MOD'S GILAD ON GAZA, KARNI, AND IRANIAN THREATS IN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 002511

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV ETTC KPAL KWBG PINS IR EG IS GOI EXTERNAL ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: MOD'S GILAD ON GAZA, KARNI, AND IRANIAN THREATS IN
JORDAN


Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary: In a June 21 meeting with the Ambassador,
Ministry of Defense Pol-Mil Director Amos Gilad claimed that,
during his recent meetings in Jordan, he was told of an
Iranian message pressuring Jordan to accept Iranian hegemony
in the region. Gilad also reported that he expects strategic
control of the Karni crossing to be returned to his office.
Gilad emphasized that Israel can no longer tolerate Qassam
attacks from Gaza, and that Kerem Shalom was closed in
response to a specific security alert. Gilad credited the
leadership of Foreign Minister Livni at the MFA and said
that, now that she is in charge, perhaps MOD will be able to
work with the MFA on sensitive issues relating to defense
exports. The Ambassador reminded Gilad that the U.S. is
still waiting for an Israeli response on the customs
protocol. Gilad agreed to look into the matter, but
cautioned that it would be difficult to obtain a firm answer
on the protocol before the Security Working Group meeting
scheduled for June 30 in Jerusalem. End summary.

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Iranian message
--------------


2. (S) Gilad claimed that during his trip to Jordan two weeks
ago "all the Jordanians" were talking about a message
received from the Iranians announcing that they are the new
superpower in the Middle East, and encouraging Jordan to join
the Iranian camp along with Syria and Iraq, which it claimed
to dominate. Gilad did not elaborate on the source of the
Iranian message. He claimed that it portrayed the Iranians
as speaking on behalf of Syrian President Bashar Asad and
totally confident of their new position in the region. Gilad
also postulated that Iran sees Qatar as the "Achilles heel of
the Gulf" and the most likely point of Iranian influence.
(Note: Gilad's staff told us after the meeting that, while in
Jordan, he met with the prime minister, the King's personal
office director, the head of the GID, the foreign minister,
the military chief of staff, and the DMI. End note.)


3. (S) Gilad noted that in separate conversations with
Egyptian Defense Minister Tantawi in Cairo, the Egyptians had
questioned in detail, "for the first time," the impact of
various Iranian steps towards becoming a nuclear power. He
said that Chief of Egyptian Intelligence Omar Suleiman told
him explicitly that Egypt will not tolerate a nuclear Iran.
Gilad claimed that he personally is worried that Egypt will
act on these fears.

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Gaza
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4. (C) Gilad told the Ambassador that Israeli intelligence
indicates the possibility of an imminent attack (in Israeli
terminology a "hot alert") against an unknown target in
southern Gaza. Gilad claimed that Hamas is encouraging
Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the local brigades to launch
attacks against Israel. Gilad said that he had received a
call that day from Suleiman asking if Israel is deploying
additional forces in the Gaza area. While Gilad did not
indicate that he gave Suleiman a definitive answer to the
question, he told the Ambassador that the Egyptians are key
to ensuring that the situation in Gaza stabilizes quickly.
The Ambassador reminded Gilad of the need to keep the focus
on political solutions, not only military aims, and noted
that the growing number of Palestinian civilian casualties
will lead to anger at Israel -- not the Hamas-led PA, and
undercut efforts by PA President Abbas and the international
community to corner Hamas. Gilad agreed and asked for
increased U.S. pressure on President Abbas to bring the
situation under control.

