SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ)

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 000333

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/WHA, S/CT, AND WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2016
TAGS: ASEC KSAC PGOV HO
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ)

REF: A. SECSTATE 17684

B. 05 TEGUCIGALPA 00557

C. 05 TEGUCIGALPA 767

D. 05 TEGUCIGALPA 1859

E. TEGUCIGALPA 0288

F. TEGUCIGALPA 0104

Classified By: CDA JAMES WILLIARD Reason 1.4 (C) and (D).


1. (U) The following responses are keyed to the Security
Environment Profile Questionnaire (reftel A).

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POLITICAL VIOLENCE
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1. (SBU) Demonstrations:

(A.) Yes. Additionally, there are a number of organizations
and groups under the loose collective leadership of (and
affiliated with) the Bloque Popular that have been carrying
out demonstrations against U.S. foreign policy, as well as
demonstrations targeting local issues. The following
organizations have been involved in anti-American political
activities to varying degrees. They are listed in
alphabetical order, utilizing Spanish acronyms where
applicable. Post notes that the majority of those
organizations are left-leaning NGOs or unions, many of whom
maintain good relations with the Embassy. (List updated
February 2006):

- ARTISTAS DE LA UNAH

Artists of the National Autonomous University of Honduras
(A-UNAH)

- BLOQUE POPULAR
Popular Block

- COCOH
Farmers' Cooperatives Union

- CODECOH
Honduran Consumer Protection Committee

- CODEH
Honduran Committee for Human Rights

- COFADEH
Honduran Committee of Family Members of the Detained and
Disappeared

- COHAPAZ
Honduran Committee for Action for Peace

- COLPROSUMAH
Honduran Professional Teachers College (a teachers' union)

- COMPA-H
People of the Americas Convergence Movement (COMPA)-Honduras

- COPEMH
Honduran Association of Secondary School Teachers

- COPINH
Civic Council of Popular Organizations and Indigenous Groups
of Honduras (also appears as COPIN)

- COPRUMH
Honduran Professional Association Teachers' Union

- CGT
General Workers Central (the largest of Honduras' three
national labor confederations)

- CTH
Confederation of Honduran Workers (arguably, the strongest of
the three national labor confederations)

- CUTH
United Confederation of Honduran Workers (the most left of
the three national labor confederations)

- FPR
Popular Revolution Forces, a shadowy alleged revolutionary
group.

- FUTH
United Federation of Honduran Workers (the largest component
of CUTH, above)

- FSM
Feminist Movement (details needed)

- FUR
University Revolutionary Front

- GRUPO LOS NECIOS DE LA UNAH
UNAH Fools Group - Activist group in UNAH that "cheerleads"
and motivates demos

- MEH
Honduran Student Movement

- PARTIDO DE LOS TRABAJADORES DE LA FACULTAD DE PEDAGOGIA DE
LA UNAH
Teaching Faculty Workers' Party of UNAH

- RADIO GUALCHO
Leftist/Activist radio station (1510Mhz) that works closely
with Bloque Popular and is actively involved in most
demonstrations

- REPRESENTANTE DE FRENTE Y REFORMA DE LA UNAH
Reform Front Representative of UNAH

- SERUNAH
New UNAH coalition group, like Bloque Popular (but not as
prominent)

- SITRAINFOP
National Institute of Professional Formation Workers' Union

- SITRAINA
National Agrarian Institute Workers' Union

- SITRAIHSS
Institute of Social Security Workers' Union

- SITRAUNAH
UNAH Workers' Union

- SITRAUPEN
A Workers' Union (details needed)

- STIBYS
Beverage and Associated Industries Workers' Union (plays a
key organizing and logistics role for many demos)- Leader of
STIBYS is also the leader of the Popular Block.

- SITRAPANI
Child Welfare Association Workers' Union

- UD
Democratic Unification Party (remnants of the Communist Party
of Honduras and other former Marxist parties; represented in
the National Congress)

- UNAH
National Autonomous University of Honduras

- URP
Revolutionary People's Union

NOTE: The most fervent anti-U.S. groups are: MEH, URP, UD,
Bloque Popular, STIBYS, COPINH, and COMPA-H. The following
groups have committed and participated in acts of political
vandalism (against the Honduran Government and other
entities) that resulted in the destruction of public and
private property: Bloque Popular, COPINH, Democratic
Unification Party (UD),and The Revolutionary People's Union
(URP).

