Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TALLINN767
2006-08-23 13:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tallinn
Cable title:  

INOPERABILITY PROBLEMS ENDANGER ESTONIAN MISSIONS

Tags:  MARR MOPS PREL AF IZ EN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0033
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTL #0767 2351358
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231358Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY TALLINN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8942
INFO RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 1125
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L TALLINN 000767 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2016
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL AF IZ EN
SUBJECT: INOPERABILITY PROBLEMS ENDANGER ESTONIAN MISSIONS
IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: CDA Jeff Goldstein for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L TALLINN 000767

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2016
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL AF IZ EN
SUBJECT: INOPERABILITY PROBLEMS ENDANGER ESTONIAN MISSIONS
IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: CDA Jeff Goldstein for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)


1. (C) This is an action request, please see para 6.


2. (C) Summary: The lack of interoperability between
U.S., UK, and Estonian jamming devices used against
improvised explosive devices (IED) in Afghanistan and
Iraq has created a dangerous force protection situation
that could potentially derail Estonia?s military presence
in Iraq and Afghanistan. End Summary.


3. (C) According to Taimar Peterkop, MOD Director for
Operations, in May, an IED exploded underneath an EDF
vehicle while it was on patrol with U.S. troops outside
of Baghdad. An Estonian officer who was driving ahead of
his unit with the lead U.S. convoy vehicle noticed the
IED. However, his Motorola radio was jammed by the U.S.
WARLOCK jamming equipment U.S. soldiers routinely use,
and he was unable to warn his unit. While the U.S.
vehicles passed the IED safely the EDF vehicle did not.
Fortunately, the recently upgraded vehicle absorbed both
the explosive force and shrapnel, preventing any
casualties. Major Stan Reimann, EDF J3-Current
Operations, told us that Estonian commanders in Iraq
believe the WARLOCK may have inadvertently also jammed
the EDF's own jamming equipment, IRIS. The
interoperability problem persists in both Iraq and
Afghanistan, forcing EDF forces to switch off their IRIS
equipment when working with U.S. and UK troops.


4. (C) Given Estonia's small size, an IED explosion
resulting in multiple fatalities could easily cause a
significant public backlash. The impact would be
multiplied if it turned out that problems such as those
experienced in May contributed. This could force the GOE
to reconsider its troop deployments in Iraq and
Afghanistan. As EDF forces operate in frontline missions
in Baghdad and Helmand Province, multiple fatalities from
IEDs are a real possibility.


5. (C) In several meetings between Emboffs and MOD and
MFA officials, the GOE has informally asked our
assistance in finding a long term solution to the
interoperability problem. They are very uncomfortable
with the ad hoc approach Estonian soldiers are forced to
employ on the ground. GOE officials suggested two ways
to deal with the issue: First, the U.S. and UK could
provide regular updates on the frequencies terrorists use
in Iraq and Afghanistan so that EDF can update its IRIS
system; and, second, U.S. forces could provide the EDF
with WARLOCK's frequencies so that EDF radios and IRIS
can be set to operate on different frequencies. To date,
the MOD has not requested the WARLOCK equipment. (Note:
The interoperability problem between IRIS and WARLOCK
could extend beyond the EDF, as Poland, Lithuania, and
the Netherlands have approached the GOE about procuring
the IRIS system.)


6. (C) Action Request: Given the security sensitivities
and regulations regarding U.S. military frequencies, Post
seeks interagency guidance on how to respond to the GOE's
requests.
GOLDSTEIN