security
payrolls to effect good governance. Some elements will use
"blackmail to improve conditions of employment," saying they
would kill someone if not put on a payroll, Gilad said. Any
non-Hamas security chief would be afraid of Hamas. In
response to a question from DAS Dibble, Gilad said that Hamas
had the capability to control Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
and the Al Aqsa Brigades, but Hamas would never accept the
appearance of any agreement with Israel. Gilad
differentiated a hudna as "not an agreement", but as a
"religious idea" open to violation whenever one of the
parties feels strong enough. He said a tadiya was less than
a hudna, but as the present "pause" in violence had "worked,"
people were relatively happy. Gilad clearly believed that
such moves by Hamas were purely tactical, saying that Hamas
would "never" recognize Israel. He further said that Hamas
considered Oslo as "subordinate to the national interests of
the Palestinian people." Gilad stated that Hamas did not
want to give up its own independent terror infrastructure.

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GOI SUPPORTS ABU MAZEN BUT QUESTIONS HIS MESSAGE
-------------- ---


4. (C) Gilad said that the messages Hamas was getting from
Abbas were not strong enough. DAS Dibble and the DCM
emphasized that the U.S. believed that Abbas' speech at the
investiture of Parliament was very strong. Gilad replied
that when the GOI put the speech together with other "public
and non-public" messages from Abbas, the thrust was not so
clear. He feared that even the speech itself gave Hamas
"room to maneuver." He opined that if Fatah did join Hamas
in a coalition, that would pave the way for "at least four
years" of Hamas rule. Dibble noted that key Fatah figures
were holding the line. Gilad said "this is the most
sensitive time," and said the U.S. needs to clarify to Abu
Mazen that his message needs to be strong and consistent. He
said PIJ and others were strengthening their capabilities.
Speaking personally, he added, "we could find ourselves back
in Gaza." In response to a question from Dibble, Gilad said
the Hamas electoral victory would change the leadership
dynamic between those in Damascus and those in the
Palestinian territories. At the same time, the military wing
would be "impatient for blood." Dibble stressed the
importance of the period up to formation of a new government
in the PA, saying it was important to squeeze Hamas and keep
on the pressure, but also to avoid strengthening Hamas
inadvertently. It was important to find and encourage the
moderate center. Noting that ordinary Palestinians would
feel the squeeze on Hamas, Gilad said that whoever got the
combination of pressure on Hamas and support for moderates
right "will get the Nobel prize." Dibble stressed the
importance of supporting Abu Mazen, while recognizing his
weaknesses. She raised the GOI decision to suspend transfer
of customs receipts to the PA in advance of any change of
government. Gilad said he was not involved in that
"political decision," but then suggested that the way the
U.S. took back the USD 50 million it had committed to the PA
earlier "may have inspired" the GOI decision.

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STABILITY OF JORDAN AND EGYPT CRITICAL TO ISRAEL
-------------- ---


5. (C) Gilad commented on the Jordanian reaction to remarks
by an Israeli general that King Abdullah might be the last
Hashemite monarch to rule Jordan. The Jordanian Charge' had
angrily demanded an apology from Minister of Defense Mofaz,
but was later somewhat mollified by an MOD clarification that
the general's remarks did not represent GOI views or policy.
Gilad called Jordan "our only barrier with Zarqawi." Noting
that Israel was in a bad neighborhood, he referred to Jordan
and Egypt as the "good coalition." Jordan was being tougher
than Gilad had expected, by not welcoming the Hamas
leadership. For Jordan, the Hamas victory was an internal
problem, Gilad said.


6. (C) Gilad said he sensed ambivalence from the Egyptian
leadership. Mubarak's intentions were not clear. He was
facing an earthquake in the Middle East. Gilad thought the
parliamentary opposition would have been several times larger
if the government had not influenced the recent election
process. He was concerned about the succession in Egypt.
Mubarak had not designated a deputy, his son had not
performed well, and Soliman will turn 71 in July. The
Egyptian wing of Al Qaeda was influencing Al Qaeda's overall
direction, producing ideas that would make it stronger,
including an emphasis on the Middle East, return to Moslem
empire, differences with Zarqawi, and a direction towards
becoming a political movement and not just carrying out
violence. Gilad asked rhetorically, "Can you imagine Jordan
as Hamastan? Egypt as the Moslem Brotherhood?" Commenting
on recent events in the region, Gilad said, "We have to be
careful of this 'democracy on the way to dictatorships.'"

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IRAN FUNDS WILL FOCUS ON TERROR, NOT BUDGET SUPPORT
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Dibble asked whether Iran would be able to pass
significant funds to Hamas. Gilad replied that "one dollar
for terror goes a long way" (from Iran's standpoint); "five
dollars to a corrupt PA does not go so far." The difference
was between suitcases of cash for terror and significant
funds for payrolls and hospitals. Iran would not give one
billion dollars to the PA, Gilad said. Iran would want to
"accelerate the terror," but at the same time an elected
Islamist government "in the middle of the peace camp" was
very good for Iran, Gilad said. Hamas would take economic
moves to reduce its dependence on assistance. Dibble noted
an estimate of 79,000 persons on security payrolls. Gilad
said Hamas would gradually take over other people's guns
after taking over the government and reducing the number of
security personnel. On a separate point, Gilad said the
Russian minister of defense had told the GOI he had "no
doubt" that Iran had a plan to develop nuclear weapons.

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AL QAEDA DEVELOPMENTS
--------------


8. (S) Gilad claimed that he had received some sensitive
information from a senior Egyptian general following his
February 21 meeting with the Ambassador (Ref). The Egyptian,
he said, agreed with Gilad's estimation that, even though the
Rafah crossing "looked nice," even "Zarkawi or Bin Laden"
could get through into Gaza. The Egyptian "let it slip" that
a suspected member of Al Qaeda had entered Gaza and been
arrested there. The general said the suspect was looking for
American targets. The Egyptian claimed not to know the name
of the individual, but promised to get Gilad more specific
information. The Egyptian was also dubious that Egypt would
be willing and able to put as many as 5,000 soldiers at the
Gaza border to provide security and prevent terrorist
intrusions, a proposal Gilad had discussed with other
Egyptian officials during a recent visit to Egypt (Ref).

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