FMCT: ISRAELI WILL OPPOSE WEOG CONSENSUS; REQUESTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 002294

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/MNSA (LUACES),NEA, NEA/IPA (MAHER)
GENEVA FOR CD
USUN FOR POL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2016
TAGS: MNUC PARM PREL KNNP IS CDG ISRAEL RELATIONS GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: FMCT: ISRAELI WILL OPPOSE WEOG CONSENSUS; REQUESTS
POLITICAL-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS ON WAY AHEAD ASAP

REF: A. STATE 92033

B. TEL AVIV 2228

C. TEL AVIV 1930

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Israeli MFA Deputy Director General for Strategic
Affairs Ambassador Miriam Ziv told Ambassador Jones on June
12 that Israel will not be able to join consensus on a
Western Group (WEOG) endorsement of the U.S. FMCT initiative,
nor remain silent if all other members of the WEOG join
consensus. Ziv allowed that Israel could join consensus on a
formulation of WEOG support for the U.S. initiative if it is
worded in a way that "excludes Israel as part of a WEOG
endorsement" of the initiative.


2. (C) Ziv, joined by Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC)
Deputy Director General Ariel Levite and MFA Arms Control
Department Director Alon Bar, made the following additional
points:

A) Israel feels betrayed by the U.S. decision to table the
draft FMCT and mandate without consulting first. In Israel's
view, U.S. action violates an understanding between two close
Allies based on recognition of Israel's unique security
requirements, and acknowledged in exchanges of letters with
both Presidents Clinton and Bush. Ziv and Levite noted that
they both had recently visited the U.S. and asked their USG
interlocutors to consult with them before any action was
taken on the FMCT. They claimed that during those visits,
they were not given any indication that a U.S. decision to
table a draft FMCT had been made.

B) Israel is being led to understand that the tabling of the
FMCT is a tactic designed to bring to the fore the question
of the CD's relevance. While Israel can understand the
thinking behind this approach, it cannot view the FMCT as a
tactical issue. For Israel, the FMCT is a strategic issue
with vital implications for Israel's national security. Like
all his predecessors, the new Prime Minister is seized with
the issue; all nuclear matters fall under his purview.
Israel will take no decision at the CD without approval from
the Prime Minster.

C) This issue should have been -- and must now be --
discussed at the political level. Israel sees no value in
having experts discuss the way ahead. Israel would prefer to
have a high-level USG official visit Israel as soon as
possible, so that any proposed resolution to the current
situation could be run by the Prime Minister for his
approval. The next round of the U.S.-Israel Strategic
Dialogue, which is to be held in Israel, could serve as the
forum for such a discussion. However, Israel might want the
discussion to take place even sooner than the dialogue. On
instructions from PM Olmert, FM Livni said Israel had "grave
concerns" about the FMCT in a June 10 telephone call to
Secretary Rice.

SIPDIS

D) Israel does not desire "any unnecessary confrontation"
with the U.S., nor does it seek to create obstacles in the
CD. Ziv cited as evidence of this Israel's silence during
the June 12 WEOG meeting. Israel prefers that discussion of
this issue remain within capitals and out of the press. A
small handful of GOI officials deal with the issue in Israel,
and it is extremely politically sensitive.


3. (C) Ziv -- who had previously received talking points
provided for the meeting that were cleared by NEA/IPA,
ISN/MNSA, T and the NSC -- presented the Ambassador with a
non-paper classified SECRET that laid out Israel's objections
to the U.S. FMCT initiative in detail. (NOTE: The non-paper
was sent the evening of June 12 via classified e-mail to
ISN/MNSA and NEA/IPA. END NOTE.)


4. (C) Ambassador Jones undertook to relay Israel's position
to Washington as soon as possible. On use of the Strategic
Dialogue to discuss the way ahead, the Ambassador suggested
that Israel, as host, propose to State one or more dates as
soon as possible. The Ambassador stressed that the U.S.
tabled the FMCT with the view that it is the agenda item most
likely to achieve consensus and unblock ten years of deadlock
at the CD.


5. (C) IAEC DDG Levite said that Israel thinks the FMCT is
inherently flawed, and stressed that the timing of the USG
initiative is problematic. He claimed that Under Secretary
Joseph told him in early May consultations that the entry
into force (EIF) clause would not pertain to Israel, but only
to the P-5, and that Israel requested written assurances to
that effect. Levite claimed he was told that such assurances
should be easy to obtain. He stressed that Israel was
therefore surprised when, two weeks later, the CD WEOG was
told that the EIF provisions will pertain to the P-5 and
Israel, India, Pakistan and the DPRK. Israel thus sees the
U.S. initiative as a setback in substance as well as to the
consultative process.


6. (C) Levite said that Israel could not realistically join
WEOG endorsement of the U.S. initiative, and then turn around
and try to block consensus in the CD plenary. It does not
have the leverage that the U.S. has to garner support for its
position, and risk drawing international approbation that
would be unacceptable and affect Israel in other fora. He
said that Israel feels it is being asked to "pay the price"
in order to promote the U.S.-India civil nuclear initiative.

7. (C) Levite said that the FMCT will also play into Iran's
hands as it will establish the principle of civilian
enrichment which is not in the NPT and which Iran will use to
claim a right to have a complete nuclear fuel cycle. He said
the FMCT will weaken pressure on Iran, noting the following:

A) Article 4 of the NPT, as currently interpreted, allows
Iran to have nuclear reactors, but not a fuel cycle.

B) The FMCT allows the production of fissile materials for
civilian purposes. Iran will produce fissile materials for
its weapons program, and claim that they are for its civilian
energy program. Without any verification provisions, the
FMCT will be "the worst for Israel." Iran will say that, per
the FMCT, it has a right to have a complete fuel cycle.


8. (C) MFA Arms Control Department Director Alon Bar said
that -- based on his readout from the WEOG meeting earlier in
the day -- he is not sure that other WEOG members will
endorse the U.S. initiative. He claimed that there is
growing concern among WEOG members that taking a consensus
position to the larger plenary might "create alienation"
among other CD members. Bar also argued that other WEOG
members have concerns about the U.S. draft negotiating
mandate, and that still others fear the repercussions that
would follow news that Israel could not support WEOG
consensus on the FMCT. Such a development might block
progress on the FMCT within the CD. Bar further claimed that
the U.S. representative pushed for WEOG consensus in the June
12 meeting, insisting two times that the "group needs to take
action." Bar urged that the U.S. reconsider calling for WEOG
consensus, suggesting that the news of a lack of consensus --
which he predicts -- would harm U.S. and Israeli interests.


9. (C) Levite used the meeting to ask if the Ambassador had
any information about the package of "sticks and carrots"
presented to Iran by EU HighRep Solana. He claimed that
Israel's sources suggest that the package Solana presented
only contained sticks and no carrots. He noted that, when
asked, the State Department spokesman refused to comment, but
did not deny this assertion. The Ambassador replied that he
had no information about the package, and that Israel should
be wary about drawing conclusions from press reporting.


10. (C) COMMENT: Our GOI interlocutors could not be clearer
about their strongly held views on the FMCT. If we are to
effect a change in their position, it will have to be through
an intervention at the political level with the PM or
possibly the FM. Please advise. END COMMENT.

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JONES