GILAD ON HAMAS'S RELATIONS WITH JORDAN, EGYPT, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001324

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KWBG IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: GILAD ON HAMAS'S RELATIONS WITH JORDAN, EGYPT, AND
IRAN

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: MOD Pol-Mil Bureau Head Amos Gilad told A/S
Welch and DAPNSA Abrams on March 31 that Hamas' close
relationship to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Jordan would
negatively impact Jordan's security. While he had raised the
issue with GOJ officials, he claimed that they are "afraid to
intervene in this problem." He contrasted Jordan's position
on Hamas with that of Egypt, saying that Cairo wants to give
Hamas time to "improve" itself. Gilad opined that Egypt is
not realistic about Hamas's policies; Hamas will never adopt
the Quartet principles, regardless of the amount of time it
has to do so. He said that relations with the GOE on the
Rafah crossing are good, however, and suggested that the
Egyptians should take over responsibility for the Palestinian
side of the crossing in addition to their own side. He
claimed that the EU/BAM is ineffective. Gilad reported that
the GOI's policy is to not talk to a Hamas-led government,
but acknowledged that this will make cooperation on security
and intelligence difficult in the future. Gilad also said
that the Palestinians, Syrians, Iranians, and Lebanese are
working together in what he characterized as a sophisticated
game. He warned that Iran's future nuclear status will give
it the ability to manipulate a "Hamastan" and "Hizballahstan"
to act against Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. End summary.


2. (C) Political-Military Bureau Head Amos Gilad told NEA
Assistant Secretary David Welch and Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs Elliott Abrams on
March 31 that now is the time for "creative thinking" on how
to deal with a Hamas-led Palestinian government. He said
that Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmud Abbas will
pass all control of the PA to Hamas in a few days, and
claimed that Egypt and Jordan are afraid of this situation.
He remarked that "even Saudi Arabia doesn't like it."

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Jordan and Hamas
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3. (C) Gilad explained that Jordan's concern is the close
connection between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and
the Islamic Action Front (IAF),the Brotherhood's political
arm, in Jordan. He assessed that this is a sensitive issue
for the Jordanian government because the MB is entrenched in
refugee camps in Jordan that are "volcanoes," and the MB's
relations with Hamas would make security worse for Jordan.
He said that containing Hamas is the GOI's top priority
because cooperation between Hamas and the MB would "change
everything," especially given that "the security of Jordan is
the security of Israel." Gilad asserted, however, that the
GOJ is "afraid to intervene in this problem." He said that
he recently raised the Hamas/MB connection and implications
with Jordanian Prime Minister Maruf al-Bakhit and GID Chief
Muhammad Dhahabi, but that he has not seen any results. He
advised the A/S and DAPNSA to stress to the GOJ the need for
cooperation and intervention with Israel. USSC Lt. Gen.
Dayton informed Gilad that Jordanian contacts have told him
that they want to support Abbas, and are willing to train and
equip Palestinian security forces under Abbas. He said that
the GOJ has offered significant intelligence on the MB and
IAF, and that it is very proactive. A/S Welch affirmed that
the GOJ is not as passive as the GOI thinks, but has
different methods of intervening, such as working with Abbas
and strengthening his organizations.


4. (C) DAPNSA Abrams asked whether Gilad thinks of Hamas as
a violent, extremist Palestinian organization or part of the
transnational MB. Gilad responded that he has read details
of Hamas's relations with the MB in sensitive intelligence
that has proven to him that Hamas is "in it for the
long-run," and part of the MB. He says that Hamas also
thinks of itself as a national movement that can defeat Fatah
in the next elections, and is preparing itself for this
eventuality, at which point it will be able to take over the
schools, health system, and intelligence and security
services. The Ambassador asked whether Gilad was referring
to presidential elections in two years or parliamentary
elections in four years. Gilad, without directly answering
the question, said that Hamas claims it wants to cooperate
with Abbas, but that it ignores him and over time Abbas will
leave. Abbas's immediate successor in this case would be PLC
Speaker and Hamas member Abdel Aziz Dweik.

