Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TELAVIV566
2006-02-07 16:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

EILAND PESSIMISTIC WITH CODEL OBAMA ON

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000566 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR H

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KWBG OREP IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: EILAND PESSIMISTIC WITH CODEL OBAMA ON
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS

REF: TEL AVIV 366 - NOTAL

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene A. Cretz. Reason 1.4 (b/d)
.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000566

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR H

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KWBG OREP IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: EILAND PESSIMISTIC WITH CODEL OBAMA ON
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS

REF: TEL AVIV 366 - NOTAL

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene A. Cretz. Reason 1.4 (b/d)
.


1. (C) Summary: National Security Advisor (NSA) Giora
Eiland briefed Senator Barack Obama January 10 on "three and
a half" different approaches to dealing with the stalemate
that exists in Israeli-Palestinian relations. He anticipated
the predicament that the U.S. and Israel would face should
Hamas assume power as a result of the January 25 Palestinian
elections, and, in the wake of those elections, has
elaborated further on how the international community should
react (reftel). Eiland's general assessment of prospects for
achieving a two-state solution remains pessimistic even
though he believes Israelis and Palestinians are not far
apart on the substance of a final settlement. Eiland raised
red flags about the dangers Hamas represents. End Summary.


2. (C) NSA Director Eiland outlined for Senator Obama and
his Foreign Policy Advisor, Mark Lippert, several possible
scenarios that may unfold in the Israeli-Palestinian dynamic
over the coming months. His general point was that Hamas
sees itself as a coequal of the Palestinian Authority no
matter what the outcome of the Palestinian Legislative
Council elections. In Eiland's view, Hamas claims equal
rights in determining Palestinian national interests.
Whether involved in the institutions of the PA or not, it
will always be strong enough to undermine constructive
measures, if it so chooses.


3. (C) Eiland retraced the actions President Abbas took upon
coming to power. In February, Abbas promised Hamas that if
Hamas reduced the level of violence, then the PA would fully
integrate Hamas into the political system. Neither the U.S.
nor Israel reacted at the time, as both were eager to reduce
the level of violence, Eiland claimed, noting that PM Sharon
met with Abbas just a week after his deal with Hamas and
never raised the issue as a key concern. Eiland criticized

his own administration for focusing on issues such as East
Jerusalem voting rather than the strategic issue of what the
Israeli policy line should be toward Hamas.

-------------- --------------
Problem about Process, not Substance of a Solution
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Eiland claimed that the Israeli-Palestinian
differences do not generally pertain to the nature of the
final settlement: "We're disputing the process, not the
substance," Eiland insisted, adding that in this the two
parties are completely at odds. He retraced the two
positions as he saw them, explaining why Israel accepted the
roadmap. "We accept it not because it is better than Oslo or
other agreements, but because the roadmap recognizes, in the
Israeli interpretation, that security problems must be solved
before political issues are broached." The Palestinian
position is exactly the opposite, according to Eiland. "The
only way to solve the security problems is if there is a full
political solution. This requires a detailed final
settlement, with clear timetables, benchmarks, international
guarantees, and, only then -- maybe -- can (President Abbas)
persuade Hamas to give up its weapons." Eiland said he could
not see how these two positions could be bridged.

--------------
Israeli policy toward the PA on January 26:
--------------


5. (C) Eiland outlined two alternatives:

-- Stick to principles: Declare that the PA will not be
considered a reliable partner and that the GOI will not
discuss important issues with a hostile party. This, in
effect, would mark an end of the roadmap.

-- Draw a redline between participation in the (PLC)
elections and other activities. When President Abbas
nominates his government, Hamas could be kept out. If Hamas
participates in the political system, Abbas must show us he
will disarm Hamas. If he presents a reasonable plan of
action, then we could give them a chance. Under this
scenario, Eiland said he would not imagine that the PA could
expect much cooperation from the GOI until Abbas proves that
his way is working. Eiland described this alternative as
"the spirit of the roadmap" that would require some
flexibility and would be harder to explain politically than
the first alternative described.

