Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TELAVIV1600
2006-04-24 16:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

BEGINNING THE DISCUSSION ON ISRAEL'S CONVERGENCE

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001600 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL KWBG IS ISRAEL RELATIONS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: BEGINNING THE DISCUSSION ON ISRAEL'S CONVERGENCE
PLAN

REF: A) TEL AVIV 1470 B) TEL AVIV 1163 C) TEL AVIV
1065 D) TEL AVIV 0940

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones; Reasons: 1.4 (B and D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 001600

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL KWBG IS ISRAEL RELATIONS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: BEGINNING THE DISCUSSION ON ISRAEL'S CONVERGENCE
PLAN

REF: A) TEL AVIV 1470 B) TEL AVIV 1163 C) TEL AVIV
1065 D) TEL AVIV 0940

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones; Reasons: 1.4 (B and D).


1. (C) Summary: Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's
intention to begin implementation of what he calls the
"convergence plan" within the next two years (reftels)
confronts the USG with decisions on whether and how to engage
with Israel on the issue. The complexities, potential
benefits, and pitfalls of the plan complicate our choices.
Olmert's goal is to establish -- with U.S. concurrence -- the
"final borders of Israel" by moving up to 80,000 settlers
from isolated areas to the larger settlement blocs west of
the separation barrier (but still east of the Green Line in
the West Bank) and to new development areas in the Negev and
Galilee. Unlike Gaza disengagement, his plan would
apparently retain freedom of movement for Israeli security
forces in the vacated areas. Olmert and his advisers claim
that their plan is in full accordance with the President's
letter to former PM Ariel Sharon from April 14, 2004.
Control of the Palestinian Authority by Hamas and Israel's
reluctance to deal with President Mahmud Abbas make any
attempt at avoiding unilateral moves and re-starting
negotiations more difficult. This is the first in a series
of cables addressing issues surrounding the convergence
policy. End summary.

-------------- --
Expect GOI Push for U.S. Support and Assistance
-------------- --


2. (C) In the next few months, Israeli officials will be
pressing at the highest levels for public U.S. support for
convergence. These discussions will necessitate a decision
on whether the U.S. will engage on the details of the
convergence plan and, ultimately, on whether Olmert's moves
should receive U.S. support. From post's perspective, the
key question is whether convergence will further U.S. goals
in the region, especially a secure Israel with defensible
borders, living side by side in peace and security with a
viable and contiguous Palestinian state. Our decision should
also take into account the U.S. interest in weakening

extremist groups such as Hamas, in taking all possible steps
to improve the lives of both Israelis and Palestinians, and
in maintaining strong support from both Israel and Arab
states in the Global War on Terrorism.


3. (C) In the upcoming talks with GOI officials, the U.S. has
a good deal of leverage. First, Olmert needs USG support as
domestic political cover to implement the convergence plan.
Second, the GOI is likely to request substantial USG
financial assistance for moving the settlers, as it did --
albeit indirectly -- with the Negev and Galilee initiative
following Gaza disengagement. Such support, if deemed to be
in the U.S. interest, could be structured to steer settlers
away from other West Bank locations (where Olmert intends to
resettle most of them) and into communities within Green Line
Israel. Third, Olmert will seek U.S. assistance in obtaining
recognition for the new "border" from the Europeans, the
Quartet, and perhaps even the United Nations. FM Livni has
already begun this effort in her April 20 meeting with EU
ambassadors in Israel. The need for U.S. assistance in
selling the plan could provide significant leverage to push
the fence closer to the Green Line, improving the
connectivity of Palestinian lands and hence the viability of
a future Palestinian state. However, it is questionable
whether the Palestinians and other Arabs would thank the USG
for any outcome short of the status quo ante 1967.

-------------- --------------
Main Goal of Convergence for Olmert is to Set Borders
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Olmert recently told Congressional visitors that he
intends to prepare the convergence plan, coordinate it with
the USG, and begin implementation within two years. He
proposes to move approximately 80,000 settlers from isolated
areas in the West Bank to the larger settlement blocs west of
the separation barrier (but still east of the 1967 borders)
and possibly to new development areas in the Negev and
Galilee. As he said on election night, in so doing his goal
is "the establishment of the final borders of Israel as a
Jewish state." In an important difference from Gaza
disengagement, the GOI apparently plans to retain full
operational freedom for its security forces in the vacated
areas and to remain in control of the Jordan Valley.


5. (C) Olmert's advisers see the convergence plan as a step
that will flesh out the remarks on major population centers
contained in the President's letter of April 14, 2004. In
meetings with USG officials, the Israelis routinely claim
that the President's letter represents U.S. acceptance of the
annexation of major settlement blocs. They conveniently
overlook other sections of the letter, including stipulations
that secure and recognized borders "should emerge from
negotiations between the parties" and be "mutually agreed."
In fact, the convergence plan, as explained thus far by
Olmert, would effectively negate the "mutually agreed" clause
by setting the separation barrier as Israel's eastern border.
While Olmert has left open the possibility for minor shifts
in the barrier, he told the press that such adjustments would
be the result of an inter-Israeli dialogue, not talks with
the Palestinians. He has also suggested that he will consult
with and seek support from the United States.

