HONDURAN IMMIGRATION: THE PROBLEMS PERSIST, BUT

UNCLAS TEGUCIGALPA 000268

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/PPC, PRM, AND INL/LP
STATE FOR CA/VO, CA/FPP, AND S/CT
STATE FOR DS/DSS/OSAC, DS/DSS/CC, AND DS/IP/WHA

E.O. 12958:N/A
TAGS: SMIG PGOV PREL ETRD PINS KCRM KJUS ASEC HO
SUBJECT: HONDURAN IMMIGRATION: THE PROBLEMS PERSIST, BUT
WITH A ROADMAP FOR ZELAYA ADMINISTRATION TO REFORM



1. (SBU) Summary. Post worked closely with the outgoing
Maduro Administration during its final months in office to
both urge and assist reform of the Honduran immigration
service. Post has presented the GOH with solid evidence of
ongoing corruption in the immigration service that is
directly abetting illegal migration to the United States.
Despite consistent GOH statements in support of reform, they
took no concrete steps. An independent commission
established by President Maduro to assess and recommend next
steps prepared and delivered to President Maduro a report
that details weaknesses in the current system and outlines
reform proposals. The new Zelaya Administration has
indicated interest in the issue; it remains unclear how or
when it will begin to put that interest into action. End
summary.

Corruption at Immigration - A Decades Old Problem
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2. (SBU) The GOH immigration service has been a consistent
source of scandal since at least the early 1990's scandals
surrounding the sale of Honduran passports to mainland
Chinese seeking an easy route to the United States. The
root of the problems in immigration, as in so many other
areas in Honduras, is corruption. Efforts to strengthen
systems or introduce secure documents over the years have
been frustrated by persistent, pervasive self-interest, from
the lowest clerks to the Director and even higher.
Following the mid-2005 criminal raids and investigations of
the immigration service, the senior leadership was fired and
briefly jailed. The GOH still has a pending criminal case
against the former immigration director and post continues
to urge a vigorous prosecution, though with limited
expectations that anyone will serve any significant prison
time for the fraudulent sale of Honduran passports. An
outsider, a lawyer with a reputation for probity but no
practical experience, was brought in to run the agency. He
lasted about two months before he resigned in the midst of a
flurry of news stories when he labeled the agency a "gold
mine" of corruption. A placeholder who was labeled
"incompetent" by his minister-level boss has held the job
since then.

The Embassy Seeks to Drive the Reform Effort Through the
Election Season
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3. (SBU) Faced with this thicket of problems and recognizing
the threat to U.S. national security from a near neighbor
that issues passports without meaningful controls, Embassy
sections and agencies including DHS/ICE, POL, RSO, and CONS
began working together to propose specific reforms for the
service. In August 2005, post issued a press release
expressing disappointment at developments in the criminal
cases arising out of the earlier raids at Immigration. This
prompted a strong verbal confrontation between the then
Minister of the Presidency, Ramon Medina Luna, and the
Charge. In September and October 2005, then Minister of
Government Roberto Pacheco, whose ministry is responsible
for passports, residencies, and other immigration matters,
repeatedly told Embassy officers, including the Ambassador,
that he had been instructed by President Maduro to seek our
advice and to do anything we asked. Many in the Embassy
thought Pacheco, and perhaps Maduro, were merely seeking to
avoid more negative headlines before the close-fought
November 27 presidential elections.


4. (SBU) On October 26, we proposed to Pacheco three areas
for reform:


A. Strengthen and better protect immigration's databases to
deter, or even prevent, corrupt manipulation. Create a
tracking system that would record every action regarding
passport and residence records to assist later
investigations. Install an automated entry/exit stamp
system to minimize opportunities for the corrupt sale of
backdated stamps.


B. Create an internal affairs investigative unit, to work
jointly with an Embassy-vetted police unit and the Organized
Crime Prosecutor's office. Restrict access by document
fixers to the immigration services offices.


C. Establish position descriptions and minimum skill
requirements for immigration service employees, and ensure
employees meet those requirements. Improve salaries to
reduce incentives to corruption.

In his November 17 reply to our letter, Minister of
Government Pacheco accepted substantially all of our
proposals.


5. (SBU) In mid-October, President Maduro ordered the
creation of a Commission on Ethics and Transparency (CET) as
a sub-part of the National Anti-Corruption Commission and
directed them to report to him 45 days later, i.e. shortly
after the election. Those who thought the CET was little
more than a fig leaf to suppress scandals until after the
November 27 elections apparently underestimated them. On
December 7, the CET briefed the Ambassador and others on
substantial problems they had uncovered in the databases and
other systems at Immigration. They reported that what had
been previously presented to us and to the Honduran public
as advances in systems security and in biometric data
collection were, in fact, steps backward. For example, the
GOH's publicly touted biometrics collection system, which
collects photos and fingerprints at the major international
airports and several land borders, is not connected to a
central database. The data remains isolated at the
collection point.

The Commission's Report and the Road Ahead
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6. (SBU) The CET reported to President Maduro in early
January 2006 and proposed reforms in five strategic areas:

Organizational Restructuring
Administrative Processes
System of Ethics and Institutional Transparency
Anti-Corruption Systems
Modernization of Applicable Laws

Post believes the CET report provides a good summary of the
existing problems in the Immigration Service and a road map
for its reform. The question now is whether the political
will exists in the new Zelaya Administration to realize this
possibility. Some weaknesses could be resolved through
administrative improvements, but others -- such as low wages
and limited professional training -- will require the Zelaya
Administration to find new resources.


7. (U) Despite receiving the CET report in early December,
Maduro left office on January 27 without taking any steps to
implement the CET's recommendations or otherwise reform
immigration. Worse still, the GOH has apparently held the
CET's report private so there has been no public pressure to
move forward with reform. Indeed, the director of
immigration told the CG on February 7 that he had not seen
the report.


8. (SBU) Post began raising immigration reform with the
Zelaya administration during the transition and key figures
such as the new Minister of Government, Jorge Arturo Reina,
indicated an awareness of the problem and our concern about
it. It remains unclear, however, where responsibility for
immigration will lie in the new government. The Ambassador
has told senior GOH officials, including President Zelaya,
that he has doubts about the suitability of Minister Reina
to head reform efforts. On February 2, President Zelaya
told the Ambassador and FM Milton Jimenez that he would move
the function from the Ministry of Government to the MFA. On
February 6, FM Jimenez told the Ambassador that President
Zelaya had asked him and Minister of the Presidency
Rosenthal to advise Reina of the change. Post will continue
to press the new GOH to face this threat to U.S. national
security.

Ford