Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TASHKENT1562
2006-08-11 12:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tashkent
Cable title:  

UZBEKISTAN'S KARIMOV THREATENED BY MILITANT ISLAM

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM UZ 
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O 111259Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6257
INFO AMEMBASSY ALMATY 
AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT 
AMEMBASSY BISHKEK 
AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 
AMEMBASSY KABUL 
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
DEA HQS WASHDC
HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001562 


DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN'S KARIMOV THREATENED BY MILITANT ISLAM
AND DEMOCRACY

Classified By: AMB. JON R. PURNELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)(D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L TASHKENT 001562


DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN'S KARIMOV THREATENED BY MILITANT ISLAM
AND DEMOCRACY

Classified By: AMB. JON R. PURNELL FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)(D).


1. (C) Summary: In a marathon discussion with President
Karimov, Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia
Boucher pressed Karimov to live up to the promise that
U.S.-Uzbek bilateral relations once held. Karimov welcomed
the effort at dialogue, but said that a lack of trust is at
the heart of bilateral problems. Initial euphoria
surrounding relations with the U.S. led to "nothing".
Uzbekistan, he said, is under attack from militant Islam.
He nonetheless agreed that there are important areas in which
we should work to develop cooperation. Boucher laid out
for him the steps Uzbekistan must take to achieve that:
normal Embassy operations, and respect for our implementing
partners and civil society. End summary.

-------------- --------------
REVIVING BILATERAL DIALOGUE
-------------- --------------


2. (C) SCA A/S Richard Boucher, accompanied by Ambassador and
senior adviser Hayden, met with President Islom Karimov for
two-and-one-half hours August 9. Newly appointed FM Vladimir
Norov and veteran Deputy National Security Adviser
Rakhmankulov were also present. Karimov welcomed A/S
Boucher's visit, saying that an open exchange of views was
the best approach to resolving outstanding issues.
Development of U.S.-Uzbek relations was in both nations'
interest, he said. Any worsening in those relations would
create problems for Uzbekistan's future and would play into
the hands of third parties.


3. (C) A/S Boucher recalled his earlier visits to Uzbekistan
with Secretaries Powell and Albright, and reminded the
President of the promise that once characterized bilateral
relations. Our new chancery in Tashkent, he said, was a
potent symbol of the optimism of those years. As Uzbekistan
celebrates its fifteenth anniversary of independence, the
basic elements of our strategic partnership are still
important and can serve as a basis for future cooperation.


4. (C) At the same time, noted A/S Boucher, the level of
bilateral cooperation has declined. The U.S., he stressed,
is not in the region to overthrow governments or push other
nations out of the region. It is true, he continued, that
the U.S. and Uzbekistan have different views about what

happened in Andijon last year and on the human rights
situation in general. He had not come to Tashkent, however,
with the intention of arguing about these differences.
Rather, his primary focus was to look for a way of moving
ahead. At the same time, support for human rights was an
essential component of U.S. policy, and we would need to find
a way to address these issues. (Comment: A/S Boucher
pursued this theme further with FM Norov over dinner. The
latter agreed that human rights could and should be part of
our dialogue. He recalled that we made tangible progress in
this area in 2004 when he was First Deputy FM. End comment.)
A/S Boucher said he saw several areas in which he thought
the U.S. and Uzbekistan could work together effectively.
They included cooperation against terrorism and drug
trafficking; economic development to benefit the Uzbek
people; and building a healthy, modern society in Uzbekistan.


5. (C) It is regrettable, said A/S Boucher, that so much bad
information about the U.S. is circulating in the press and
among the public here. We know who is responsible for such
disinformation. Secretary Rice personally requested that he
convey to the President that the U.S. wants to work with
Uzbekistan to improve relations, make the region safer and
improve the well being of the Uzbek people. U.S. policy
continues to be based on support for Uzbek independence. Any
nation's independence is more secure when it has multiple
options for pursuing its development.