--------------
Complexities, Benefits and Pitfalls
--------------


6. (C) The complexities of the convergence plan complicate
the decision on whether the U.S. should support Olmert's
move. While the evacuation of settlers removes a partial
obstacle to a two-state solution, strengthening other
settlement blocs in the West Bank makes it even less likely
that Israel will ever relinquish any of these areas to a
future Palestinian state. The undefined status of the
evacuated parts of the West Bank, free of Israeli civilians
but still subject to regular patrols and raids by Israeli
forces, is also problematic. Such a scenario would erode
Palestinian responsibility for security and leave Israel as
an occupying power in the eyes of Palestinians and others in
the region and around the world. The most contentious issues
of the Arab-Israeli conflict, such as Jerusalem, are not
directly addressed by the convergence plan at all except
insofar as it strengthens the settlement blocs around the
city and defines its municipal boundaries with the separation
barrier.


7. (C) Olmert's plan could result in some tangible benefits
for the region. First, any dismantling of West Bank
settlements would represent the crossing of an important
psychological hurdle in relinquishing the dream of "greater
Israel" (i.e., setting Israel's eastern border at the Jordan
River) that helped propel the settlement movement forward; it
also could prepare the ground for future negotiations.
Second, a withdrawal should allow the Israeli Defense Force
to ease considerably the closure regime and thereby reduce
constraints on the Palestinian economy and quality of life.
Although some restrictions are likely to remain in place, we
could make a substantial easing part of the price for U.S.
acquiescence or support, if we choose to engage on details.
Third, a withdrawal may increase acceptance of the two-state
solution among the vocal minority of Israeli society
currently opposed to such a step. Fourth, the GOI believes
that the initiative will result in defensible borders and
reduce the number of suicide bombings. Disengagement is a
model here; despite daily rocket attacks, there have been
fewer Israeli fatalities since disengagement removed settlers
and soldiers from direct proximity with Gazans. Finally, the
convergence plan offers the advantage of action when there
are few other alternatives. This appears to be a major
motivation for Olmert. He told Senator Lieberman that
inaction would result in a third Intifada and additional
bloodshed.


8. (C) At the same time, Olmert's plan has some serious
pitfalls. Israeli moves resulting in a less-than-viable
Palestinian state or in prolonging the military occupation of
the West Bank are incongruous with a two-state solution.
Convergence could potentially strengthen Hamas, since the
group will take credit for any Israeli withdrawal (as it did
in Gaza) without giving anything in return. Some
Palestinians could interpret Israel's actions as de facto
recognition that Hamas will remain in control of the PA
indefinitely. Completion of the security barrier and the
effective cantonization of large parts of the West Bank will
complicate efforts at economic development in the remaining
Palestinian areas and could further increase tensions and/or
violence. Engagement on the part of the USG is likely to be
interpreted as complicity in what some in the international
community will see as the GOI's illegal annexation of
occupied territory. Such involvement may adversely affect
support for other U.S. policies -- including the war on
terrorism -- among the Arab states, Europeans, or in the
developing world. Finally, U.S. support for convergence is
almost certain to deepen existing rifts within the Quartet,
calling into question the continued viability of the group
and its Roadmap.

--------------
Are Negotiations an Option?
--------------


9. (C) Olmert has said he is willing to give negotiations
with the Palestinians a chance before moving ahead with
convergence. Nevertheless, his (and our) demand that Hamas
accept the Quartet's three principles, combined with the
GOI's unwillingness to hold any political discussions with
Abbas, currently preclude such an outcome. If Abbas were to
take the necessary steps to move back to the Roadmap and give
up what Israelis believe is his sole intent to move directly
to final status issues, there might be a possibility of
bilateral talks. While the Labor Party has hinted during
coalition negotiations that it wants a serious effort on the
negotiating front, Olmert recently told Senator Lieberman
that he assessed the chances of the Palestinians taking steps
necessary to restart talks as "nonexistent." It seems
equally, if not more, doubtful that his convergence plan will
move them toward the Quartet principles, however.


10. (C) The reality is that Olmert has given up on the
negotiating track and is unlikely to reassess this view
without an unexpected emergence of a credible Palestinian
partner or the precipitate fall of a Hamas government.
Israeli political pundits have noted that only Hamas has the
organization and power to seriously negotiate with Israel,
but such conjecture is moot as long as Hamas fails to
recognize Israel and change its unacceptable policy on
terrorism. The international community's desire to work
through Abbas and the president's office to bypass, isolate,
and weaken Hamas has already been rejected by the current
Israeli Cabinet. Olmert's argument is that Abbas is not a
viable partner, which leaves -- in his mind -- unilateral
moves as the only way forward.


11. (C) While Labor's presence in the new government may
temper his views, we doubt the change will be sufficient to
allow negotiations without strong outside encouragement. The
UN and the Europeans will also be key partners as the new
Israeli policy evolves. There will be issues left from
convergence that will require international understandings,
at a minimum in the face of a continuing lack of a viable and
empowered Palestinian partner. While the U.S. will remain
critical to their plans, the Israelis recognize that they
will need other partners as well if they are to gain
international acquiescence to this bold endeavor.

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JONES