Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TELAVIV4349
2006-11-01 12:06:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

(S/NF) PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI SECURITY

Tags:  PINR PBTS PGOV PREL GZ IS 
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Leza L Olson 11/01/2006 02:25:29 PM From DB/Inbox: Leza L Olson

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
S E C R E T NOFORN TEL AVIV 04349

SIPDIS
CXTelA:
 ACTION: POL
 INFO: IPSC PD RSO CONS IMO RES ECON DCM DAO AMB AID
 ADM

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:RHJONES
DRAFTED: POL:MCKEAYS
CLEARED: A/DCM:HFINN, POL/C:MJSIEVERS, DAO:PJD, POL/RES:JF, CG:JW, US

VZCZCTVI956
PP RUEHC RUEHJM
DE RUEHTV #4349/01 3051206
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 011206Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7334
INFO RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 4902
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 004349 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2031
TAGS: PINR PBTS PGOV PREL GZ IS
SUBJECT: (S/NF) PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI SECURITY
COOPERATION (C-NE6-01638)

REF: STATE 169657

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reason: 1.4 (b) (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 004349

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2031
TAGS: PINR PBTS PGOV PREL GZ IS
SUBJECT: (S/NF) PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI SECURITY
COOPERATION (C-NE6-01638)

REF: STATE 169657

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reason: 1.4 (b) (d).


1. (S/NF) In response to reftel, embassy submits the
following answers to questions posed in reftel. These
answers were formulated with contributions from SIHO, DAO Tel
Aviv, ConGen Jerusalem, and the U.S. Security Coordinator's
office.


2. (S/NF) The answers below correspond to the questions posed
in reftel.


A. (S/NF) There is limited cooperation between Israeli and
Palestinian security services. This is mainly as a result of
long-standing tensions between Palestinians and Israelis.
None of the District Coordinating Offices (DCOs) or District
Coordinating Liaisons (DCLs) appear to be jointly manned.
The Israeli security services have different levels of
contact with the District Coordinating Offices (DCOs)
depending on the issue, but the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)
circumvent the DCOs and communicate directly with the
Palestinian people in the West Bank. Representatives from
the Israeli Security Agency (ISA, also known as the Shin Bet
or Shabak) meet routinely with representatives from the
Mukabarat (the Palestinian intelligence service) and the
Preventive Security Organization (PSO) on specific
security-related issues. There are indications that threat
information is shared, including information on imminent
suicide attacks, and information on Palestinian Islamic Jihad
(PIJ) and Hamas affiliates. How the Palestinians respond
varies according to the crisis of the moment. In general,
Israeli security officers display favorable attitudes towards
senior Palestinian security officials like Rashid Abu Shabak
(the Director General for Internal Security, and the previous
chief of the Gaza PSO) and Tawfik Trawi (the acting commander
of the Mukabarat's General Intelligence Organization). The
ISA also views West Bank PSO commander Ziad Hib-al-Rih as
cooperative. The IDF tends to have a lower opinion of
Palestinian security organs across the board. Israeli
security officials complain about the extent to which their

Palestinian counterparts act against terror suspects in
response to tips and information. The Israelis seek greater
action on the part of the Palestinian security services to
apprehend suspected terrorists based on intelligence provided
to them. The Palestinian security services seek greater
intelligence sharing from their Israeli counterparts, and for
their part complain that the Israelis do not provide enough
specific information to act upon.

1) (S/NF) There is limited cooperation between the Israeli
and Palestinian security services. Occasionally, Shin Bet
liaises on a behind-the-scenes basis with the Preventive
Security Organization, which falls under the authority of
Director General for Internal Security Rashid Abu Shabak.
Shin Bet also informally liaises with the Mukabarat, which is
directly under Palestinian President Abbas. The Israelis
cooperate with and directly assist the Presidential Guard in
motorcade operations, based on Israel's interest in
safeguarding PA President Abbas. Post does not believe that
there are contacts between the Palestinian civil police and
the Israeli National Police (INP),but the INP is visible in
parts of the West Bank.

2) (S/NF) Liaison and functional representatives from both
sides continue to have contact with their counterparts.

3) (S/NF) During meetings, which are sensitive and closely
held, representatives from both sides discuss specific
security information. The Palestinians pose various requests
to the Israelis and vice versa. (NOTE: More detailed
information about these requests can be found in reports in
intel channels. END NOTE.)

4) (S/NF) Israeli and Palestinian counterparts may meet
several times per month or on a case-by-case basis. Meetings
occur both at the senior and mid-level ranks.

5) (S/NF) Meetings usually take place in Jericho or
Jerusalem. The Israelis help their counterparts get past
checkpoints when necessary. Several senior Palestinians have
VIP status, but find it less problematic when they coordinate
with the Israelis.

6) (S/NF) There are few coordinated operations against a
limited number of targets. Expectations and underlying
mistrust on both sides render cooperation difficult. The
Israelis are cautious when dealing with the Palestinians, and
for their part, the Palestinians are careful not to be seen
as collaborating with Israel. The second Intifada, the
long-standing war on terror, and Hamas's January 2006
election victory all contribute to continued distrust and
skepticism, yet at the same time, the Hamas victory has
aligned to a greater degree the interests and objectives of
the Israelis and Fatah-affiliated security services against
Hamas.

7) (S/NF) Israeli and Palestinian security agency
representatives who have contact with one another have
developed a degree of respect on a personal level. After the
January 2006 elections in which Hamas gained political clout,
the frame of reference for the Israelis seemed to change as
they began to look at the Fatah-loyal Palestinians as allies
against Hamas. This has not, however, translated into any
change in perception by Israeli security officials towards
their Palestinian counterparts. If the Shin Bet were to rank
order the Palestinian security services, it would place the
Mukabarat at the top of the list, followed by the PSO, the
Presidential Guard, the Palestinian police, and the National
Security Force (NSF). The Israelis are concerned that
Palestinian security services may be penetrated to some
extent by Hamas, which might compromise any further
development in cooperation.

8) (S/NF) Hamas's January 2006 election victory spurred a
different frame of reference for the Israelis. Israel's
official policy now is to not meet with PA officials, aside
from the President and his representatives. Post's overall
assessment is that cooperation is currently limited and will
not expand to its full potential until greater progress is
achieved in the peace process at the political level. Israel
is inclined to help the U.S. Security Coordinator assist the
Presidential Guard to a certain extent, so that it can
protect President Abbas.

9) (S/NF) There is no longer any formal mechanism for
contacts or coordination between the IDF and Palestinian DCO.
Experiences from recent hostage situations and evacuations
from Gaza indicate that there is minimal contact between the
IDF and the Palestinians, and that any such contacts are
informal or personal. They are generally limited to
resolving specific issues.

10) (S/NF) Post is unaware of any regular dealings between
MATAK and the Palestinian security services.


3. (S/NF) In addition to the information that DAO Tel Aviv
has contributed in the above assessment, DAO Tel Aviv
believes -- based on its close relationship with the IDF and
military intelligence sources -- that the Israeli military
does not cooperate with the Palestinian security services, or
utilize the DCOs or DCLs in the execution of its duties in
the West Bank. DAO Tel Aviv's assessment is that the Israeli
military has a very low regard for the Palestinian security
services, and that cooperation between IDF representatives
and Palestinian security officials is unlikely to develop
absent significant progress in the peace process.

********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
JONES