BIBI SAYS UNDECIDEDS, TURNOUT RATE MAKE ELECTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 001164

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KPAL PINR IS GOI INTERNAL ELECTIONS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GOI EXTERNAL
SUBJECT: BIBI SAYS UNDECIDEDS, TURNOUT RATE MAKE ELECTION
PREDICTIONS IMPOSSIBLE (C-NE6-00442)


Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: Likud Chairman Binyamin (Bibi) Netanyahu
told the Ambassador and DCM March 22 that the main factors to
consider in this election are the continuing high number of
undecided voters so close to election day and the possibility
of a low voter turnout. Netanyahu underlined his concern
that if Kadima wins a majority, A/PM Olmert will implement
additional unilateral withdrawals, which, Netanyahu asserted,
will only serve to strengthen Hamas. Describing Hamas as a
"malignancy" that will never moderate, Netanyahu called for
"shrinking it" and referred several times during the meeting
to the need for "regime change." Netanyahu tied Hamas to
what he claimed is an overall Islamic fundamentalist regional
trend bent on continuing "religious wars." Turning to
economic issues, Netanyahu emphasized the need to continue
with economic reform, and denied recent press reports that he
had apologized publicly for the extent and impact on the poor
of social spending cuts he instituted as finance minister.
The Ambassador stressed that the USG had not taken a position
on additional unilateral withdrawals. End summary.

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Bibi Can't Predict the Outcome
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2. (C) Netanyahu told the Ambassador and DCM March 22 that
"it is hard to say what will happen" in this election. He
said that exit polls on election night can only be reported
after voting has ended. The major variables, Netanyahu
stressed, are the turnout rate and how the currently
undecided voters ultimately vote -- if they vote at all. In
response to DCM's query, Netanyahu said that never before had
the number of "floaters" been so high so close to election
day. He added that the final voter turnout rate, which had
been in a downward trend over the years, could be the lowest
ever. In response to the Ambassador's query as to how Likud
intends to get out the vote, Netanyahu said that his party
branches will work on this effort and cited telephoning as
one tool to be used. He half-joked -- in an
uncharacteristically self-deprecating manner -- that he would
also be making "last minute impassioned pleas" to vote for
Likud. Referring to Likud polls, Netanyahu asserted that
Kadima has sunk to only 32 Knesset seats, which he claimed
continues a steady downward trend since January.

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Bibi: Olmert's Policy Dangerous to Israel, U.S.
-------------- --


3. (C) Turning to Hamas, Netanyahu charged that A/PM's
proposed policies on additional unilateral withdrawals "is a
very, very, very serious problem" for Israel and the United
States. This policy, he asserted, will "undoubtedly" boost
Hamas and help it consolidate its rule. He underscored his
view that Hamas should not be helped in any way. The
Ambassador noted that USG policy clearly precludes providing
Hamas with any funding. Netanyahu quipped that he cannot say
the same thing about Israel's government. (Note: Netanyahu
was probably referring to Olmert's decision to transfer tax
revenues to the PA in February. End note.) Netanyahu
stressed that this election is really about what he termed a
choice between the policy of defeating Hamas -- his policy --
and sustaining it -- which Netanyahu claimed would be the
result of Olmert's policy. He claimed that Sharon had
opposed any further unilateral moves. Olmert is zigzagging
now in his policy statements, Netanyahu assessed, in order to
keep both his left-leaning and right-leaning voters. In
response to the Ambassador's query, Netanyahu said that the
public is not focused on the Hamas issue as it does not view
Hamas as an immediate critical threat. The Ambassador
stressed that the USG has not taken a position on Olmert's
proposed additional unilateral moves.

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Need Regime Change
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4. (C) Netanyahu underlined his view that Hamas is like a
"malignancy" that, left to its own devices, will only expand
and never moderate. He advocated "weakening" and "removing"
Hamas from power, as was done with the regime in Iraq. He
said that Hamas, like Iran, can never be "bought off," and
that, since it is even better organized than Fatah, it will
only gain more control. Hamas is part of a greater regional
trend of Islamic fundamentalism, Netanyahu argued, which
encompasses the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Taliban
movement, and the growth of al Qaeda. He advocated that
Israel retain control of the Jordan Valley to prevent Hamas
expansion into that area and what he termed the threat that
Hamas would then pose to Jordan. He advocated that Jordan be
strengthened against this possible threat, with economic
assistance, but he did not elaborate. Asked whether Hamas
might fail on its own, Netanyahu was emphatic that Hamas
would not, unless it is deprived of the means to succeed. He
said that Hamas could continue for several years
"distributing money it receives" to the people. Hamas would
retain popularity by putting a little money in a lot of
pockets rather than a lot of money in a few, as Fatah had
done, he said.


5. (C) The Ambassador raised the need to encourage
moderation among the Palestinian people as the best way to
rein in Hamas. Netanyahu countered that Hamas popularity
grew not because the public rejected the PA for its
corruption, or because of disengagement, but because of a
broader regional Islamic trend of rejecting the modern world.
He said the only way to counter this trend "is to do what
you've been doing -- remove the regime" and engage democratic
forces. He agreed with the Ambassador's comment that
encouraging democracy involves more than supporting free
elections, and requires support for democratic institutions
and civil rights. In response to the DCM's query, Netanyahu
assessed that it is not possible to resolve the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict apart from the larger problem of
Islamic fundamentalism because, he claimed, the Palestinians
will not be satisfied with recognizing the 1967 borders. The
Palestinians' "real grievance" against Israel, Netanyahu
claimed, is Jaffa and Akko.

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Hamas is in Israel
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6. (C) Netanyahu warned of the threat posed by Hamas within
Israel. The Ambassador asked about plans for development in
the Negev and Galilee that could benefit Israeli Arabs, who
Netanyahu had alleged are vulnerable to recruitment by Hamas
elements. Netanyahu said he supports "weaning" the Israeli
Arabs away from a "culture of dependence." He advocated
strengthening free markets and cutting child allowances,
which, he claimed, serve only to keep Israeli Arabs as well
as ultra-Orthodox Jews in a poverty trap. Israeli Arabs
would then move to a higher economic status and would not be
as susceptible to radicalization, he said. Netanyahu
stressed that providing jobs to the Israeli-Arab sector is
even more important than improving their educational system,
since jobs provide immediate benefits. "I refuse to look at
any Israeli citizen -- Jew or Arab -- as a welfare case,"
Netanyahu asserted.

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Economics -- Bibi at his Best
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7. (C) Noting that he would like to turn to what he termed
the other issue close to his heart, Netanyahu began a long
monologue on how he helped bring strong growth to the Israeli
economy during the some three years that he served as finance
minister under PM Sharon. He said that growth at six or
seven percent annually can continue only if his free market
polices are maintained. He said he would also change
Israel's policy of maintaining 93 percent of its land as
public land, open only to long-term lease, not to private
purchase. In response to the Ambassador's query, Netanyahu
said an unraveling of his policies had started as soon as he
left the finance ministry, and continues. He said that the
voters do not understand what he had been trying to do.
Netanyahu emphatically denied press reports that he had
publicly apologized for having implemented economic measures
that may have hurt certain sectors.

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Bio Note
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8. (C) Netanyahu met the Ambassador and DCM March 22 at his
personal office in Tel Aviv, which was abuzz with campaign
strategists and assistants, and decorated with Likud campaign
literature and whiteboards scribbled with diagrams, arrows,
and numbers. In contrast to the surrounding commotion, Bibi
appeared calm and in control, spoke in a soft, confidential
tone, and was impeccably dressed.

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