--------------
UZBEKISTAN UNDER ATTACK
--------------


6. (C) Before responding directly to A/S Boucher's comments,
Karimov offered some insights into how he sees Uzbekistan's
situation in the world today. Uzbekistan, he said, is an
integral part of the extremely diverse Muslim world. Despite
this great diversity, fundamental links exist that facilitate
communication and understanding among all Muslim peoples,
whether in the Middle East, Africa, Europe or Asia. In
recent years a dangerous misunderstanding has arisen between
the U.S. and the Muslim world. Today we are faced with a
virtual war between the Christian and Muslim worlds. There
is also a major struggle going on within the Muslim world,
which Karimov characterized as enlightened Islam versus
totalitarian or militant Islam.


7. (C) It is important for the U.S. that enlightened Islam
win out. According to Karimov, however, U.S. policy in the
Middle East has played into the hands of militant Islam, he
said. By promoting democracy in the region, the U.S. helped
create the conditions for Hamas and Hezbollah to succeed.
Uzbekistan became a target for attack by militant Islam when
it gained independence, and remains one to this day. "We are
no different from Lebanon or Palestine," he said. If the GOU
were to drop its vigilance, we would see militant Islam gain
control of all the Central Asian states inside of three
months. Uzbekistan, he said, is not against democracy, but
is not ready for it. If it is introduced too quickly, the
result will be the same as in Lebanon or Palestine. At the
same time, Karimov said he understands exactly what the U.S.
means when it talks about democracy and human rights. He
does not have a different approach to or understanding of
human rights, and he understands that they are key to
democracy. The day will come when Uzbekistan is ready for
democracy and human rights, but it would be a mistake to
"impose" them prematurely.

--------------
EUPHORIA AND TRUST GONE
--------------


8. (C) Uzbekistan, he said, had always been something of a
soft "buffer zone" for Russia when it was part of the USSR.
The Russians, however, never understood the Uzbek mentality.
When independence came, there was a period of euphoria.
Uzbeks did not understand that freedom alone was not enough,
that they had to develop their economic independence as well.
Today there is a more sober view: economic cooperation is
more important than political cooperation. Politics, he
said, is the concentrated expression of the economy. Had the
U.S. moved quickly to establish a key position in the Uzbek
economy, we probably would not have seen a cooling in
relations. He also lamented that the U.S. had not supported
his 2003 request that the World Bank set up a billion dollar
credit line to help Uzbekistan achieve currency
convertibility.


9. (C) Turning to the bilateral relationship, Karimov
described himself as a pragmatist who wants to look forward
and improve U.S.-Uzbek ties. Several factors, however, had
led to a downturn in relations: a non-objective, inadequate
analysis of what happened in Andijon; U.S. efforts to
cooperate with certain religious groups and tolerate Hizb
ut-Tahrir; an unprecedented information war against
Uzbekistan; and efforts to create an image of Uzbekistan as
an authoritarian totalitarian state and isolate it in the
international arena. As a result, we have lost mutual trust,
and third countries benefit from the downturn in relations.
He went on to identify several areas in which we should try
to reestablish dialogue and cooperation: counter-terrorism,
counter-narcotics and counter-proliferation; border security
and customs; military training and cooperation; economics and
investment; developing civil institutions, democracy and
market reforms; and humanitarian cooperation in areas such as
health and education.

--------------
VIEWS ON AFGHANISTAN
--------------


10. (C) Changing direction, Karimov offered his views on
developments in Afghanistan, explaining that he is "not an
optimist" with regard to the country's future. Poverty and
unemployment, he said, are not decreasing in Afghanistan, and
social conditions are getting worse, despite significant
international assistance, because of corruption in the
central government. As a result, people do not trust the
government in Kabul. The Taliban are winning the information
war, and a purely military victory there is impossible, as
the Soviet Union found out. Pakistan can play a key role in
bringing stability to Afghanistan, and President Musharraf is
best placed to help. Any change of leadership in Pakistan
would be counterproductive in relation to Afghanistan.