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Karni
--------------


5. (C) While not able to provide full details on the alert
that caused Kerem Shalom to close, Gilad did mention that the
security services had been successful in stopping an attack
against Karni last week by "tricking" the attackers. He
declined to describe the nature of the attack or the "trick"
involved. The Ambassador told Gilad that the USG is
concerned that the U.S.-leased scanners are not being fully
utilized at Karni. He noted that lately an average of only
23 containers per day have been leaving Karni when it is
open, while more than 40 leave Shar Efriam (a crossing in the
northern West Bank). Gilad explained that the Israeli
National Police (INP) are currently responsible for actual
security at Karni and their determinations decide the
flow-through rate. He said that if, based on Shin Bet
intelligence, the INP directs the Civil Aviation Authority
(CAA) to conduct deep inspections into all cargo containers
passing through a crossing, productivity (as measured in
number of containers processed) falls. Gilad went on to
describe the competing authorities and overlapping
responsibilities of different government agencies at the
crossings, but concluded confidently, "at the end of the day,
I will be in charge of Karni, at least strategically."


6. (C) The Ambassador told Gilad that U.S. companies are
complaining about the management system for Karni, and
alleging corruption on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides
of the border. Gilad expressed concern about such
corruption. The Ambassador described the U.S. idea of
creating an on-line database registration system for Karni so
that all commercial shippers can see, in a transparent
manner, their position in the queue. Gilad agreed that this
is a good idea, and that only humanitarian shipments should
have priority to jump the queue. The Ambassador suggested as
a first step increasing the number of empty containers
allowed to come out of Gaza so that international aid
organizations do not have to pay high storage and demurrage
fees. (In a June 23 meeting MOD consultant BG (ret) Baruch
Spiegel told the Ambassador that it was decided on June 22 to
resume exports of empty containers on Sunday, June 25.)
--------------
Defense Exports
--------------


7. (C) Commenting on the Ambassador's speech at the Jaffee
Institute earlier in the day, Gilad "got the message" on
expanding the role of the MFA in improving the defense export
system. Gilad claimed that the MOD's previous reluctance to
work with the MFA was based on the perception that the MFA is
the source of most leaks of highly classified information.
He acknowledged that, "maybe it will be different with Tzipi
(Foreign Minister Livni) -- she is different." Gilad
mentioned former FM Shalom's meeting with the Pakistani FM in
Turkey as the kind of "damaging behavior" he expects from the
MFA saying, "I only learned about the meeting from the
newspaper." Gilad claimed that the meeting caused Indian
interlocutors to question Israel's commitment to good
relations with India. He added that Pakistan is only
interested in meeting Israelis so that they can use Israel to
gain favor with the U.S.

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Security Working Group
--------------


8. (S) Gilad reported that Israel has drawn up a list of
items for discussion at the June 30th Security Working Group
meeting to be chaired by Lt. General Dayton. The list
includes:
--PA acceptance/non-acceptance of the security protocol.

--Continued violations of the protocol.

--Procedures for dealing with explosive or dual-use items
entering via Rafah.

--Terror elements utilizing the crossings. (Note: Gilad later
said that he did not plan to raise this issue at the meeting,
but he maintained that he is interested in discussing this
point with the USG. End note)

--The importation of cash via Rafah.

--Kerem Shalom as a crossing for non-Palestinian ID holders.

--Extra scanners needed for luggage at Rafah.

--Increased supervision of luggage, including possibly
sending real-time images of luggage to the liaison center,

--Decreasing the amount of time for liaison feed to one
minute.

--Increasing the presence and influence of Egypt at Rafah.

Gilad said that he will be the Israeli representative at the
meeting. He asked that the meeting be held in a "neutral
location" such as one of the major hotels.


9. (S) The Ambassador noted that the U.S. is still waiting
for an Israeli response to the side letter on the customs
protocol, which was negotiated before the Hamas victory in
the January Palestinian Legislative Council elections. The
Ambassador emphasized that the PA Presidency signed onto the
terms of the agreement (via letter to CG Walles),and that an
Israeli letter to the Ambassador to the same effect would
enable the EU-BAM mission to exercise more authority in
dealing with money laundering at Rafah. Gilad promised to
work on a response, but said that it would be unlikely that
Israel could commit to signing such a letter in advance of
the June 30th Security Working Group meeting.

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