-------------- --------------
Three Political Approaches (Labor, Likud, Kadima)
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Israeli policy post-PLC elections could move in
several directions, none of which are new options, in
Eiland's view.

-- The Peretz (Labor) Approach: Dialogue without
preconditions, i.e. accept the PA perspective on the peace
process by pursuing political and security tracks. Although
this approach has been tried, the proponents of this approach
will respond that it must be tried again with pragmatic
leadership.
-- The Likud Approach: No real progress possible until the
Palestinians stop terrorism. This represents a very strict
interpretation of the roadmap, with no compromises or further
withdrawals.

-- The Unilateral Approach: Cooperate with the U.S. and
withdraw from parts of the West Bank. Israel persuades the
international community that it is in its interest to reduce
the state of Israeli occupation. In return, Israel gets
something in return -- perhaps new relations with the EU,
trade incentives. Anything could be on the table. Although
Olmert has espoused this perspective at times, Eiland
clarified that this approach was not the policy of the
current government. Moreover, there are many differences on
the size of and level of further unilateral withdrawals
contemplated.

--------------
Option 3.5: An International Role
--------------


7. (C) Unilateral actions are not the best solution, Eiland
said, adding that perhaps it is time to consider giving an
official mandate/role to the international community in
certain activities or areas. Even with these alternatives,
Eiland concluded that while the bilateral differences are
mostly process-related, there is currently no way to reach
agreement with the Palestinians.

--------------
HAMAS: Don't be fooled
--------------


8. (C) Senator Obama asked whether Hamas participation in
the government of the PA would prove to be a moderating
influence, or whether the organization's core is so focused
on the destruction of Israel that it would be amenable to the
"softening" that President Abbas's approach is predicated
upon. Is there anything Israel, the U.S. or international
community can do to strengthen President Abbas and his
ability to deliver a functioning government, including law
and order and economic development?


9. (C) Eiland addressed several assumptions observers made
about Hamas and proceeded to debunk them.

-- Some say Hamas can be made a more pragmatic Palestinian
party. Eiland doubts that a party rooted in the tradition of
the Muslim Brotherhood and its legacy can move in this
direction. "In religious terms, Israel can't exist,"
according to their ideology, so, Eiland said, it is hard to
imagine Hamas being pragmatic about a non Arab state on "Arab
land." Hamas does not operate in isolation, Eiland
underscored.

-- Hamas behavior may moderate, but Hamas policy positions
will not change. That point will make things difficult for
the GOI, in Eiland's view. "The last change Hamas would make
-- even if they do become more pragmatic -- would be in its
statements and declarations (about Israel)."

-- Even if Hamas behavior changes, it won't be soon.

--------------
Back to the Future: No reason to be hopeful
--------------


10. (C) Senator Obama queried Eiland about AMA
implementation. Eiland replied that Israel had tried to ease
the life of ordinary Palestinians at checkpoints and the
like. But the problem remains one of distinguishing between
civilians and terrorists. "If we relax
(closures/checkpoints),this leads to an upsurge in
terrorism. The DCM asked whether the launching of convoys
and easing of closures would have improved President Abbas'
stature. Eiland claimed that seventy percent of Palestinian
problems were "domestic" -- unrelated to such measures. He
did acknowledge that the release Palestinian prisoners,
including leaders like Marwan Barghouti, might have given
President Abbas a deliverable, which could have been achieved
solely through political means.


11. (C) Senator Obama asked what the U.S. could do to help
the PA build structures that function? Eiland said the U.S.
must help improve the capacity of the young Fatah leadership,
but acknowledged that this challenge could not be met
overnight. He also addressed the argument that Fatah was in
difficulty because Israel had destroyed the PA by arguing
that Arafat's influence over the years had so complicated
(and compromised) the functioning of the PA that it now
required even stronger leadership to correct its problems.
Eiland cited the Tanzim as an example: Arafat gave the
"movement" weapons that transformed it into a militia that
even his own security forces could not control.


12. (U) CODEL Obama cleared this message February 6.

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