(B.) Yes. There have been approximately 31 demonstrations in
Tegucigalpa since February 2005, including 7 demonstrations
either held outside or near the U.S. Embassy. However, most
demonstrations are not directed against the U.S. Government,
although some are convoked to protest against U.S. foreign
policy initiators, such as the ongoing war in Iraq or the
Central American Free Trade Agreement.

(C.) Roughly 25 percent of the demonstrations noted above
have taken place near U.S. Mission facilities. There have
been no demonstrations in front of the U.S. Embassy during
the last six months.

(D.) The size of demonstrations at the Embassy, when they do
occur, varies from twenty to over three hundred
participants. The larger demos usually consist of supporters
from six to more than twelve different organizations, which
operate as a loosely structured coalition under the guidance
of Bloque Popular.

(E.) Over the most recent months, and largely due to
expectations of a new liberal party government to "right past
wrongs", the focus of demonstrations has been shifting back
towards unresolved domestic issues: civil service salaries,
privatization, gasoline prices, and public transportation.
Objections to U.S. foreign policy still trigger
demonstrations, mainly over the Central American Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA) as well as ongoing U.S. actions in Iraq and
previous U.S. involvement in Venezuela and Haiti. The
following statements, demands, and gestures have been made
repeatedly during past demos at the Embassy: No to war in
Iraq, No to war, Stop Plan Colombia, Pro-Human rights, World
Peace, Stop Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA),
U.S. Forces out of Honduras (Soto Cano AB),U.S. Military out
of Cuba, U.S. destroy your WMD, Stop intervention in
Venezuela, Stop Standard Fruit from exploiting the indigenous
people, Opposition to CAFTA, No to privatization, Stop
intervention in Haiti.

The following is a summary of some demonstrations triggered
by both U.S foreign policy initiatives and local issues:

-- On March 8, 2005, several groups protested against the
CAFTA resolution which was passed by the Honduran Congress on
March 3 (reftel B).
-- On April 8, the Honduran public sector unions protested
against alleged back pay, and the Honduran police used water
and tear gas to break up the crowd (reftel C).
-- On May 11, approximately 150 people from the Consejo
Civico de Organizaciones Populares e Inigenas de Honduras
(COPINH) and the Bloque Popular again protested against
CAFTA.
-- On September 7 and 8, protesters comprised of mainly
public transportation (taxi) drivers blocked streets in
protest against an increase in gasoline and other basic
products. Access and egress from the main airport in
Tegucigalpa were shut-off for approximately 14 hours (reftel
D).
-- On January 19, 2006, approximately 600 people from various
worker's unions, supported by the Bloque Poplular, gathered
in front of the Congress to protest the privatization of the
national telephone company, Hondutel, and to protest against
CAFTA.
--On February 14, 2006 a thousand protesters from the
Honduran Unitary Federation of Workers (FUTH) blocked roads
near the Honduran Presidential Palace. The workers were
protesting the possible dismissal of large numbers of the
public sector workforce by the new ZELAYA ADMINISTRATION,
both for reductions in staff of government offices and the
traditional replacement of politically appointed personnel,
even in the lower ranks of government (reftel E).
--On February 16, 2006, approximately 600 protesters from
FUTH marched to the National Congress building to again
protest the dismissal of public workers.

(F.) Generally peaceful, but demonstrators have burned U.S.
flags and thrown rocks.

(G.) N/A.

(H.) N/A.

(I.) Yes.

(J.) Yes. Occasionally they will pass by the Embassy.

(K.) The average size varies from 200-1000 people.

(L.) Generally peaceful, but fences, grillwork, and windows
have been destroyed near the National Congress, as well as
many tires burned. At times, suspected plain-clothes police
have been held and beaten by hard-core protesters within the
demonstrations.

On occasions, small groups of thug-like cadre have
initiated/instigated violence against static police guards by
attempting to strike them in the lower leg areas, which are
not protected by riot shields with heavy placard poles with
large nails embedded in the ends. Several police officials
have been injured in unsuccessful attempts to get the police
to use force.

(M.) N/A.

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2. (SBU) Macro Conflict Conditions:
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(A.) No.

(B.) N/A.

(C.) N/A.

(D.) N/A.

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3. (C) Host Country Capabilities:
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(A.) No.

Police are somewhat mediocre in professionalism and training;
they are also somewhat apathetic toward post residential
security requirements, including response to alarms and
investigation of incidents in Mission neighborhoods; they
have definite resource/manpower limitations that inhibit
their deterrence or response effectiveness.