11. (C) A/S Boucher said he agreed with Karimov that military
operations alone could not bring peace and stability to
Afghanistan. Confronting terrorists and drug barons requires
force, but ultimately the challenge is to extend good
government to all the people of Afghanistan. He also
concurred that Pakistan has a crucial role to play in the
region and the U.S. actively supports President Musharraf's
efforts.

-------------- --------------
BUILDING NEW BILATERAL RELATIONS
-------------- --------------


12. (C) Bringing Karimov back into focus on bilateral
relations, A/S Boucher suggested postponing further
discussion of Middle East issues until a future meeting. He
noted that his own list of areas for future cooperation was
quite similar to Karimov's. But to carry out any meaningful
joint work the U.S. would need visas to staff our Embassy in
a normal manner, an end to harassment of our NGO partners,
the ability to implement education programs, an end to
shutting down civil society groups, an end to pressure on
U.S. companies and improvements in the business climate. If
we can make progress in these areas we can begin to fulfill
the promise inherent in our strategic partnership agreement.
If not, then both sides will likely make decisions that will
further restrict our relations. Our cooperation would be
good for the independence of Uzbekistan, stability in
Afghanistan and for the region as a whole.


13. (C) Karimov said that, in principle, he agreed with A/S
Boucher's conclusion. He used the latter's reference to
visas, however, to launch into a diatribe against the
Embassy, claiming that Embassy personnel have maintained
inappropriate contacts and interfered in Uzbekistan's
internal affairs. He leveled similar criticisms at U.S.
NGOs, charging that they are funding political activities in
Uzbekistan. All NGOs, he said, must respect Uzbek law and
refrain from funding political activities. He added,
however, that he had no plans to expel diplomats, as he knew
they were carrying out instructions. He hinted at a way out
of the current visa impasse by suggesting that if we provided
the MFA with the number of diplomats we need at the Embassy,
he would see that they got visas. The number, however, must
be firm.

--------------
LINKING VISION AND REALITY
--------------


14. (C) Changing gears, Karimov spoke of his "vision" for
Uzbekistan, saying that he wants to see a strong political
opposition and free press in the country (sic). He wants
Uzbek youth to have the same values as American youth. He
urged the U.S. to work with Uzbek youth, not the fringes of
society. When A/S Boucher pointed out the obvious
contradiction between this vision and the Uzbek decision to
close NGOs that implement U.S. education exchanges, Karimov
said that IREX had broken Uzbek law by recruiting students
without first having a bilateral agreement with the
government. He said that if relations continue to
deteriorate, education exchanges will suffer even further.


15. (C) Karimov concluded by stressing that a lack of trust
lay at the heart of our bilateral difficulties. He chided
the U.S. for allegedly searching for "a regional leader."
(Comment: A clear reference to Kazakhstan President
Nazarbayev. End comment.) Such a search, he said, is
counterproductive and harmful. Kazakhstan, he said, is not
even part of Central Asia. To think of it as a locomotive
for the region is counterproductive.


16. (C) Closing on a positive note, A/S Boucher reiterated
the importance of making progress in areas of immediate,
practical interest as a first step in rebuilding trust.
Karimov agreed that this should be our approach. He said he
saw the discussion as the beginning of a positive dialogue.


17. (C) COMMENT: The presentation, often contradictory and
self serving, was vintage Karimov. Even as he professes to
share U.S. values and vision for the region, he is actively
cutting back the U.S. presence here. He steadfastly
maintains that U.S. policies and actions undermine his
position and are responsible for the downturn in bilateral
relations. While he suggested some flexibility on our
immediate visa problems, he offered no olive branches in
relation to NGOs and civil society. That said, some areas of
cooperation remain active (e.g., border controls,
non-proliferation, health, etc.). It could be that with a
growing Russian presence here Karimov will decide that it is
now time to revive his relations with the U.S. It may also
be that that will have to wait until he is safely beyond the
2007 presidential elections.


PURNELL