Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TELAVIV387
2006-01-27 14:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

INITIAL ISRAELI RESPONSE TO THE PLC ELECTIONS

pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 000387 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL KWBG IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: INITIAL ISRAELI RESPONSE TO THE PLC ELECTIONS

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 000387

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAL KWBG IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: INITIAL ISRAELI RESPONSE TO THE PLC ELECTIONS

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones; Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary and comment: Alternate Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert has urged patience in formulating a response to the
surprise outcome of the Palestinian elections, but said
publicly that he will not negotiate with a Palestinian
Authority government that includes Hamas. Israeli
politicians from most parties except Kadima and Labor blamed
disengagement for the strong Hamas showing, while security
officials worried that the outcome could lead to renewed
terrorist attacks. These factors cast the first real dose of
uncertainty into the March 28 Knesset elections, which have
to this point been Kadima's to lose. Olmert's cautious line
means that working-level contacts with the caretaker PA are
likely to continue until a new PA government is formed. We
should expect increased GOI pressure to maintain -- and
ensure that the Europeans adhere to -- a "no contact" policy
with Hamas. We also face the prospects of a further deadlock
on implementation of most of the remaining Agreement on
Movement and Access (AMA) issues. End summary and comment.

-------------- --------------
Olmert urges patience, demands that the PA disarm
militants, and says he will not negotiate with Hamas
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Despite its significant intelligence-gathering
capabilities in the West Bank and Gaza, the GOI was taken by
surprise by the margin of the Hamas victory. In meetings
with USG officials and Congressional visitors prior to the
closing of the polls on January 25, A/PM Olmert, NSA Giora
Eiland, and Senior Adviser Dov Weissglas were focused on
avoiding any USG acceptance of international (read European)
contact with Hamas officials if Hamas were to assume even
sub-cabinet positions in the executive branch, let alone
important cabinet portfolios. Olmert was insistent that --
regardless of the outcome -- the PA honor its roadmap
obligations to disarm militants, a point he reiterated
publicly after the elections.


3. (C) As it became clear on January 26 that Hamas would win

big, Olmert called an evening meeting of his security
cabinet. Following the discussion, he told reporters: "I
suggest not rushing into hasty responses. We are only at the
start of the process." In keeping with this strategy, we
remain hopeful that Olmert will proceed with revenue
transfers to the PA as usual, i.e., according to previous
agreements, until a new PA government is formed. Finance
Ministry officials told econcouns that the next revenue
transfer, if it takes place, will occur January 31 and will
total NIS 240 to 250 million (after deducting NIS 50 to 60
million for utilities and NIS 5 million for court
attachments),even though the GOI has no assurances on how
the money will be spent. Shimon Peres has indicated in both
public and private conversations that he nonetheless foresees
a freeze in international assistance to any PA run by Hamas.


4. (C) Press reports indicate that PM Adviser Weissglas will
continue to chair a group of senior officials who are tasked
with examining Israel's options with the Palestinians.
Weissglas told the Ambassador January 27 that the previous
evening's cabinet meeting had been an angry affair, where
many of the ministers vented their frustrations. However, in
the end the only decision was to go forward with a previously
planned meeting with the PA on revenue transfers set for
January 29. Deputy CoS MG Moshe Kaplinsky and Chief of
Operations (J-3) MG Gadi Eisencot told the DATT January 27
that, for the time being, the Israeli Defense Forces had no
plans to increase their alert status or impose additional
closures or checkpoints. They would, however, continue
arrest operations and the pursuit of "ticking bombs" as they
had done during the past months.


5. (C) In a statement issued after the security cabinet
meeting, Olmert said "Israel will not negotiate with a
Palestinian administration if its members include an armed
terrorist organization that calls for the destruction of the
State of Israel." Olmert was also widely quoted as stating
that "... if a Palestinian government is formed with Hamas
participation, the Palestinian Authority will become a
terrorist authority, which the world and Israel will ignore
and render irrelevant ... a Palestinian Authority with Hamas
is not a partner." These public statements track closely
with what Olmert has been telling visiting CoDels and USG
officials in recent days.

--------------
Impact on the Knesset elections
--------------


6. (SBU) The Hamas victory immediately became fodder for the
ongoing campaign for the Israeli general elections on March

28. Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu wasted no time blaming
the disengagement policy for rewarding terrorism, saying:
"before our very eyes, Hamastan has been established, the
step-child of Iran and the Taliban." Echoing what he had
previously told USG officials, former FM Silvan Shalom warned
that holding the PLC elections had been a "grave mistake" and
would provide the international community with the
justification to deal with Hamas. Criticism also came from
the left, such as Meretz leader Yossi Beilin, who accused the
GOI of having weakened Abbas by acting unilaterally on
disengagement. Labor leader Amir Peretz took the opposite
tack, saying: "if we have to, we will implement unilateral
moves. We will not agree to a diplomatic stalemate. The
changes in the Palestinian Authority will not hold us
hostage."


7. (C) IDF leaders told the DATT that they are concerned that
post-election maneuvering between Hamas and Fatah could lead
to violence that might spill-over into Israel. Several media
commentators asserted that an upswing in violence could
affect Kadima's chances of maintaining its current lead in
the polls.

-------------- --------------
Comment: increased uncertainty/problems for the AMA
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Despite press headlines announcing the "death of the
peace process," the GOI is waiting to see what steps Abbas,
the PA, and Hamas take next. Olmert's cautious line means
that the limited working-level contacts with the PA are
likely to continue at least until a new PA government is
formed. Despite Israeli rhetoric against Hamas, the
possibility exists that such working-level contacts on
operational issues could continue afterwards. One former
minister and high-ranking IDF official from the Labor party
told a staffdel last year that he and other GOI officials had
met with Hamas in the past, and he assumed that such contacts
continue. Polling data taken in January indicates that
approximately half of the Israeli electorate would not oppose
negotiating with Hamas if the group ends its call for
Israel's destruction.


9. (C) As the USG, we should expect increased pressure from
the GOI to keep the Europeans in line and refrain from any
contact with Hamas. NSA Eiland asked DAS Danin on January 25
"to raise the bar" with the EU, and FM Tzipi Livni is hard at
work cobbling together a unified international response for
dealing with the election results. Specifically, she is
working on ensuring that the international community
maintains its demand that the PA and Abbas take action to
disarm militants. In this regard Weissglas told the
Ambassador that Israel is looking for a strong statement from
the January 30 meeting of the Quartet.


10. (C) The Hamas victory is also likely to lead to a further
deadlock on implementation of most of the remaining AMA
issues, as well as increased pressure regarding what the GOI
sees as PA non-compliance with parts of the Rafah agreement.
Resolving operational problems will also be more difficult.
For example, IDF leaders told the DATT that they did not know
how they would deal with issues such as the Karni closure in
the future, since they are not certain with whom they can or
should deal on the Palestinian side.


11. (C) Whatever shape the PA eventually takes, the victory
by Hamas has cast the first bit of uncertainty into what
looked to be an easy Kadima victory in Israel's March 28
elections. Kadima's opponents have now pounced and declared
that disengagement strengthened Hamas. Kadima is likely to
flip the argument on its head. If faced during the campaign
with a Hamas-led PA and/or further marginalization of Abbas,
Kadima could argue that the GOI no longer has a partner for
peace and has no choice but to take additional unilateral
steps that are in Israel's interest. Olmert has told us that
this is not his preferred option, but it is one that he is
contemplating; he made this same point publicly in his recent
speech to the Herziliya conference. In any case, Olmert has
told us that Israel will be unable to make significant policy
moves until after the Knesset elections in March.

********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
JONES