The National Preventive Police and Criminal Investigations
Directorate General (DGIC). Both departments suffer from a
lack of manpower, training, equipment, low pay, and
motivation. Honduras has the lowest per capita ratio of
police in Latin America. They lack the capital to purchase
and maintain vehicles (including gas) and radio equipment.
There is no standard service weapon. Despite numerous
training programs and efforts by many nations, including the
U.S., the DGIC is lacking in morale, leadership, and
resources. In numerous traffic accidents involving Mission
personnel, the response time has exceeded several hours by
the transit police. The courts, prosecutors, and police are
extremely susceptible to bribery and influence, causing
reversals in judgments against the Embassy. Terminations
have been numerous for both political as well as criminal
reasons and extend beyond positions normally considered
political appointees. In other cases, certain high-ranking
police cannot be terminated for technical reason. Morale
and integrity in the DGIC is seen as low. It remains to be
seen whether the existing conditions will improve or decline
with the newly elected Liberal Party government. President
Manuel "Mel" Zelaya was inaugurated on January 27, 2006 to
serve a constitutionally-mandated maximum term of four years.

(B.) Yes. Training by U.S. Border Patrol Tactical (BorTac)
teams is good, but GOH security infrastructure needs major
improvements.

(C.) Yes. Corruption is widespread throughout almost all
agencies within the GOH, including the national law
enforcement departments. Corruption is especially rampant
within the Honduran Immigration system. Most recently, RSO
has been working in conjunction with Department of Homeland
Security (DHS),in the investigation of an ongoing smuggling
ring involving immigration officials from Guatemala and
Honduras. This ring is smuggling Brazilian nationals from
Sao Paulo to the United States. Recently, one group of
Brazilians were detained by Honduran officials and they
provided information about how the operation works. RSO and
DHS has learned as many as three Honduran immigration
officials may be involved, a Honduran Frontier Police
Captain, who is not directly involved in this illicit
operation, may be corrupt (reftel F).

(D.) No. However, GOH intelligence units have an
institutional awareness of and a modest capability of
penetrating indigenous radical groups.

(E.) Yes.

(F.) No. (They have almost no capability to detect or
disrupt international terrorist activities).

(G.) Yes.

(H.) Poor. There is widespread corruption within
immigration and customs and a measurable lack of security
coordination within the airport. Physical security is also
inadequate, as the perimeter lacks effective fencing, vehicle
barriers, and lighting.

(I.) Ineffective. Corrupt officials are easily bribed, and
therefore pose a real threat to U.S security interests.
Honduran passports, for example, have been fraudulently
obtained through immigration and customs officials for use by
subjects not legitimately entitled to them.

(J.) Average/Ineffective. A unit within the Ministry of
Public Security called the Frontier Police handles border
patrol duties. The unit is making positive steps towards
border control, but lack of funding and manpower are limiting
the effectiveness of the unit.

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4. (SBU) Indigenous Terrorism-Anti American Terrorist Groups:
-------------- -


(A.) No.

(B.) N/A.

(C.) N/A.

(D.) N/A.

(E.) N/A.

(F.) N/A.

(G.) N/A.

(H.) N/A.

-------------- -

5. (SBU) Other Indigenous Terrorist Groups:
-------------- -


(A.) No.

(B.) N/A.

(C.) N/A.

(D.) N/A.

(E.) N/A.

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6. (C/NF) Transnational Terrorism
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(6-A.) No. However, there are rumors that in the past there
have been Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA),IRA, and
Chiapas (Zapatistas) sympathizers in Honduras who could be
involved in advising indigenous groups. Some Hondurans are
studying in Cuba and also conceivably could be receiving
training in subversion and terrorism, although it is more
likely they are being indoctrinated as agents of influence.
As this Cuban program for Hondurans is in its infancy, there
have been no indications that such training is taking place.

Additionally, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) has a limited presence in Honduras, especially in the
northern coastal areas, where they trade arms for drugs /
drugs for arms. There is evidence that weapons originally
sold to Honduras have been turned-in or seized in Colombia.
Some individuals associated with the FARC, or who have
facilitated arms trafficking from Honduras to Colombia, have
been apprehended in the last year.

(B.) N/A.

(C.) N/A.

(D.) N/A and No.

(E.) N/A.

(F.) The only known hostile intelligence presence of note is
Cuban. While the Cuban mission appears to have extensive
contacts with leftists and indigenous groups, there is no
indication they are planning or supporting terrorism.
Likewise, while there is concern over alleged Venezuelan
contact with and possible funding of Leftist organizations,
there is no indication that they are planning or supporting
terrorism.

(G.) There is no shortage of weapons in Honduras. It would
also not be difficult for hostile terrorist elements to
import weapons and/or explosives from neighboring countries.
Ford