Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TELAVIV366
2006-01-26 14:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

ISRAELI NSC SAYS CLARITY NEEDED ON HAMAS IN NEW

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000366 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA DAS ROBERT DANIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KPAL KWBG IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GOI EXTERNAL PEACE PROCESS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI NSC SAYS CLARITY NEEDED ON HAMAS IN NEW
PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT


Classified By: DCM Gene A. Cretz. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000366

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA DAS ROBERT DANIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KPAL KWBG IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GOI EXTERNAL PEACE PROCESS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI NSC SAYS CLARITY NEEDED ON HAMAS IN NEW
PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT


Classified By: DCM Gene A. Cretz. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) During their January 25 meeting at Israel's National
Security Council, NSC Director MGEN (Ret.) Giora Eiland and
his deputy, Eran Etzion, told NEA DAS Robert Danin the
following:

-- USG, GOI and Quartet statements on a HAMAS presence in the
new Palestinian government need to be clear and consistent.
Israel will not accept any former or current HAMAS members
serving in any cabinet or sub-cabinet position. HAMAS will
have to limit its role to the parliament, or Israel will be
forced to react as it deems appropriate. The GOI believes
that Palestinian Authority (PA) Chairman Mahmud Abbas does
not understand this, and that HAMAS will use any ambiguity to
press for a presence in the new government.

-- Two issues need to be addressed in the immediate term:
(a) expectations about the new Palestinian government's
behavior need to be clear. Israel is concerned that the EU
will apply "weak standards" in defining this, and that this
will encourage the Palestinians to "play games." Israel
wants the U.S. to ensure that the EU raises the bar; (b)
performance benchmarks for the new Palestinian government
need to be pegged against a short timeline. Because of
perceived gains by Hizballah in the new Lebanese government,
the GOI believes that the Palestinians must be presented with
realizable performance benchmarks pegged to a timeline
ranging between a few weeks and a few months. These
benchmarks should be reasonable so that PA Chairman Abbas can
succeed in implementing them. The benchmarks should put
HAMAS in a difficult situation. (NOTE: Neither Etzion nor
Eiland elaborated on how to make the situation difficult for
HAMAS. END NOTE.)

-- The NSC believes that the Egyptians and Saudis could
influence HAMAS in a positive direction, if the U.S. were to
ask them to play a more significant role than they have to

date. Cairo and Riyadh should be asked to pressure HAMAS to
accept certain conditions -- including recognition of the
state of Israel, renunciation of terrorism, and disarmament
-- as a price for joining a Palestinian coalition government.

-- The NSC believes that any expectation of further
unilateral withdrawals by Israel from the West Bank is
unrealistic. END SUMMARY.

--------------
CLEAR AND CONSISTENT POSITION ON HAMAS NEEDED
--------------


2. (C) Eiland and Etzion said that the USG, GOI and the
Quartet should issue a coordinated, clear and consistent
statement that no former or current HAMAS members should be
allowed to hold any positions in the new Palestinian
government. Both stressed that Israel will not accept former
and current HAMAS members serving as civilian ministers,
sub-ministers, or even clerks and secretaries, as, from a
practical point of view, HAMAS' occupation of such positions
would jeopardize Israeli-Palestinian coordination that has
taken place to date. They stressed that they do not wish to
see cooperation with the PA discontinued.


3. (C) Etzion pointed to the fact that the last Quartet
statement said specifically that former HAMAS members could
be cabinet ministers. Etzion claimed that the wording
suggested that HAMAS members beneath the ministerial level
were acceptable. He said this ambiguity needed to be closed.
"Otherwise," he said, "HAMAS will cross over from the
legislative branch into the executive branch, and we will
start down a slippery slope."


4. (C) Eiland and Etzion said they are confused about the
U.S. position regarding whether the USG will deal with a PA
that has HAMAS members in it. They referred to recent press
statements by USG officials to the effect that the Lebanon
model might be applicable, i.e., that the U.S. will deal with
a government, but not with ministers that are members of
Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Eiland and Etzion stressed
that the Palestinians are behaving as if they see no cost to
having HAMAS members in a future Palestinian government.
"The lack of clear USG and GOI messages may lead HAMAS to
insist that it has people in the government," they said. DAS
Danin responded by pointing to the Secretary's statement of
January 11 that armed groups have no place in the democratic
process. Eiland and Etzion replied that they are not sure
that the Palestinians have accepted this position.


5. (C) Eiland and Etzion said that the Palestinians must be
told that if former and current HAMAS members take up
positions in the executive branch, they will not enjoy the
privileges accorded to their positions, and international
financial support for the Palestinians will cease. Eiland
allowed that if HAMAS wins the elections, Israel might be
forced to completely lock down the Gaza Strip and tell the
Palestinians, "If you have problems, go to Egypt for help."
Eiland clarified that this would be a worse situation than
that which the Palestinians face today in which there are
occasional crossing closures: "We are talking about no
cooperation whatsoever. Even in the bad old days with
Arafat, we had some cooperation. The more HAMAS is part of
any administration, the more measures Israel will have to
take to show that it is unacceptable."