--------------
Egypt and Hamas
--------------


5. (C) Gilad reported that the GOI has been discussing Hamas
with the Egyptian government, but said that the bottom line
is that the GOE is not "doing anything" except trying to buy
time. He opined that the GOE is trying to give Hamas time
because Cairo thinks Hamas will "improve," but remarked that
this contradicts the picture Israel has of Hamas. He said
that the USG should press Egypt to tighten its timeline for
Hamas to adopt the four Quartet principles because Egypt is
not being realistic about Hamas's policies. He assessed that
regardless of the amount of time Hamas is given, it will
never change its policies and adopt the Quartet principles.
A/S Welch asked whether GOE officials would visit Israel
soon, and Gilad replied that after the Jericho incident,
Intelligence Chief Omar Sulaiman had delayed his trip. He is
now talking about coming in May, ostensibly to allow time for
the new GOI to be formed.


6. (C) Gilad commented, however, that there is increased
interaction between Israel and Egypt on the Rafah crossing,
and that the Egyptians are protecting the Philadelphi
corridor with relative professionalism. Gilad said that, in
his opinion, and not the official position of the GOI, the
GOE should also take responsibility on the Palestinian side
of the crossing to oversee the Palestinians. The Ambassador
asked whether he prefers Egypt to the EU/BAM in Rafah, and
Gilad responded that the EU/BAM is not efficient or relevant.
He said the mission is physically present in Rafah, but that
it is "not useless but close." He said that the EU/BAM is
not connected to Israel's intelligence picture, and that
Egypt has three intelligence services operating in the Sinai
that are very powerful.

--------------
Israel and Hamas
--------------


7. (C) A/S Welch asked about Israel's contacts with Hamas,
referring to the March 30 meeting between the A/S, DAPNSA
Abrams, and Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz (septel). Gilad
replied that Israeli officials have been ordered not to talk
to a Hamas-led Palestinian government, but that this would
impede cooperation between security and intelligence
services. He said that if the GOI stops all contact with the
Palestinians, the Palestinians will have no alternatives for
collaboration, and will all turn to Hamas. He also noted
that the absence of coalition partners for Hamas within the
PA and Hamas would make it easier to enforce a strict
no-contact policy for the PA. Despite all possible efforts
on security, he added pessimistically, in time the
Palestinians will "do something" (i.e., a terror attack) that
will force a "spectacular" response out of the GOI. "But
even if we take over all of the West Bank, what else can we
do?" Gilad concluded. DAPNSA Abrams informed Gilad that
restrictions on dealing with a Hamas-led government would
have implications for U.S. aid to Palestinians that also
affects Israel, such as the wastewater treatment plant in
Hebron. Gilad said that this is one reason why the GOI and
USG need to have regular strategic dialogue more often.

--------------
Gilad's View of an Iranian
Strategic Threat
--------------


8. (C) Gilad went on to claim that Iran continues to enrich
uranium, that Syrian President Bashar al-Asad "feels better,"
and that Hizballah is determined to commit a terror attack
against Israel despite delaying it for the Israeli elections.
He asked rhetorically, "Why is Hizballah confident enough to
provoke us when we can endanger them in southern Lebanon?"
He answered his own question by saying that everything "is
combined now," explaining that the Palestinians, Syrians,
Iranians, and Lebanese are no longer independent entities,
but are working together in what he characterized as a
sophisticated game. He warned that in the future, Iran's
status as a nuclear state would give it the ability to
manipulate a "Hamastan" and "Hizballahstan" to act against
Israel, but also against Jordan and Egypt because they
cooperate with Israel.


9. (C) Gilad advised, however, that the USG, Israel, Jordan,
and Egypt have the cards to play together against an Iranian
threat, and said that "we need to coordinate or the future
will be very gloomy." He commented again that it is time for
"creative thinking," because everyone is focusing on too many
details and not on the big picture.


10. (U) A/S Welch and DAPNSA Abrams have cleared this cable.

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