-------------- --------------
CLARITY ON TERRORISM, AND QUICK PERFORMANCE TO BENCHMARKS
-------------- --------------

6. (C) Etzion stressed that there are two main issues that
need to be addressed in the immediate term as the Palestinian
elections wrap up, and the government begins to form:

A) Firewall: The "firewall" between what is terrorist, and
what is not, must be sound. Israel is afraid that HAMAS and
PA Chairman Abbas will try to find an accommodation by
forming loose arrangements that blur this distinction.
Etzion said that the EU would ultimately set the quality
standard because it always sets the lowest standard. In this
case, the U.S. and Israel will need to get the EU to raise
the bar. The best way is to start by setting it high.
Etzion stressed, "Israel will be opposed to anything that
blurs the line between the good and the bad sides in the
international community. Hizballah does this very well. We
cannot accept game-playing, as this makes a mockery of
anything that you want to implement."

B) Time: Israel needs to see the new Palestinian government
perform to agreed-upon benchmarks that are pegged to a
timetable of "no less than a few weeks, but no more than a
few months." Etzion said "The Israeli position will be that
a clear timetable must be agreed upon. This will put
pressure on the new Palestinian government and HAMAS."
Etzion suggested that if a political crisis ensued as a
result, and Abbas were forced to step down, it would be
unfortunate for Israel because of Abbas's departure, but
would likely result in HAMAS being blamed for failure --
something Israel would welcome. Etzion added, "I am sure the
Europeans would not want a political crisis and Abbas'
resignation, but it is an acceptable price for Israel to pay."


7. (C) Eiland stressed, however, that Israel wants to see
Abbas succeed, "even though he has avoided commitments." In
order to make this more likely, Abbas should be presented
with "realizable benchmarks" that require minimal performance
of the new PA. These benchmarks should include statements,
laws and reforms, especially in the security area, and should
be agreed upon by the USG and the GOI. Eiland said that
Israel would do nothing to undermine the PA's efforts in
meeting the benchmarks. At the end of a few months, Israel
would then evaluate the performance. If Abbas delivers,
there should be some significant rewards, including progress
on a Gaza seaport, and a meeting between the Israeli PM and
Abbas. Eiland admitted there is a low probability that this
"best possible scenario" will materialize, but stressed that
it is important that Israel "give a chance to even a
partially reliable partner. It is a genuine Israeli interest
not to choose unilateralism before Abbas has one last
chance."

-------------- --------------
EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA COULD POSITIVELY INFLUENCE HAMAS
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Eiland and Etzion said that they believe the Egyptians
and Saudis could influence HAMAS in a positive direction, if
the U.S. were to approach them. First, the U.S., Israel and
Abbas need to agree upon benchmarks. Then, the U.S. could
encourage Egypt and Saudi Arabia to urge HAMAS to "do the
right thing." Eiland and Etzion stressed that now is the
perfect time to talk to the Egyptians, Saudis, Jordanians and
other Arabs. They recommended that the USG use the following
approach: "We are walking into a disaster. The PA is about
to collapse. You need to play a more significant role than
you have done to date. To Egypt: You should consider taking
over Gaza when it plunges into a Somalia-like chaos. You
could do this with Saudi Arabia's political cover. You could
even have a role in the West Bank. To Jordan: Like, Egypt,
you could help to facilitate transit between the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip."

9. (C) Eiland and Etzion clarified that they were trying to
be optimistic: "With pressure, you could force HAMAS into a
coalition under conditions that are acceptable to all of us.
These conditions would include recognition of the state of
Israel, renunciation of terrorism, and disarmament."


10. (C) Etzion said he will look at the Letters of Mutual
Acceptance that were signed by Rabin and Arafat to see if
there is language that could be useful in working out "mutual
recognition," or at least "unilateral recognition by HAMAS."
He stressed that the U.S. and Israel need to avoid "mushy
recognition of the PLO variety," and need to strike the right
balance between concrete and symbolic steps that HAMAS would
be required to make.

-------------- --------------
FURTHER ISRAELI UNILATERALISM IS NOT A REALISTIC OPTION
-------------- --------------

11. (C) Etzion said that when Israel's policy-making
community initially looked at disengagement, it never thought
of further steps, e.g., additional withdrawals from the West
Bank. Instead, the thinking was that disengagement would
lead to a stable situation in the West Bank. Etzion said
that Israel is now somewhat disappointed with the results of
disengagement due to the terrorist attacks that followed and
the increase in Qassam rocket launches. "Now, it seems, "
Etzion said, "that a second unilateral move seems impossible,
especially after the rise of HAMAS. Pulling out of the Gaza
Strip was an easy sell to the Israeli public. Pulling out of
the West Bank would be a much harder thing to sell."


12. (C) Etzion said that the current situation pales in
comparison, however, to what Israel would face in a PA run by
HAMAS. There is no way that Israel would be able to
disengage from the West Bank without a very basic security
regime in place. If Israel were to withdraw now, Qassam
rockets would find their way into the West Bank, and would be
launched against strategic targets like Ben Gurion Airport.
Etzion said that the GOI has not made up its mind on this
issue right now, but would be reluctant to withdraw from the
West Bank in the face of a "rogue Palestinian state and no
reliable partner."


13. (U) This cable has been cleared by NEA DAS Robert Danin.

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